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How do people behave when confronted with uncertainty and violence?  This 
dissertation examines how Central American migrants cope with escalating violence 
in transit and how these coping tactics reshape the social landscape of transnational 
routes. From villages in El Salvador into Mexico and through the United States, the 
sustained practice of migration informs behavior along a dangerous route, not only 
through social networks, but also by carving a transit political economy and 
transnational imaginary. Migration decisions are rational, but must be viewed as an 
ongoing process of learning constituted by information gathering, imagination and 
improvisation en route. As people move along these routes, migrants and citizens 
improvise new identities, shifting national, racial and gendered boundaries. The 
ethnographic framework of this dissertation elucidates the implications of this process 
for the governance of states through which transnational flows pass. The attempt to 
impede these flows within the territory of transit states, like Mexico, has not only 
thickened borders and policing; it has extended the social ambiguities and uncertainty 
of the borderlands, inviting the Hobbesian anarchy of the international system into the 
domestic domain of the state. Thus, this dissertation points to how migrants and 
citizens share the catastrophic human security consequences of migration policing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCING THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 
 
Introduction 
 
Man of misery, whose land have I lit on now?   
What are they here- violent, savage, lawless?   
Or friendly to strangers, god-fearing men? 
  --Odysseus1 
 
Tossed by terrible storms onto unchartered coasts where fantastic monsters dwell, 
Odysseus makes his way by coping with great uncertainty. An intrepid and resourceful 
man at the mercy of capricious Gods, he must navigate the “dark wine sea” as it 
undulates in rhythm with divine moods. As he met the challenge of the unknowable and 
the unpredictable, Odysseus, like sailors across the ages, relied on a type of knowledge 
known to the Classical Greeks as ‘metis’: 
…a type of intelligence and of thought, a way of knowing; it implies a complex but 
very coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behavior which combine flair, 
wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, 
opportunism, various skills, and experience acquired over the years.  It is applied to 
situations which are transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous, situations which 
do not lend themselves to precise measurement, exact calculation or rigorous logic 
(Detienne and Vernant 1975, p.3-4). 
 
The utility of metis does not end at landfall.2 On his winding journey, Odysseus 
continually confronts the unknown: encountering strangers, wilderness and a new politics 
                                                        
1 All excerpts from Homer’s The Odyssey come from the 1996 translation by Robert Fagles. 
2 On the range of activities to which metis applies, Detienne and Vernant (1975, p.47-48) 
explain: “This is a cunning intelligence for which hunting and fishing may originally have 
provided the model but which extends far beyond this framework as the figure of Odysseus, 
the human embodiment of metis, in Homer, clearly shows.  There are many activities in which 
man must learn to manipulate hostile forces too powerful to be controlled directly but which 
can be exploited despite themselves, without ever being confronted head on, to implement the 
plan in mind by some unexpected, devious means: they include, for example, the stratagems 
used by the warrior the success of whose attack hinges on surprise, trickery or ambush, the art 
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upon his return home to Ithaca. He relies upon an endless array of stratagems and 
disguises as he negotiates these adventures. They test both his ingenuity and 
determination, and teach him and us that the flip side of endurance is flexibility.3  
The timelessness of Homer’s epic arises from the universality of human adaptability 
and ingenuity in the face of danger. Like the indomitable sailors and merchants who 
trekked beyond the known world in ancient times, contemporary migrants must make 
decisions amidst danger and dynamic uncertainty. It is from this perspective that this 
dissertation examines the decisions and experiences of unauthorized Central American 
migrants. These intrepid and resourceful people live “the adventure story of the twenty-
first century” (Nazario 2007, p.xiv) and often find themselves at the mercy of criminal 
gangs and police, who, like the gods of the ancient Greeks, continually manipulate the 
rules of the game.4 The interplay of violence and evasion structures the migratory route.  
To make their way, migrants must respond with both flexible tactics and an indomitable 
will. To survive, they must endure hardship and draw upon the same constellation of 
strengths possessed by Odysseus: “flair, wisdom, subtlety of mind, deception,                                                                                                                                                                
of the pilot steering his ship against winds and tides, the verbal ploys of the sophist making the 
adversary’s powerful argument recoil against him, the skill of the banker and the merchant 
who, like conjurors, make a great deal of money out of nothing, the knowing forethought of 
the politician whose flair enables him to assess the uncertain course of events in advance, and 
the sleights of hand and trade secrets which give craftsmen their control over material which is 
always more or less intractable to their designs.  It is over all such activities that metis 
presides.” 
3 In his analysis of the ‘practical intelligence’ of Odysseus, Jeffrey Barnouw (2004, p.21-26) 
emphasizes the duality of being “wily yet single minded.”  Determination and craftiness are 
inextricably intertwined. 
4 Peter Andreas (2000) famously describes U.S.-Mexico border crossing as a ‘game’, 
highlighting the ritualistic aspect of repeated crossing attempts.  The stakes of this terrible 
game have increased asymmetrically since the mid-1990s with migrants either receiving long 
prison terms if they are caught or dying during the journey.  While there are ritualistic 
components in unauthorized migration (these will be explored in depth in this dissertation), 
the rules also shift unpredictably. 
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resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various skills and experience acquired over the 
years” (Detienne and Vernant 1975, p.3).      
Drawing on the concept of metis, this dissertation describes how practices of 
information, imagination and improvisation construct a ‘mobile knowledge’ of 
transnational migratory routes in North America. Migrants are rational, but they must 
solve an almost impossibly complex problem under conditions of extremely imperfect 
information in which uncertainty is exacerbated by clandestine activities. The migrants 
respond by embedding their decisions in a mobile culture constructed during the journey 
itself; they are informed by a ‘mobile knowledge’ that they create. The fluidity of the 
social reality they construct accounts for the durability of migration flows despite intense 
suffering and criminal predation. This process has broader implications for the 
governance of transnational routes.  
Uncertain Journeys 
In what way is the journey ‘uncertain’? While risk is the probability of a danger and 
its potential harm, uncertainty characterizes a dangerous situation without a known 
probability (Knight 1921).5 A consensus of scholars, journalists and migrants suggests 
that the journey from Central America to the United States has become much more 
dangerous in the last two decades.6 Both risk and uncertainty are on the rise along the 
route.7 Bandits, corrupt officials and unscrupulous smugglers have robbed and raped 
                                                        
5 On the difference between risk and uncertainty, see Mark Blyth (2006), John Maynard 
Keynes (1921), F. H. Knight (1921), and Anthony Giddens (1999).   
6 For sustained journalistic accounts of the dangerous journey from Central America to 
Mexico see Oscar Martinez (2010) and Sonia Nazario (2007).    
7 Wayne Cornelius (2007, p.11) documents an increased awareness of the dangers of the 
journey among Mexican migrants: “Eight out of ten thought that it is much more dangerous to 
cross the border without papers today, and nearly two-thirds of our interviewees personally 
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migrants ever since people began to transit through Mexican territory en route to the 
United States (Frelick 1991).  But, in the last decade, even more serious dangers, such as 
organized mass kidnappings in which the victims are systematically tortured to extort 
money from their U.S.-based relatives, have emerged (Amnesty International 2010; 
CIDH 2010). The National Human Rights Commission of Mexico (CNDH 2009) 
estimates that, between September 2008 and February 2009, at least 9,758 migrants were 
kidnapped in Mexico. Between April and September 2010, the CNDH (2011) believes 
that 11,333 migrants fell victim to kidnappings. 
Compounding the growing sense of apprehension about the journey, Central 
American media began reporting crimes along the Mexican routes with greater frequency 
following the end of the civil war period in the 1990s. And the increasing organization 
and severity of this violence came to international attention with the shocking discovery 
of seventy-two corpses of Central and South American migrants in a mass grave in 
Tamaulipas, Mexico in August 2010 (Sanz, Reinolds and Dalton 2010). Mass graves are 
a tragic byproduct of increased territorial competition between drug gangs, their attempt 
to control passage and charge tributes from human smugglers, and the kidnapping 
opportunities that attend the route. Ask any migrant and they will tell you that the journey 
is far more dangerous today than ever before.   
However, knowledge concerning the general context of risk does not give the 
migrants much useful information about migration tactics once the decision to leave has 
been made. Uncertainty along the route has risen because the rules, routines and social                                                                                                                                                                
knew someone who had died trying to enter clandestinely. But for the overwhelming majority 
of potential migrants, such knowledge does not diminish the propensity to go north.”  The 
journey facing Mexican migrants is shorter with fewer uncertainties than confronts Central 
Americans. 
   
  5 
networks that underlie undocumented migration have undergone profound change in the 
wake of both intensified immigration policing (since 2001) and the Mexican drug war 
(since 2006). Nevertheless, Central American migrants continue to leave home, relying 
on their faith and wits to survive.  
Indeed, Central American migration has not slowed as precipitously as Mexican 
migration, despite greater dangers and difficulties during the longer journey from Central 
America. According to the Mexican Migration Project, net Mexican migration slowed to 
zero in 2008 (Massey 2011). Based on American Community Survey (ACS) data, the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimates that the unauthorized Mexican 
population decreased from a peak of 7,030,000 people in 2008 to 6,640,000 people in 
2010 (Hoefer, Rytina and Baker 2011, p.4); that is 390,000 fewer unauthorized Mexican 
migrants living in the United States in two years.  However, the estimated unauthorized 
population of Central Americans in the United States (from El Salvador, Honduras and 
Guatemala alone) increased during that same two-year period from 1,300,000 to 
1,470,000 people (p.4).8 The U.S. Border Patrol intercepted 95,532 Central Americans 
attempting illegal entry in 2012, up from 46,997 migrants captured in 2011, a surge in 
apprehensions that does not appear to be explained by changes in policing at the border 
(Archibald 2013). Therefore, while the overall trend in the United States is toward less 
unauthorized immigration, the decline is largely driven by the slowdown in Mexican 
migration. 
                                                        
8 These findings from Hoefer, Rytina and Baker (2011, p.3) are generally consistent with the 
Pew Hispanic Center estimates based on Current Population Survey (CPS) data (Passel and 
Cohen  2011).  
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For practical purposes, migrants traveling the entire length of Mexico (over 1,000 
miles from southern Mexico to the Texas border following the shortest line) must 
presume that each journey will be unique. Migrants face information constraints, but they 
are not naïve; they know that they do not know what the future holds. ‘Reflexive 
feedback loops’ (Soros 2009 cited in Katzenstein and Nelson 2013) along the migratory 
route constantly remind them of the fallibility of the past as a guide for the future. On the 
ground, strategic interaction between migrants, police and criminals renders the iteration 
of successful tactics dangerous, because predators rapidly identify and respond to migrant 
travel tactics. Therefore, a path or ploy that had previously offered passage cannot 
guarantee safety a second time around. For this reason, migrants insist that, “every trip is 
different”; the strategic context of the route thus ensures that no two journeys are ever 
alike, and specific information from any previous trip quickly becomes outdated. Fully 
aware of this dynamic, migrants assume a worldview of uncertainty. 
Danger heightens this sense of uncertainty. Frank H. Knight (1921, p.149) noted that 
“a decision in which one’s whole fortune (or his life) were at stake” may be an exception 
to the human tendency to view events as patterns in a lifetime. When the entire future is 
at stake, a person is more likely to view the impending event as completely isolated from 
past experience. In the course of migrating, people may lose their life savings or even 
worse, people sometimes die. Migrants thus come to view each journey as uncertain, 
rather than risky. 
Furthermore, traveling the route changes people, and the continual presence of 
travelers changes society. In her study of migrant disillusionment in receiving 
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communities on Long Island, Sarah Mahler (1995, p.75-81) described the often-painful 
transformation that the journey entails: 
The individual who emerges from a tunnel or trailer or trunk of a car and steps onto 
U.S. soil is not the person who left Peru or El Salvador or Colombia.  Her identity has 
become the near antithesis of the woman left behind.  She has gone from citizen to 
foreigner, law abider to law breaker, legal to illegal, independent to dependent, social 
member to social outcast; and her personhood is degraded.  Fragments of her previous 
self remain, but they lie scattered like shards of broken glass.  The trip strips her 
naked, and from her nakedness she is expected to clothe herself in the American 
dream….The journey of undocumented immigrants to America is cultural as much as 
physical.  By selling their worldly goods to finance the trip, divorcing themselves from 
their families and the reciprocal bonds of friendships, breaking many rules of proper 
behavior, and falling prey to abuses that humiliate even the most steadfast, these 
immigrants must shed much of their past identities.  They take on new identities as 
debtors, passive chickens in the clutches of coyotes, beguiling chameleons who 
assume new personae to test wits with seasoned predators, and finally illegals, 
wetbacks, or merely outlaws in the Promised Land.  They approach their last crossing, 
the Rio Grande, with little more than the shirts on their backs.  They have come to 
nature virtually in a state of nature. 
 
Mahler presents the most difficult realities of unauthorized migration, but even 
journeys that are less dramatic and painful can profoundly reorganize identity. It is cliché 
to remind readers that every journey across the globe has its parallel journey into the self; 
as the old adage says, we travel to know ourselves. Heroes, and even a reluctant warrior 
like Odysseus, voyage into the unknown to realize and test their inner mettle. This 
process of realization alters self-awareness, giving birth to new desires, changing our 
preferences and broadening our imagination. Whether we go as tourists or migrants, this 
process of dual discovery, one part internal and the other external, changes us. Obviously, 
some interests do not change: nobody wants to be maimed, raped, killed or incarcerated. 
Nevertheless, migrants rethink their goals, consider new destinations, change their 
loyalties, gain new capabilities, and become enmeshed in unanticipated activities as they 
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move through the social field of the route. Identity becomes a more open question as 
people travel through foreign places. 
As the quote from Mahler (1995) suggests, identity also becomes a more open 
question as people confront violence face-to-face.9 Just as new experiences and travel 
transform identity, so too can proximity to violence. Violence reconstitutes identities, 
motives, social roles and norms; in Michael Taussig’s (1984, p.468) words, violence 
produces a “space of death” that: 
… is preeminently a space of transformation: through the experience of death, life; 
through fear, loss of self and conformity to a new reality; or through evil, good.  Lost in 
the dark woods, then journeying through the underworld with his guide, Dante achieves 
paradise only after he has mounted Satan’s back.10  
 
Primo Levi (1988, p.36-49) understood this transformative space as a ‘gray zone’ 
where victims and bystanders unintentionally or intentionally commit violence while 
attempting to survive, blurring the boundary between master and slave, perpetrator and 
victim. Survival often requires subtle forms of collaboration with victimizers. Likewise, 
Lee Ann Fuji (2009, p.8-11) argues that genocidal violence is a dynamic process with the 
power to transform identities and complicate categories of “perpetrator”, “victim”, 
“bystander” and “rescuer” as people occupy multiple positions or change their positions 
in response to a shifting context over time. 
Similarly, violence produces a fundamental ambiguity and uncertainty along the 
route. As I will show, this ambiguity begins in the impoverished and insecure home 
                                                        
9 Note that Mahler (1995) wrote even before the dramatic escalation of violence along the 
route through Mexico that occurred in the 2000s.  
10 This need to enter a ‘space of death’ in order to arrive at a destination is common for travel 
narratives of all sorts, including the Odyssey. For migrants, it erupts in the discussion of 
sacrifice and the journey. Likewise, Odysseus had to travel to the underworld to consult the 
dead before escaping the grasp of the nymph Circe.  
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communities of Central America and follows the migrant all the way to the destination. 
At various places along the route, the roles of the ‘migrant’, ‘smuggler’, ‘gang member’, 
‘state official’ and ‘kidnapper’ overlap or become fluid. Migrants or smugglers may be 
forced to collaborate with kidnappers or police, and police may be forced to collaborate 
with smugglers or kidnappers. It is a strategy that Levi says is “well known to criminal 
associations of all times and places” (p.43). Many social markers that might normally 
signal trustworthiness or solidarity, such as nationality, religion, gender or class, betray 
those who would rely upon them.11 Among people forced to make decisions under 
violent conditions, treachery is rampant and uncertainty is high as loyalties shift under the 
strain.12  
On the other hand, solidarity, political participation and collective resistance also 
emerge from the experience of violence and the perception of injustice. Amelia Frank-
Vitale (2011) documents moments in which a shared migrant identity facilitates 
collective resistance to violence among Central Americans in transit through Mexico. In a 
different context, Elisabeth Jean Wood (2003) documents how violent injustice provoked 
peasant solidarity and armed resistance to the state during the Salvadoran civil war. 
Therefore, migrants have some good reasons to rely on the loyalty of their comrades. The 
                                                        
11 For an excellent overview of the extensive anthropological literature on the indeterminancy 
of violence and the social ambiguity it produces, as well as discussion of the special 
challenges of ethnographic fieldwork in violent environments, see the introduction to the 
edited volume by Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C.G.M. Robben (1995). 
12 Here, I am concerned with direct forms of physical violence.  Nevertheless, the ‘structural 
violence’ of extreme poverty and scarcity may have a similar effect. Johan Galtung (1969) 
famously defines structural violence as “the increased rates of death and disability suffered by 
those who occupy the bottom runs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death 
rates experience by those who are above them.” For the purpose of this thesis, however, the 
focus is on a threat or act of harm to another person’s body. For analysis of structural violence 
and the Central American migration route, see Felipe Jacome (2008) and Wendy Vogt (2012). 
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journey can bring out the best in people, creating allies of strangers in a time of need and 
generating a sense of community along the routes through Mexico. 
To be sure, without this hope there would be no betrayal.13 Both sides of the 
migration narrative are true at the same time. Similarly, Wendy Vogt (2012, p.17) notes 
the seemingly contradictory tendency toward both social fragmentation and displays of 
transnational solidarity along the Central American migration route in the wake of 
escalating violence. In fact, the potential for many intervening shades of ‘gray’ responses 
between disloyalty and solidarity underscores the unpredictability of individuals’ 
reactions to violence. Therefore, what Levi described of the experience of imprisonment 
is equally and ironically true of movement across a violent terrain: 
The world into which one was precipitated was terrible, yes, but also indecipherable: it 
did not conform to any model; the enemy was all around but also inside, the “we” lost its 
limits, the contenders were not one not two, one could not discern a single frontier, but 
rather many confused, perhaps innumerable frontiers stretched between each of us.  One 
entered hoping for the solidarity of one’s companions in misfortune, but the hoped for 
allies, except in special cases, were not there; there were instead a thousand sealed off 
monads, and between them a desperate covert and continuous struggle (p.38). 
 
As they travel a violent route, people meet strangers and build unexpected 
friendships. However, established friends may become strangers when confronted with 
violence; the frontiers between friend, enemy, acquaintance and stranger shift. Moving 
across this violent landscape is a process of acquiring knowledge about a dynamic path 
and the ‘shape-shifting’ people and strangers encountered along it. As noted by Knight 
(1921, p.154), under conditions of uncertainty “knowledge is more a matter of learning 
than the exercise of absolute judgment. Learning requires time, and in time the situation                                                         
13 Fuji (2009, p.18), citing Mark Granovetter’s (1985) work on trust-building and breaking, 
reminds us that “by trusting someone, a person becomes more, not less, vulnerable to 
betrayal.”   
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dealt with, as well as the learner, undergoes change.” Migration requires time, and in time 
the situation dealt with, as well as the migrant, undergoes change. Under conditions of 
violence, people take on metamorphic capacities, not unlike the deceitful and cunning 
gods of Greek epics. This dual ability to transform and to cope with the transformations 
of others is the domain of a metis-like knowledge.14 Ultimately, this ongoing learning 
process blurs boundaries between foreigners and citizens, migrants and settlers, thereby 
transforming the social landscape of the route in such a way that complicates the 
governance of transnational flows. 
The illegality of human smuggling and migration further exacerbates uncertainty by 
reinforcing incentives for secrecy and deception. Of course, if such practices were 
perfectly concealed, smugglers would run out of clients. So, there are also incentives for 
publicity. Unauthorized migrants share their travel stories, and they even make claims on 
the state for protection and services during their journey. As a result, the location and 
protocols of unauthorized routes become common knowledge in the communities through 
which they pass. Nonetheless, illegal activities are undocumented in the sense that we 
lack an objective general record to understand migrant vulnerability to danger while in 
                                                        
14 Detienne and Vernant (1975, p.21) explain the relationship between the goddess Metis, her 
legendary cunning and the uncertain conditions that she must confront: “…Metis imitates 
those elusive beings which baffle men with their constant transformations and thus escape 
from their planned hold over them and slip through their fingers.  The many-coloured, 
shimmering nature of metis is a mark of its kinship with the divided, shifting world of 
multiplicity in the midst of which it operates.  It is this way of conniving with reality which 
ensures its efficacity.  Its suppleness and malleability give it the victory in domains where 
there are no ready-made rules for success, no established methods, but where each new trial 
demands the invention of new ploys, the discovery of a way out (poros) that is hidden.  
Conversely, the ambiguous, disparate, unstable realities with which men attempt to come to 
grips may, in myth, take on the appearance of polymorphic monsters, powers of 
metamorphosis which delight, in their cunning, to disappoint all expectations and constantly to 
baffle the minds of men.”  
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transit. For this reason, Susan Bibler Coutin (2005) defines clandestine terrain as territory 
that is simultaneously “hidden yet known”. While the veil of secrecy is far from 
complete, it certainly complicates an objective evaluation of risk. And survival in this 
environ of deception requires metis, an intelligence that “operates through disguise” 
(Detienne and Vernant 1975, p.21).    
The Role of the State   
It might be tempting to describe this environ of deception and danger as a Hobbesian 
state of nature. However, it is an anarchy crafted by the state, not a primordial place that 
predates the state. The Mexican and United States’ governments have partnered to 
increase the risks to migrants travelling unauthorized routes, thereby deterring would-be 
border crossers. To do so, U.S. migration authorities have explicitly channeled the 
migrant stream toward the most dangerous places at the U.S-Mexico border, such as the 
most deadly desert zones (Cornelius 2001; Eschbach et al. 1999). Mexican migration 
policing now also channels migrants to the most dangerous places within Mexico, such as 
the drug-running corridors where kidnappers and corrupt authorities prey upon them with 
relative impunity (Casillas 2007; Martinez 2011). In this sense, the heightened risk of 
criminality to migrants constitutes an extralegal violence that informally serves state 
purposes to deter Central American migration. In so far that policymakers are aware of 
their role in exacerbating these risks, states are complicit in crime against migrants. 
However, these states have not only exacerbated the risks of the journey. Under the 
banner of the drug war, the Mexican and United States’ governments have also allied to 
increase the uncertainty experienced along unauthorized routes. They have intentionally 
dislocated the routines and relationships that underpin the political economy of transit 
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through Mexico. To do so, police have explicitly “decapitated” the drug cartels. They 
hunt the terrain bosses to generate violent strife within and between competing gangs, 
and thereby disrupt unauthorized traffic in drugs and people (Wilkinson 2010).15 The 
outcome of this policing strategy has been the state-induced growth of what Guillermo 
O’Donnell (2004, p. 41) called a ‘brown area’: 
Whatever formally sanctioned law exists is applied intermittently, if at all.  More 
importantly, this intermittent law is encompassed by the informal law enacted by the 
privatized- patrimonial, sultanistic, or simply gangster like- powers that actually rule 
those places.  This leads to complex situations involving a continuous renegotiation of the 
boundaries between formal and informal legalities, situations in which it is vital to 
understand the interplay between both kinds of law and the uneven power relations that 
develop.   
 
 In Mexico, migrants have only intermittent recourse to formal law, because of their 
vulnerability to violence committed by officials and their fear of deportation. Since the 
intensification of the drug war (2006-present), informal rules have been subject to a 
continuous renegotiation by criminal actors. As a result, these informal legalities offer 
less than perfect guidance for migrants in transit. From the perspective of migrants, these                                                         
15 For this reason, the Mexican government has periodically claimed that the high death toll of 
criminal violence represents an indicator of success in the drug war (e.g. President Calderon 
quoted in Wilkinson 2010). They expect gang warfare to weaken organized criminal actors, 
and they expect violence to spike as gangs undergo their death throes. Indeed, the Mexican 
government expects cartels to lash out at migrants, as well as competitors. In response to the 
August 2010 mass murder of 72 Central and South American migrants in Tamaulipas, 
Alejandro Poire, a security official, offered the following analysis: “This act confirms that 
criminal organizations are looking to kidnapping and extortion because they are going through 
a difficult time obtaining resources and recruiting people willingly” (quoted in Archibold 
2010). In other words, the administration of Felipe Calderon read violence against migrants as 
an indicator of success in the drug war, despite the fact that both a public minister and a police 
officer were murdered just days after their investigation into the massacre began. However, 
this massacre may be viewed as a ‘success’ in a second, more disturbing way; as migration 
policing channels migrants into the path of drug cartels, criminal violence against migrants 
can be seen as an extralegal enforcement of borders. States are complicit in this criminality. 
Violence between and within drug gangs was an explicitly stated goal of Calderon’s policing 
strategy, directly articulated by him and his advisors. Violence against migrants has been 
explicitly hailed as a regrettable unintended (but predictable) consequence of success in the 
war against cartels. 
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informal legalities inadequately anchor the contracts, codes of conduct and protocols that 
facilitated unauthorized migration in previous eras. The result has been a humanitarian 
catastrophe along the routes, rather than a cessation of migration. 
This ‘brown’ and ‘gray’ migration route is not a space outside governance. It is a 
conflicted child of the state, itself constituted by governance and resistance to that 
governance. As predicted by O’Donnell, “the resulting informal legal system, punctuated 
by temporary reintroductions of the formal one, supports a world of extreme violence” 
(p.41). Thus, the combined effect of migration policing and the drug war is largely 
responsible for the dramatic increase in both risk and uncertainty.16  
In other words, these violent conditions are not natural. Ironically, this anarchic 
reality is a product of governance that prioritizes the integrity of borders at the expense of 
human security within national territory. The internalization of border policing has 
brought a level of anarchy normally associated with the international realm into the 
domestic affairs of the Mexican state. As this dissertation will demonstrate, the struggle 
between the state, criminals and migrants has eroded legitimacy, upended identities, and 
deepened social ambiguity along transnational routes. The policing of transnational flows 
in the interior of states extends and deepens the clandestine contestation that normally 
occurs at the borderlands. By intentionally exacerbating the risk and uncertainty of 
migrant journeys, the Mexican and U.S. governments are culpable for this humanitarian 
catastrophe. 
                                                          
16 Wendy Vogt (2012) traces both the contemporary migration policing and the drug war 
offensive to a neoliberal agenda pursued by the United States in the region, and she argues that 
this militarized, free-market agenda constitutes a continuation of processes of colonial and 
Cold War social fragmentation in Latin America. 
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The Practice of Survival and Social Transformation 
Despite this state-induced risk and uncertainty, migrants have a variety of tools for 
understanding and avoiding danger and assessing alternative choices. Uncertainty 
necessitates a seemingly intuitive response, as opposed to statistical estimation (Knight 
1921, p.139). The practice of migration facilitates this social intuition. People acquire 
information about violence through their movement across terrain. Indeed, uncertainty 
privileges the experiential gathering and transmission of information over other forms of 
communication and planning. And face-to-face confrontation with danger turns the 
migratory experience into a voyage of self-discovery, as people discover strengths (or 
weaknesses) they did not know they posses and they reconsider their goals. The long road 
north changes the migrant, and migrants learn to how to bend the rules to avoid violence. 
As people update their information and reimagine their worldview, they improvise new 
tactics and performances. As the migrants adapt to this new social reality, the routes 
change course and other strategic actors adjust accordingly. But because migrants can 
draw on a mobile knowledge, they can adapt to these eventualities.   
This dissertation describes the construction of that ‘mobile knowledge’. To do so, it 
traces the micro-practices of the transnational migration route from Central America 
through Mexico and the United States. It examines how migrants gather information, 
imagine possibilities and improvise new tactics to negotiate a dynamic and violent 
terrain. It argues that the decision to migrate is not a one-time choice based primarily on a 
plan of action, but instead, an imaginative and improvised practice that unfolds as people 
move across the physical and social landscape. By examining the journey as a learning 
process and the social practices that shape it, this dissertation explains migrants’ 
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seemingly paradoxical flexibility to adapt to nearly any situation and their inflexible 
resoluteness to continue moving forward.  
Finally, this dissertation probes the interaction between these individuals and the 
communities of the route. It shows how their relationships and the roles that define them 
become transformed in passage. In so doing, this dissertation highlights a paradox of 
continuity and change in a globalized world; informal rules govern sustained 
unauthorized flows, but official and unofficial violence demands their constant 
renegotiation. The subsequent mobile knowledge created and carried by these seemingly 
inexorable transnational flows fertilizes the imagination and inspires the improvisation of 
potentially new identities and spaces in transit states. Both citizens and migrants 
participate in this creative process, complicating the governance of the unauthorized 
routes which form a ubiquitous feature of globalization. 
Contributions 
In this way, this dissertation contributes to conceptual and empirical debates across 
multiple disciplines and the policy realm. Empirically, it documents a new trend along 
international migration routes. Previous generations of migration and smuggling 
scholarship emphasized the imperviousness of the routes to government intervention and 
the stability of migration routines despite intensifying risk to migrants (e.g. Andreas 
2000; Massey et al. 1987). In contrast, this dissertation describes a drug war context that 
de-stabilized smuggling networks, unsettled migration protocols and subsequently 
exacerbated uncertainty for migrants, as well as intensified risk; it provides a snapshot of 
a period of transition. Migration continues, but routes, relationships and routines have 
changed.  
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Furthermore, the dissertation examines the personal, social, and political 
transformations that accompany the journey in greater depth, an experience that has 
received relatively little scholarly attention relative to integration issues in destinations. 
Importantly, this dissertation argues that the individual travel experiences of migrants 
shape the cultural and material landscape of Mexico. Each experience diversifies the 
practice of human movement and shapes the social context for the people that follow.  
The experiences of migrants also shape the social context for the people who stay and 
settle along these routes. A study of these odysseys reveals the intimate impact of 
sustained Central American migration on local Mexican identities, interests, and 
ultimately, possibilities for governance. Thus, the dissertation should interest migration 
scholars seeking to understand the importance of journeys to the societies, economies and 
politics of transit and settlement countries.  
In addition to its intrinsic interest to migration scholars, the conceptual apparatus 
developed to understand how migrants navigate this uncertainty should find a much 
broader audience. The social sciences, by and large, have failed to cope adequately with 
the issue of uncertainty and its impact on human behavior, instead assuming a world 
characterized only by risk (Katzenstein and Nelson 2013). This dissertation breaks new 
ground, not by predicting the violence that besieges migrants, but by elucidating how 
migrants cope with a violence that is largely unpredictable. The ethnographic framework 
of mobile knowledge developed in this approach has wide application beyond the realm 
of migration studies, potentially contributing to our understanding of the behavior of 
actors under a wide range of uncertain and dangerous situations.  
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In particular, scholars with an interest in how everyday people cope with crises of 
human security will find a new way to think about resources for and constraints on life 
and death decisions. By focusing at the level of practice, I move the discussion of these 
resources beyond the static concepts of rational choice and social capital. Rational choice 
models assume that decisions occur in discrete moments with stable identities. They 
therefore miss the fluid social and personal transformations that accompany movement 
across violent and uncertain terrain. The concept of social capital implies that knowledge 
may accumulate overtime, when in fact, the utility of specific information expires quickly 
in dynamic strategic settings. For these reasons, people rely on a metis-like ‘mobile 
knowledge’ to cope with uncertainty. Their capacity to do so underlies the adaptive 
flexibility of unauthorized transnational routes and the resilience of the transnational 
imaginary constructed in human movement.  
To arrive at these conclusions, the dissertation travelled an ‘ethnographic journey’, 
which pushes the methodological boundaries of political science. Borrowing methods 
employed in the anthropology of flows (e.g. Marcus 1995; Nordstrom 2007; Watts 2008), 
this study offers a unique window into unauthorized globalization from the ground-up, 
bringing the everyday practice of violence and the global illegal economy into dialogue 
with concepts that have influenced contemporary political science. This micro-practice 
lens refines our understanding of the nature of information under conditions of violent 
uncertainty. It is eclectic, empirically grounded, transnational scholarship that challenges 
us to think critically about the tensions between individuals and nascent transnational 
communities. In sum, the study employs the in-depth approach of anthropology to better 
understand the broad theoretical concerns of political scientists.  
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This conceptually rich analysis constitutes a necessary antidote to policy propaganda 
about participants in transnational criminalized activities. The need to hide criminalized 
activities from state actors underlies a dearth of reliable data and undermines reasoned 
public discourse on these issues. In particular, Andreas (2010, p.23) finds faults with the 
use of statistics in policy debates over the global illegal economy: 
…illicintess makes possible a politics of numbers that is particularly susceptible to 
speculation, distortion, and sometimes even outright fabrication that is rarely questioned 
or challenged in policy debates and media reporting.   
 
Illicitness generates incentives for a potentially misleading politics of statistics, one 
that effectively ignores how people understand and respond to the uncertainty that 
plagues their clandestine lives. Therefore, to study activities prohibited by the state, 
political scientists must also venture beyond the official story and into the everyday 
practices of participants in the criminalized global economy. As cargo with a voice, 
migrants’ stories provide a unique vantage point on the social and political mechanisms 
that underlie the global illegal economy and violence within it. These voices, otherwise 
silenced by a purely macro-level discourse, offer a missing piece for our broader 
understanding of the elasticity of unauthorized practices under conditions of both 
escalating risk and uncertainty.  
By reinterpreting these voices and bringing public discourse to the level of practice, 
this dissertation has much to teach liberal democratic states about how to manage 
migration flows. By re-focusing our attention on how unauthorized routes become 
transmission belts for information and violence, the dissertation illuminates the 
contradictions of contemporary liberalism. These routes are not isolated edges of society, 
limited to border zones; they are embedded in the nation-states through which they pass, 
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incorporating migrants and citizens alike into their activity. An analysis of the social and 
political processes that unfold along these routes leads us to a strong normative argument 
in favor of the prioritization of the human security of migrants over a myopic 
commitment to the border security of nation-states. By describing mobile knowledge, the 
dissertation elucidates an overlooked contributing factor to the failure of migration 
policing, and it highlights the increasingly illiberal implications of that failure.   
In conclusion, the Greek concept of metis is essential for understanding the itinerant 
imagination and tactics of unauthorized movement across a terrain. Metis, as the 
character trait of clever heroes, finds a parallel in mobile knowledge, which is a practical 
learning that emerges in the movement of people through places. Contemporary migrants 
must demonstrate the same craftiness summoned by the classic Greek hero Odysseus, 
whose return to his beloved Ithaca and faithful Penelope had been forbidden by a 
powerful God. The successful completion of that epic journey required the capacity to 
judge the trustworthiness of both friends and strangers using clever stratagems, to 
leverage existing knowledge to navigate uncharted territory, to disguise or blend into a 
variety of crowds, to know whom to ask for hospitality and how, to use existing 
instruments and objects for alternative purposes that their makers had not intended, and 
perhaps most importantly, to manipulate restrictive social mores and rules to produce a 
freedom of action. And like Odysseus, contemporary migrants know that much of their 
success can be attributed to the will of a higher power that arranges the specific place 
where their practical intelligence can be viable, providing them with an opportunity to 
help themselves.   
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Outline of Argument 
The argument proceeds in three parts. The first part, containing chapters two and 
three, sketches concepts and establishes the routes as uncertain and violent terrain. This 
first part of the dissertation explains the overarching argument for understanding the 
journey in greater depth, situating this unconventional approach within the sociological 
and economic literature on migration decisions. It also provides an introduction to the 
players of the route and how their relationships change over time. These fluid 
relationships generate social ambiguity and acute uncertainty for the migrants.  
The second part of the dissertation, including chapters four and five, explains the 
initial expectations for the study. It further explicates the shortcomings of conventional 
approaches to migration studies. To do so, the dissertation compares and contrasts the 
informational setting of two Salvadoran migrant communities of origin, arriving at 
surprising conclusions about the ineffectiveness of information as social capital. In this 
sense, part two presents null findings. This analysis of home communities reinforces the 
need for research along the transnational routes to understand the learning that happens 
during the journey. Finally, the second part of the dissertation describes the fieldwork and 
sketches migrants’ geographic and normative orientation to the journey.  
The third part of the dissertation, spanning chapters six and seven, explains migration 
practice in greater detail, fleshing out the concepts introduced in the theory. It turns to the 
question of how migrants navigate the violent and uncertain terrain, if conventional 
approaches fail to adequately describe this process. These chapters explore the social and 
material dimensions of the journey in turn. Thus, part three examines how stories and 
social performances constitute survival tactics in transit, thereby changing social roles 
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and identities as people move across terrain. Next, it examines how migrants understand 
and employ material resources in unexpected ways during the journey. Taken together, 
this third part of the dissertation documents a process of mobile knowledge, as migrants 
transform information with imagination and improvisation under conditions of violence 
and uncertainty. The final chapter concludes by outlining the implications of this analysis 
for a liberal society of states. 
 
     
CHAPTER 2 
THEORIZING MIGRATION 
Introduction 
 
“Ah my friend,” seasoned Penelope dissented, 
“dreams are hard to unravel, wayward, drifting things- 
not all we glimpse in them will come to pass…” 
Like seasoned Penelope, who knows better than to play at oracle, migrants understand 
that their “American dream” offers only vague lessons for reality. Their goals can be 
illusory, because wayward, drifting journeys potentially bring them into harm’s way. In 
Central America and Mexico, a common refrain suggests that the American dream may 
just as easily become the “American nightmare”. For this reason, migrants attempt to 
hold concrete expectations at a minimum, relying instead on a mixture of hope, faith and 
a one-step-at-a-time sensibility. They remain ready for the unexpected challenges that 
erupt en route. 
This chapter outlines a novel approach to our understanding of how migrants respond 
to uncertainty and violence; it examines how they cope with this omnipresent possibility 
of undone dreams. Standard approaches treat the journey from the origin to the 
destination as unproblematic and leave unanalyzed migrants’ adaptations to unexpected 
situations along the way. In contrast, this chapter builds a conceptual framework that 
traces the micro-practice of migration. In so doing, it responds to Emanuel Adler and 
Vincent Pouliot’s (2011, p.7) call to bring “scholarly debates down to the ground of 
world politics in order to empirically scrutinize the processes whereby certain competent 
performances produce effects of a world political nature.” Specifically, this chapter views 
migration as an ongoing learning process constituted by information-gathering, 
   
  24 
imagination and improvisation en route. To navigate a violent and unpredictable passage, 
migrants convert information into ‘mobile knowledge’ through practices of imagination 
and improvisation that unfold during the journey. The route through Mexico is the place 
where this conversion occurs.  
Sustained social practices of human movement constitute the transnational route. This 
notion of a ‘route’ provides a powerful metaphor for the relationship between material 
practices and the social imagination. These practices leave tangible imprints across both 
the physical and the socio-economic landscapes.  Over time, the footfall of migrants cuts 
trails through the desert and mountains.  Cultural and economic configurations adapt to 
the movement of people across the landscape, clustering along prominent paths. As 
people move great distances over time, these ruts in the landscape become a 'transit 
political economy' where clusters of social activity emerge; entire communities spring to 
life in the wake of trade routes. The human movement along a trade route is like a river, 
carving a path through the society it crosses.  In so doing, it deposits the physical and 
cultural sediment of people in its wake.  The routes through Mexico have thus carved a 
transit political economy and a transnational society of unauthorized movement.  As 
Michel de Certeau (1984 p.97) so eloquently describes: 
Their story begins on ground level, with footsteps.  They are myriad, but do not 
compose a series.  They cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative 
character: a style of tactile apprehension and kinesthetic appropriation.  Their 
swarming mass is an innumerable collection of singularities.  Their intertwined paths 
give their shape to spaces.  They weave places together.  
 
These observable changes, the weaving of places together, parallel changes in the 
human mind. The routines of the route become fixed in expectations and social identities, 
as well as the physical terrain of the pathway.  As a ‘culture of migration’ emerges in 
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communities of origin and transit, sustained human movement wears grooves in the 
social imaginary17. Charles Taylor (2004, p.23) defines the social imaginary as: 
… something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may 
entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode.  I am thinking, 
rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with 
others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations. 
 
In this social imaginary, where strategic expectations, causal evaluations and 
normative commitments fit together, a culture of migration takes hold.  As defined by 
Jeffrey H. Cohen (2004, p.5), a ‘culture of migration’ emerges when geographic mobility 
becomes a pervasive presence in the everyday practices within the community, such that 
the decision to migrate becomes a socially sanctioned (and even expected) means for 
achieving economic goals.18 Transit communities become both socially and economically 
oriented to the passage of people. Pierre Bourdieu (1977; 1980) would refer to this 
phenomenon as the formation of a habitus with “practices that tend to produce 
regularities.”19 The material path also shapes where people think to tread, making a 
                                                        
17 Following Lisa Wedeen (2002, p.714) I define culture as “practices of meaning –making”.   
18 William Kandel and Douglas S. Massey (2002, p.982) similarly describe the culture of 
migration in Mexican migrant sending communities: “within such communities, people come 
to valorize foreign wage labor positively, along with the behaviors, attitudes and lifestyles 
associated with it….As migratory behavior extends throughout a community, it increasingly 
enters the calculus of conscious choice and eventually becomes normative.  Young people 
who grow up and come of age increasingly expect to migrate internationally in the course of 
their lives.  For young men, especially, migration becomes a rite of passage, and those who do 
not attempt it are seen as lazy, unenterprising and undesirable as potential mates”.  
19 Bourdieu (1977) defines ‘habitus’ as “a system of internalized structures, schemes of 
perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same group”.  When the 
habitus becomes like ‘background knowledge’, accepted unthinkingly, it takes on the 
character of a stable ‘doxa’.   
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particular route seem self-evident, thereby bounding the social imagination; it becomes 
an unintended ‘knowledge-based artifact’, an object that conveys social memory.20 
As the social sediment of passing people accumulates along the material path, cultural 
landscape changes, ultimately widening the social imagination. A cultural exchange 
occurs, as migrants from diverse origins in Central America track the social practices that 
constitute everyday life, thereby connecting the cultural space of home through transit 
communities and destinations. Transnational ways of speaking with mixed dialects 
combining Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Honduran, Mexican and American slang; types of 
food; methods of negotiating; and creative tactics for moving and evading obstacles 
emerge along the way. 
This exchange occurs both between migrants moving along the route, and with the 
people from communities of origin, transit and destination.  The everyday world of food 
vendors, bus and taxi drivers, hotel owners and landlords, and employers does not 
necessarily directly involve smuggling, but these people contract with migrants in transit 
and smugglers on a daily basis.  They thereby rely on the transit economy for their 
livelihood, and through their economic practices, they become enmeshed in social 
relations with the people in passage. Migrants make friends, create enemies and form 
sexual partnerships along the way. Because of their ongoing daily interaction with 
migrants, settled citizens along the routes play an integral role in the production and 
transmission of mobile knowledge. They do so without ever leaving home.  
                                                        
20 In his study of drug trafficking networks, Michael Kenney (2007, p.4) draws on 
organizational theory to define a ‘knowledge-based artifact’ as an organizational memory, 
emphasizing the intentional storage and transmission of information in tangible forms.  
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Over time, the traverse becomes entrenched as a cultural form. Yet, unauthorized 
migration through Mexico requires immense tactical innovation during periods of 
intensified policing and criminal violence. Under these uncertain and dangerous 
conditions, the routines and ruts that constitute the route cannot be trusted as a guide.  
Thus, migrants learn through the practice of migration. Learning is “a process whereby 
knowledge is created through the transformation of experience” (Kolb 1984, p.38).  In 
this chapter, I first explain how a more complete understanding of the learning process en 
route extends the standard account of migration. Second, I discuss information 
acquisition en route, highlighting how both physical and social experiences of the route 
provide informational updates during the journey. Third, I trace the transformation of this 
experiential information into knowledge through imagination and improvisation.  Finally, 
I describe the mobile knowledge that emerges when people practice migration. 
Conventional Approach to Understanding Migration  
The conventional approach to understanding migration decisions does not shed light 
on the enigma of the journey: how do people navigate uncertain violence along the routes 
to the United States? In both neoclassical and social network models of migration, people 
base their travel decisions solely on the information available at the outset of the journey.  
The journey to the United States is treated as a plan that, once set in motion, remains 
invariable. When scholars approach migration in this manner, migrants’ agile responses 
to dangers during the journey are rarely treated as a puzzle in themselves. While rational 
actor models and social networks provide important conceptual tools for understanding 
how migrants make decisions about their travel tactics, scholars working in this tradition 
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treat knowledge as a thing, not a transformative process, thus conflating knowledge with 
information. This obscures the learning process along the transnational route.    
Migrants are rational. They respond to information about the costs and benefits of 
migration. In the long history of collective movement, we see the impact of push and pull 
factors on the level and direction of migration flows;21 people move to mitigate poverty 
and violence. Central American migration to the United States accelerated during the 
civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s, as people moved in response to political 
repression, violence and the economic dislocation (Chinchilla and Hamilton 1991, p.95-
101; Montes 1987).22 In the mid-1990s, the migration flow from the region again 
accelerated dramatically, primarily in response to economic incentives for movement 
(and opportunity widened by social networks established during the previous period) 
(Rosenblum and Brick 2011, p.1-15).  Since the 1990s, escalating criminal violence and 
insecurity in the region have begun to play a greater role in pushing migrants to leave 
(Archibald 2013; Brigden 2012).23 Since 2007, economic incentives for movement from 
                                                        
21 Push and pull theories of migration focus on the macrostructures that motivate movement, 
while neoclassical decision models focus on how individuals respond to incentives at the 
micro-level (Massey et al. 1993; Massey et al. 1998).  These two lines of scholarship are 
generally compatible, and for the purpose of this thesis, discussed together.  For a historical 
view of European mass migrations responding to economic push and pull factors and rational 
choices by individuals, see O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, p.199-166).  For a brief history 
of Mexican and Central American migration that outlines changes in push and pull factors 
over the last several decades, see Rosenblum and Brick (2011). 
22 In the 1980s and early 1990s, academics and policy makers hotly debated whether Central 
American migration was primarily a labor flow, pulled by the relative economic opportunity 
of the U.S., or a refugee flow, pushed out by political repression and violence in Central 
America (e.g. Morrison and May 1994; Stanley 1987).   
23 Using Latinobarometro data, Charles H. Wood et al. (2010) found that criminal 
victimization significantly increased the propensity to migrate. On the growing sense of 
uncertainty and insecurity in El Salvador, see Moodie (2012).  For a description of the new 
urban insecurity in Central America, see Rodgers (2009). 
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Central America to the United States have weakened, but persist.24 The desire to reunify 
families also propels people to attempt unauthorized entry.25 
When discussing their decisions, migrants clearly articulate the material and social 
interests that motivate them to leave and describe their own decisions as rational. In 
interviews, they often list concrete material goals, such as a new roof or house, their 
children’s educational expenses or capital to begin a small business, when explaining 
their initial motive to leave home. They explicitly weigh the dangers of the migration 
journey against the insecurity and criminal violence of Central America. People also 
discussed their desire to rejoin family members already living in the United States, 
making migration the means to fulfill an important social and emotional commitment.                                                         
24 Central American migrants interviewed for this study acknowledged that the hey-day of 
getting rich by moving to the United States was over; people are generally aware that jobs are 
scarce and immigration enforcement increasingly strict in the U.S.. However, even in the 
context of the recession and rising unemployment among migrants, the lasting wage 
differential between Central America and the United States justifies the journey for many 
people. If the migrant succeeds in entering the United States and finding employment (a task 
that has become much more difficult), the pay off is enormous: the opportunity to earn the 
rough equivalent of an entire Central American day’s wages in one hour in the United States.  
If times are tough in the United States, they are even tougher in Central America.  The 
difficulty finding work after arrival makes family less willing to burden themselves with the 
large debts for paying for high-end, door-to-door smuggling service, and more people may 
choose to risk traveling through Mexico to the U.S. border without professional help.  
Mexican migration has slowed more abruptly than Central America, in part because the 
Mexican economy has been more robust.  The Mexican growth rate exceeded the United 
States, but Central American countries continue to lag behind.  On Mexican migration trends, 
see Passel, Cohen and Gonzalez-Barrera (2012).    
25 Family reunification and fear of crime in home communities figured prominently as 
motivations in interviews with migrants. There may be a link between the changing motives 
for migration and changes in immigrant composition. For example, apprehensions of Central 
American children attempting unaccompanied unauthorized entry almost doubled between 
2011 and 2012 (Preston 2012).  The rise in apprehensions of unaccompanied minors may 
signal increased importance of family reunification strategies or the transition to a refugee 
flow, as parents move children for reasons of safety rather than leave them behind to receive 
monetary remittances from the U.S.  Either way, it seems that ‘labor migration’ may not 
perfectly characterize the true nature of the contemporary Central American migration flow. 
For this reason, arrests for illegal re-entry now outpace arrests for illegal entry (Cave 2011). 
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For these reasons, neoclassical models of migration decisions have much to say about the 
initial motivation to leave.   
But how do people travel?  How do migrants negotiate their relationships with 
smugglers, natives and other migrants during the journey? How do they navigate an 
uncertain and violent odyssey?  To answer these questions, a neoclassical decision 
framework falls short because many choices about travel tactics occur en route.  
Neoclassical models of migration treat knowledge as a static entity and the decision to 
migrate as a one-time choice made in the community of origin.26 As explained by 
Douglas S. Massey et al. (1993, p.434) in their sweeping review of the literature on the 
causes of migration, “in this scheme, individual rational actors decide to migrate because 
a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect a positive net return, usually monetary, 
from movement”. Theories based on these ‘neoclassical’ models do not consider the 
reflexive and strategic process of the journey itself. According to these models, the 
journey from the community of origin to the destination and its associated risks (such as 
the probability of capture by authorities, injuries during desert crossing and exploitation 
by smugglers) are simply a cost weighed in the initial decision to leave home, not a 
transformative experience through which migrants learn, improvise new tactics and adapt 
to challenges (e.g. Gathman 2008, p.1928; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999 p.1339; 
Todaro and Maruszco 1987, p.104).  These authors presume that all relevant decisions 
about the method of travel and hiring of a smuggler occur before the journey, at the same 
time as the initial choice to leave. They leave no room for the adaptations that migrants 
undergo after departure and before arrival.  In a rational decision framework, the choice                                                         
26 For the archetypal neoclassical analysis of migration to the United States, see Borjas (1989).  
In the study of crime, Gary Becker (1968) provides the exemplar of the neoclassical approach. 
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of migration tactics is understood as a plan, based on information received at the outset of 
the journey. The informational context for these decisions is too frequently assumed, not 
explored. 
For example, Yuji Tamura (2007, cited in Tamura 2010) considers the impact of 
policing on whether smugglers exploit their clients under conditions of both perfect 
information and asymmetrical information. However, Tamura’s model assumes that once 
the smuggler has been hired, the client remains totally passive, submitting to all manner 
of exploitation and unquestioningly following the direction from the smuggler: 
Migrants lose control over the assets they carry with them-their bodies and labor- once 
the provision of smuggling services is implemented because they are required to obey 
smugglers in order to achieve a successful border crossing (p.540). 
 
  It is, of course, true that migrants are routinely deprived of liberty in these travel 
arrangements; even when migrants enter voluntary smuggling contracts, as opposed to 
being trafficked, they may be locked in safe houses, stuffed involuntarily into unsafe 
secret compartments, and compelled to accept severe sexual, physical and emotional 
abuse.  While migrants must accept the authority of their smuggler and are vulnerable to 
smuggler predation, they also devise clever survival tactics to deal with smugglers and 
companions in their travel group. Under extreme conditions, the customers may turn on 
their smuggler, making threats or declarations to authorities. When injustice is 
collectively perceived, migrants within the travel group may conspire against their 
smuggler. While migrant agency is severely constrained after the contract is negotiated, 
first payment made or travel underway, migrants are resourceful. Scholars should treat 
how migrants receive new information, find opportunities for resourcefulness or adapt to 
overcome adversity along the route as an open empirical question. 
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The ‘neoclassical’ research cited here includes diverse models of why people leave, 
whether they hire smugglers and whether they suffer abuse during the journey.  However, 
all the models share the assumption that these decisions are bundled once at the outset of 
the journey within a single cost-benefit calculation. And much of this literature derives 
decision frameworks exclusively from the experience of Mexican migrants. A notable 
exception is Guido Friebel and Sergei Guriev (2012, p.16), who point out that the short-
distance migration journeys typified by the Mexican case probably have different 
informational resources than long distance journeys. Not coincidentally, they also 
observe that migration researchers have better informational resources for studying the 
Mexican case (p.16).  While Friebel and Guriev (2012, p.13) argue for a richer 
understanding of “the respective specificities of home and host countries” to inform 
models of smuggling markets, they continue to overlook the importance of transit state 
context. Perhaps this failure to see transit countries as an important influence on 
smuggling markets is a residue of the nearly hegemonic focus on Mexico-US migration, 
where one border represents the primary obstacle. Even in studies of the exploitation and 
violence against migrants that occurs en route, the route itself and decisions made along it 
are ignored. 
Studies of migrant social capital and interpersonal trust networks improve upon these 
oversimplified neoclassical decision models by tracing information flows and 
incorporating social context into our understanding of these migration decisions. While 
Tamura’s (2007; 2010) neoclassical model does not incorporate iterative interactions 
between the client and smuggler over multiple journeys or the potential for reputation 
effects, social capital scholars argue that “the ‘decision’ to migrate…is best characterized 
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not as a discrete decision by an individual but rather as a social process….” (Kyle 2000 
p.197). Over time, the development of transnational interpersonal ties lowers the costs 
and risks of migration and produce path dependency in migratory flows, despite 
intensified policing (Gaytan 2007; Sheridan 2009). There is no doubt that the social 
capital, conveyed by ‘interpersonal trust networks’, prepares people for their journey, 
enhancing the chances of survival (Singer and Massey 1998; Menjivar 2000, pgs. 58-76; 
Spener 2009; Tilly 2007). Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as  
…the aggregate or the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of 
its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which 
entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. These relationships may exist 
only in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which help to maintain 
them.27  
 
Access to reliable information is one aspect of this social capital, a product of 
participating in networks based on reciprocity and trust. Since its popularization in the 
study of human migration by Massey (Massey et al. 1987; Massey et al. 1993), the 
metaphor of networks has achieved hegemony over migration studies, becoming an 
indispensible tool for thinking about the path dependence of migration flows (e.g. Kyle 
2000; Tilly 2007).  The concept of interpersonal trust networks is experiencing a similar 
popularity in the study of criminal activity, where networks based on kinship help 
mitigate the absence of the state in the enforcement of contracts and discourages 
                                                        
27 Robert Putnam (1993, p.167) similarly defines social capital: “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions”.  In turn, he cites Coleman (1990). I chose the definition by 
Bourdieu to emphasize the fact that ongoing exchanges, whether material or symbolic, are 
central to the persistence of networked relationships. 
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defection to the state (e.g. Kenney 2009; Mcillwain 2000).28 Similarly, Avner Greif 
(2006) discusses the role of kinship and social networks in medieval trade. This research 
goes a long way toward explaining how each individual’s decisions alter the pay-offs for 
the future choices of kin and community members, and it highlights the durability of 
migration and other unauthorized activities overtime.  It points to the potential for a 
reputation mechanism to solve the problem of private order in the smuggling market 
(Spener 2009; Kyle and Scarcelli 2009).  Indeed, in interviews, I found that migrants’ 
family networks play an important role in the provision of financial resources for the 
journey, and ultimately, migrant safety during unauthorized travel. 
However, the social capital critique of neoclassical models also overlooks the central 
importance of the journey itself as a major source of the dynamism of migratory flows 
when policing and violence escalates. Conventional approaches to understanding 
migration, whether neoclassical or sociological, tend to assume that people cross the 
border mechanically and somewhat predictability, with an itinerary neatly planned in 
advance.  They do not fully consider the possibility that the migrants learn and adapt 
while moving within an ever-changing flow.  To the extent that these scholars have 
considered learning, they have used the lens of human capital to measure its impact on 
future journeys, rather than examine sources of creativity and adaptation en route (e.g. 
Singer and Massey 1998).     
In summary, the conventional approach to understanding the choice of migration 
tactics focuses almost exclusively on decisions made in the communities of origin and                                                         
28 For an introduction to the use of network analysis as a method for understanding organized 
crime, rather than the conceptual use of networks more generally, see Goldsmith and 
Lysaght’s (2011) workshop. 
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destination.  In neoclassical decision models, information about the dangers of the 
journey is treated as a given; people calculate and consider the risks relative to the 
benefits in advance of the adventure.  Knowledge is assumed, rather than explained and a 
focus on pre-departure decisions obscures the learning process along the route.  In social 
capital models of migration decisions, information about the dangers of the journey 
accumulates through reciprocal relationships among family or community members. The 
assumption is that information about past journeys can be relayed to the home 
community before it becomes obsolete. In this view, knowledge is a product of social 
capital; it is a thing that can be possessed, hoarded and exchanged without losing its value 
over time.  Despite their utility for explaining the durability of informal institutions, the 
concepts of social capital and interpersonal trust networks do not fully explain the 
flexibility of these practices under conditions of violent suppression. In reality, networks 
emerge and disappear in a dynamic process that unfolds along the migratory route.  
Social capital and interpersonal trust networks play an important role in rational 
migration decisions, but they must be augmented with other sources of information that 
surface only during the journey.  
The journey can be transformative for both individuals and society. The route 
provides a physical and social infrastructure for the acquisition of information after 
departure. As individuals practice migration, they come into physical contact with new 
situations and update their tactics accordingly. Along the route, migrants also observe and 
mimic tactics in real time, experiment with new tactics, talk with strangers, confront 
specific situations requiring immediate responses, and learn how to use new technology 
to communicate with people at other points in the route (such as Facebook). Without 
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ongoing imagination and improvisation, however, crowds become herds. For all these 
reasons, unauthorized migration is a continuous learning process. As Taylor (2004, p.25) 
says, “If the understanding makes the practice possible, it is also true that it is the practice 
that largely carries the understanding.” Migrants often learn the newest adaptations and 
innovations as they move across terrain, not when planning that movement. And as they 
move, they transform that social and material terrain. 
Informing Routes 
Unauthorized routes become what Abraham and van Schendel (2005) call an 
‘underground’ of “legally banned but socially sanctioned and protected” practice where 
information mediates entry (p.22): “One may see these spaces but not know how to enter 
them.  Hence, privileged information becomes a primary distributional resource to access 
this space….” There are two primary ways of accessing this social space during the 
journey: ‘practiced terrain’ and ‘practiced crowds’. These are the physical and social 
institutions of the route, constituted by the practices of movement. As they travel, 
migrants shape places, leaving traces of their passage behind in physical artifacts, both 
intentionally and unintentionally.  These places become gathering points, where crowds 
engage in migration practice and proximity provides vital information.   
First, a ‘practiced terrain’ includes the places and objects molded by routine social 
activity. Places and things form part of the material culture of sustained human 
movement.  As ‘knowledge-based artifacts’ that emerge when migratory routines become 
fixed, they are the physical institutions of transit. In his study of long-distance trade, a 
process bearing many similarities to the transnational migratory route, Greif (2006, 
p.134) follows Friedrich von Hayek (1973; 1976) by explaining how “institutionalized 
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rules aggregate private information and knowledge and distribute it in compressed form”. 
Similar to social rules, the material evidence of practice is a compressed form of 
knowledge: it is the physical manifestation of patterned migration. 
Practices of movement shape tangible objects both deliberately and accidentally, 
conveying information to migrants as they encounter these physical remnants en route. 
Of course, these knowledge-based artifacts also unintentionally transmit information to 
would-be predators of migrants, such as bandits and police. By codifying sustained 
practices for all to see and generating an expectation of repetition, these knowledge-based 
artifacts identify points of vulnerability for unauthorized migrants.  
In this case, unintended knowledge-based artifacts include train tracks and footpaths, 
as terrain reconfigures to sustained movement thereby orienting travelers.  Many 
migrants leave home without financial resources or accurate geographic orientations, 
knowing only that they must arrive at a train yard to find the route north and then move 
along with the human tide.  Now that passenger service has been discontinued, the only 
people (aside from the conductors) that travel the Mexican trains are unauthorized; every 
morning in southern Mexico, train yards and the rooftops of trains fill with hundreds of 
Central Americans.  In this manner, migrants use the train tracks, artifacts of the legally 
sanctioned movement of commodities, as a compass needle for unauthorized movement; 
and they co-opt the train yards, key sites in the legal economy, as a platform for 
unauthorized movement north. As explained by a Salvadoran man who was too poor to 
hire a paid guide to help him cross Mexico, “The train is the guide. You just follow the 
tracks and they get you there” (El Salvador, 4/9/10). Similarly, footpaths (exclusively 
used for unauthorized movement) emerge around migration checkpoints, to and from 
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shelters and train yards, and across borders. Once formed, these footpaths direct 
movement to these locations.    
For this reason, movement in the legal and illegal economies is often symbiotic. At a 
macroeconomic level, Peter Andreas (1995, p.75) traces the relationship between free 
market policy and the growth of the illegal economy in Latin America with a warning 
that “legal and illegal markets are often inextricably intertwined”. At a micro level, 
Andreas (1996, p.58; 2003, p.96) notes the tendency for legal traffic to facilitate illegal 
traffic by camouflaging clandestine movements and complicating the capacity of the state 
to filter unwanted trade. He notes how the physical infrastructure of border crossings and 
roads can be harnessed by both legal and illegal traffic. In a similar vein, Eric 
Tagliocozzo (2000, p.5) describes how busy urban environments provide camouflage for 
illegal transactions. However, legal economic practices do not just conceal information 
from police; they provide information to participants in illegal activity. In this case, 
migrants orient themselves to the legal traffic through the tracks and highways as a guide 
from the periphery to the economic core. They may also collect information about 
smuggling services through the networks forged while a customer or worker in legal 
economic activities. Legal economic practices contribute to an informational 
infrastructure that may also be harnessed for unauthorized movements through a process 
of re-imagination and improvisation. 
Intentional knowledge-based artifacts include efforts by both organizations and 
migrants to convey knowledge to the people passing behind them. Migrants sometimes 
leave notes with addresses on the walls of shelters. Migrant artists paint elaborate murals 
about the experience of migration. Family members post flyers with the photos of 
   
  39 
missing migrants. Gang members mark territory with graffiti and their bodies with 
tattoos. Kidnappers and gangs publicize their brutality by mutilating and dumping human 
bodies. Government agencies post wanted signs and propaganda. Human rights agencies 
and organizations make maps and print brochures describing the dangers, migrants’ legal 
rights and safety precautions. However, like unintended artifacts and the places where 
migrants congregate, these messages can cut two ways, both transmitting vital 
information for the security of migrants and exposing migrants to harm by publicizing the 
nature of migration practices to potential predators.  And as migrants are fully aware, 
these messages may also become instruments of misinformation. 
Clandestine places along the route also convey information by facilitating social 
encounters. Through the sustained practice of movement over terrain, key places emerge 
along the route and provide an excellent environment for these social interactions to 
occur, with both positive and negative consequences for migrant vulnerability to violence 
in transit: shelters, train yards, overlooks with a view of the border, brothels, flophouses, 
and cantinas.  Clandestine places for information exchange along the route are “hidden 
but known”; they consist of space routinely and knowingly used for purposes outside the 
law (Coutin 20055, p.198). Thus, the physical architecture of practice channels migrants 
into crowds, which encourages social encounters among strangers.   
These places become increasingly visible to a variety of actors, because they persist 
over time, thereby generating both security and vulnerability for migrants.  They are 
places where information surfaces in an informational desert, and like oases, they are 
necessary for the migrants’ survival.  But they attract predators too.  As visibility 
increases, these places become sites of a struggle over information. Migrants, state 
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authorities with a variety of official agendas (ranging from public health to law 
enforcement), kidnappers, smugglers, corrupt authorities, humanitarian workers, activists, 
religious leaders, family members of missing persons, potential employers, journalists 
and academics vie for access to the underground at these locations.29 They are places 
with perpetual rumors about the presence of informants, and migrants devise tactics for 
maintaining secrecy.  Eventually, the very persistence of these sites eventually makes 
migrants too weary of unwanted attention to visit them, and the sites suffer periodic 
purges or decline into the ruins of a former trade route. 
Second, the practiced crowd that gathers in and around these places transmits 
information through both observational and social learning (Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch 1998, p.153): what James Surowieki (2004) popularly calls the “wisdom of 
crowds”. In observational learning, the mere presence or movement in a crowd can 
trigger an information cascade.30 Within the crowd, social learning also happens. 
Information diffuses among strangers by word-of-mouth, and socialization occurs 
through both verbal and visual cues.  While serendipity plays a role in all human affairs, 
casual meetings in these crowds are something more than a random encounter; through 
practice, opportunities for these exchanges are shaped by their location within all three 
landscapes: material, socio-economic and the socio-psychological. These roving crowds 
constitute the social practice of human movement. This notion of a practiced crowd 
                                                        
29 Not coincidentally, these are many of the places I visited during fieldwork.  
30 An information cascade is when “individuals rapidly converge on one action on the basis of 
some but very little information…when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the 
actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without 
regard to his own information” (Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch 1992, p.994).    
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draws on the concept of ‘communities of practice’ (Wenger 1998). In his discussion of 
transnational communities of practice, Emanuel Adler (2008, p.196) explains that: 
The vanguards or ‘carriers’ of social structures across functional and geographical 
boundaries are not necessarily states or societal networks, but ‘communities of practice’ - 
like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by 
a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice. 
 
Likewise, migrants come together, informally bound by a shared interest in learning 
and applying migration practice. They follow the crowd in search of information, and 
sometimes, the physical and emotional security found in numbers. Sometimes the 
agreement to travel as a collective is explicit, as people break into teams at key places 
along the route. At other times, people just happen to be moving in the same direction, in 
the same way.  
These crowds do not necessarily lead to a sense of ‘community’.  Depending on the 
specific circumstances and social practices of the crowd, socialization within it may lead 
to suspicion and animosity, rather than trust, reciprocity and obligation. Most often, 
crowds are a situational mix of community and hostility. In other words, practiced 
crowds do not necessarily follow the process outlined by Adler (2008) to become 
transnational ‘communities of practice’ with institutionalized moral expectations. But 
they may. Along the route, some travel groups dissipate after a short time together, 
whether consciously fleeing danger or simply wandering their separate ways. Other 
groups develop a sense of solidarity through shared emotional experiences in the practice 
of movement; by learning how to migrate within the context of a social group, they may 
reimagine their collective identity as migrants (e.g. Frank-Vitale 2010).  Because of their 
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informational value, kidnappers and smugglers (and it is sometimes rumored, undercover 
police) often infiltrate these crowds and communities. 
Importantly, community is not always a necessary context for the exchange of 
information, even in dangerous situations. In the anonymity of a crowd, there is little or 
no expectation of repeated interaction or reciprocity. These social moments do not meet 
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) requirement that “the reproduction of social capital presupposes 
an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition 
is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed”. Nevertheless, within an anonymous crowd in 
motion, migrants convey and process vital information, and they engage in simple forms 
of mimicry. Casual meetings of strangers are invaluable to the people involved. 
A variety of face-to-face encounters occur in these places: warnings, small talk, 
storytelling, sex, bragging, commiserating, joking, singing, evangelizing, speculating, 
complaining, interviews, begging, selling and trading. Sometimes people intentionally 
transmit information to strangers and, at other times, the information exchanged is 
accidental to other social purposes. Misunderstandings and misinformation (i.e. 
intentionally conveyed misunderstandings) are common. Motives for sharing information 
range widely, from boredom to economic self-interest. Sometimes there is only the 
mutual need for information. At other times, there is neither a clear instrumental nor 
altruistic motive to share information. People often carry on a conversation for their own 
entertainment or comfort. Sometimes people overhear information conveyed to others; 
eavesdropping is very important. Finally, sometimes the information exchanged has very 
little to do with what is actually said, let alone what was intended (Goffman 1959). 
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Speech is certainly not the only form of communication; people also take in scenes and 
strangers with their eyes. 
People watch and mimic strangers along the route. If any mental state can be said to 
characterize a clever person in an uncertain situation, it is watchfulness. They look for 
uncoordinated collective actions, like the sudden dispersion of the crowd in response to 
danger, rapid movement to the train yard that indicates an impending departure, or the 
presence of a large group of customers waiting to depart with a guide signaling good 
reputation.31 And migrants watch other migrants, looking for ideas and tactics that might 
help move along the route. 
Finally, migrants also observe other migrants in order to evaluate their intentions.  
Membership in “imagined worlds” (Appadurai 1996, p.33), such as those constituted by 
nationality, religion, street gangs, class, and gender, provide interpretive frames for 
judging strangers. These memberships can be inscribed on the body, as well as verbally 
expressed. And information about them is an invaluable asset en route.  These imagined 
categories define possible roles that people might perform, and thus the ways that other 
migrants might pose threats, offer assistance or themselves be vulnerable or valuable to 
criminals. 
The ability to conceal membership can also be invaluable. For example, Central 
Americans watch and mimic Mexicans living along the route. Incentives for such 
mimicry are high because the ability to pass as a Mexican citizen provides greater safety 
from state authorities and criminal predators. Central American migrants conscientiously                                                         
31 All three of these examples could be characterized as ‘information cascades’.  Fearful, 
uncertain and sudden situations seem to be most likely to trigger these reactions along the 
route.  The use of a crowd to signal reputation of a smuggler mirrors the oft-cited example of a 
crowd in front of a restaurant indicating the best food (e.g. Surowieki 2004, p.53). 
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learn to dress and speak like Mexicans as a form of camouflage. Other mimicry occurs 
unconsciously, as new expressions, accents and mannerisms become habitual adaptations 
through interaction with Mexicans along the route. In so far that they are advantageous, 
such adaptations may become a form of ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu 1986). And the 
reverse is also true; some Mexicans unwittingly take on the cultural tells of Central 
Americans. Indeed, urban Central American street culture, generally associated with the 
spread of immigrant gangs from Los Angeles back to El Salvador in the 1990s, has 
already become a hybridized panoply of transnational urban practices, speech patterns 
and styles of self-presentation (Zilberg 2004; 2011). These, too, are now common among 
all nationalities along the migrant route.32 On the one hand, this cross-cultural exchange 
can be a distinct disadvantage for Mexicans because it enhances the likelihood of 
wrongful deportation and other abuse.  Some Mexican people along the route traversed 
by Central Americans are, for all purposes, undocumented in their own country; many 
people lack papers and some Mexican squatter settlements along the train tracks fall into 
ambiguous legal status. Central American cultural cues can be a dangerous asset for these 
already marginalized Mexican citizens. On the other hand, such cues may be an everyday 
advantage by generating a more permanent community of practice, ultimately bringing 
them culturally closer to the people that inhabit their everyday world.                                                            
32 By using descriptors  “Mexican” and “Central American”, I am not making claims about 
national authenticity.  While in El Salvador, I frequently heard complaints from older people 
about how Salvadoran youths adopted these styles and practices in the United States and then 
brought it with them back to El Salvador, where they spread rapidly.  Some of these street 
critics, who view the cultural change as an external threat, called it a Mexicanization of the 
youth, and others called it an Americanization.  Given the long history of regional human, 
economic and cultural mobility, I would argue that there is no ‘authentic’ Central American, 
Mexican or American practice. I use these national markers, because participants use them and 
the people who transgress national categories either suffer real material penalties or gain real 
material advantages.   
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Ironically, the increased difficulty of entering and staying in the United States has 
created a fertile social field for ‘communities of practice’ along the routes.  With so many 
people making repeated attempts to enter the United States, unauthorized travelers may 
encounter each other several times. Aggressive immigration policing and deportation 
policies in the United States has encouraged the emergence of permanent bands of 
Central American migrants who rove the routes through Mexico. Some migrants have 
simply adopted transit as a lifestyle. Unwilling or unable to return to the poverty and 
criminal violence they left behind, but equally unable to make a home in the United 
States, these young men roam the railways like hobos.33 Indeed, migrants who wander 
aimlessly across Mexico are sometimes recruited into street gangs and/or as guides in 
smuggling networks (and/or more sinister kidnapping networks) working the Mexican 
segment of the route.  In this manner, aggressive immigration policing and deportation 
policies in the United States generates a transnational class of vagabonds, and with it, a 
more durable ‘community of practice’ with links to professional smuggling networks. 
Hang out in any migrant shelter or train yard along the route for a time, and you will 
begin to recognize their faces in the crowd. 
The familiarity that perpetual migration produces cuts two ways for these route-
dwellers. On the one hand, they benefit from their ties to settled Mexican citizens, 
transnational street gangs and professional smuggling networks. On the other hand, their 
face becomes increasingly recognizable to others along the route, making them a 
potential target for criminals or authorities. As they become recognizable, they lose their 
capacity to claim that they are ‘legitimate’ migrants searching for a better life. As a                                                         
33 This class of wanderers seems to be almost all male, with some exceptions. 
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consequence, Church-run shelters, for example, may deny them assistance because they 
suspect that they are a guide or gang member. In many situations during the journey, it is 
best to pass incognito and, thus, not to become a potential source of information for 
others. In the strategic context of unauthorized migration, any patterned behavior, 
including participation in transnational communities, can be dangerous because it 
increases visibility.   
Therein lies the central problem of information along the route. Information becomes 
most accessible, most visible and most ‘legible’, where practice becomes institutionalized 
in the form of social rules and reputations that bind communities or in the form of the 
material artifacts that define place. James Scott (1999, p.183) warns that “legibility is a 
condition of manipulation” by the state. Indeed, the visibility and potential legibility of 
information often diminishes its utility for migrants, who must respond to a very dynamic 
and violent strategic environment. Patterned behavior generates vulnerability, rather than 
safety. In the context of criminal violence and immigration enforcement, a path or 
strategy repeated one too many times results in disaster. Therefore, information alone is 
not enough to safely navigate conditions of extreme uncertainty and insecurity. 
 Imagining and Improvising Routes 
The ultimate impact of information is determined by how it is used by migrants and 
their foes, not simply whether the information exists. For instance, the utility of 
information largely depends upon migrants’ capacity to exploit it in novel ways. In turn, 
this novelty can only be imagined and improvised. To be sure, migrants’ behavior 
exhibits a lucid rationality as they attempt to evade violence, but this rationality can only 
be deployed as practice. Messages written into a material and social landscape constituted 
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by practice convey informational cues to migrants during the journey. With information 
obtained as they move along the route, migrants thus imagine and improvise new paths 
forward.   
As migrants approach unfamiliar people and situations or as they question the 
motives of people they once trusted, the sense of uncertainty deepens. Jens Beckert 
(2011) notes the tendency to rely on imagination to make decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty; building on the work of Wolfgang Iser (1993) and John Searle (1975), he 
defines fictions as “images of some future state of the world or course of events which are 
cognitively accessible in the present through mental representation” to explain rational 
decision-making in a context of uncertainty (Beckert 2011, p.1).34 Fictions represent 
specific imaginings that inform future expectations (p.7). Indeed, rational decision-
making always requires these story-like expectations about the future, which are not 
formed mechanistically, but drawn from the vast creative and symbolic reservoir of the 
human mind. Without expectations, any purposeful action (let alone rational action) 
would be impossible (p.6). The images and narratives that inhabit the imaginary come 
from religion, popular media and word-of-mouth, but the imaginary does not become a 
repository of useful fictions until people move along the route and confront specific 
situations. These fictions, with their capacity to envision a new and different future than 
the present, explain human creativity.35 
                                                        
34 The term ‘fiction’ is not meant to imply that these imaginings are false.  Beckert (2011, p.5-
7) goes on to explain that fictions could be true.  They are narratives about what might happen 
in the future, and under conditions of uncertainty, we must act upon them as if they are true.    
35Cornelius Castoriadis (1975; 1994) emphasizes the emancipatory potential of imagination in 
politics. Building on that work, Beckert (2011, p.9) underscores its potential for explaining 
dynamism in the global economy. 
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 Paradoxically, the imaginary seems to spawn reified ‘common sense’ as much as 
creativity. To return to Taylor’s (2004, p.26) description of the social imaginary, it is “the 
implicit grasp of social space”.36 The nature of this imaginary is clarified when contrasted 
to information.  Information triggers moments of inspiration. The imaginary is the 
structuring that presorts possibilities without strictly determining them.  As explained by 
Taylor (2004, p.25), however, the imaginary is also unstructured. It delimits without 
being limited itself. It defines without being definite. At first, an ‘unstructured 
structuring’ may seem like an oxymoron, but the imaginary is not organized in a linear 
manner; it is abstract, rooted only in practice and consecrated by imagery and emotion. It 
prefigures reason. It is a fluid ordering, not an order fully amenable to conscious 
comprehension. Indeed, the imaginary is largely unconscious and unthinking, only 
revealing itself in fragments and generating connections “not by conscious choice or 
deliberate selection, but by a mechanism over which we do not exercise deliberate 
control” (Hayek 1973, p.30). We may put ourselves into a place or position that creates 
opportunity for imagination, but creativity (in the form of an exciting recombination of 
fragments of the imaginary) rarely happens on cue. The imaginary posits purpose, but 
cannot be directed to serve one without a muse. As we will see, the imaginary is the 
cognitive companion of practice; practice provides the imagination with a continuous 
form of inspiration. And as maps drawn by migrants will illustrate in Chapter 5: Mapping 
Routes, the imaginary provides a normative and geographic orientation to migration, but                                                         
36 As such, the imaginary the available content from which the imagination draws; it is the 
“background knowledge” (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Searle 1995), the “doxa” (Bourdieu 1980), 
the “abstract knowledge” (Hayek 1973, p.30), the “logic of practicality” (Pouliot 2010); the 
“tacit knowledge” (Iser 1993; Polyani 1983 [1966]), or at least, it is a close approximation of 
these many related concepts.  
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without a predictable grid.37 Its non-linearity and tendency to re-compose images and 
ideas in unanticipated ways generates the appearance of intuition.  In Stephen 
Greenblatt’s (2010b, p.76) words: 
…the imagination works through metaphor, personification, magical animation; that is, it 
works by projecting voices, inventing geneologies, transporting and knitting 
heterogenous elements together. 
 
First social contacts between strangers are negotiated within this mosaic of 
imagination. In this vein, Erving Goffman provides what is perhaps the most complete 
sociological theory of the practice of face-to-face interaction. He reminds us that, in the 
absence of full information about another individual, we tend to use “cues, tests, hints, 
expressive gestures, status symbols, etc- as predictive devices” (1959, p.249). Goffman 
(1959) famously argues that each social meeting requires a performance to make the 
situation recognizable to its participants, and, in fact, to make the participants 
recognizable to themselves. Each performance requires a social role or rule re-enacted 
through a script, the repetition of which gives form to a coherent sense of self despite an 
individuals’ competing identities. Jean-Paul Sartre (1984 [1943], p.101-103) reminds us 
of the imaginative element of these ‘bad faith’ performances, the self-deceiving “dances” 
of everyday life that mollify the conscience into believing our actions are determined 
when other possibilities actually exist (Goffman 1959, p.75-76); through the performance 
of scripts, migrants, kidnappers, smugglers and border patrol agents may even become 
convinced that certain situations are inevitable or tolerable. The intelligibility of these 
                                                        
37 Taylor (2004, p.24) agrees: “Such understanding is both factual and normative; that is, we 
have a sense of how things usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they out to 
go, of what missteps would invalidate the practice”. 
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scripts and their cues to all parties in a social meeting is not guaranteed. A mismatch may 
occur, whether by honest misunderstanding or fraud.    
 These roles and scripts originally come from a social imaginary that migrants bring 
from sending communities and are integrated into the transnational routes through stories 
of perpetual departures, returns, and absences, as well as long-distance symbolic and 
economic transactions, such as remittance flows and popular media.38 Sometimes life 
imitates art.  Before Central Americans leave their birthplace, they are inundated by a 
deluge of movies, songs, internet sites, television programs, radio reports and newspaper 
articles about the journey.  For example, films like El Norte (The North) (1983), Tres 
Veces Mojado (Three Times a Wetback) (1989), La Misma Luna (The Same Moon) 
(2007) and Sin Nombre (Without a Name) (2009) have become cult classics. Spanish-
language television news programs and Central American newspapers now publish 
reports of abuse of migrants almost daily.39  The U.S. border patrol (USBP) sponsored a 
public relations campaign in Mexico and Central America that uses these mediums to 
raise awareness of the dangers of migration.40 Lynnaire Sheridan (2009) analyzes print 
and music representations of the U.S.-Mexico border crossing and argues that these mass-                                                        
38 Arjun Appadurai (1996) calls this the ‘mediascape’.   
39 Central American migrants with whom I spoke often had a jaded view of information 
received through newspapers, and understandably so, given the politicized history of 
journalism in Central America (Rockwell and Janus 2003).  However, even when approached 
with skepticism, media stories come to inhabit the social imaginary.    
40 In 1997, the USBP launched its first media campaign to raise awareness of the dangers of 
illegal border crossing among potential migrants in Mexico. In 2004, the Border Safety 
Initiative of the USBP launched ‘No Mas Cruces en la Frontera’ through Elevacion, a private 
advertising agency.  Critics complain that the materials provide little transparency about their 
sponsorship (Ceresole 2009; LeBron 2009; Marosi 2005; Surdin 2009).  An official website 
highlights stories of suffering and death: http://www.nomascruces.org.  The campaign first 
targeted potential Mexican migrants, but was extended to Central America in 2010.  It began 
with a focus on desert dangers, primarily targeted at male migrants, but now includes 
warnings about human trafficking targeted at female migrants.  For examples of materials, see 
the PR firm website at: http://elevationpr.com/.  
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produced cultural expressions influence risk perceptions of migrants before they begin 
their journey.  Since the same Spanish-language songs, movies and television programs 
often air in Central America, we should expect them to influence a transnational social 
imaginary across the Americas.  And, of course, the book of singular great importance for 
the transnational social imaginary of Central American migrants is the Bible. Narratives 
from these sources form archetypes of people, places and things that migrants come to 
expect to encounter along the route.   
Furthermore, as they navigate the terrain of the route, migrants listen intently to 
stories about the journey of others. In the fleeting communities of practice that converge 
for short distances along the route, migrants share and receive information by way of 
campfire stories, anecdotes, songs, jokes, rumors, sermons, and testimonies. These 
narratives circulate among migrants, as well as among the many other people along the 
route: bandits, kidnappers, police, townspeople, smugglers, activists, journalists and 
academics. Migrants recognize that these stories represent a mishmash of truth and 
untruth as people err, exaggerate, bluff, boast, entertain and just plain lie. But in a 
dangerous and uncertain context, no information can be entirely dismissed. People listen 
most intently to tales about events that occurred in their immediate surroundings or what 
might lie just ahead. But even when stories are fantastic, new images and ideas seep into 
the imaginary. Memories of these images and ideas may surface again during the process 
of improvisation.  In this way, the route becomes a ‘place’ in the social imaginary through the stories 
told before, during and after the journey. And people become their performances, as they 
imagine themselves into the various worlds along the route. Within these ‘imagined 
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worlds’ (Appadurai 1996, p.33), migrants may perform a variety of competing and 
complimentary social roles with varying degrees of sincerity: migrant, smuggler, friend, 
lover, wife, mother, gang member, informant, activist.  The possibilities for scripts are 
legion.  Dynamic conditions and violence along the route promote constant revision, 
giving rise to hybrid roles, imaginaries and communities. 
Jens Beckert (2011, p.5) juxtaposes script following and imagination as two ideal 
types of decision-making, but I emphasize how neither pure script nor pure innovation 
can be fully realized. Imagination occurs as scripts meet new and unknown realities. 
Script following is not a separate mode of decision-making associated with a determined 
outcome, but part of the real world process of reimagining. Scripts amenable to constant 
experimentation and ruthless rewrites do not serve as social macrostructures; rather, they 
are the basis for improvisation. The improvisation that occurs under conditions of 
uncertainty is not pure innovation, but a tinkering with the existing symbolic and material 
resources at hand. Indeed, these scripts guide tentative social interactions along the route 
the way a theme might guide a stand-up comedian confronted with hecklers or a mood 
might guide a jazz musician performing in a new ensemble.41 Social scripts, employed 
loosely and altered to fit the particular scenario of the moment, aid the self-presentation, 
interpretation and organization of face-to-face social interactions under conditions of 
uncertainty.   
Thus, the individual imagination has both a liberating and constraining nature.  On 
the one hand, as noted by Beckert (2011, p.9), imaginative interpretations of a situation 
produce dynamism and “indeterminancy”, as people rethink and see differently.  On the                                                         
41 The metaphor of the jazz musician is borrowed from Curtis (1991, p.xviii) and Yanow 
(2001, p.58). 
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other hand, imaginative interpretations are also overdetermined, produced at the juncture 
of a seemingly infinite variety of memories, images, and stories. Like the dreamscapes 
that unfold unpredictably during a night’s sleep, the imagination sometimes reconstructs 
information in idiosyncratic ways, moving it from one context into another seemingly at 
random in such a way that, when reassembled, it leads to novel insights.  During the 
movement of people, the imaginary becomes transnational (Appadurai 1996) as people 
from many cultural backgrounds meet and exchange habits, ideas, and tall tales.  And as 
they confront violence together, they share emotional experiences.  The imaginative 
potential of the migrant redoubles by living in this clandestine crossroads of cultures; but 
this creativity can only be activated in practice. 
To better understand how the imagination becomes a useful fiction, and hence its 
janus-faced quality of innovation and reproduction, we must understand the process of 
movement: we must understand improvisation.42 Stephen Greenblatt (2005 [1980], 
p.165) defines improvisation as “the ability both to capitalize on the unforeseen and to 
transform given materials into one’s own scenario….the opportunistic grasp of that which 
seems fixed and established”.43 Improvisation depends on available informational, social 
and material resources to meet pressing needs in new ways.  In his critique of the                                                         
42 Taylor (2004, italics mine p. 29) also recognizes the relationship between improvisation and 
change in the social imaginary: “For the most part, people take up, improvise, or are inducted 
into new practices.  These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first articulated in 
the theory; this outlook is the context that gives sense to the practices.  Hence the new 
understanding comes to be accessible to the participants in a way it wasn’t before.  It begins to 
define the contours of their world and can eventually come to count as the taken-for-granted 
shape of things too obvious to mention”. 
43 Unlike my treatment of the concept here, Greenblatt (2005) downplays the “spur-of-the-
moment quality of improvisation”, because “the impromptu character of an improvisation is 
itself often a calculated mask, the product of careful preparation”.  Without denying that some 
actors (particularly smugglers) have an incentive for “faking” the need to improvise, I stress 
this impromptu character of improvisation under conditions of uncertainty. 
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conflation of rationality with planning, David Ames Curtis (1991, p.xviii) looks to the 
improvisatory nature of jazz music as an exemplar of this character of living: 
One need not write out all one’s notes in advance, or even “plan” them all, as evidence 
precisely by jazz “improvisation”.  But playing before this planning process is 
“complete” is not lack of “foresight”. 
 
Improvisation is not a lack of rules, maps, scripts or other informational resources. It 
is not the absence of preparation (Yanow 2001, p.59; 2009, p.293). Instead, it is an 
irreverent attitude to those resources, co-opting whatever symbolic or material tools 
might be at hand without respecting their origin or purpose. Curtis (1991, p.xx) further 
argues that the development of the improvisational jazz genre in America, a self-
consciously migratory society, is no coincidence; he calls it a fundamentally “mulatto” 
musical form, because black Americans “adopted, reworked, and fashioned anew and in 
particular ways the instruments, practices, and rules of a different, dominant culture while 
changing that culture in the process”.   
To paraphrase Curtis, Central American migrants adopt, rework, and fashion anew 
the instruments, practices and customs of Mexican and U.S. culture, while changing that 
culture in the process. Confronted with sexual violence, female migrants and female 
smugglers use feminine wiles and patriarchal norms to overstep traditional roles (as well 
as immigration law), altering gender in the process. In a shift that some might call 
“corruption”, migrants and smugglers adopt, rework and fashion anew the instruments, 
practices and rules of the state and legal economy. Such is the handiwork of 
improvisation. Similarly, David Spener (2010) argues that Mexican migrants engage in a 
form of ‘rasquache’ while crossing the border.  Chicano artist Ybarra-Frausto (1991, p. 
156) explains the origins of the ‘rasquachismo’ art form: 
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In an environment always on the edge of coming apart (the car, the job, the toilet), things 
are held together with spit, grit, and movidas.  Movidas are the coping strategies you use 
to gain time, to make options, to retain hope.  Rasquachismo is a compendium of all the 
movidas deployed in immediate, day-to-day living.  Resilience and resourcefulness 
spring from making do with what is at hand (hacer rendir las costas) (quoted in Spener 
2010, p.15). 
 
Spener (2010) mistakes this sensibility as a distinctly Mexican and Chicano/a cultural 
form. However, improvisation permeates all migrations. All migrants learn the art of 
making do. Appadurai (1996, p.6) correctly points out that contemporary diasporas 
“move the glacial force of the habitus into the quickened beat of improvisation for large 
groups of people”. Nonetheless, improvisation characterizes all human life, most often 
and most poignantly at the margins. The homes of the poorest people in Latin America, 
whether urban or rural, are improvised structures of recycled materials: discarded tin, 
tires, cardboard, mud, extension cords that tap ‘borrowed’ sources of electricity, bits of 
string, fallen tree branches and trash bags.44Their livelihoods must be patched together in 
similar ways, with odd jobs and hustle. Indeed, the migratory journey is part of a larger 
improvisation of living that begins at home, long before the decision to move has been 
made; the hardship that necessitates this constant improvisation begins at home. As 
explained by a Salvadoran campesino who had returned to his village after a long 
experience abroad, “To be a migrant is to be exploited...migrants are migrants, whether 
they move or not” (12/7/09). In this sense, the journey represents a continuation of a 
perceived injustice.  It also represents a continuation of improvisational tactics for coping 
with physical insecurity, economic marginalization and injustice.45                                                          
44 On the development of a landscape of squatter communities and slums to accommodate the 
unplanned life that takes place within planned cities, see James Scott (1998, p.103-146). 
45 In the words of pianist Michael Jones (2001, p.63), improvisation is “not only a technique or 
skill but also a foundation for living and leading in a rapidly changing world”. 
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During the journey, people often usefully employ both things and ideas in a manner 
that the thing’s creator or author never intended. Empty plastic bottles are fashioned onto 
a makeshift raft or a life-vest. A mango becomes a hiding place for money. A national 
anthem or national holiday becomes an impromptu citizenship test at a migration 
checkpoint. An ambulance hides contraband.  A tattoo identifies the nationality of a dead 
body for the government bureaucrats who must arrange its shipment home to Central 
America.  
Conscious planning cannot account for these improvised adaptations (Scott 1998), 
and it is certainly not adequate preparation for the migrant trail.  People cannot plan their 
routes, before they confront and seek to evade a proactive state and bandits. As a rural 
Salvadoran community leader explained, and many migrants echoed in interviews, “no-
one is ever prepared” for the unknowns that wait along the route (1/5/10); nobody knows 
exactly what the journey will entail before they begin, because “every trip is different”. 
To hold stubbornly to a route chosen before the journey would, in a context of rapidly 
changing patterns of violence, be suicide. In this context of obvious but unpredictable 
danger, to mindlessly follow established habits of travel would lead migrants to their 
destruction, like lemmings over a cliff.46 However, the process is not purely spontaneous 
either. Unauthorized migrants do not summon their tactics from thin air, but instead                                                         
46 Human migration is fundamentally a social practice, and while it draws on forms of tacit 
knowledge, it is not instinctual.  The seasonal migrations of most species follow a direct and 
predictable path, and when obstacles (such as hazardous roads) emerge along this path, most 
species do not deviate from the established migratory route. Thus, migratory species are prone 
to extinction when disturbances occur along the routes. Humans, not surprisingly, are an 
exception in the animal kingdom; the social process of migration takes people to unexpected 
places along a winding and wandering course to evade obstacles to our movement.  Mobile 
knowledge is more adaptable than instinct. Hayek (1973, p.31) also warns against the 
misconception that people behave in a manner that is either ‘instinctive’ or ‘intuitive’. It only 
appears intuitive. 
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improvise through a reflexive reinterpretation of themselves and their knowledge of the 
route in specific social and strategic contexts. They must be both flexible and determined 
to survive the possibility of detentions, deportation, robbery, rape or even death. Thus, 
violence structures migration practice, such that the routes exist because of violence not 
simply despite it. 
The individual repetition of social routines also drives their transformation (Bourdieu 
1980, p.57).47 The repetition of practice in a changing environment and the cross-
fertilization of practices encourages subtle forms of recycled creativity, a patchwork of 
existing practice reassembled in novel ways, which ironically stabilizes the routes and the 
unquestioned viability of migration as a life strategy. In this context, practice both reifies 
and liberates the social imagination, giving the social imagination its dual character: 
sometimes blinding us to the obvious and at other times generating ingenuity when 
confronted with seemingly intractable puzzles.48 It is both the source of unwavering faith 
and creative questioning of possibility. 
Likewise, Michel de Certeau (1984) challenges the dichotomy between the 
consumption and production of information, pointing to this practice of “bricolage”.                                                          
47 This idea of a “reiterative power” is also at the heart of Judith Butler’s (1993) concept of 
performativity in the discursive realm of gender identity.  It is the repetition of norms that 
ironically opens space for reinterpretations and reinventions.   
48 This duality reminds us that stability and change are not opposites; mobility and constraint 
reinforce each other in often surprising ways (Greenblatt 2010a).  Following Bourdieu, Adler 
and Pouliot (2011, p.7) incorporate patterned regularities into their definition of the concept of 
practice, but they also note the potential for practice to bridge the study of change and 
continuity.  Ted Hopf (2010) points out that by ignoring the role of habitual behavior in 
practice, in favor of normative and instrumental decision making logics, IR constructivists 
have overemphasized possibilities for change and intentionality.  Migrants intend to survive 
and reach their destination, but actions to achieve these basic material goals come with 
unintended consequences for them and the unauthorized route. And while they must respond 
with flexibility to achieve their immediate goals, determined migrants also bring their 
structured habits of mind with them on their journey.     
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People do not simply consume new information, passively adding it to an immobile 
reserve.  Nor do they produce new information without reference to an existing social 
imaginary or habitus.  Instead, the knowledge that emerges from improvisational 
practices is novel but situational, arising through the simultaneous navigation of the 
physical, socio-economic and socio-psychological terrain (p.81-82).  As de Certeau 
(1984, p.82-86) reiterates, this improvised knowledge is “…a memory, whose 
attainments are dissociable from the time of their acquisition and bear the marks of its 
particularities” but derives its utility from its “very capacity to be altered- unmoored, 
mobile, lacking and fixed position”.   
Mobile Knowledge 
In this manner, an ongoing process of imagination, information and improvisation 
constitute a ‘mobile knowledge’ of the route.49 To elaborate upon the type of knowledge 
that emerges from bricolage, de Certeau (1984, p.81) cites Marcel Detienne and Jean-
Pierre Vernant’s pivotal study of the Greek concept of metis.  Scott (1998, p.311-341), 
also drawing on this pivotal study by Detienne and Vernant, emphasizes how this 
knowledge is local.  Physical terrain matters for the development of clandestine routes 
and the ‘local knowledge’ acquired from travelling along them.  As Tagliacozzo (2005, 
p.18) describes in his history of contraband in 19th century Southeast Asia, capricious 
weather conditions and the varying depth of channels in the Straits of Malacca gave an 
advantage to homegrown smugglers with intimate knowledge of the terrain.  
Emphasizing the resources produced by this experiential knowledge of the local setting,                                                         
49 Scholars of experiential learning have devised a similar conceptual apparatus to describe the 
process of knowledge creation. In David Kolb’s model (1984), an iterative cycle of 
experience, reflection and analysis constitutes this creative process.  It is not my wish to 
formalize the process as the study of pedagogy does, but the similarities are clear. 
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Tagliacozzo notes that three physical terrain features encourage sustained smuggling 
practices: borders and peripheries, natural choke points, and urban environments (p.5).   
These terrain features encourage the development and durability of clandestine 
routes, even in the age of globalization.  In a study of ‘clandestine transnational 
organizations’ in contemporary Southeast Asia, Justin V. Hastings (2010, p.5-6) argues 
against Thomas Friedman’s (2006) assertion that ‘the world is flat’: 
In effect, the farther and faster any non-state actor wants to move around the world, 
the more dependent it becomes on chokepoints….Moreover, the groups’ movements 
are territorially constrained- people moving through mountain passes do not have the 
option of skipping over several countries as those in planes do.  
 
Building on Murphy (2003), Hastings notes that policy and perceptual space overlay 
territory generating an “iterative interplay” of ideas, transnational activities, politics and 
landscape (p.6). In other words, Hastings ultimately emphasizes ‘place’, not natural 
(Euclidian) space, when analyzing the flexible tactics of unauthorized non-state actors. 
Similarly, John Ruggie says (1999, p.235), “space is not given in nature. It is a social 
construct that people, somehow, invent”. The invention of place, as opposed to natural 
space, occurs in the practices that weave together the physical terrain, the socio-economic 
configuration of the landscape and the social imaginary. Human mobility is central to this 
iterative interplay.   
‘Mobile knowledge’ encompasses both the movement of travelers and the migration 
of local knowledge that accompanies them. This knowledge is neither a stock of human 
capital nor a personality trait, like metis. As explained by Colin McFarlane (2011, p.18): 
If we reject the functionalist view of knowledge as static, bound and fixed, and argue 
instead for a view of knowledge as social, then the practices and materialities through 
which knowledge is learnt are brought into view….while situated, this knowledge is also 
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mobile: it is formed not simply in place but through multiple knowledges that run through 
and call into being various spaces. 
 
Thus, mobile knowledge is a socio-spatially structured learning process, rather than a 
product (McFarlane 2011, p.24).  Through socio-economic interaction with people along 
the routes and the material artifacts produced by these practices, ‘local’ knowledge may 
be transported to new spaces and, in the process, transformed; it can be made ‘mobile’ 
and acquired in practices of moving.  As a process of moving information from one 
context to another using both material practice and imagination, ‘mobile knowledge’ 
transcends the dichotomy between local/universal knowledge.50 
 Conclusion 
 
Of course, even the master of metis, Odysseus, does not end his travelling life upon 
his safe return to Ithaca. As the ghost of Tiresias warned as he passes through the 
underworld, Odysseus is fated to undertake other quests to far away lands. He must 
placate the God he angered and regain the wealth that he lost in his initial adventure. 
Despite being the object of intense longing, the destination is only a temporary one. By 
the time Odysseus crosses the threshold of his palace, he already re-imagines the 
possibility of his next journey.  
Similarly, as noted by Cecilia Menjivar (2000), Susan Bibler Coutin (2005) and 
Sabine Hess (2010), the learning process does not end when migrants arrive at a                                                         
50In the field of Science and Technology Studies, Helen Watson-Verran and David Turnbull 
(1995, p.115-116) describe how this dichotomy has influenced the study of knowledge 
systems: “So-called traditional knowledge systems of indigenous peoples have frequently 
been portrayed as closed, pragmatic, utilitarian, value laden, indexical, context dependent, and 
so on, implying that they cannot have the same authority and credibility as science because 
their localness restricts them to the social and cultural circumstances of their production.  
These were accounts of dichotomy where the great divide in knowledge systems coincided 
with the great divide between societies that are powerful and those that are not.  Here was a 
satisfying explanation of the relation between knowledge and power” . 
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destination, because they constantly face deportation and therefore must continually 
reimagine the possibility of another journey.51 Clandestine spaces emerge within the 
United States; these routes include footpaths around highway checkpoints, the locked 
safe houses in Los Angeles and Houston where migrants await final payment and 
delivery, the predictable seasonal circuit followed by immigrant agricultural workers52, 
the city street corners where immigrant day laborers await employers in broad daylight, 
and trafficked women await customers at night. With the intensification of internal 
migration policing at bus and train stations, a smuggling industry now exists within the 
United States, not just at the border. Indeed, when I did my fieldwork, it cost just as much 
for an unauthorized migrant to travel with a guide from McAllen, Texas to Houston, 
Texas as it did to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.53 For these reasons, immigrants must 
improvise new lives in their destinations. The seemingly endless migrant odyssey brings 
the wisdom of Anthony T. Carter’s (1988, p.166) approach to human decisions into sharp 
focus; summarizing the contributions of G.W. von Leibenstein and Anthony Giddens to 
anthropology, he says that:                                                          
51 In this vein, Massey (1987, p.1498) says, “Migration is a process, not an event.  Unlike birth 
and death, which happen once and are bounded in space and time, migration involves at least 
two points on each dimension.  Except on the margins, the definitions of life and death are 
self-evident and widely shared.  However, the definition of a move relies on ambiguous 
concepts of settlement, residence, and place that are socially constructed and culturally 
variant.  The situation is further complicated because moves may occur more than once, and 
may encompass a variety of origins and destinations”.  
52 Ted Conover (1987) traveled these seasonal circuits with Mexican farmworkers in the 
1980s.  
53 Drawing from his fieldwork in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Spener (2009, p.68) writes 
that after crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, “The biggest challenge was still yet to come: 
traversing the unforgiving South Texas brush country that lay between the river and the 
immigration checkpoints on the highways leading away from the border.  In South Texas, the 
greatest difficulty for migrants had never been crossing the border itself.  That had always 
been and still remained relatively easy. The big challenge was to get past the immigration 
checkpoints to the towns and cities in the U.S. interior where jobs awaited them.” 
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…human action or agency involves the reflexive monitoring and rationalization of a 
continuous flow of conduct rather than a sequence of discrete acts or instances of 
choice and planning.  There are too few close ethnographic studies of such flows.   
 
We should understand migration strategy as an ongoing decision-making process, as 
opposed to an impulse to leave home. Migrants update their information along the way, 
and this information often prompts them to change tactics, and even goals. Importantly, 
smugglers may be hired at any point during this journey, and the location of the contract 
between smuggler and migrant influences its content. Strangers interact. Interpersonal 
trust networks are forged and dissolved.  Along the way north, migrants respond with 
ingenuity and agility to unexpected situations. As they move across a terrain, they come 
into contact with new practices and their artifacts, mimicking other people as a survival 
tactic, improvising upon social repertoires and adapting material objects to their needs, 
sometimes unconsciously.  
Thus, this chapter has argued that information is one part of a larger learning process 
that continues long after departure from the home community. Knowledge comes through 
the practice of migration. Because information about danger along the route quickly 
becomes outdated, migrants cannot rely solely on news retrieved from interpersonal trust 
networks to stay informed about dangers.  In the hyper-dynamic context of the Mexican 
drug war (2005-forward) and intensified migration policing along the route through 
Mexico since 2001, by the time a friend or relative arrives in the United States his/her 
route and the players along it have frequently changed beyond recognition. Under these 
conditions, migrants must continually gather information, reimagine their options and 
improvise.  In writing about the relationship between improvisation and the imagination 
in the work and life of Cornelius Castoriadis, Curtis (1991, p.xviii) exhorts us to find “a 
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kind of life that does not deny rationality, planning, and organizing, but does not confuse 
the plan with living nor does it live for the plan”. In other words, he asks us to live like a 
migrant. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A VEIL OF BROWN AND GRAY: THE AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE ROUTE 
Introduction 
The cave has two ways in, 
One facing the North Wind, a pathway down for mortals; 
the other, facing the South, belongs to the gods, 
no man may go that way… 
it is the path for all the deathless powers. 
 
The southern border of Mexico, like the entrance of the cave that greets Odysseus 
on his return to Ithaca, marks the beginning of a dangerous path for migrants. The way 
forward is obscured by ambiguous social relationships. There can be no blind trust in 
humanity in these dark places; they fall under a veil of ‘brown’ and ‘gray’ with sullied 
norms (O’Donnell 2004; Levi 1988). Social groups and their allegiances reorganize 
rapidly. Territory changes hands among competing criminal gangs without warning. 
Kidnappers disguise themselves as migrants or smugglers. Authorities collaborate 
with criminals. New violence emerges suddenly and spectacularly. Even hindsight of 
violence seldom provides clarity, as rumors compete with official versions of events. 
Instead, the unearthing of anonymous mass graves, the transience and disappearance 
of migrants, a lack of faith in the capacity of governments to prosecute the culpable, 
and rampant conspiracy theories heighten a sense of uncertainty along the route. 
Indeed, the cave has grown darker in the aftermath of the drug war (2006- 
present). Mexican bandits have long assaulted Central American migrants. For over 
three decades of mass migration, beginning with the northbound wave of refugees in 
the 1980s, corrupt officials have robbed and raped them. And tricksters have posed as 
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smugglers to defraud and then abandon them along the route. Those dangerous 
characters remain on the scene today. However, organized actors capable of 
orchestrating mass kidnappings of migrants for ransom have joined the repertory of 
criminal predators along the route. The emergence of these new predators and the 
subsequent reordering of social relationships, norms and routines create uncertainty 
for the migrants who must cross Mexico. 
This chapter describes the gauntlet of organized crime that migrants must run as 
they move through Mexico. It explains how relationships among organized criminal 
groups along the route have changed over time with deleterious consequences for 
migrants. I trace the evolution of the social menagerie of the route over three historical 
periods. First, I examine the route travelled by Central American refugees in the 
1980’s, and the relationship between its coyotes (human smugglers) and the migrants 
who followed them. Second, I describe the intensification of immigration enforcement 
in the 1990s through 2001 and the manifestation of a new face of villainy: 
transnational street gangs, known as maras. Third, I discuss the contemporary 
relationship between kidnappers and smugglers in the post-2006 drug war era.    
The discussion of each of these three historical periods follows a travel story from 
a migrant. I selected these three stories as exemplars of the changing personae 
dramatis of the route in each epoch, but the reader should be advised that there is no 
‘typical’ journey. In conveying these stories in three acts, I hope to give the reader a 
sense of the violent, unpredictable and dynamic context of migrant journeys and its 
cast of characters: 
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Figure 3.1: Cast of Criminal Characters 
 
 
Character Description Stereotypical Costume Halcyon First 
Period 
(1979-1992) 
Statist Second 
Period 
(1992-2005) 
Contested 
Third Period 
(2006- 
Present) 
Coyotes   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Human smugglers, 
including low-level 
“guides” that move with 
the migrants, “connectors” 
that recruit customers and 
make introductions 
between migrants and 
service providers, or 
coyote “bosses” who 
coordinate the actions of 
many guides; diverse 
social group 
Low-level guides dress 
as migrants (backpack, 
dirty clothes, worn 
sneakers and jeans) to 
avoid detection while 
en route, usually 
unarmed; bosses may 
dress ostentatiously to 
display wealth  
Relatively 
reliable 
performance 
of services 
with 
hometown 
heroes; some 
breech of 
contract, 
abandonment 
and rape 
Subcontracting 
schemes 
undermine 
accountability 
to customers; 
rising prices 
for smuggling 
services  
New business 
models blur 
line between 
trafficking 
and 
smuggling, 
further 
undermining 
accountability 
to customers  
Tricksters Confidence men (and 
women) who pose as 
smugglers 
May dress as low level 
guides or coyote 
bosses 
Fraud, 
robbery and 
rape 
Fraud, robbery 
and rape 
Fraud, 
robbery, rape, 
collusion with 
kidnappers 
Corrupt 
Authorities 
Some Mexican federal, 
state and local police; 
immigration enforcement 
personnel; military; 
security guards  
Official Uniforms Petty bribery 
and rape 
Petty bribery, 
rape and theft 
Petty bribery, 
rape, theft, 
collusion with 
kidnappers 
Bandits Some Mexican locals 
commit crimes of 
opportunity 
Varies; may be armed 
with pistols or 
machetes 
Overcharging 
migrants for 
goods or 
services, 
extortion, 
assault, rape  
Overcharging 
migrants for 
goods or 
services, 
extortion, 
assault, rape 
Overcharging 
migrants for 
goods or 
services, 
extortion, 
assault, rape  
Mareros Members of transnational 
street gangs (maras) with 
strength in Central 
America, such as MS 13 
and Barrio 18; particularly 
active in southern Mexico 
along the train route 
Tattoos; piercings; hip 
hop fashions; hand 
signals; may speak 
Spanglish or street 
slang; pistols and 
machetes; youth  
N/A Robbery, rape, 
murder, 
extorting 
passage fees 
Robbery, 
rape, murder, 
extorting 
passage fees, 
kidnapping 
Zetas Former enforcers for the 
Gulf Cartel, now an 
independent drug 
organization that controls 
territory along the route; 
particularly active along 
the Gulf coast; widely 
franchised and imitated by 
other groups; also used as 
a generic word for 
‘kidnapper’ by migrants 
Black clothing or 
military fatigues; 
military bearing and 
hair cuts; high 
powered weaponry; 
military-like code 
names and passwords; 
dark sports utility 
vehicles and trucks 
with tinted windows 
N/A Paramilitary 
group working 
for the Gulf 
Cartel, to 
which coyotes 
paid fees for 
passage, but 
did not 
interfere with 
migration 
Extort 
passage fees, 
kidnapping, 
trafficking, 
murder, 
torture and 
rape; now 
franchised 
and widely 
imitated; also 
a generic term   
Rateros Spies working for 
kidnappers  
Dress as migrants of 
humble origin; carry 
cell phones 
N/A N/A Collaborate 
with 
kidnappers; 
assault  
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These are the players in the human security tragedy along the route. The 
relationships among these players define the social structures through which migrants 
must pass on their journey. Clearly, the characters are not mutually exclusive. 
Shakespeare is quite right that “one man in his time plays many parts”, and the actors 
along the route may unexpectedly shift their roles and betray their allegiances. 
Adversaries have the potential to recombine into allies, giving them the quality of 
dangerous chimera. Fluidity characterizes the relationships between corrupt officials, 
coyotes, mareros and Zetas. Furthermore, in this transient and anonymous 
environment, people may not be who they seem to be. These fluid relationships and 
ambiguous roles, leading sometimes to unexpected changes in territory and 
organizations, generate uncertainty for migrants as they contemplate their journey. 
Halcyon First Period  
We met at a popular local church in rural El Salvador. The evangelical minister 
wore his hair in a short, military style (El Salvador, 12/30/10; 1/6/10; 1/24/10).54 A 
faint scar marked his left cheek. He had been counting the Church’s finances when I 
knocked on the door. A notebook, a pile of pennies, a dollar and a few rolls of coins 
were strewn across the table in front of him the first time we talked, and he agreed to 
share his story with me. 
He left El Salvador in 1989, during the war. It was a period when hundreds of 
thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans traveled north, fleeing the violence and the 
economic dislocation wrought by civil war (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991; García                                                         
54 All interview quotes are reconstructed from shorthand notes, not recordings. This research 
followed protocols of informed consent and confidentiality approved by the Cornell 
Institutional Review Board. 
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2006). As he spoke, the minister returned again and again to the fact that the halcyon 
days of an easy journey north had ended. Neither the rules of conduct along the route 
nor life in the US were what they had been when he travelled: 
Back then, the United States was a land of opportunity. Now, it is only a false 
hope….False promises, sometimes by the coyote. False hopes. They [migrants] enter 
something like a trance with the dollar. They can only think of the money. It is all they 
see. They don’t think about the risks, the impact on their family. It is a sickness.  
 
He explained that only the people who left early and established lives in the United 
States could build big houses in the rural Salvadoran town. The big houses perpetuate 
the illusion of opportunity.55 But, the minister warned, the young people leaving now 
are not going to build big houses, because the epoch of opportunity ended in the 
1990s. I asked what advice he gave the members of his congregation when they make 
migration decisions, and he explained that the Bible is central to his advice to them, 
not his own experiences along the route. He thought his experiences were no longer 
relevant for the younger generation.   
A Story from a Bygone Era: The Minister 
He joined the Salvadoran army at the age of fifteen. After his first two-year 
enlistment, he re-upped for two more. He was in the army in the mountainous 
Morazán department, the stronghold of the guerilla fighters, during the worst years of 
                                                        
55 Amparo Marroquín (2012) notes that in the early period of Central American migration, “It 
was not only the houses of the migrants that stood out in the local urban infrastructure, but 
those of the coyotes as well.” One community member of a small town in El Salvador 
explained to me that these days, the migrants who leave do not build the big houses, but the 
coyotes collect land from defaults on loans. Since the economic recession of 2006 in 
particular, migrants have had a difficult time paying off the debts they accrue during the 
journey. If I want to identify the human smugglers, he told me, I should look at who owns 
more and more property in town. Indeed, when a new migrant does build a large home in the 
present era, he or she may be accused of various illegal activities in local gossip (Pedersen 
2012).  
   
  69 
the war from 1985 to 1989. But the leftists discovered that he had volunteered to re-
enlist, and they assumed he did it because he wanted to serve the government. Since 
he was not a forced conscript, they threatened to kill his pregnant companion and their 
toddler son, and once his enlistment contract ended, his family urged him to leave for 
their own safety. Despite the fact that she understood why he had to go, his mother 
cried when he told her that he was leaving. His father was already in the United States 
and saved the $1,500 to hire a smuggler. The map he drew of the experience shows 
him leaving home with a backpack that did not survive the journey: 
Figure 3.2: The Soldier who Became a Minister
 
 
The left hand side of the map shows his mother crying as he left home. On the right, 
he reunites with his father in Los Angeles. 
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The map also shows how he took a bus from El Salvador to the Guatemala-Mexico 
border. The minister, his smuggler (known as a ‘coyote’ or ‘pollero’) and the other 
migrants disembarked the bus to sneak across that border. After crossing into Mexico, 
the coyote purchased a tourist visa for him, and they flew by airplane to Tijuana. The 
minister travelled the length of the journey with the same coyote. He explained that he 
had a very good coyote: 
A good coyote is well connected. He knows who and how to bribe. That is his job. He 
also can talk like a Mexican and pass. Those are his skills.  
 
Community Coyotes: hometown heroes and neighborhood confidence men  
As this story illustrates, the coyote has long been a central character in the drama 
of Central American migration. The coyote is the guide to both the natural terrain, 
orienting migrants to the desert and watching for the movements of U.S. border patrol, 
and the social terrain, negotiating the bribes to authorities and fees to criminal bosses 
necessary for safe passage through Mexico. The coyote also coaches the migrants 
about Mexican culture, helping them ‘pass’ undetected among the citizens. However, 
the very experience and social connections that permit coyotes to negotiate bribes also 
link them to nefarious networks, a potential source of corruption and threat to the 
migrants who contract with them. Even in these early days of mass Central American 
migration, the coyote represented a dual personality, rendered both useful and 
dangerous by the capacity to transgress terrain and the social contacts that come with 
it. Coyotes facilitate escape from the horrors of war and poverty, but also potentially 
trick, abandon or abuse clients (Spener 2009, p.88). As Amparo Marroquin (2012) 
explains, 
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In this flight there is a central character. In many cases, he has been the difference 
between life and death, success and failure. He is an obscure character loosely 
portrayed in the media: the forger of roads, the speaker of riddles, the knower of 
passwords and secret handshakes that open borders and close the doors to extortion 
and kidnapping. Alternately respected, feared, invoked and conjured: he is the coyote. 
 
In the 1980s, a coyotes’ breech of contract posed perhaps the greatest danger to 
migrants en route. Coyotes could abandon their charges in dangerous places, like the 
desert. Coyotes often squeezed profits out of the travel costs by reneging on the 
purchase of promised hotels or food during the journey. In this case, the minister was 
fortunate. His coyote did neither. His father, already waiting for him in the United 
States, had found him a guide with a solid reputation. According to the usual protocol 
for such transactions, the father paid half the money in advance and expected to pay 
half on arrival. These pay on delivery arrangements built on Mexican traditions of 
coyotaje (Spener 2009), enforcing contracts in the absence of a third party. These 
protocols and social ties developed around the networks established by the earliest 
movers from the region. In this case, the minister’s father had left to look for work in 
the United States before the civil war. 
Despite the potential duplicity of the early Central American smugglers, they 
generally maintained a direct relationship with their clients, which anchored (however 
imperfectly) both social and reputation mechanisms in the market for smuggling 
services. If and when a calamity occurred during the journey, the families at home 
knew whom to hold accountable. In the 1980s and 1990s, smuggling and migration 
had not yet been criminalized in migrant home countries. In El Salvador, migrants 
could contact coyotes through legitimate travel agencies, which openly advertised trips 
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to the United States “with or without visa”.56 While some unscrupulous tricksters 
would accept money for travel services and abandon their clients en route, the legal 
framework in Central America provided a slight and highly imperfect degree of 
protection before smuggling became outlawed. Migrants and their family members 
could bring fraud charges against tricksters or irresponsible smugglers in a court of 
law. Such charges were usually settled out of court, but the law provided clients of 
smugglers with some leverage when dealing with co-nationals (police officer, El 
Salvador, 3/4/10). When the state failed to punish an irresponsible guide, migrants and 
their families sometimes took the law into their own hands.57 
Perhaps for these reasons, some observers have called this period “the era of the 
heroic coyote.” Some home communities embraced this generation of pioneering 
migrants and coyotes, and by the early 1990s, an emerging patriotic discourse extolled 
their contributions to the national economies of Central America. Tales of suffering 
and adventure saturated song, film, newspapers and even monuments, transforming 
migrants and their guides into celebrated public figures (Coutin 2007, p.83; Marroquín 
2008, p.36-40). Indeed, a successful career as a hometown coyote in Latin America 
might even pave a way to the mayor’s office. Then as now, the clients of coyotes 
generally did not view them as “good or evil”, but as the provider of a potentially 
                                                        
56 Classified ads in newspapers in El Salvador still occasionally advertise smuggling services 
in thinly veiled code. Online advertisements also occasionally surface. 
57 In one memorable story from 1975, a woman was abandoned by her guide in a hotel in San 
Salvador, but she tracked down her smuggler and demanded that he fulfill his responsibility 
(returned migrant, El Salvador, 7/1/10). She and her travel group did not know his name or 
other identifying information. So, they grabbed a taxicab and drove around the capital city 
until they located his car. They knocked on various doors in that neighborhood until they 
found him. They warned him that now that they knew where he lived, he had to comply with 
the terms of their contract. He did.  
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dangerous, but necessary, service (Marroquín 2012; Spener 2009). For migrants, a 
trustworthy and competent coyote was (and is) invaluable. 
Border Policing and Border Crossing 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, immigration control concentrated on borders. Until 
1983, Central American migrants could easily obtain six-month tourist visas (FM-T) 
to travel legally in Mexico on the way to the United States (García 2006, p.56). In 
1983, as the Central American refugee crisis worsened, Mexico sent more migration 
personnel to its southern border (p.56). Throughout the period, the U.S. border patrol 
militarized its southern border (Dunn 1996). As a result, the border is the focal point 
of migration narratives from this period; it was the point of the most acute danger. 
Even in the early days of Central American migration to the United States, the 
aboveground desert and underground tunnel crossings were becoming prominent 
symbols of death in popular culture. Human bones and debris had already begun to 
accumulate along the paths through the wilderness traveled by migrants into the 
United States. As early as July 1980, 13 Salvadoran migrants died together while 
attempting to cross Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument in Arizona (Conover 1989, 
p.224). Coyotes would sometimes abandon their clients during a difficult border 
crossing; migrants suffered the elements and died from exposure.  
The plot of the minister’s story also climaxes in the drama of the U.S. border 
crossing. After he flew in an airplane from southern Mexico to Tijuana, as illustrated 
in the map that he drew, the minister and his coyote arrived at the staging ground just 
to the south of the U.S. border. There was an area at the border that had been off limits 
to both the Mexican and U.S. border patrols: 
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You can stand in this zone and see the patrols on the mountains on either side. There’s 
a big market that sells lots of food. People chat. The coyotes shepherd their groups 
through. It is safe and harmonious. You can relax before the next part of the journey. 
The coyotes chat. They watch the hills for the right moment. Then they set off in small 
groups along their routes. They take different routes and stay in small groups….You 
don’t get to this place alone. 
 
In that no-man’s land, coyotes had friendly relations among themselves.58 The 
minister did not see them argue. His description sounds more like a picnic than the 
beginning of a potentially deadly trek through the wilderness. There, he crossed the 
desert, and he likened that experience to the song and movie Tres Veces Mojado 
(Three Times a Wetback) written and starring the Mexican norteño band Tigres del 
Norte. His travel group included an old woman who had hurt her leg. Despite the fact 
that she slowed them down, making them vulnerable to capture, they could not leave 
her behind to die. After all, “in the trip, people become what happens to one happens 
to all.” They band together. His group of ten travelers came from many different 
communities across El Salvador, and they became friends during the journey. They 
had to carry the old woman.  They slept in the desert overnight, but they were captured by border patrol outside San Diego. When they saw the U.S. border patrol approach, they huddled together to hide under a bridge. The patrol surrounded them, and an agent pushed him onto the ground. The agents had their guns drawn, but the minister was not scared. Others might have been scared, but he had been in the war and knew that they were not going to harm him. When they arrested him, one of the agents taunted him in Spanish, “Bienvenidos a los Estados Unidos, cabron” (Welcome to                                                         
58 This description of the border is strikingly similar to the no-man’s land between Tijuana and 
San Diego described by Ruben Martínez (2001, p.196). 
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the United States, bastard). The minister laughed coldly remembering it, but not because it was funny. 
Bandits and Corrupt Officials 
 
The minister, like many migrants, encountered rough handling and rudeness by 
U.S. officials at the border. Human rights organizations have documented extensive, 
and in some cases fatal, use of excessive force by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(ACLU 2012). Scholars have documented corruption (Spener 2009, p.132-133) and 
numerous sexual assaults of migrants by officials on U.S. soil (Falcon 2007[2001]). I 
interviewed one man who received a severe beating by U.S. border patrol agents and 
several others who reported verbal or emotional abuse, both at the border and in 
immigrant detention facilities (returned migrant, El Salvador, 1/19/10).59 Two 
migrants reported the denial of vital medical services to which they are entitled during 
their detainment, and one of them urged me to investigate the death of a friend that 
resulted from the denial of these medical services (returned migrants, El Salvador, 
4/17/10; 2/19/10). The humiliation of detainment in and deportation from the United 
States is extreme. Nevertheless, the encounter with U.S. migration officials is 
generally traumatic for its potential to end in official detention and deportation, not for 
its potential for criminal victimization, when compared to interactions with Mexican 
                                                        
59 One woman reported mistreatment during legal entry (family member, El Salvador, 
3/30/10). At the airport, migration officials pulled her aside for further questioning. She was 
pregnant and repeatedly asked to see a doctor, sensing that something was wrong after the 
turbulence experienced during the flight. However, the officials kept her waiting and refused 
to provide medical care, even after she began to bleed vaginally and pleaded for attention: 
“my baby was dying and they did nothing”. Only when the blood had drenched her legs did 
they take her to a doctor, who gave her a suppository to complete the miscarriage. She has not 
been able to conceive since that brief tourist visit to the United States.   
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authorities. Despite the degradations inherent to detainment and deportation 
procedures, many migrants reported professional behavior from U.S. officials. 
Encounters with Mexican authorities, by contrast, were almost always 
accompanied by the extortion of bribes, and sometimes assault or rape: “the corrupt 
[Mexican] police beat you and leave you robbed. The others [in the U.S.] arrest you 
and deport you” (Salvadoran migrant, Ixtepec, 3/2/11). In fact, migrants expect 
corruption and criminal violence from Mexican officials, whether they are dealing 
with federal, state, or local police or migration authorities. During the early period of 
Central American migration, encounters with Mexican authorities usually occurred in 
border towns. The fact that corrupt Mexican officials perpetrated many crimes helps to 
explain why the most policed zone of the route, the borders, was also likely to be the 
most criminally dangerous. While migrants suffered fraud and banditry across Mexico 
during this period, the U.S. border itself constituted the most visible and dangerous 
segment of the route. As another Salvadoran man who flew to Tijuana explained,  
There was always danger. The border was always dangerous in the past. Our own 
coyotes assaulted us, raped people. At the U.S.-Mexico border, it was always like that, 
risky. 
 
This is not to say that danger and violence were limited to that border space. This 
man, like the minister, could afford luxury; they traveled by airplane across a large 
portion of the route through Mexico.60 However, many Central Americans, lacking the 
funds or contacts with well-connected coyotes, had to make the land journey in its 
entirety, sometimes requiring weeks or even months of sacrifice to arrive in the United 
States, if they arrived at all (O’Dogherty 1989; Menjívar 2000, p.63). Despite the                                                         
60 In Cecilia Menjívar’s (2000, p.63) study of migrants of this era, 33% of Salvadoran 
respondents had traveled by airplane for some segment of the route. 
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relative ease of passage through Mexico in the 1980s when compared to later decades, 
the journey could be very dangerous. Even in the halcyon days, bandits and corrupt 
coyotes raped, robbed and assaulted Central American migrants with impunity 
(Frelick 1990; Mahler 1995; Menjívar 2000). Many people who traveled across 
Mexico by land, even those who did so with a visa, reported some form of criminal 
victimization or threats.61 Indeed, criminal victimization of migrants has been integral 
to the route through Mexico since this early period. The Salvadoran minister was 
lucky that he did not meet with corrupt Mexican authorities or bandits at the border. 
U.S. Entry: Legal, Economic and Social Integration 
During this early period, the U.S. border patrol practiced ‘catch and release’ 
policing (Andreas 2000; migration official 2/9/10); they bussed Mexicans immediately 
across the border and released them to try their luck again. For this reason, many 
Central Americans attempted to impersonate Mexicans to avoid beginning again from 
home. For a time in the early 1990s, however, Mexicans began to impersonate Central 
American political refugees who might be eligible for protected entry to the United 
States, released into the country to await asylum hearings or granted temporary status 
(migration official 2/9/10). There was no charade for the minister. The U.S. 
immigration agents knew he was Salvadoran. They looked at the passport he carried. 
After he explained that he was a military veteran fleeing persecution, the border patrol 
released him. His father paid several hundred dollars in bail money, roughly what he 
would have paid for the final installment to the coyote.                                                          
61 In Menjívar’s (2000, p.63) survey of Salvadorans living in San Francisco in the early 1990s, 
many of whom had traveled in the 1980s, 33% of her respondents had been assaulted once and 
34% of her respondents had been assaulted multiple times. 
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Eventually, the minister received Temporary Protective Status (TPS). TPS is a 
provision established by the Immigration Act of 1990, which followed on the heels of 
a series of legal judgments that also opened possibilities for Central American asylum 
seekers (García 2006, p.111-112). Under this provision, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security may temporarily designate countries with vulnerable populations, such as 
people fleeing war or natural disasters, thereby granting a short-term, renewable stay 
to their citizens in the United States.62  
Even after receiving legal status, the minister had trouble finding work in the 
United States. Until that point, his only experience in life had been carrying a gun. 
Despite eventually landing a factory job, he never really adapted to the U.S. lifestyle; 
in words that echo many other unsatisfied Central American migrants, the minister 
complained that too much “pressure” permeates daily life in the United States.63 With 
persistence and hardship, he ultimately met with financial success, but he remained 
socially isolated and missed the country he loved. As soon as the war ended in 1992, 
he returned home. By that time, his companion and two children had moved on with 
their lives.  
                                                        
62 El Salvador received its most recent TPS following the earthquake of 2001, and Honduras 
and Nicaragua received the designation after Hurricane Mitch in 1999. These temporary 
measures were renewed and Salvadorans, Hondurans and Nicaraguans granted TPS following 
these environmental catastrophes can continue their stay at this time. In the wake of a recent 
volcanic eruption and tropical storm in 2010, Guatemala petitioned the U.S. government for 
TPS, but has never before been granted the provision (Allison 2012; Menjívar 2012). At the 
time of writing, the Guatemalan request was pending. 
63 Many migrants talk about the pressure of inflexible deadlines, restrictive work routines and 
the difficulties of negotiating the foreign (and sometimes unfriendly and racist) culture and 
language that they encounter in the United States. Migrants in the contemporary era also cite 
the pressure of living under surveillance and fear of deportation. While many leave home 
under threat of violence and poverty, migrants find a new host of daily stressors and 
humiliations in their destinations (e.g. Mahler 1995). 
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The minister bought his current house with money he saved in the United States, 
and he began a new family. He explained, however, that nowadays many people take 
loans to travel to the United States and lose their houses. The interest on these loans 
can run as high as thirty percent, and coyote services are now much more expensive 
than during his journey. With the economic recession and intensified immigration 
enforcement in the U.S., many people return home poorer than when they left. Indeed, 
his brother wants to take an $8000 loan against their father’s property to pay a 
smuggler, and he could easily lose their family homestead. The minister had warned 
him not to go, that times have changed, but his brother is an adult. If he wants to go, 
there is nothing to be done about it. 
Then and Now 
Beyond differences in the legal and economic context in destination communities, 
the minister’s travel story points to several key differences between the route in the 
early days of mass migration from Central America to the United States and the post-
2006 journey. In the 1980s, when the refugees from internal conflicts in El Salvador 
(1979-1992) and Guatemala (1960-1996) began moving north en masse, professional 
smugglers generally maintained a more direct relationship with their clients, often 
accompanying them for the entire length of the journey. Relations among coyotes, 
while not always amicable, alternated between collaboration and market 
competitiveness, as opposed to combat. While women often suffered sexual coercion 
during the journey, loyalty within travel groups was the expectation. Confidence men 
sometimes posed as smugglers to defraud migrants, but prices for coyote services were 
thousands of dollars less than today. Many people simply relied on experienced 
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relatives to guide them. Some Central Americans had ventured north in search of work 
before the civil war, and the refugees relied on these transnational social networks for 
assistance during migration (Menjívar 2000). 
The journey, while dangerous, was easier than the passage that confronts migrants 
today. Before the implementation of new technologies and stricter control at the 
border, some people could cross U.S. border patrol checkpoints hidden in the trunks of 
cars of family friends or relatives (e.g. Salvadoran migrant 2/8/10). Most importantly, 
however, migration control largely stopped at the borders. For either very daring or 
very poor migrants, it had been easier for Central Americans to travel the length of 
Mexico without a paid guide, as internal immigration enforcement through Mexico 
had been more lax. Bandits attacked migrants and corrupt authorities extorted money 
from migrants, but fewer checkpoints within Mexico funneling migrants to clandestine 
routes made a relatively wide range of travel options available to avoid crime. Thus, 
the early days of mass Central American migration to the United States was less risky 
and uncertain than the periods that followed. 
Statist Second Period 
Throughout the 1990s, the risks of the journey increased in tandem with the 
intensification of migration policing along the length of the route through Mexico. 
Mexican migration authorities established checkpoints along the northbound highway 
and began to inspect major transit points, such as bus terminals. The United States also 
implemented interior checkpoints and inspections. Both Mexico and the United States 
adopted more punitive laws for convicted smugglers. The United States also 
criminalized illegal entry, giving prison sentences to migrants who cross the border 
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repeatedly. The United States adopted laws making it easier to strip legal permanent 
residency from convicted criminals, even for minor offenses.  
With the new emphasis on internal migration enforcement, deportations from the 
United States to Central America escalated rapidly. In a five-year period, deportations 
of Central Americans jumped from 5,695 people in 1993 to 16,418 people in 1998, not 
including voluntary departures (DHS 2003).64 Five years later, in 2003, the United 
States deported 20,702 Central Americans, not including voluntary departures (DHS 
2003). In fiscal year 2009, removals of Central Americans peaked with 81,104 people 
sent back to the region, not including voluntary departures (DHS 2011).65 
These deportations carried new cultural formations to Central America, including 
(but not limited to) the protocols, language and styles of immigrant street gangs from 
Los Angeles. These practices soon spread along the train corridors of Mexico as a new 
generation of Central American migrants with experience and extensive social ties in 
the United States travelled the route. Migrants continued to move despite the 
intensification of deportations and internal migration policing. They also continued to 
move because of it, motivated by the desire to return to the United States after 
deportation. The intensification of policing and the deportation circuit generated a 
permanent transnational transience along the routes, in which migration became a 
lifestyle with an indefinite beginning and end. In so doing, it also produced new 
criminal opportunities and actors along the route.                                                         
64 A voluntary departure is not necessarily voluntary. When apprehended, migrants often agree 
to depart in order to avoid the legal penalties that accompany other removals. While 
apprehended unauthorized migrants do not always have this opportunity to avoid legal 
penalty, voluntary departures far outnumber deportations. 
65 This data includes citizens of Belize, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa 
Rica, and Panama. 
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Home and Back Again, and Again: the English Speaking Man 
For example, one of the men I met in the migrant shelter in Saltillo, Coahuila spent 
enough time in the United States that he preferred to speak English in our interview 
(7/18/10).66 In the summer of 2010, he was on his way north through Mexico yet 
again, hopefully for the last time. He was originally from a community near the shores 
of Lago de Yojoa in Honduras, but he started riding the freight train through Mexico 
at the age of 17. That first time crossing through the southern state of Chiapas in 1998, 
migration agents raided the train in the dark of the night. From the next wagon over, 
other migrants warned him not to talk and to stay hidden. Then he heard a loud 
scream. When the train stopped five miles later, the conductor told him that someone 
had died and warned the migrants to be more careful. The English-speaking man did 
not see what happened that time, but he has witnessed many other assaults during his 
extensive time on the route.  
Bandits 
On another occasion in Chiapas, close to Tapachula [where the train line used to 
begin near the Mexico-Guatemala border], the train stopped with its head in the city 
and its tail concealed in the bush. Thirteen migrants lingered alongside the tracks 
waiting for it to depart. They pooled their money to buy a soda pop, and they sent him 
to the store. When he returned, his twelve travel companions were naked. Three 
Mexican thieves with firearms had assaulted them. They stole everything. They hit 
them. One of his companions had a purple eye. Alerted to the robbery, the English-                                                        
66 During fieldwork in Central America and Mexico, I met several people who claimed that 
they preferred English to Spanish. Some of them probably enjoyed showing off their English 
language skills, but remained fluent in Spanish. Others felt like non-native Spanish speakers 
after living away from their country of birth for many years. 
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speaking man hid in the bush, and when the assailants left, they walked right by him. 
Such incidents, often committed by opportunist locals living nearby, regularly occur in 
the train yards and walking paths that lead through the wilderness around highway 
migration checkpoints in Mexico. 
Mareros 
Those thieves were Mexican, but there were also Central American gangs, and the 
English-speaking man told me about yet another harrowing ordeal on the train: 
There used to be a lot of MS13 [a prominent Central American street gang] on the 
train. I caught a wagon once. Inside the wagon were seven guys playing cards, each 
with a machete and tattoos. “We’re MS 13”, they said, and they threw the signs [hand 
signals]. I threw the signs too, and pretended to be one of them. They gave me some 
food. They talked about all the stealing and raping they had done, bragging. They 
asked me what I had done. I played along. They told me to go collect money and food 
and come back. I didn’t come back. Thank God I never saw those people again. Those 
gangs used to be Hondurans.   
 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, these Central American street gangs, whose 
members are known as mareros in Spanish, boarded the cargo trains that the poorest 
migrants ride through southern Mexico to rob, rape and sometimes, murder. The two 
most prominent transnational street gangs are the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and 
Barrio 18 (M18). Members of the MS 13, in particular, frequently demand fees from 
migrants and coyotes to ride and sometimes throw uncooperative migrants from the 
train. Armed with machetes and pistols, they also stalk migrants in train yards, bars 
and hotels in transit towns in Chiapas, the southernmost state of Mexico on the border 
with Guatemala. In communities along the routes, they engage in extortion, drug 
shipments and dealing, and deadly disputes with rivals. The gangs generally include 
street kids and young adults from Central America, some of them with experience in 
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the United States. The most sophisticated members of the gangs issue orders, by word 
of mouth or cell phone, from the inhumane, overcrowded and uncontrolled prisons 
system in Central America (Cruz 2010, p.396). However, individual cliques may only 
be loosely affiliated and not entirely controlled by this imprisoned leadership. The 
control and coherence of the gang has fluctuated dramatically over time (Cruz 2010). 
The history of both of these gangs is inextricably tied to human migration. 
Barrio 18 traces its roots to marginalized Mexican American youth, who formed street 
gangs to protect their neighborhoods from local toughs in the 1960s (Valdez 2011, 
p.24); it is named for 18th Street in the Rampart district of Los Angeles, and it became 
one of the first multinational Latino street gangs. In the three decades that followed 
Barrio 18’s founding, subsequent waves of immigration to these communities, coupled 
with conflict over control of local drug markets, violently splintered Latino gangs in 
Los Angeles (Valdez 2011). In the 1980s, Salvadoran refugees created the Mara 
Salvatrucha to protect themselves from Barrio 18 and other hostile Los Angeles-based 
gangs (Valdez 2011, p.25; Wolf 2011, p.48). When the Mara Salvatrucha integrated 
into the Mexican Mafia, it added the 13 to its name to signify this relationship.   
The initial spread of these gangs to Central America was an unintended 
consequence of U.S. migration policies. Elana Zilberg (2004; 2011) argues that U.S. 
incarceration of immigrant youths and their subsequent deportation forcibly 
transnationalized street gang and policing culture, linking Los Angeles and San 
Salvador in a “securityscape.” Under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Individual Responsibility Act, thousands of temporary and permanent residents 
became eligible for deportation from the United States to El Salvador after committing 
   
  85 
crimes. Having been fully acculturated into the street life of Los Angeles, many 
deportees felt like foreigners in their country of birth, expressing extreme feelings of 
disorientation and dislocation. Some of them barely spoke Spanish (Salvadoran police 
officer, 5/1/11). As cultural strangers and social outsiders in the country of citizenship, 
deportees created enclaves of urban U.S. street culture in San Salvador (Zilberg 2004; 
2011). Over time, they crowded out the local gangs (Cruz 2010, p.385; Salvadoran 
police officer, 5/1/11). Nor did they passively accept exile; many attempted return 
along the route through Mexico, facilitating the unauthorized movement of drugs and 
migrants with them (Papachristos 2005, p.53). From San Salvador and Los Angeles, 
the gangs spread to Tegucigalpa and Guatemala City, and then infiltrated rural areas 
across Central America. These gangs flourish in the transnational circuit created by 
U.S. deportations (Cruz 2010; Papachristos 2005, p.53).  
As the English speaking man’s story suggests, these gangs developed cultural 
tells that mark membership with distinctive linguistic traditions and codes (including 
hand gestures), etiquette, artwork and written symbols in graffiti, music, style of dress, 
mannerisms and spoken history. Andrew V. Papachristos (2005, p.51) argues that 
these scripts and performances constitute the most powerful a transnational dimension 
of the gangs67: 
Globalization and street gangs exist in a paradox: Gangs are a global phenomenon not 
because the groups themselves have become transnational organizations (although a 
few have), but because of the recent hypermobility of gang members and their culture.                                                           
67 Despite the fears of the security community, survey research as recent as 2006 in Central 
America suggested that only a minority of gang members maintain transnational criminal 
networks (Cruz 2010, 393-394). Indeed, it may be that street gangs have fewer transnational 
contacts than other more cosmopolitan sectors of Central American society. Shared routines 
and cultural repertoires, not necessarily sustained interpersonal networks, link these gangs 
across borders.  
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Thus, these gangs are a collection of transnational practices that emerged 
spontaneously from the dislocation surrounding international migration and 
exclusionary policies. As cultural formations, they sit uneasily with national identity. 
For example, one day, the members of a MS 13 clique benevolently explained 
themselves to terrified migrants on top a moving freight train; the gang members 
lamented that they no longer felt Central American because they have lived in Mexico 
so long (Honduran migrant, Ixtepec, 3/29/11). But they were not Mexican, and they 
claimed to feel solidarity with their marginalized Central American brethren. This 
confusion is understandable given their transient transnational lives. They frequently 
speak a mix of English, Mexican Spanish, Central American Spanish, and slang 
(known as ‘caliche’ in El Salvador) among themselves, ingeniously employing mixed 
modes of communication incomprehensible to many outsiders (fieldnotes 11/5/10).  
These young people move around a train like it is most natural thing in the 
world to jump on and off a speeding locomotive or leap among the moving boxcars to 
defeat boredom (fieldnotes 3/3/11); for many, ceaseless unauthorized movement has 
been their life, except perhaps, when they have been imprisoned. They have faced 
extralegal extermination by cartels, vigilantes and paramilitaries. Many members, 
having lived in the streets since an early age, have substance abuse problems. At night, 
some of them huddle, cold and hungry, in the train yards.68 The gangs have norms and 
                                                        
68 In October 2010, I accompanied several volunteers from the migrant shelter to the railroad tracks in 
Ixtepec, Oaxaca, Mexico (10/22/10). There, we found a small group of young people huddled under 
streetlights, among them two women. When the volunteers approached the young people, others 
emerged from the darkness between the train cars. The night breeze was chilly, and not everyone had a 
sweatshirt. The volunteers brought bread and atole, a warm corn drink received by smiles by those 
unfortunates who sleep in the train yards. Several people sent salutations and thanks to the priest 
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a hierarchy, enforced by violence, but leadership is frequently challenged and internal 
jealousies emerge; young people rebel. Their life expectancy is not long. In summary, 
some of the cliques along the route are not rigid, disciplined organizations. 
Under these conditions of transnational transience, their cultural markers and 
protocols are meant to establish permanence of loyalties and inculcate a sense of 
belonging. To this end, both MS 13 and Barrio 18 have traditions of tattoos and the 
infamous “morgue rule”, which promises that the only way out of the gang is death. 
Despite these practices, membership and allegiances are continually challenged. While 
navigating a safe exit from these gangs is extremely difficult, some escape by fleeing 
their neighborhood or converting to Evangelical Christianity (Brenneman 2012). As 
they engage internal and external power struggles, gang members manipulate the 
norms and rules of their group, as well as the legal norms and rules of the state. 
Members of competing gangs may disguise themselves to infiltrate another gang. The 
state may sponsor impersonations of gang members in undercover police work. As 
suggested by the English speaking man’s successful impersonation of a gang member, 
                                                                                                                                                               
running the shelter. They complained about being hungry and unable to find jobs on empty stomachs. 
Some had visible tattoos. Others did not. A young man, maybe in his early twenties, with a baseball 
cap and earring took command of the distribution of the food, ensuring that the women received their 
portions first and that everyone ate. After everyone in the group had been served, this young man 
(presumably the leader) took his share. With the food gone, the young people retreated back into the 
shadows of the train yard.  Because of its ordinariness, this encounter between shelter volunteers and 
MS 13 street gang members is a revealing moment; it illustrates the basic conditions under which these 
young people sometimes live. However, caution is necessary before generalizing from this encounter, 
because other cliques of the gang are not as desperate. The gang is not a consistent and coherent 
organization across the various cliques, and with turnover and internal struggles, turf changes hands 
among them. Furthermore, a glimpse into the camaraderie and humanity shared by these marginalized 
youth should not mask the brutal violence and victimization in which they often engage. 
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the signs of belonging cannot be fully relied upon. Ambiguity persists despite these 
cultural markers. 
In fact, the distinction between gang member and the outside acquaintance of 
gang members is rarely as well-defined as either the law or the gangs’ own protocols 
would imply. Gang members inhabit a variety of other roles as parents, siblings, 
lovers, friends, migrants and citizens; no one is only a gang member, subsumed 
entirely by a singular role. Despite the rituals of entry (often a beating or an 
assignment to kill), membership and mutual respect accrues gradually in a courtship 
period with new recruits, such that the social boundaries that demarcate membership 
have a gray zone of “sympathizers” (Brenneman 2012, p.34). During a journey along 
the route, gang members and migrants (as well as migrants who happen to be gang 
members and gang members who happen to be migrants) must shape-shift between 
competing social expectations and uncertain interactions, improvising scripts from all 
of these roles depending on the context. 
Fluctuations in Criminal Control 
Importantly, these gang members can become more professional over time, 
acquiring skills and alliances with other criminal groups. Their control waxes and 
wanes along the unauthorized migratory routes. For example, the presence of gangs 
along the route surged in 2003, when El Salvador and then other Central American 
governments implemented a repressive policing strategy called Mano Dura (iron fist) 
(Cruz 2010; Hume 2007). Caught between the Mano Dura in the south and zero 
tolerance gang policing in the United States, gang members began to roam the route 
indefinitely (activist, Ixtepec 11/6/10). In southern Mexico, the presence and power of 
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MS 13 peaked after this legislation and before Hurricane Stan in 2005. The storm 
damaged the railroad connecting Tapachula with Arriaga, halting the trains. Following 
the termination of train service along that segment, migrants dispersed and depended 
more heavily on busses, combi (shuttles) and foot to arrive in Arriaga. The dispersal of 
migrants to other routes undermined the power of the gang, devaluing their territory 
and cutting their transport line (shelter staff, Ixtepec 4/1/11).    
With the post-2006 upheaval among the Mexican drug cartels that previously 
controlled the routes, the gang may acquire new resources along the route. In the 
throes of the territorial wars and intercine violence, Mexican cartels may increasingly 
subcontract limited tasks to gangs.69 Previously, street gangs were too unruly to be 
reliable partners, but are now valued for their low risk; street gang members know 
little about the inner circle of the cartels and their liaisons in government, which poses 
little threat if they are apprehended by authorities. Furthermore, Central American 
migrants can be used as an expendable, replaceable resource in a war with no end in 
sight (fieldnotes, Saltillo 7/17/10). This subcontracting follows a predictable division 
of labor among criminal groups, described by Richard Friman (2004, p.98), in which: 
“Native crime groups relegate immigrants to the higher-risk and lower value-added 
stages of criminal activities and exclude them from information about how their stages 
fit into the broader economic processes of the national criminal economy.” For MS-
13, contracts with Mexican cartels could mean greater access to sophisticated 
                                                        
69 For an analysis of the pros and cons for alliances between Central American street gangs 
and Mexican cartels, see Stephen Dudley (2012). He points out that if the Zetas are, in fact, 
allied with the MS-13, it represents a de-professionalization of the cartel. 
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weaponry, bigger profits from drugs and less fear of predation by stronger crime 
groups. 
Recent rumors suggest that the railroad between Tapachula and Arriaga may 
reopen, thereby increasing the value of the MS-13’s traditional stronghold in Chiapas 
and restoring their transport lines, giving the Central American gangs a greater 
bargaining position with cartels as the ‘caretakers’ of train shipments of drugs and 
people. New, more organized and professional, gang members may be moving north 
from their stronghold in Central America to take advantage of these opportunities 
(fieldnotes, Ixtepec 5/13/11). These new cliques may be displacing or taking over the 
cliques of marginalized youths that roamed the route terrorizing migrants and 
community members since 2005. As explained by one official (San Salvador 4/28/10) 
with field knowledge of the migration route, “Well, there’s a little of everything.” By 
July 2013, gangs had again reasserted their control of the Southern train route, 
demanding payments of $100 per migrant from smugglers boarding the train in 
Arriaga (private communication, 7/29/13). However, nothing about street gangs is 
permanent. 
Intensified Internal Policing 
There were many dangers for a Central American in Mexico during the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, when the English speaking man had traveled while underage in that era, 
Mexicans also reached out to help him and give him money. He worked and made 
friends in Saltillo. Then, he worked for six months in Piedras Negras, a border town 
straddling the U.S. and Mexico, before crossing the border with a few Mexican friends 
instead of a paid guide.  
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Unfortunately, he was only in the United States for two months before he was 
deported back to Honduras. He had made the mistake of riding the Greyhound bus 
through Arizona. In the 1990s, migration agents began extensive surveillance of bus 
and train stations in search of migrants. In 1992, political pressure for migration 
enforcement mounted in the United States (Dunn 1996, p.173). Beginning in 1993, the 
U.S. Border Patrol launched a series of high-profile operations to deter migrants from 
attempting the crossing, and began construction on a wall at the border (Dunn 1996, 
p.174). Inside the country, Section 287(g) of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) of 
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
established partnerships between state and local police and migration enforcement. 
The same legislation increased criminal penalties for smuggling and illegal re-entry 
(Spener 2009, p.116), and it contained provisions for the deportation of permanent 
legal residents who commit even minor offenses.70 The Border Patrol also established 
71 interior checkpoints along highways inside the United States as a second tier of 
defense after the border (Bustillo 2013).   
Migration policing and deportations also intensified south of the U.S. border 
(García 2006). In 1990, Mexico criminalized human smuggling, making it punishable 
with ten years in prison (Frelick 1991, p.221-222). In a post-NAFTA ‘de facto 
bilateralism’ on the issue of border security with the United States, Mexico intensified 
both its internal and external policing (Carlsen 2008; Castillo 2003; Casillas 2007;                                                         
70 Originally, this legislation was applied retroactively to migrants who had pleaded guilty to 
offenses, making many people eligible for deportation for crimes they thought had been 
resolved and punished. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the law could not be 
retroactively applied to migrants pleading guilty before 1996 (INS v. St. Cyr). However, not 
before many legal permanent residents had been unconstitutionally returned to their countries 
of origin. 
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Sassen 1996). In 2000, Mexico’s National Institute of Migration (INM) maintained 25 
migration stations, most of them congregated in Chiapas, near the Guatemalan border 
(Casillas 2007, p.16). In 2001, President Vicente Fox launched Plan Sur, which 
established two internal control belts, with highway inspection checkpoints, across the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec (p.18). Between 2003 and 2005, Mexican migration 
authorities reported a dramatic rise in the number of migrant apprehensions across the 
country, a fact that Rodolfo Casillas (2007, p.10) attributes to their increased resources 
and personnel deployed in that time period. By 2005, the INM had expanded 
operations to 52 migration stations across the length of the country, not only at the 
border (p.19). 
Under pressure from the United States, Central American home countries also 
began to criminalize smuggling (activist, San Salvador, 11/24/09). For example, El 
Salvador outlawed coyotaje in 2004, coupling trafficking and smuggling under the 
same law. Peter Andreas (2003, p.79) labeled this shift to internal and transnational 
policing with cooperation between destination, transit and home countries a 
‘thickening’ of borders. 
The English speaking man did not know the specific legal and policy changes that 
ushered in this new era of migration policing, but he had experienced it. And he felt 
confident in his capacity to navigate this intensified policing. In part because of his 
extensive experience and the kindness of Mexican and American friends he met 
during his many journeys north, the English speaking man proudly explained that he 
had never been caught by migration authorities, whether Mexican or U.S., at any 
border: “…I know they don’t catch me. They never catch me at the border.” After his 
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earlier deportations, he had learned not to ride the busses. However, as migration 
policing extended and deepened along the length of the route, so too did criminal 
violence against migrants, and it was the ever growing threat of crime that frightened 
him more than the possibility of apprehension by border patrol.   
Coyotes: Subcontractors 
In this challenging environment of growing banditry, extortion and policing, 
coyotes diversified their tactics and raised their prices. After his capture while riding 
the bus and his subsequent deportation, the English speaking man immediately 
returned to the freight train through Mexico, and a nephew paid $400 for a very 
inexpensive coyote, only to cross the U.S. border. In the 1990s and early 2000’s, door-
to-door smuggling service from Honduras might have cost as much as $5000, and he 
could not justify such an expense. By that time, the freight train had become the 
symbol par excellence for the dangers of the journey, as migration policing funneled 
the poorest migrants toward the tracks (e.g. Nazario 2005). The bus routes had now 
become off-limits for anyone incapable of negotiating a series of bribes for passage 
through the checkpoints, and migrants with sufficient financial resources often paid 
for expensive passage in hidden compartments in trucks. But the hidden compartments 
are not without their own risks.  
A Salvadoran man described his harrowing experience in 2000 (El Salvador, 
3/1/10). They were trapped inside the truck until Puebla. He heard the migration 
officials outside, asking “You carrying any pollos [chickens, slang for migrants] in 
there?” and banging on the walls of the hidden compartment. The officials walked 
loudly over the top of the compartment, but everyone inside sat silently. He had curled 
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into a small ball with his head to the side. He could not shift his weight. The migrants 
urinated on one another, but the guides had given them a pill to keep them from 
defecating. They passed the migration checkpoint, and when the coyotes dragged them 
from the compartment, none of them could move. The coyotes pulled their ankles or 
legs and dumped them onto the ground like bags of potatoes. People would fall and lie 
immobile, as the blood returned to their limbs. It took thirty minutes before he could 
move.  
Another man told of strikingly similar experiences during the same era (El 
Salvador, 4/11/10). On his first adventure in a hidden compartment, Mexican 
migration police had rescued his travel group at a checkpoint. Without the intervention 
of law enforcement, they would have suffocated. However, the close call with death 
did not prevent him from attempting a second ride in a hidden compartment from 
Mexicali to the border: 
We got into another hidden compartment to be taken to the border. When I got out, I 
couldn’t move. My body was asleep. I had a fat woman on top of me the whole time. I 
had been one of the first in. They had to drag me out by the arms and legs and toss me 
under a tree. Helicopters were circling overhead. It took an hour before I could move 
my body again. I was numb. The guide said not to move, but I was worried the police 
would come and everyone would run. I would just be laying there. 
 
These men’s experiences are not isolated events. Many others tell similarly stories, 
and describe the crippling, humiliating, and near fatal conditions within hidden 
compartments (e.g. returned migrants, El Salvador 4/15/10). In what journalist Jorge 
Ramos (2005) called “the worst immigrant tragedy in American history”, 19 Mexican 
and Central American migrants, including one small child, suffocated in a trailer after 
their coyote abandon them at a truck stop in south Texas in May 2003. Smugglers hid 
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the migrants inside the truck trailer in order to pass the inspections at the interior 
migration checkpoint in south Texas before reaching Houston (Ramos 2005).  
These dangers increased as coyotes adopted business models that complicate 
accountability in the wake of such tragedies. In response to intensified policing and 
criminalization of smuggling, some coyotes began to outsource risky segments of the 
journey to other guides (police officer, El Salvador, 3/4/10). Coyotes specializing in 
high-end door-to-door service from Central American to the United States, in 
particular, increasingly subcontracted to specialists for each part of the route. 
Underling Mexican guides were easy to blame for the mistreatment of clients. Safe 
houses, the places where smugglers hide their clients en route, became increasingly 
overcrowded, as multinational travel groups merged there. Service deteriorated and 
migrants found themselves frequently locked inside under unhygienic conditions as 
they waited for transport to the next rest stop on the route. The safe houses, under the 
control of people with only distant relationships with the migrants’ home 
communities, were not safe.  
Over time, these arrangements began to erode some of the reputational and social 
mechanisms that enforced contracts. Suffering became normalized, an expectation of 
the journey. Migrants with close relatives in the United States continued to pay for 
premium services, in hope of avoiding both the police and gangs stalking the routes. 
Some migrants also continued to rely on experienced friends and family members to 
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guide them. Human smuggling through Mexico became an increasingly diverse 
collection of enterprises with packages to fit any customer’s budget and risk profile.71 
Then and Now 
The English speaking man managed to stay in the U.S. for five consecutive years. 
He worked. He helped two brothers get to the United States. He got married. After 
marrying a U.S. citizen, he tried to fix his legal status. However, an attorney provided 
poor advice. In reality, he could not change his status until a ten-year re-entry ban that 
he had received during his previous deportation expired. When the English speaking 
man went to the government office to file the paperwork, migration agents caught him 
and deported him again. Thus, in 2010 at the age of 29, he immediately began again.  
He had experienced the dangers first hand during his last journey, and he knew 
that the route had deteriorated during his years in the United States. So, I asked him 
why he was willing to risk it all again to return. In response, he explained that he had a 
three and a half year old U.S. citizen son. On the phone, his son had pleaded with him, 
“Daddy come back home.” With the sound of his son’s voice in his ears, he was ready 
to undertake any risk and uncertainty to arrive. His wife, born and raised in the United 
States, was frightened for him on this last journey, but she did not want to live in 
Honduras. She had a job in Minnesota.  
The irony of his transnational life had not been lost on the man. He had achieved 
his original goals in the United States, but through his son and wife, now found 
himself tied permanently to a country to which he did not legally belong. He had first 
left Honduras, because his family was poor. He and his brothers worked hard. They                                                         
71 David Spener (2009) comes to the same conclusion after fieldwork among Mexican 
migrants. 
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acquired nice houses, land and a truck in Honduras, but his son was in the United 
States; “it is one thing or the other.” Even so, the man lamented, “This is my last trip. I 
don’t want to die.” After all, since the 1990s, the migration route has seen the 
spectacular emergence of new forms of violence, and the man’s migratory experience 
and social ties no longer guaranteed his safety. Indeed, on this journey to end all 
journeys, these social ties rendered him even more vulnerable. If kidnappers were to 
learn that he has family in the U.S., they would demand a large ransom for him. 
Contested Third Period 
Since 2006, the security situation along the migratory routes has deteriorated 
precipitously. As the drug war escalated, contestation over territory and tributes paid 
to “plaza” bosses has intensified both risk and uncertainty for migrants. In Mexico, the 
discovery of anonymous mass graves and alleged disappearances of migrants have 
become more frequent. With the splintering of Mexican criminal groups, the protocols 
and relationships that formerly underpinned smuggling networks have been 
undergoing a period of renegotiation. Allegiances cannot be trusted. Drug cartels have 
turned to kidnapping migrants for ransoms paid by U.S.-based relatives, and have 
coerced some formerly trustworthy coyotes into collaboration, blurring the boundaries 
between traffickers and smugglers. Nevertheless, migrants embark on the ever more 
dangerous journey. 
A Story of Betrayal: A Desperate Young Man 
For example, I met one such desperate young man in the office of the migrant 
shelter in Ixtepec, Oaxaca, Mexico. He was from Tocoa, Colon, Honduras (12/3/10).  
The first time he traveled through Mexico to the United States was in 1999, when he 
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was just fourteen years old. His mother had lived in the United States since he had 
turned one, and he had never known her. His grandparents sent him away after a street 
gang killed a family member. His aunt in the United States told him to come quickly 
to avoid the violence. He left suddenly, without a guide. His family gave him a 
thousand dollars to travel by bus to Chiapas, and there he met a cattle farmer who 
brought him north. The rancher was connected to organized crime, but he became a 
friend, willing to adopt the fourteen year-old. However, the desperate young man 
chose a reunion with his mother over the adoptive father. The rancher accepted his 
decision and helped him on his way. A smuggler friend of the rancher took him in a 
hidden compartment of a truck to Mexico City. This friend stole cars for a living, and 
the fourteen year-old stayed with him for ten days before the rancher arranged for a 
second smuggler friend to take him as far as Monterrey. Again, the rancher asked him 
to stay and offered him a job, but by this time, the boy was determined to join his 
mother. The rancher took him to Reynosa, Tamaulipas where the desperate young 
man’s aunt came to help him across the border.  
He lived in Houston for nearly a decade, acculturating to his community there and 
embracing life in the United States. By his own admission, he felt more at home in 
Texas than Honduras. In Houston, however, a cousin started a fire in their apartment 
and police falsely accused him of his cousin’s crime. Understanding that he was taking 
a fall for another family member, a second cousin paid a lawyer for him. But, in order 
to receive parole, the lawyer advised him to sign a paper with an admission of guilt. 
The desperate young man followed this advice only under duress; he had never been 
incarcerated before, and felt utter desperation to be released. However, after accepting 
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the guilt, the court sentenced him to two years in state prison, and three months later 
they sent him to the migration authorities. It was October 30, 2008 when they deported 
him. The deportation papers bore both his name and his cousin’s name.  
He began the return journey to the United States in November, as soon as he 
landed in Honduras. There was no internal debate, no moment of indecision, about the 
choice to return. His work was in the United States, as well as everything he owned 
and everyone he cared about. The desperate young man could not stay in exile in 
Honduras. 
A friend from Honduras accompanied him on the return journey. This friend had a 
friend in Veracruz, Mexico who had taken him north last time without a problem. The 
last journey with this friendly contact was safe, comfortable and inexpensive. The 
contact offered to take them from Coatzocoalcos, Veracruz to Houston for $3500. 
From Central America to the United States, smuggling services can cost double that 
sum. The young men called their relatives in the United States to arrange the contract 
and payment. After some negotiation, his cousin offered to pay for delivery when they 
arrived in Reynosa. However, the two migrants did not know that their ‘friend’ in 
Veracruz was now working for the Zetas.   
The Zeta Franchise: “You know the letter” 
The daily humiliations and crimes of opportunity committed by mareros, 
tricksters, bandits and corrupt officials continue, but the specter of the Zetas now 
overshadows them in the contemporary imagination of migration. Smugglers, 
humanitarian workers and migrants all agree that human security of migrants and 
smugglers deteriorated with the arrival of the Zetas on the scene. Systematic mass 
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kidnappings of migrants crossing Mexico were virtually unheard of until after 2005. 
The policy of ‘decapitating’ organizations through kingpin killings and prosecutions 
incited violent power struggles within drug associations, as well as between them. 
During President Calderon’s tenure in office (2006-2012), perhaps as many as 50,000 
Mexicans, and an unknown number of undocumented migrants, died in drug war 
violence (Wilkinson 2012). In August 2010, the Zetas allegedly committed a highly 
publicized mass murder of 72 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico.72 In the years 
following this massacre, Mexican authorities discovered other mass graves of 
migrants, and many of the corpses exhibit signs of torture (CIDH 2011, p.7). On May 
13, 2012, Mexican authorities discovered forty-nine mutilated corpses, many of them 
missing heads, arms and feet, in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon. The government of El 
Salvador and human rights activists worried that the dead could be Central American 
migrants, but the bodies had not been immediately identified (Najar 2012). Despite an 
arrest in the case, the massacre remained shrouded in fear-provoking ambiguity, the 
subject of endless rumors rather than a sense of justice. In such situations, the Zetas 
are often the official suspects, but one can never be sure. One shelter staff member 
answered the question of when violence began to escalate against migrants in this 
way: 
Three years ago. I came to work in the shelter in 2007. There were painful stories 
about suffering back then, particularly in the north, in the desert. But in 2008, 
Veracruz became worse. Then the stories from the Istmo began. Between 2009 and 
2010, it has been continuous violence, stronger every day….It has been getting worse 
since the Zetas. In the past, it was common thieves. Of course, the migrants say it is 
the Zetas. I do not know. The Zetas cause so much fear. People used to say ‘maras’                                                         
72 After forensic analysis, the most recent death count for that mass grave has been raised to 
193 (Dudley 2012). However, I use the number originally reported in the media, because 
today the victims collectively are known across Latin America simply as ‘the 72’.  
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and now they say ‘Zetas’. They are so feared because they are organized and strong. 
They can stop a train and take everyone away and there is nothing that can be done. 
Many thieves might say they are the Zetas. The real Zetas are more organized than all 
the shelters combined….But those thieves that steal 200 pesos…. Why would a Zeta 
risk himself for 200 pesos? When they can stop whole trains? There must be thieves 
who claim to be Zetas. They must be common delincuents if they steal only 200…..All 
a thief has to say is “you know the letter” [the letter Z] (shelter staff, 1/20/11). 
 
I sought more information, but she demurred, explaining that she does not want to 
know more about the Zetas. Knowing less is better, safer. The original Zetas group 
formed when Osiel Cardenas Guillen, then boss of the Gulf organization, hired 
Mexican Army Lieutenant Arturo Guzman Decena as an enforcer in 1997  (Castillo 
2010).73 In turn, Guzman recruited other soldiers. The Mexican Special Unit Against 
Organized Crime (UEDO) initially identified 31 former enlisted men working as 
‘Zetas’ (Otero and Aviles 2003), of whom at least 13 served in the Special Air Mobile 
Force Group (GAFEs) (Medellin 2004).  These men formed the original ‘core’ of the 
organization behind Guzman, and their penchant for dressing in black uniforms and 
driving dark suburban vehicles with tinted windows quickly became part of the their 
legend (El Universal 2003; Logan 2009). Since that time, the group continues to 
recruit ex-military (including Guatemalan special forces), ex-police personnel and 
corrupt officials into its ranks (Thompson 2005). Some evidence suggests that at least 
some new Zetas undergo a military training at compounds in Guatemala and northern 
Mexico (Castillo 2010; Thompson 2005).                                                          
73 While working for Cardenas and the Gulf organization, Zeta activities ranged from debt 
collection, personal security, territorial control, kidnapping, execution and internal 
enforcement (Cook 2007, p.8). During kidnapping and murder schemes, the Zetas 
impersonated soldiers (Otero and Aviles 2003), tapped the government phone lines (Otero 
2003), used sophisticated weaponry (Cook 2007, p.7), disseminated propaganda (Monge 
2003), established military-style training camps (Castillo 2010; Thompson 2005), and boldly 
launched frontal attacks on police installations to free their associates (Cook 2007, p.8).  These 
tactics signaled a professionalization of criminal enforcer groups.  
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 However, there has been turnover within the Zetas group, including at its highest 
echelon. In 2002, a rival gang killed Guzman, leaving Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano and 
Miguel Angel Treviño Morales in charge, until Lazcano was killed in 2012 and 
Treviño was captured in 2013 (Althaus 2013; Cervantes 2011, p.8). The Zetas began 
to receive public scrutiny in the violent wake of Cardenas’s capture in March 2003. 
Violent rivalry among drug associations spiked after his capture, as the Zetas struggled 
to maintain the Gulf cartel’s drug routes (Gomez 2005; Meyer 2007, p.6). After 
Cardenas’ 2003 arrest and 2007 extradition to the United States, the Zetas became 
increasingly independent, splitting entirely from the Gulf cartel in February 2010 
when the Gulf cartel murdered a Zeta operative (Dudley 2012) and Cardenas received 
his U.S. conviction (Roebuck 2010 citing anthropologist Howard Campbell).   
The Zetas’ increasing independence from the Gulf cartel precipitated the more 
aggressive entry of this group into the kidnapping industry. The timing of Cardenas’ 
capture in 2003, his extradition in 2007 and his U.S. conviction in 2010 roughly 
correspond with an intensification of violence during migrant kidnappings and the 
transition to kidnappings on a massive scale. The Zetas probably began kidnapping 
migrants, because they had never maintained a drug route independent of their former 
employer the Gulf cartel. Without having independently maintained a drug route, the 
kidnappings may have been necessary to make first social contacts and negotiate 
passage fees with human smugglers crossing the terrain. Cardenas had carefully 
guarded his drug contacts and know-how, leaving the Zetas without the opportunity to 
manage the Gulf organization or independent entry into the drug industry upon his 
arrest (Riva 2005 citing Carlos Resa Nestares of the UNAM). However, the Zetas 
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identified the potential for a large-scale industry in migrant kidnappings, turning the 
stream of unauthorized travelers into a “gold mine” (Mendez 2010): possibly the 
fledgling cartel’s primary source of income for a time. Indeed, the capacity to 
franchise these kidnappings, granting the right to commit them in the Zetas name, now 
provides an easy way to pay members of a very loosely connected extended network 
(activist, Tenocique, 6/2/10). By 2012, the Zetas controlled much of the terrain along 
the Mexican border with Texas, collecting passage fees from coyotes (fieldnotes, 
Saltillo, 7/17/10).  
Very few of the original Zetas members remain alive, and they no longer 
constitute an exclusive, elite group of professional mercenaries. According to Jose 
Wall, Senior Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, “most of the original Zetas are gone, but the legacy of the Zetas still lives 
on” (quoted in Logan 2009). This turnover prompts Logan (2009) to distinguish 
between ‘Los Zetas’ and ‘the Zetas Organization’, the larger more diffuse group 
today. Nevertheless, Zetas and their imitators go to great lengths to maintain their 
image of military efficiency, threatening journalists who write stories about their 
weaknesses and defeats (Meyer 2007, p.4). They frequently make a spectacle of their 
black uniforms, high caliber weapons, and a cavalcade of black Suburbans, as well as 
the torture and killings of their captives. The image-conscious Zetas pioneered the 
practice of beheadings as “narcomessages”, now part of the common repertoire of 
Mexican drug gangs. Zetas and their collaborators may purposely spread rumors of 
their own brutality.    
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Thus, the image of this paramilitary group came to personify kidnappings and 
extortion of migrants. The Zetas and violence against migrants have become 
synonymous in the public imagination, despite the fact that the Sinoloa cartel has also 
kidnapped migrants crossing its terrain (Martinez 2011). Other groups, including the 
Gulf, Juarez and Tijuana cartels, do not provoke the terror and spectacle of the Zetas, 
despite some forays into kidnapping and trafficking, as well as charging crossing fees 
from smugglers passing their territory (Dudley 2012).74  
As a result of the infamy of the Zetas, less well-organized, local groups also 
imitate their kidnappings. They use the infamous Zeta image and name to incite fear in 
their victims. The extent to which the Zetas now license the use of their name or 
outsource certain activities to local collaborators is open to speculation, but it also 
seems to have become a common practice. Furthermore, unauthorized use of the Zeta 
brand and internal conflicts within and among the various Zeta cliques may be on the 
rise. Competing gangs may commit crimes claiming Zeta responsibility to bring the 
attention of law enforcement personnel to Zeta territory; indeed, the investigation into 
the Cadereyta massacre was complicated by a strange series of messages both owning 
and disowning Zeta responsibility (Najar 2012).  
Moreover, several reports leading up to Lazcano’s 2012 killing by government 
forces suggest that the remaining core leadership had been fighting for control, leaving 
Lazcano exposed to attack (Pachico 2012; Pachico and Dudley 2012). The extent to 
which Treviño commanded the Zetas before his arrest is unclear (Pacheco and Dudley 
2012). Factions within the group had been in rebellion (Althaus 2013).                                                          
74 Only one migrant in my interviews believed that he had been kidnapped by the Gulf cartel. 
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The boundaries of the group are unclear. In previous years, some evidence of the 
enforcement of Zeta name brand surfaced, such as in 2009 when a kidnapping band 
was killed in a Nuevo Laredo jail, allegedly for using the Zeta name without 
permission (Corchado 2009). However, these enforcement activities have been 
restricted to key territory, and it is unclear whether leadership can continue them 
effectively. For this reason, Alejandro Hope (2013; quoted by Althaus 2013) reasons 
that the Zeta organization may be in disarray following Treviño’s arrest, but the 
violent and remorseless Zeta attitude and practice will continue at the hands of new 
perpetrators. 
Further complicating the attribution of blame, the term “Zeta” has become a 
generic descriptor for organized and brutal kidnappers, thereby likely undermining the 
group’s capacity to enforce its brand. I asked kidnapping victims how they identified 
their kidnappers as “Zetas”. Some kidnappers claim to be Zetas, despite working in 
regions not known for Zeta activity. Some kidnappers claim to be Zetas, despite a 
poverty and lack of professionalism that contradicted the gang’s folklore. 
Nevertheless, migrants seem inclined to believe these claims. As explained by shelter 
staff (Ixtepec 4/1/11), “They construct the meaning of the word [Zeta] in the route…as 
they move north, they feel their presence more.” In other words, migrants themselves 
use the name ‘Zetas’ in a manner that changes its meaning, undermining the group’s 
control of the trademark. The word becomes associated with cruelty and the costumes 
of any paramilitary criminals, such as the black or camouflage clothes, the trucks with 
dark tinted windows and high power rifles. When asked how migrants knew their 
kidnappers were Zetas, many people respond with a shrug; of course they are Zetas, 
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they were cruel and bad men. Indeed, the word for kidnapper is now often used 
interchangeably with the letter “Zeta” in conversation. The transference of ‘Zeta’ to 
mean ‘kidnapper’ illustrates the ambiguity that confronts migrants. The infamous 
letter Z has become one of many phantoms that stalk the route. 
Corrupt Officials 
For migrants, the difference between a Zeta and a migra [Mexican migration 
official], like the blurry boundary between rival criminal gangs, is also often unclear. 
When a freight train stops for a migration raid, few migrants wait around to identify 
who has stopped the train or check their uniforms. In the confusion and the dark, 
people scream, push and fall from the train. Everyone runs. Families sometimes 
become separated. People hide. Afterwards, few people know with any certainty 
whether the migrants captured have been kidnapped by criminals or detained by 
officials or both. In an interview in the chapel of a now-defunct migrant house in 
Lecheria, a Honduran man explained (7/13/10): 
In San Ramon [on the train route between Arriaga, Chiapas and Ixtepec, Oaxaca], 
there was a truck that drove along the side of the train. From the truck, they stopped 
the train using the break tube. The truck was white with two people in it….The two 
were armed and they caught like thirty [migrants]. Some say it was migra and others 
say it was Zeta. I did not have time to figure it out. I escaped in the corn. 
 
The man guesses that he witnessed a kidnapping, but there is no way to be certain. 
Even when Mexican authorities wear uniforms, migrants cannot be certain that they 
will carry out official duties or corrupt activity. Sometimes officials simply extort 
bribes. At other times, they work more intimately with organized crime (fieldnotes, 
Saltillo, 7/17/10). Such criminal activity is common enough that encounters with law 
abiding Mexican police and soldiers come as a surprise to migrants. Thus, migrants 
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attempt, with limited success, to develop frames for understanding the intentions of 
state authorities.  
For example, a Honduran migrant (Ixtepec, 3/29/11) explained a rumor about 
secret codes in Mexican police uniforms. He and his friends had met a mysterious 
group of well-armed men, some in uniform and others in plain clothes, on a trail 
through the wilderness leading around a migration checkpoint. At first, he thought 
they were kidnappers, but the well-armed men claimed to be protecting the migrants. 
They warned the migrants of the known locations of bandits. In retrospect, the 
Honduran migrant reasoned that they must have been ‘real’ police, because Zetas who 
dress in Mexican police uniforms, “go about with the insignia on the opposite side” or 
so a friend told him.  
These migrants were understandably nervous when approached by any armed 
person, whether they wear a uniform or not. Despite the belief of the Honduran man, 
clues like subtle alterations to uniforms are not a reliable code to understand 
intentions. Indeed, even if real Mexican officials detain migrants, there is a chance 
that they end up in the hands of kidnappers, or beaten and robbed, rather than deported 
home. Migrants do not necessarily know whether the police approaching them are 
kidnappers or serving in their official capacity, and either way they are likely to try to 
escape before they need to find out (e.g. Salvadoran migrant, Ixtepec, 3/30/11). In 
2011, Mexican migration officials allegedly apprehended 120 Mexican, Central 
American and Chinese migrants travelling north by bus and gave them to the Gulf 
cartel (Dudley 2012; Ramsey 2011). In that year, the National Institute of Migration 
(INM) registered 230 reports of corruption (Fox 2013). Between January 2006 and 
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December 2012, the INM removed 883 agents from their posts for “irregular conduct” 
(Fox 2013). Furthermore, kidnappers sometimes evade capture, because they receive 
advance warning about Mexican officials’ plans to raid their drop houses.75 Of course, 
collusion between Mexican officials, including police and military personnel, is 
particularly blatant in kidnapping stories in which victims must be transported across 
the country to captivity in the northern border towns. Some victims of these 
kidnappings, both in interviews I conducted and in interviews conducted by human 
rights groups, reported that officials at highway checkpoints interacted with their 
kidnappers (Amnesty International 2010; CNDH 2011). For example, a Salvadoran 
man (Ixtepec, 6/28/11) described his kidnapping and collusion between kidnappers 
and Mexican police: 
A friend from Honduras said, “let’s go have a beer”…. In the park, close to the church 
and the Casa de la Caridad [shelter], there were two taxis, and we went five and five in 
each. The plan was to [later] take the train to Nuevo Laredo, but it didn’t go like that. 
We were kidnapped by the Zetas….There was a group of 12, well armed and dressed 
as civilians in three trucks, like what the Padre has [small SUVs]. They hit us. They 
took our money. They killed my friend and another…..  
 
I interrupted to ask, “Why did they kill him?” 
 
His error was that he didn’t tell them that he had a wife and children in the US. The 
boss told me, “I cooperated with the killing of the 72.” I said I had family that would 
pay. And I told them I was looking for La Guera in Nuevo Laredo [a coyote]. The boss 
said, “We’re the same”. So, he took us to a neighborhood in those cars. I thought, 
“Why don’t my friends call for help?” There were people around. But it was because 
of fear. This was Saturday. On Sunday, three friends’ money came. The ransom came. 
They were released. I had to wait eight days….. 
                                                         
75 For example, on March 7, 2013, the Mexican Navy freed 105 Central Americans held in 
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, but they did not capture a single kidnapper at the scene of the 
crime (Cawley 2013). In this case, there is no certain evidence that a leak provided 
information to the kidnapping gang. However, I speculate that the frequency with which these 
gangs escape before the authorities arrive indicates that they receive some insider tips. Most 
observers arrive at the same conclusion. 
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I asked about the ransoms, and he explained: 
 
They asked for $5,000 each one. One Nicaraguan friend had an aunt in Costa Rica 
who sent $6,000. Every day they hit us. At ten to seven he took us in a car for the 
money. When they moved us, they passed a patrol and the police talked to the 
murderer. The law is corrupt. 
 
This quote illustrates the potential for collaboration between coyotes, police and 
Zetas, as well as its dire consequences for migrants. The man who told the story had 
been released by the kidnappers after his sister in El Salvador sent three thousand 
dollars to save his life (Ixtepec, 6/29/11). A brother in Las Vegas did not help. Instead, 
his sister took out a high interest loan to pay the ransom. Debts acquired to pay 
ransoms are potentially catastrophic for families, because the rescued person is not 
delivered to the United States where a job might be available to help pay them. For 
this reason, kidnappers sometimes need to torture victims or kill their travel 
companions to extract contact information of family members from migrants. 
Kidnappers also sometimes audibly torture migrants during negotiations with family 
members. The sacrifice made by this man’s sister, who earns $238 dollars a month in a 
Salvadoran clothing factory, drove him to contemplate suicide. Instead, he embarked 
on the journey again, desperate to find work and pay the debt or die trying. 
Coyotes vs. Zetas 
While collusion between coyotes, police and Zetas is common, the relationships 
among the different groups of actors along the route change over time, and these 
changes reshape the physical security of migrants in transit. Today, the most violent 
crimes against migrants are not committed by coyotes, but by cartels. Indeed, migrants 
now pay coyotes largely to help them negotiate the tributes to organized crime, rather 
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than evade capture and deportation by migration authorities. As explained by the 
English Speaking man I met in Saltillo: 
I don’t plan to go by myself, alone, because of the kidnapping. The coyote pays the 
Zetas $300 for each individual. So you have a license to walk from here to the border. 
The price of a coyote [only from Saltillo, Coahuila to cross the border] is $2000. They 
charge you to be in this territory….A friend told me…A friend came in bus. In 
Veracruz, the migra stopped him and said that for $300 we let you go and be sure to 
call this number. It was the Zetas, and you have to pay and they gave him a pin. They 
said if another Zeta catches you, give him the pin. He once gave the pin to the police, 
and they let him go. They’re together, the police and the Zetas. 
 
The friend who had recounted this story had traveled in 2008. The story makes 
evident important changes in the route since the English-speaking man’s earlier 
adventures on the train. Migrants hire coyotes, not primarily to avoid immigration 
enforcement as they did in the 1990s, but to avoid the possibility of kidnapping. 
Organized criminal groups, who charge fees for passage, often seem more capable of 
controlling passage than law enforcement officials. By the time they reach the shelter 
in Saltillo, migrants, like this English-speaking man, overwhelmingly believe that to 
travel farther without a connected coyote would be tantamount to suicide 
Don’t take the train after Saltillo. You take the train, you’ll get caught by either 
migration or the Zetas. Big organizations, a chain, cross fifty people at a time. That’s 
why they [the Zetas] respect those people [big coyotes]. They [the coyotes] pay to let 
them work. 
 
This man and his travel party decided to rely on a cousin who traveled to the 
United States three weeks before them to choose a coyote. They hoped that the record 
of the coyote in his recent dealing with the migrant’s family member signals 
reliability, but the danger is always that the coyote sells them to the Zetas rather than 
deliver them to the U.S. Given how quickly criminal territory and relationships change 
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in the post-2006 environment, past dealings with the coyote offer no certain outcome 
for future contracts. 
Indeed, the relationship between kidnapping groups and smugglers alternates 
rapidly between conflict, coercion and collaboration (Fieldnotes 9/5/10).  Likewise, 
the ‘Zetas’ and mareros have a sometimes adversarial, sometimes cooperative 
relationship. In the northern part of Mexico, the Zetas and other organized groups fight 
over territory (Cervantes 2011), and factions within the Zetas now fight among 
themselves (Pachico 2012; Pachico and Dudley 2012). As explained previously, the 
Zetas do not control use of their brand at all times and places, and other, smaller bands 
of kidnappers capitalize on their symbolic resources (with or without permission). For 
these reasons, the criminal threats to migrants are multiple and fluid, depending on 
changes in the relationships among these actors and the territory they control. This 
complicates the relationship between the Zetas who control terrain and the coyotes 
that wish to pass clients across it.   
Several stories of Zetas torturing, threatening or murdering coyotes came to my 
attention during fieldwork. These stories underscored the potential for conflict 
between smugglers and kidnappers. In interviews with migrants describing their own 
kidnappings, two types of criminal violence against guides have surfaced: punishment 
and coercion. Criminal groups tax movement on the routes north, and guides who have 
not paid the requisite fee may be killed and their clients held for ransom. During 
kidnappings, Zetas have also tortured migrants to identify paid guides within travel 
groups, presumably with the knowledge that each paid guide has a smuggling boss 
with money to ransom his worker and clients. A middle-aged Salvadoran woman 
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(12/1/10) at a shelter in Arriaga recounted the story of the kidnapping of her travel 
group in Tierra Blanca in 2009: 
At first, the Zetas did not know the Guatemalan was the guide.  There was a 
Honduran, a Guatemalan and my husband.  They beat all of them.  The Honduran 
fingered the Guatemalan as the guide.  The Zetas know that when there’s a guide, 
there’s a boss.  They knew this Guatemalan had a boss who would pay.  They told him 
to call his boss and tell him he needs to pay $5,000.  The boss paid and we ended up at 
his house in Nuevo Laredo where there were about ten Central American guides and 
that Mexican boss….Migration gets paid $300 for each migrant, like the Zetas…. In 
Monterrey, migration stopped the trailer.  The boss paid to get us through to Nuevo 
Laredo.  No problem.  We did not know where we were going.  When we got there, 
we knew we were in Nuevo Laredo…. The boss insisted that we pay $2800 per 
person. 
 
Her Mexican ‘husband’ endured a terrible beating by the Zetas, leaving him “black 
and blue all over his back and chest” and barely capable of walking.76 Since the 
coyote boss paid the ransoms to the Zetas, the woman and her ‘husband’ became his 
chattel in Nuevo Laredo: 
Well, I was in the hands of those people, a band of coyote.  They wanted $2800 for 
each of us….. They said that we had to work for them, if we could not pay.  But we 
escaped.  The guards were drinking and then fell asleep.  They forgot to lock the 
door….  They wanted him to work as a coyote, and they wanted me to work as a 
housekeeper, helping the woman of the house.  My husband is Mexican.  The boss 
threatened to turn him over to migration, and he said “go ahead.” I will go to 
migration myself.  I am not going to work for you….. The boss bargained with them: 
“OK, how about $800 for the food and shelter that they used en route [from Tierra 
Blanca to Nuevo Laredo]?  But my husband refused to pay…  And he said “I am 
Mexican.” He was not going to be bullied by them like the Central Americans get 
bullied. 
 
Despite this woman’s insistence that she had escaped and now desired to return to 
El Salvador, rumors that surfaced during interviews with other migrants indicate that                                                         
76 Later in the interview, the woman explained that her travel companion was not her husband 
after all.  After a pause, she said, “He is not my husband.  My husband died long ago.  It’s just 
that this man helped me.  My coyote abandoned me in his town, and his family let me into 
their house and he offered to take me north.  He was kind and helped me.” In Central America, 
it is fairly common for monogamous sexual partners to pronounce themselves husband and 
wife for a time. 
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she continued along the route and might actually have been working for an abusive 
coyote. While drunk guards forgetting to lock a door is a plausible story (one that 
appears in multiple kidnapping narratives), the escape may have been a fabrication to 
hide the woman’s complicity with illegal schemes. In other words, this kidnapping 
might have forced migrants to become smugglers or forged a new collaboration 
between smugglers and kidnappers. The coyote boss in Nuevo Laredo now 
presumably knows he must pay Zetas, just as he pays migration, to get his people 
through their territory. And clients who cannot pay their debts become ‘his people’.   
Indeed, with a little coercion, Zetas have turned the capture of guides into new 
business arrangements that blur the line between the kidnapping and smuggling 
industries. With the shifts in territory caused by leadership change and criminal 
reorganization in the wake of intensified policing, kidnapping is a method for making 
contact with human smugglers; it is a form of communication with potential business 
partners, a means to begin negotiations over a new system of tributes. Smugglers may 
then be forced either to pay tribute to the plaza boss or to find victims for kidnappers 
with false promises of travel services; when they cooperate with kidnappers at the 
expense of their clients, they are no longer smugglers, but tricksters.  
In the process of establishing their independence from the Gulf organization, the 
Zetas launched an immense effort to co-opt guides and control the taxation of 
movement along the routes. In the migrant shelter in Saltillo, a Honduran kidnapping 
victim (7/18/11) reiterated the claim that the coyotes must pay three hundred dollars 
per client to pass Zeta territory or pay with their lives. When I asked him how he knew 
that, he shrugged, “All the world knows that.” 
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Independent coyotes face a two-fold threat.  First, the guides fear apprehension 
and prosecution by state authorities. In Mexico, the government has criminalized 
smuggling and adopted highly punitive policies. Second, independent guides fear 
punishment and coercion from non-state violent groups.  As violent criminal groups 
proliferate, human smuggling becomes more difficult; tribute demands may also 
proliferate, and territory may change hands requiring new, and often dangerous, first 
social contacts. As explained by Stephen Dudley (2012) in his analysis of migrant 
kidnappings and organized crime: 
Which group he [the coyote] paid depended on what was happening in the area. 
Responsible coyotes, therefore, may carry extra cash on hand for any unforeseen 
circumstances. No matter what the system, confusion about how has paid whom and 
when remains a strong possibility. Moreover, in a shifting landscape, it is difficult for 
coyotes and their representatives to properly identify a given criminal group’s role and 
informants. 
 
Furthermore, organized criminal groups have distinct characteristics, resources and 
strategies, such that changes in territorial ownership among them have consequences 
for patterns in violence.77 Given their reliance on coercive business practices with 
smugglers, the Zetas presents a special safety challenge to coyotes and their clients. 
Indeed, a smuggler based in El Salvador claimed that things would be much better for 
Central American migrants if the Gulf cartel won its fight against the Zetas and 
reestablished its domain (7/5/10). In Monterrey, Nuevo Leon in the summer of 2011, 
when fighting between the groups still erupted in the area, locals whispered in hushed 
tones that they longed for the old criminal bosses, because the Zetas obeyed no codes 
of conduct (fieldnotes 7/20/11). One Salvadoran migrant chose to travel through                                                         
77 See Cervantes (2011) for a brief description of each of the major crime groups and their 
leadership and characteristics, as described by Mexican government reports. 
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Piedras Negras, Coahuila rather than Zeta territory in Nuevo Laredo, because he had 
not heard negative reports from returning migrants from that location and he knows 
that “it is the cartel of El Chapo there [the Sinoloa cartel], and that is the best of the 
cartels” (7/16/11). However, given the amorphous nature of the new Zetas and their 
imitators, it seems uncertain that either the Sinoloa or the Gulf cartel would be capable 
of putting the lid back on the kidnapping box. Indeed, given its recent setbacks, the 
Gulf cartel hardly seems capable of securing a wide swath of territory. Finally, codes 
of conduct, once broken, are difficult to reassemble. 
Smuggling vs. Kidnapping 
The Mexican human smuggling industry and the migrant kidnapping industry 
overlap, each with an intimate effect on the business opportunities in the other, but the 
activities should not be conflated, as they often are in media reports. The migrant 
kidnapping industry grew from a common practice in the human smuggling industry: 
payment on delivery. For Central American coyotes, payment of half the travel fee 
prior to the journey and half upon successful arrival within the United States is still the 
norm. Migrants are then held hostage until family members pay the agreed upon final 
installment; it is a guarantee for payment.  Importantly, migrants do not consider this 
to be a ‘kidnapping’, unless the smuggler unilaterally changes of the terms of the 
contract and demands more money than expected.  In some cases, the journey north 
may have accrued unexpected expenses and the smuggler may attempt to recoup these 
expenses by changing the terms of the oral contract after departure.  From the 
perspective of the migrant, changes made after departure may constitute an unfair 
business practice, or worse, a kidnapping. Extreme violence and torture does not 
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generally accompany this type of smuggler-kidnapping, probably because the 
perpetrators remain tied to a travel service business that depends on attracting future 
clients.   
However, smuggling and kidnapping share a common insight: family members 
waiting for migrants in the United States have money to pay the border crossing 
guides. If they have a long-distance coyote that takes them all the way from Central 
America, and not just a border crossing guide, the family members have even more 
money waiting for the migrant’s arrival. Brian Roberts et al (2010) summarized 
various survey estimates of the U.S. border crossing for Mexican nationals to find a 
range in averages estimates between $1,305-1,845 and rising over time. Of course, 
that money only covers the short distance of the US border itself.  Healthy adult 
Salvadorans paid between $5,000-7,000 for door-to-door service from El Salvador to 
destinations within the United States in 2010. At that time, special service from a 
reputable coyote for small children and pregnant women who cannot cross long 
distances by foot could cost as much as $10,000. Unauthorized travel from McAllen to 
Houston, once inside the United States, cost as much money as the border crossing. 
Prices vary according to the services and length of segments included in the travel 
package. For high-end long distance arrangements, a protocol from an earlier era of 
migration remains intact: half the money is generally paid at departure, and half the 
money is paid upon delivery. 
Therefore, kidnappers generally ask for the amount expected by the average 
smuggler on delivery, anywhere between $2,000-5,000 in ransom from US family 
members.  Sometimes family members can negotiate the ransom down to a few 
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hundred dollars.  But we should expect the prices in the two industries to influence 
each other.  As fees for smugglers increase under pressure from immigration policing, 
so will the ransom demands of kidnappers. Kidnappers will continue to assume that 
the families of migrants have sufficient money to pay the guides. 
If kidnappers do not receive payment, they may try to extract profit through forced 
work. This also happens when a family cannot pay a smuggler the agreed upon fees at 
delivery.  Women might be forced to prostitute or do housework in the drop house. 
Men might be forced to smuggle. Today, the Zetas force some Central American 
migrants to work as spies along migratory routes, known as rateros, identifying other 
migrants who receive remittances from the United States and setting them up for 
capture.  
Given the emergence of this new criminal activity, it is particularly important to 
correctly differentiate between the types of criminal actors that travel the unauthorized 
migratory routes. Recent media coverage conflates smugglers and kidnappers to the 
benefit of the Mexican government’s human rights reputation. Under pressure from 
human rights groups promoting the protection of migrants, the Mexican government 
and its associated media have been quick to call any interception of migrants en route 
a “rescue”. The language of “rescue” began to appear with greater frequency 
following the publicity that surrounded the massacre of 72 migrants in Tamaulipas in 
August 2010. Not all claims of rescue are valid. For example, on February 8, 2011, the 
military claimed to have rescued forty-four Guatemalan migrants in Reynosa, 
Tamaulipas; but the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry argued that the migrants were not 
victims of kidnapping, but paying clients of a smuggler (Avila 2011).   
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News reports about ‘rescues’ provoked an incredulous reaction from human rights 
defenders. In particular, they argued that if the reported “rescue” occurs at a highway 
checkpoint and migrants are pulled from a northbound moving van, it is possible that 
they were traveling in their chosen direction with their guide, not held against their 
will.  Furthermore, a human rights activist pointed out that these so-called ‘rescues’ 
provide a convenient excuse for military personnel to perform the duties of migration 
agents, a crossover prohibited by the law (fieldnotes 1/11/11). Without testimony from 
migrants themselves, it is difficult to tell the difference between rescues and 
immigration raids, and few newspaper articles include such firsthand accounts by 
victims. Several cases have surfaced in the Mexican media in which immigration 
enforcement has likely masqueraded as human rights protections, making it difficult to 
evaluate government efforts to protect migrants. These cases illustrate the danger of 
conflating smugglers and kidnappers. 
Kidnappers and thieves frequently disguise themselves as guides or coyotes. 
Furthermore, even reputable smugglers sometimes engage in extortion and other 
misdeeds (particularly sexual coercion or threats to enforce contracts78), but smugglers 
do not necessarily use violence against migrants or others; the primary source of their 
profit is the provision of a travel service, and the best guides treat migrants as 
customers, not cargo. By definition, however, kidnappers and thieves assault migrants, 
and the interests of these violent criminals are at odds with those of reputable guides 
engaged in the smuggling industry. When the Zetas declared their independence from 
the Gulf organization, clandestine spaces along migratory routes became more                                                         
78 Rape, a special case of endemic violence along the route, is beyond the scope of this 
chapter.  I will discuss it in greater depth in Chapter 6. 
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fragmented and fluid, with former alliances under continuous renegotiation and a 
shifting territorial control of routes. This new social menagerie challenges simple 
state-crime dichotomies.   
Coyotes: Traffickers or Smugglers? 
Of course, the boundaries between actors are not fixed, and frequently one actor 
has many roles depending on the place, time and people with whom he/she is engaged. 
For example, the low-level guides and the coyote that I met during fieldwork do not 
engage in smuggling fulltime or as a lifetime career. At many levels of the smuggling 
enterprise, it seems necessary to ‘keep your day job’ with smuggling only 
supplementing other income or occurring as the opportunity presents itself.  Consistent 
with Spener’s (2009) study of Mexican coyotaje, I found that many experienced 
Central American migrants also pass in and out of the category of smuggler along the 
route; at some times and in some segments, they guide friends for altruistic reasons, 
and at other times, they ask for a little financial help in return (often to finance their 
own unauthorized migration north).  While the era of the ‘heroic coyote’ might be 
over, human smuggling remained a diverse cluster of social processes; no single crime 
group controlled all Mexican human smuggling routes. Nor did smugglers respond to 
danger in a homogenous manner. Guides adopted a variety of strategies for dealing 
with risk and uncertainty, frequently combining tactics of collaboration, subversion 
and conflict.  
In addition to subcontracting schemes, an even more decentralized system 
emerged to cope with increased violence: a chain of people who buy and sell migrants 
(e.g. returned migrant, El Salvador, 4/15/10). The smuggler in the community of 
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origin receives the first payment for recruitment of the migrant.  After crossing the 
first segment of the route north, the smuggler then sells the human cargo for a small 
sum of money. As delivery pay-off gets closer and risk of apprehension decreases, the 
price of the migrant increases and the human cargo changes hands many times. This 
system mirrors how investors deal with risk in commodity and financial markets; it is 
a form of hedging against the increased risks posed by intensified policing. Indeed, 
migrants hire smugglers, because they can often better judge risk. Consistent with 
Mexican migrants’ experiences with coyotes crossing into the United States, coyotes 
who cross Mexico are ‘risk managers’ (Sheridan 2009, p.66). By complicating the 
attribution of blame when violence occurs and distancing social relationships between 
client and service provider, both of these schemes undermine the reputational and 
personal mechanisms that could enforce a smuggler-migrant contract. This tactical 
displacement thereby exacerbates the insecurity of migrants en route.  Over time, 
practices developed by migrants and smugglers to evade immigration control have 
exacerbated migrants’ exposure to violence perpetrated by criminal gangs. Both risk 
and uncertainty have increased. 
In other words, a smuggler is not an immutable social category, but includes 
people that engage in a transient practice that overlaps with other social practices, 
including activities motivated by both reciprocity and economic profit. Likewise, 
‘kidnapper’ is not an immutable social category, but a transient practice that overlaps 
with other social practices, including smuggling. In some social contexts, officials 
may be corrupt, but not others.  Finally, despite the youth gangs’ emphasis on lifetime 
membership, fealty, and the indelibility of tattoos, it too represents a transient practice 
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overlapping with other social practices and relationships. The key for understanding 
the human security of migrants is to examine the social practices that link the activities 
of these actors as they move across a violent landscape. 
To be Kidnapped 
The desperate Honduran man discovered what happens to a migrant when they fall 
into the clutches of the Zetas, and he lived to tell about it. The friend in Veracruz, now 
under contract as their guide north, took them in trucks to another guide in Reynosa. 
But the contract suddenly changed. The new guide wanted another $3500 in addition 
to the original bargain. The new guide began to negotiate with relatives in the United 
States, and the migrants were kept locked in a safe house with insufficient food. The 
young man estimates that 140 men and 36 women were in this house. The guides, now 
acting as kidnappers, extorted money from relatives in the United States, and they 
repeatedly raped the women. 
To celebrate Christmas 2008, the kidnappers drank heavily. Only two of the six 
armed-men had been left to guard the house, and they were outside making fajitas. As 
they became aware of the lax security during the holiday celebrations, the migrants 
had an idea; they would escape as soon as the New Year’s Eve festivities began. He 
and his friend organized a group of forty captive migrants to escape. 
Unfortunately, hunger overcame one skinny migrant, and he alerted the guards to 
the plan in an attempt to receive larger food rations. The kidnappers subsequently 
identified the four masterminds of the escape. When they first separated the young 
man and the three other plotters from the larger group of migrants, he thought his 
relatives must have paid his ransom. He expected to be released. But very suddenly, 
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they started hitting him with a pistol in the chest and head. They tied his arms behind 
his back and took him to a second safe house, where the kidnappers held another large 
group of migrants. He slept that night with his hands tied uncomfortably behind his 
back.  
One member of his group of four masterminds was a man from San Pedro Sula, 
Honduras. He was a Christian. They came for him on a Friday and said, “You are on 
the way to Houston.” But instead, they took him to the Rio Bravo where they cut off 
his head with a machete and threw the body in the river. On Saturday, they showed the 
video of his beheading to the remaining three masterminds of the escape plot. They 
told the young man that it would be his turn on Monday. He knew he would soon be 
dead. 
However, the young man and his two co-conspirators began to talk to the other 
migrants in the safe house. There were people from Brazil, Guatemala, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Ecuador, a few from El Salvador and even a Chinese person. But most of 
the victims were Hondurans. All of the migrants had been tricked into thinking they 
were dealing with coyotes and brought only to the drop house in Reynosa instead of 
the United States. Many people had been held captive four to six months, and some 
had been there as long as a year. That Sunday, six Nicaraguan migrants agreed that it 
was time to escape. At five am, when it was still dark, they turned off the electricity, 
and everyone began to fight the kidnappers, wielding a pitchfork and anything else 
they could get their hands on. He saw one person killed with the pitchfork. All of the 
migrants on the bottom floor of the house escaped. They broke the windows, smashed 
through them. Blood drenched the floor. 
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By seven or eight in the morning, the kidnappers had regained sufficient control to 
move over one hundred victims, including the man who told me this story, from the 
top floor to a neighboring house. The kidnappers squeezed these people into three 
cramped rooms that already housed over one hundred people. The man estimated that 
the little house held around 340 victims. A Honduran kidnapper with a gun guarded 
the new house. Monday morning dawned, and four Zetas arrived to take the young 
man to his death. By this time, the desperate young man was thin and close to 
starvation. 
At that moment, when the four Zetas arrived to take the man to his death, the 
military and police raided the house. The soldiers had beaten a kidnapper found in the 
abandoned safe house next door, hit him in the head with a rifle butt, and smashed his 
teeth to get information. He disclosed where the migrants were held. The military 
surrounded the house in a big circle so that no one could escape, but few of the 
migrants ran. The migrants had made an agreement among themselves not to run when 
the police came, to stay and give their testimony rather than evade deportation. 
Despite this agreement, the desperate young man ran and hid in the garage, where a 
soldier found him. Upon being discovered, he gave a silent signal to indicate the 
hidden position of a kidnapper nearby. The soldier then discovered and beat the 
kidnapper, and the young man re-joined the migrants, now in official custody. 
The police and military rescued the young man from the kidnappers on January 4, 
2009. He and sixty other migrants gave their testimony in Reynosa, and then they 
were promptly turned over to the migration authorities. He did not know about the 
Mexican FM3 visa, designed for victims of crime who give testimony, he would have 
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been eligible to receive. In 2007, the Mexican government acquiesced to human rights 
advocates and established these humanitarian visas (Amnesty International 2010, 
p.29). Unfortunately, like this desperate young man, few migrants seem capable of 
accessing these visas, or even aware that they are entitled to them. 
In fact, to his surprise, they turned them over to the same migration officials who 
had visited the kidnappers’ house. They were part of the same group of Zetas. Of 
course, neither he nor the other victims said anything, because they were afraid. The 
desperate young man reasoned that the migration authorities could let the Zetas kill 
them while they remained in official custody, because the police had only caught the 
guards at the safe house, not the bosses. Even the soldiers had their faces covered for 
their own protection. Fortunately, a special police force and consular officials from 
some of the home countries accompanied them during the deportation process.  
Over a month after his rescue from the kidnappers, the young man was deported 
from Mexico to Honduras with the same friend who had accompanied him throughout 
the hideous experience. His friend left immediately again for the United States, but the 
young man could not. He had been beaten savagely, taking blows to the head. And he 
was so skinny. He needed medical attention and vitamins. He rested in Honduras for a 
year before trying again.   
Then and Now 
In December 2010, when I met him in the migrant shelter in Oaxaca on his third 
journey through Mexico, the desperate man felt confident that he now had better 
information about where the dangers were. The contours of these dangers had begun 
to take shape in his mental map. He explained that MS territory extends for some part 
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and then the Zeta territory begins. He had heard rumors that the contact who betrayed 
him during the last journey is now an infamous boss of a clique of Zetas in Medias 
Aguas, Veracruz, the next stop north of Ixtepec on the western train route. 
While he expressed greater confidence that he could locate the dangers on a map, 
he had suddenly found himself more vulnerable to these dangers. He had come to 
know the route, but in the process, the maras had come to know him. As a result, he 
had to abandon his original plan to travel north by train. A friend had come through 
this shelter only three months before, and reported that there had not been a gang 
problem. However, now in the shelter, he had come to believe that the gangs had 
infiltrated the place. The desperate man watched gang members wander the grounds at 
night, and they returned for a meal during the daytime.  
The gang’s entry into the shelter made him nervous, because a handful of gang 
members, armed with a knife, had attempted to rob him after he disembarked the train 
and walked toward the shelter. In response, he and his friends had picked up rocks and 
threatened their would-be attackers. After that incident, the gang knew him and could 
recognize him as one of the migrants who resisted them. He feared that they might 
seek their revenge. In fact, he believed that they sent a black Honduran man to spy on 
him79: “From street gangs to Zetas, there is danger on every side. Before, one could 
pass like it was nothing….This time there is no social interaction. Now, I cannot 
confide in other people.” He lamented how he must now assume the worst of people, 
but he repeated that he had seen, with his own eyes, the black Honduran with the gang                                                         
79 After watching the accused man visit the shelter multiple times, I interviewed him and he 
did not admit to any involvement with the gang. I did not push the matter, but the allegations 
against him seem plausible, because he spent a great deal of time along the route on the tracks 
in the company of others with ties to the street gangs. 
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that had attempted to rob him. Because of the likelihood that the gang would hunt him 
down for resisting them, the desperate young man received advice from the shelter 
manager about a little-known bus route; he lacked the anonymity necessary to travel 
the train route safely. 
Conclusion  
  This chapter describes the anonymous, violent and uncertain social context of 
migrant journeys. It charts the black and gray zones of the route (O’Donnell 2004; 
Levi 1988), in which the dramatic and unexpected changes in the relationships 
between migrants, coyotes, Zetas, mareros and Mexican officials have unfolded along 
the routes over three decades of mass migration. Despite this veil of uncertainty and 
ambiguity, we must not conflate the many actors involved in diverse clandestine 
activities along the routes. The relationships between coyotes and kidnappers vary 
between collaboration and conflict with important consequences for migrant safety. 
People change their roles without warning; coyotes or police may become kidnappers. 
Friends and travel companions report to kidnappers. Mareros and Zetas may strike 
deals. When street gangs become a nuisance, Zetas hunt them. So-called Zetas may be 
imposters, and common criminals manipulate cases of mistaken identity to their 
advantage. Members of the same gang may turn on one another, battling for control 
and collaborating with enemies. In summary, loyalties are more ephemeral than the 
tattoos they wear.  
Indeed, loyalties are often crosscutting, as individuals who wander the route 
trespass across multiple social roles and identities, as well as across terrain. A gang 
member might be a migrant, a Central American by birth, an adopted member of a 
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Mexican community, a man, a friend, a boyfriend, husband, a Catholic, a father, an 
occasional kidnapper or bandit, and a part-time coyote. Pulled in many directions, 
these conflicted souls might collaborate with one another one day and combat the 
next. As they wander lost in the land of lotus-eaters, their own odysseys to the United 
States derailed, gang members struggle for power within their own cliques, as well as 
against competing gangs. The result is uncertainty and ambiguity for all migrants. 
A Story of a Conflicted Soul: The Informer 
In December 2010 in Ixtepec, Oaxaca, where the routes north bottleneck in the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, a mass kidnapping, the murder of a marero and threats 
against the life of the shelter priest provoked one such conflicted soul to turn informer 
against his own street gang. When a competing group within his own gang 
collaborated with the Zetas, the informer sang to human rights activists and police 
(fieldnotes 5/13/11). Sometimes his loyalties seemed to lie with the priest and the 
abused Central Americans along the route. Killing time with small talk in the dusty 
yard of the shelter, the informer would shake his head and lament the exploitation of 
his fellow migrants (e.g. fieldnotes 1/14/11). On occasion, he would announce his 
commitment to protect them by any means necessary, savoring the idea of being a 
‘social bandit’ riding the rails to bring justice (Hobsbwam 1959, p.13-29). At other 
times, he would commit crimes against his fellow migrants, or work as a recruiter for 
smugglers (fieldnotes 3/28/11). A cynic might view his testimony to authorities as 
pure power politics, rather than a crisis of conscience (e.g. government official 
4/28/11). He had murdered people, after all. The informer vied for control of the 
Arriaga-Ixtepec smuggling corridor with challengers from both inside and outside the 
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ranks of his own gang, and he might have expected the police to clear away his 
competition for him.  
Thus, while the tattoo on the side of his face marked him as a member of the MS 
13, his identity was more complicated. By his own admission, he was neither Mexican 
nor Central American anymore. As an unaccompanied child, he had left Honduras 
behind, beginning an indefinite odyssey along the train tracks (fieldnotes 1/14/11; 
5/30/11). He improvised a living with the materials at hand, and had performed many 
roles in his time.  
When I met him, he had been hiding in the migrant shelter with a girlfriend, taking 
refugee from his own gang. He left Ixtepec for the last time when people began to 
gossip and warn that someone was coming to get him, whether he remained under the 
protection of the shelter priest or not. The informer had many enemies, before and 
after his betrayal, and his ultimate disappearance from the route triggered many 
rumors. Some people (myself among them) wanted to believe that he had faked his 
own death and went into hiding, maybe in Mexico City (fieldnotes 5/30/11). However, 
the general consensus among migrants and shelter staff was that he had died. Some 
migrants passing through the shelter heard the rumor that his own gang killed him. 
Others whispered in hushed tones that it was the Zetas who killed him and then 
dissolved his body in acid (fieldnotes 5/13/11). A mutual friend told me different 
stories on various occasions. When I pressed him on the inconsistencies, he responded 
with mild exasperation that all the stories were probably true (fieldnotes 5/12/11).  
In this case, the acceptance of inconsistencies is not evasive; it is instructive about 
the nature of truth, violence and uncertainty along the migratory route. Given the 
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complex and fluid relationships along the route, there will never be a final answer 
about the violence: who did it and why. There is no expectation that a court of law can 
arrive at the truth, and there is no expectation among migrants that only one 
uncontestable truth about violence exists.80 Indeed, when I asked a legal advocate for 
migrants about the possibility of justice in the courts, she laughed, “Justice…ha 
ha…that’s a big word. Go ask the priest about that.” In an uncertain context that 
implicates authorities in violence, this attitude is simply realistic, not jaded. Within an 
ambiguous and uncertain social structure, multiple plausible alternative versions of a 
violent event can co-exist, long after formal arrests have been made and the official 
investigation comes to a close. As Ellen Moodie (2011, p.14) explains in her analysis 
of the socio-political role of crime narratives in the aftermath of the Salvadoran peace 
accords: 
What is important is that people imagined a common shape of their world.  What is 
important that the stories had patterns- and that they were seen (or rather, heard) as 
possible….They created convictions, social facts, structures of feelings, senses of 
reality that had effects.  They had consequences in and on the world.  Consciousness 
cannot be false in that sense. 
 
The co-existence of multiple unofficial versions (and the lack of credibility of 
official versions) of criminal events says something important about the actors and 
alliances that perpetrate that violence. The relationships among these actors are 
extraordinarily flexible. Along the route today, people betray their loyalties, transgress 
agreements and rebuild relationships. Nothing is settled. People may not be able to 
distinguish between kidnappers, authorities, smugglers, and migrants, because                                                         
80 This is the janus-faced nature of violence in Central America, defined by Elana Zilberg 
(2007, p.39), drawing on the work of Begona Aretxaga (1998, p.2) as a “a montage of 
interlocking images and imaginaries…a fragmented gaze” that functions “through a discourse 
of conspiracy.” 
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individuals switch roles without warning. The uncertainty produced by such 
ambiguities has a profound impact on how migrants and smugglers navigate the route. 
In the next chapter of this dissertation, we will begin to explore how migrants 
negotiate with these chimerical characters and navigate the dark cave that is the 
migratory route. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INFORMING ROUTES: A MORAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL SMUGGLING 
MARKETS IN TWO SALVADORAN HOMETOWNS 
Introduction 
Rumor the herald sped like wildfire through the city, 
Crying out the news of the suitors’ bloody death and doom 
And massing from every quarter as they listened, kinsmen milled 
With wails and moans of grief before Odysseus’ palace. 
 
Rumor is a herald that motivates the plot of the Odyssey. Rumors about Odysseus’ 
location, his actions and the misdeeds committed by the suitors against him travel across 
an anarchic landscape through gossip. These word-of-mouth messages potentially 
impugn reputations. They alternately sow distrust, anger, fear and hope, thereby 
impelling characters to fulfill fate. Likewise, rumors animate the drama of migration from 
rural Central America. Information circulates along the transnational route, spreading like 
wildfire in the aftermath of tragedy. Rumors may damage the social reputation of 
migrants and smugglers, thereby provoking vengeance. They circulate distrust, anger, 
fear and hope within a community. Rumors about migration permeate hometowns, 
conveyed through social networks, and they are often migrants’ primary source of 
information about the migratory route. However, in reality, these rumors seldom provide 
clarity. 
Given the tendency of information to flow through social networks, research suggests 
that communities with a long migration history develop informational advantages. This 
research implies a strong tendency toward path dependence for migration flows; we 
would expect that early start communities fare better during the journey.1 Drawing on                                                         
1 James Mahoney (2000) explains that ‘path dependence’ is a small, contingent event 
triggering a larger pattern over time. The concept has described a wide variety of processes, 
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fieldwork among Mexican migrants from 1998 to 2004, David Spener (2004, p.315-316) 
speculates that migrants from new sending areas may initially lack the human and social 
capital that might ensure safe arrival, leaving them more vulnerable to abuse and assault 
in transit. Spener’s (2001; 2004; 2009) approach emphasizes the ‘social embeddedness’ 
of unauthorized migration and the smuggling markets that facilitate travel under 
conditions of policing.2 Likewise, as David Kyle and Marc Scarcelli (2009, p.298-299) 
explain in their comparison of violence along Cuban and Haitian migratory routes to the 
United States: 
Violence is not a necessary part of migrant smuggling organizations, which are 
embedded within wider social networks, cultural norms and contractual 
relationships….The smuggling contract both exposes migrants to risks, including 
violence, and, at the same time, prevents violent coercion from being a central feature 
of clandestine migration industries.  Nonetheless, there are distinct patterns and 
conditions in which violence, both en route and after arrival, are likely to occur. 
 
Beginning with an understanding of smuggling and unauthorized migration routes as 
rooted within this context of “social networks, cultural norms and contractual 
relationships”, this chapter examines what migrants from different communities know 
about violence before the journey begins, and where this information comes from. 
Therefore, I explore the social context of smuggler-client contracts and rumors of 
violence in two migrant hometowns in El Salvador. I ask what people know about the 
journey before it begins, what role interpersonal networks play in transmitting that 
information, and whether beliefs about the journey vary across different migrant sending 
                                                                                                                                                               
ranging from technological innovation to economic theories of increasing returns (e.g. David 
1985, Easterly 2002).  In the study of migration, Douglas Massey et al. (1993) call this 
tendency ‘cumulative causation’.  
2 Highlighting the role of the social networks that underpin economic transactions, Mark 
Granovetter (1985, p.487-491) explains ‘social embeddedness’ as a “concrete, ongoing system 
of social relations” which grounds the economy.   
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communities. To do so, I compare and contrast the experiences and information of 
migrants from two Salvadoran towns with divergent migration histories. Then, using 
interviews with migrants of other nationalities along the routes through Mexico and the 
United States, I ground the analysis of these two Salvadoran towns in a larger regional 
context.  
My findings run against accepted wisdom that dominates the field of migration 
studies. These findings also run against my own initial expectations for the research. 
Based on accepted wisdom, I had initially expected to observe community-level variation 
in the quality, intensity and frequency of rumors about violence circulating within the two 
Salvadoran communities. I also expected to observe more frequent first hand reports of 
violence in the community with a shorter migration history. Finally, I expected to find 
evidence of the stabilizing impact of reputation mechanisms and more precise 
information about the behavior of particular smugglers in the community with the long 
migration history. However, I did not find any such variation. 
Ultimately, I explain why the smuggling markets and migration flows embedded in 
the two towns do not fit the expected model of path dependence. Migrants from towns 
with a long migration history do not necessarily have an informational advantage over 
migrants from towns with a short migration history. In fact, the attrition of the town’s 
available social capital and internal migration gives rise to cross-country familial 
networks that reshape the boundaries of ‘community’. A cultural norm based on a belief 
in ‘envidia’ (envy) generates an obstacle to resource flows by undermining community 
solidarity and cohesion.  
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Thus, I find greater evidence of variation in resources at the level of the family, as 
opposed to the hometown. While much scholarship on Mexican migration emphasizes 
hometown networks, Lynnaire Sheridan (2009, p.167) notes that, even where community 
is important, “without a doubt, the number one risk management tool for unauthorized 
Mexican migrants is family”. In the Central American context, family networks are the 
most important financial resource for migrants before the journey begins. In addition to 
providing migrants with money, families play a vital role as potential retribution systems 
in enforcing contracts in local smuggling markets. These findings contrast with previous 
research conducted by scholars in Mexico who emphasized community migration 
histories (e.g. Spener 2009).  
The role of these family networks is primarily financial. Migrants with more money 
can more easily adapt to unexpected situation en route, ranging from the renegotiation of 
smuggling contracts to payments for ransoms or bribes. For this reason, migrants 
receiving remittances from family members in the United States have an advantage. 
These migrants from families with a long migration history are better prepared to cope 
with uncertainty, but not necessarily better informed, than migrants without family 
sponsorship. 
In contrast to the important financial role of family for migrant safety, I emphasize 
the contingent and fallible nature of these migrant family networks as an information 
resource, given the present reality of the route. Migrants understand that information can 
outlive its utility. When I locate changes and gaps in information flows, I also ask: What 
do migrants not know about the routes before the journey begins? I explain that migrants 
have ample knowledge about the dangers of the route, but they cannot judge the 
   
135  
probability that the dangers might befall them during a specific journey. Recent violence 
along the route in Mexico is restructuring relationships between smugglers and criminal 
territory bosses, generating uncertainty for even experienced migrants and established 
smugglers. The rules of the game are subject to change. Indeed, migrants are aware that 
even information from trustworthy sources (or even recent personal experience) might be 
outdated by the time it is applied en route, and this awareness erodes confidence in all 
information. A common refrain is that “no two trips are ever alike”, even for the most 
experienced migrant or smuggler. I point to the ramifications of this uncertainty for 
migrant strategy and safety.   
In summary, the social world of the migrants mirrors the social landscape of the 
Odyssey. It is a social reality where family ties, not community ties, matter. As it was for 
Odysseus, social reputation matters more than market reputation for smugglers; where 
luck and divine will dominates, the sense of a man’s character is more powerful than a 
record of transactions and kept promises. It is an anarchic world, with social contracts 
grounded in family and the use of force, as opposed to community regulation and market-
cooperation. For smugglers, the threat of violent retribution is more important than 
potential changes in consumer behavior. Finally, the route is a fluid entity where rumors 
may outlive their utility, becoming misleading and mistrusted artifacts. 
Methods 
In this chapter, I leverage my experiences and interviews along the route with 
migrants from various nationalities and diverse communities of origin (both urban and 
rural) to interpret and occasionally augment findings from extensive interviews in a 
paired comparison of two Salvadoran home communities. El Salvador provided an 
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excellent starting point for a community-level analysis. Salvadoran migratory and 
political patterns both exhibit strong spatial variation at the level of municipality. El 
Salvador is a small country with enormous contemporary migratory and remittance flows 
that have left an indelible imprint on the social and economic landscape. Susan Gammage 
(2006) maintains that a “transit economy” now dominates El Salvador, and thus shapes 
Salvadoran society and politics. To put the magnitude of migration in perspective, it is 
helpful to consider that the Salvadoran Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that roughly a 
quarter of the Salvadoran citizenry lives in the United States (Coutin 2007, p.7). The 
Salvadoran case exemplifies global migration processes, but in their most extreme 
incarnation. These characteristics bring causal relationships surrounding migration routes 
and migrant strategies into focus, and facilitate theory building through process tracing.3   
Given the dynamic and clandestine nature of Central American migration, all 
perceptions of the route through Mexico and into the United States are necessarily partial.  
All documentary evidence of this migration and its companion practices is, by definition, 
incomplete. How can we understand the route from migrant sending communities, when 
unauthorized migration and criminal violence remain shrouded in official secrecy, thus 
precluding the possibility of a reliable objective record?   
To begin, I triangulated information sources, both from within the towns and from the 
outside, to develop a sense of the situation that confronts migrants. I interviewed a wide 
variety of actors of different nationalities along the routes from origin to destination.                                                         
3 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2004, p.6) explain that, “in process tracing, the 
researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts and other sources to 
see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies is in fact evident in the 
sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case”. In the two Salvadoran towns, I 
began with hypothesis testing, but used process tracing to construct a new theory when my 
original expectations proved false. 
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Importantly, my own sense of the situation does not represent a more complete account 
of the violence than does the viewpoint of migrants from these towns, but I use 
information drawn from diverse sources to interpret the stories told in the two towns. 
Second, I compared and contrasted the information available to particular migrants from 
different hometowns and first hand reports of violence against those migrants. I judged 
the reliability of these autobiographical reports with interpersonal assessments, 
alternative narratives and social understanding accumulated during participant 
observation. Third, I traced rumors in the towns, attempting to identify their origins and 
track changes in those narratives over multiple tellings. I frequently asked townspeople 
whether they had confidence in their information and why. Finally, I searched for outliers 
who believed different information than seemed generally available to other residents, 
and I conducted oral histories with those people to understand what explained this 
divergence.   
These interviews are not a survey. Some participants produced long narratives with 
very little prompting, while others waited for directed questions to discuss their 
experiences. Ethnographic interviews often begin with a set of questions, but permit 
conversations to emerge and allow participants to have a high level of control over the 
direction and pace of questioning, particularly about sensitive topics.4 The result is not a 
simple ledger for accuracy, but systematic qualitative documentation of what people 
believe to be true and why.   
During these conversations, it was the very opacity of the migration context, and how 
migrants navigate it, that most drew my attention. People often expressed skepticism that                                                         
4 Lee Ann Fuji (2009), Ellen Moodie (2010) and Elisabeth Jean Wood (2003) exemplify this 
tradition of ethnographic interviewing about violence. 
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anyone could believe anything about the route, beyond a faith in God that would guide 
them through inevitable sacrifice and suffering. Indeed, in the face of rapidly changing 
dangers along the unauthorized routes and a dearth of specific, reliable information about 
dangers, migrants from both communities struggle to plot their course. Nobody (not 
migrants, government officials or academics) can say with certainty that a migrant from 
one community has human security advantages over a migrant from another community. 
By tracing what migrants from different towns believe about the route and what 
townspeople believe about each other, I identified reasons to believe that no community-
level patterns in migrant vulnerability to violence in transit likely exist for migrants 
leaving El Salvador. 
Case Selection 
Research for this chapter began where the migratory journey often begins: walking 
along those cobblestone and dirt roads in rural towns in El Salvador. I selected two 
similar towns with divergent migration histories: one with early migration onset (Town 
A) and one with more recent migration onset (Town B).5 The selection criteria for the 
two communities constitute a most similar systems design (Przeworksi and Teune 1970 
cited by Lijphart 1971).6 While any number of places in El Salvador could have been 
                                                        
5 Town A is easily identified with the information provided here, and I do not fear its 
identification. Nevertheless, the names of these communities will be withheld to protect the 
confidentiality of study participants in Town B. I believe that, given the collaboration of key 
local people from that community, it is not prudent to reveal the location of Town B at this 
time.   
6 Despite considerable effort made in both places, my time investment and level of 
engagement was deeper in Town B than in Town A, resulting in higher participation and 
better responses in Town B.  The decision to spend more time in Town B, where no written 
history of local migration processes exists, was strategic. Of the ninety participants in this 
phase of the study, twenty-four participants were living in Town A, fifty-five participants were 
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selected as a town with early migration onset, scholars and journalists have visited Town 
A for over two decades to study migration processes, thereby producing a rich secondary 
literature that provides a window into the past and a context for the interpretation of my 
own ethnographic fieldwork (e.g. Montes 1987; Pedersen 2003; Pedersen 2012).7 
Both towns have pre-conquest origins and indigenous names with obscure meanings, 
largely forgotten by the present Spanish-speaking population that retains little awareness 
of their long concealed and ostensibly lost indigenous heritage (Lardé y Larin 2000). 
Though located on opposite sides of the country in the departments of La Union and La 
Libertad, both towns straddle the boundary between coffee country and the coastline. 
They are heads of counties (i.e. municipios) that span both small plantations and 
beachfront properties.   
Given their similarities in terrain and agricultural production, it would be easy to 
imagine that the two towns would share similar economic trajectories in the absence of 
divergent migration histories. Despite Town A’s fame as a magnet for remittances from 
its diaspora in the United States, some students still miss school during the harvest to earn                                                                                                                                                                
from Town B, and eleven participants (family members of disappeared migrants, activists, 
police officers and government officials) were from urban areas of El Salvador. 
7 Town A has been used as the exemplar of the extreme expression of long-term migration 
processes by a number of well-known sources, including in Samuel Huntington’s anti-
immigrant diatribe (2004, p.206). It seems that whenever a reporter or analyst travels to El 
Salvador for a story on entrenched emigration, they pay homage to Town A. A road sign 
pointing to the town illustrates the cover of the UNDP (2005) report on El Salvador, 
highlighting the importance of migration to the national economy. In response, David 
Pedersen (2012) complicates the mythmaking that surrounds Town A’s reputation as the “city 
of the dollar”.  He argues that the town’s widely accepted remittance-led success story 
represents only an experience of the local elite, and he traces the insertion of the town into 
transnational capital flows through narratives of daily life in the town to broader trends in 
global political economy, including the local-global transformations wrought by the 
Salvadoran civil war period and subsequent neoliberal restructuring of the regional economy 
of Latin America. His detailed telling of the lived experience of this migration mecca and his 
observations about the changes in the community over time are broadly compatible with my 
analysis. 
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piece-rate wages that supplement their families’ incomes, just as they do in Town B.  
Both towns have long participated in El Salvador’s agricultural economy, in national 
decline since 1930s Depression-era cutbacks in coffee production (Gould and Santiago 
2008, p.58; Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991, p.102) and the economic restructuring caused 
by the civil war (Wood 2000, p.54-62). Cotton production has also long been a mainstay 
in Town A, but it suffered major setbacks in the 1960s with fluctuations in global prices 
and never fully recovered its market value (Pedersen 2012, p.92-93). Local economic 
development and distribution in both municipios follows a core-periphery model, 
common in rural El Salvador, in which the town center represents a privileged position 
(home to the mayor’s office, more expensive real estate and most wealth) while the 
population of the surrounding neighborhoods (i.e. colonias) in the municipio seem 
relatively deprived, with the exception of the coastal hotel strips.8 The proximity of the 
towns to the coast provides opportunities for tourism development, a nascent but quickly 
growing industry in both places.9   
Politically, the two towns share a common history. At the time of fieldwork, neither 
town had ever elected a mayor belonging to the FMLN, the political party that emerged 
from the leftist insurgency during the peace process.10 During the civil war period (1979-
                                                        
8 For more detailed analysis of these inequalities and how migration has structured them in 
Town A, see Pedersen (2012). His account provides detailed discussion of the layers of 
movement between the margins and core of the town.  
9 Wealthy Salvadoran urbanites own vacation homes along the beach near Town A, but the 
diaspora has fueled the tourism boom.  In addition to hosting day tourists from the capital, the 
coastal area near Town B has a new and thriving international backpacker and surfer scene, 
which is less dependent on the ‘nostalgia tourism’ of the diaspora.  
10 In Town A, the reputation of the right-wing ARENA party was severely damaged by a 
corruption scandal, and the party has not won a mayoral election since the early 1990s 
(Pedersen 2013, p.203-204). Instead, centrist parties, like the PDC, were most popular at the 
local level. The Salvadoran Supreme Court eliminated the PDC and PCN in 2011, but they 
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1992), both towns fell under military control, challenged only a handful of times by 
sporadic raids made by guerilla forces (community member, 1/29/10; Montes 1987, 
p.170). While a common history of political repression shaped both communities and 
their surrounding areas during this time period, neither locale became a depopulated 
battlefield like the mountainous departments of the FMLN-controlled north or a violent 
contested zone like the low lying areas where insurgency had taken hold among the 
peasantry (Wood 2003, pgs. 52-60).  If insurgent land occupations can be used as an 
indicator of the strength of leftist organizing and insurgent participation during the final 
phase of the war period, the departments of La Libertad and La Union (locations of Town 
A and Town B respectively) rate similarly low, both with only 1.8% of the area occupied 
(as opposed to a high of 25.3% of the contested low lying department of Usulutan) (pgs. 
84-85).11 
Despite these similarities, the two towns developed very different migration stories.  
Town A is located in the far southeast of the country in the department of La Union. In 
that town, widespread economic dislocation from economic sabotage and nearby wartime 
destruction generated an early mass emigration that built upon meager migrant networks 
to the United States established prior to the outbreak of the civil war (Montes 1987, 
                                                                                                                                                               
were reborn under new names. In Town B, ARENA dominates local politics, challenged by a 
vocal local faction of the FMLN that has yet to win a mayoral election. The conservative 
GANA party was established and entered a national governing coalition with the liberal 
FMLN during my fieldwork in January 2010. At that time, it was too early to predict the 
reception of the new party in the rural areas where I worked. 
11 While it is impossible to say whether the people of Town B participated in the 1932 
rebellion (and I have uncovered no mention of it), similar villages throughout this Western 
region rebelled and suffered violent oppression afterwards (Gould and Santiago 2008).  The 
genocidal repercussions of this rebellion forced the rapid and near complete integration of 
indigenous peoples in El Salvador into the nation-state. 
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p.170).12 The first known emigrant to the United States from the town left in 1967, over a 
decade before the war began (Montes 1987, p.170). By 1987, Segundo Montes, the first 
researcher of Salvadoran refugee flows, was hard pressed to locate a local family without 
relatives in the United States, and U.S. remittances had already begun to change the 
material landscape of the town (pgs.171-173).   
In contrast, Town B, located in the La Libertad department, became a refuge of 
relative calm and economic stability during the war period. Only a trickle of migrants left 
in response to political repression and forced military recruitment. Emigration from Town 
B accelerated only after a series of natural disasters (mayor, 11/4/09). A severe 
earthquake devastated the zone in 2001, causing many homes to collapse. Hurricane Stan 
struck Town B hard in 2003.  And in 2006, the town experienced an extremely windy 
season that caused widespread hardship. Emigration also increased nationally during the 
last decade, as crime and unemployment motivated Salvadorans to leave. 
                                                        
12 Some young men also left in response to forced military recruitment (Montes 1987, p.173). 
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Figure 4.1: Map of the Departments of El Salvador 
 
The map shows the locations of the fieldwork sites in El Salvador. Town A is located in La Union 
to the east. Town B is located in La Libertad to the west. To put the distances into perspective, El 
Salvador is roughly the size of the U.S. state of Massachusetts.  
 
Until the civil war, the two towns seemed to share a common demographic destiny.  
Today, however, the staggered start of the two migration flows is readily apparent to any 
visitor. Town A, which only three decades ago was just a collection of simple adobe 
structures, is now famous for its developed infrastructure (banks, tourist agencies, 
cultural center, road signs and commerce), large U.S.-style homes and English street 
names.  However, it houses relatively few inhabitants; population in Town A grew slowly 
from an estimated 5,000 people in 1987 (Montes 1987, p.170) to just over 7,500 people 
in 2007 (with nearly 3,000 people living in the town center and over 4,500 people living 
in the more rural surrounding colonias, i.e. roughly 38% urbanized in the town center 
(DIGESTYC 2007)).  The center square of the community, “Parque de las/los 
Emigrantes” (Emigrant Plaza), boasts of its long migration history with a statue of the 
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first migrant to the United States and photos of his family who now reside in New Jersey.  
Several of the large US-style homes sit empty, waiting for holiday visits from 
Salvadorans naturalized abroad. 
Figure 4.2: Emigrant Plaza with the Statue of the First Migrant: Town A 
 
The statue, a man carrying a backpack and looking back over his shoulder, pays homage to the 
“first migrant” in the Emigrant Plaza in Town A. (Photo Credit: the author) 
 
Town B has a stable economy and less poverty compared to more remote areas of the 
Salvadoran countryside. While not poor by Salvadoran standards and home to continuing 
construction of two-story cement buildings even in the context of an economic downturn, 
the town center has fewer large U.S.-style homes than Town A. The town center of B 
also has several small, simple adobe structures packed with large families. A handful of 
locally owned restaurants and small shops recently put up signs to attract customers, but 
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the residents of Town B must still travel nearly an hour by bus to reach a bank or ATM. 
The 2009 El Salvador census estimates the population of Town B’s municipio at just over 
13,000 people (with nearly 4,000 people living in the town center and over 9,000 people 
living in the surrounding colonias, i.e. 29.2% urbanized in the town center) (DIGESYTC 
2007).    
Given the differences in the material environment of the two towns, the uninitiated 
observer should be forgiven for thinking B is smaller than A, despite the fact that the 
municipio of B has almost twice the resident population of the municipio of A. Indeed, 
the arrival of Town A’s first bank in 1996 caused at least one resident to reflect 
differently about the size of his town and proclaim that “…we are no longer a pueblo 
[small town].  We are a ciudad [city].  No, we are a villa [large town]- something in 
between” (quoted in Pedersen 2003, p. 431). In terms of population, however, Town A 
remains relatively small, at least excluding its sizeable expat community that lives in the 
United States (for which estimates vary wildly, but there might be about 7,000 people 
abroad). While the two towns fit the population category of medium-size rural 
Salvadoran communities, the contrast between them, a legacy of Town A’s head start in 
the migration circuit, is stark. 
Initial Expectations Based on Migration Literature 
Across Central America and Mexico, the most important migratory strategy is 
contracting with a paid guide (i.e. a coyote).13 Migrants without access to reputable 
coyotes are in the greatest physical danger of apprehension and abuse during their 
journey (Singer and Massey 1998; Spener 2001; Spener 2004). Coyotes’ importance                                                         
13 Migrants use various words to describe their smugglers: ‘coyote’, ‘pollero’, and ‘guia’ 
(guide) are the most common in conversation. I use these terms interchangeably.  
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increases as policing intensifies (Andreas 2000; Spener 2001; Spener 2004). Secondary 
sources have documented a diverse array of human smugglers specializing in different 
‘travel packages’ (Kyle 2000; Kyle and Siracusa 2005; Spener 2001; Spener 2004; 
Spener 2009).   
Using survey data from 34 Mexican sending communities, Singer and Massey (1998) 
find that migration-specific social capital influences the likelihood of hiring a paid guide.  
In addition to personal experience that accumulates at the individual level, the 
information conveyed through social networks proves invaluable for such contracts for 
entire communities; “family friends show the migrants how to bargain on price and how 
to extract guarantees for services rendered, and they teach them how to behave if and 
when they are apprehended and what to expect upon arrest” (p.566). Following this 
research, we should expect the content of coyote contracts to vary between communities 
with established migratory networks and those without such networks. In other words, 
migrant social capital is an important resource for coyote-migrant transactions, and 
ultimately migrant safety from violence in transit.    
In northern Mexican communities, research has documented several informal 
institutional components that stabilize and facilitate the market for these services.  At an 
individual level, the ‘culture of migration’ generates expectations of mobility (Kandel 
and Massey 2002). At the community level, social networks enhance both informational 
and financial resources, thereby increasing opportunities for migration. Concomitantly, 
an etiquette emerges surrounding the departure, journey, smuggler contacts and 
remittances.  These practices and social networks perpetuate a cycle of movement from 
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particular places, and fuel the path dependent character of migratory flows (Gaytan et al. 
2007; Singer and Massey 1998).  
Payment and customer recruitment protocols facilitate the coyote-migrant 
transactions in migrant communities (Kyle and Scarcelli 2009, p.308-309; Spener 2004; 
Spener 2009).  In the absence of a state to enforce contracts, these protocols constitute 
preconditions for coyote bargains. They are the basis for private order. Furthermore, 
variation in these protocols may change the relative importance of reputation and the 
ability of both parties to monitor the contract. Therefore, they can structure the incentives 
for other important aspects of the travel arrangements, such as the likelihood of violence 
in the undocumented migration process (Kyle and Scarcelli 2009, p.308-309). Indeed, 
these protocols may dictate when migrants are treated as commodities or customers. 
Drawing on this approach, I originally expected that the sequencing of migratory 
flows and policing should matter. Migratory flows become institutionalized overtime. All 
other things equal, the timing of a community’s insertion into transnational migratory 
networks should shape the informational resources available to migrants within that 
community. Communities with migratory networks and practices institutionalized prior to 
intensified policing should have greater informational resources than more recent sending 
communities. These informational resources should result in variation in the modes of 
smuggler-migrant contract recruitment, payment, and enforcement. In turn, this variation 
should cause divergent levels of violence in the migratory route from each community 
with a different migratory history.  
Without reputation-based mechanisms and a well-institutionalized market, coyotes 
may rely more heavily on coercion and become less attentive service providers. 
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According to this view, variation in violence against migrants from communities with 
different migration histories should become particularly pronounced during times of most 
intense policing, when these institutions face external stress. Only the most 
extraordinarily draconian policing measures would be enough to dislodge well-
established reputation-based institutions. However, policing would easily disrupt the 
early development of these institutions, undermine migrant safety, and exacerbate 
violence within less well-institutionalized smuggling markets.  
For these reasons, in the community with the long migration history (Town A), I 
expected to find a market for smuggling services in which reputation mechanisms protect 
migrant customers, as evidenced by: fewer reports of abuse and violent episodes in 
transit; more accurate information about smuggling services, unauthorized travel service 
providers and the dangers of the journey; and fewer migrants traveling without the 
assistance of professional guides. In the community with the short migration history 
(Town B), I expected to find the opposite. However, despite the strong scholarship that 
informs this expectation, fieldwork in these two towns refutes it. 
Findings  
Unauthorized migrants from Town A, with its long migration history, did not express 
different beliefs about the dangers of the route than people from Town B.  Town A’s 
early entry to the migration circuit translated into a unique local material culture, 
expressed by physical structures and formal businesses that testify to its transnational ties 
to the United States. Nevertheless, interviews reveal that people from Town A generally 
did not have more information about the reputation of local coyotes or more specific 
details about the risks of the journey. Migrants from Town A reported very similar fears, 
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perceptions of mistrust, personal stories of violence, and rumors of violence along the 
routes as migrants from Town B. Residents of Town A could not agree upon the 
existence of a particular responsible coyote, or even if honest guides exist at all. Indeed, 
many people in Town A thought no good local coyote was available and they purchased 
unauthorized travel services in a nearby city. While some inhabitants of Town B chose to 
shop elsewhere for their smugglers, most people agreed upon a particular smuggler as 
responsible and trustworthy: the only local coyote doing business in town at the time of 
research.  
 Information about Violence along the Routes  
The information about violence along the routes was remarkably similar across the 
two communities. Study participants reported the same fears about the journey in both 
places. Most would-be migrants were aware of a wide variety of dangers before their 
journey, including deportation, rape, kidnapping, death or amputation by train, robberies, 
drowning deaths, the desert and extortion by corrupt officials. Study participants in both 
communities also reported distrust in the information they received from other people 
within their community. There is also some skepticism about information conveyed by 
newspapers and television news: “They don’t tell is how it is… they only try to make 
people afraid so they do not leave the country” (e.g. male migrant, 5/18/10). Among 
migrants who had already traveled the route at least once, firsthand reports of violence 
were similar in each town, with frequent autobiographical reports of robberies and 
   
150  
assaults in transit, a handful of people cheated by their smugglers and only a few victims 
of kidnappings, as shown in Figure 4.3:14   
Figure 4.3: Autobiographical Report by Victim or Witness of Crime in Transit15 
 
The Smuggling Market 
In the two decades since the refugee flow ended with the cessation of civil war 
hostilities, the Salvadoran smuggling market has changed.  Human smuggling was not 
illegal in El Salvador until 2003. Until that time, travel agencies in urban areas advertised 
their capacity to arrange trips to the United States (with or without visa) in their 
storefronts. Smugglers would offer their services to strangers in the street (male migrant, 
4/15/10). In the 1980s and 1990s, want ads boasting of “fast and secure arrival” or “safe 
trip” with “passport only” (i.e. no visa necessary) filled the travel section of the two 
major nationally syndicated Salvadoran newspapers, La Prensa Grafica and El Diario de 
                                                        
14 I have reason to believe that autobiographical accounts of rapes have been underreported in 
my interviews. I analyze sexual violence in Chapter 6.   
15To interpret the data in this table, it is important to keep in mind that some returned migrants 
from both communities traveled decades ago when, by all accounts, the route was less 
dangerous. Interviews conducted in migrant shelters and train yards report a much higher 
proportion of migrants who have witnessed or suffered violent crimes than interviews in home 
or sending communities. A disproportionate number of migrants without high-end coyotes or 
who have already suffered a catastrophe en route enter the shelters. Furthermore, the longer 
migrants spend on the train route through Mexico, the more likely it seems to become that 
they suffer multiple incidents of violence.   
Crime Town A  Town B  
 Victims Percentage of 
Returned Migrants 
Interviewed in A 
Victims Percentage of 
Returned Migrants 
Interviewed in B 
Robbery/Assault 7  44% 9  43% 
Cheated by Smuggler 3  19% 2  7% 
Kidnapping 2  13% 3 
 
 10% 
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Hoy.16 In Town B, I met one man who had migrated during the 1980s through a travel 
agency in a nearby city (male migrant, 1/15/10). Today, the newspaper want-ads still 
offer the occasional slyly worded advertisement, but the dominant form of customer 
recruitment for smugglers is word of mouth. 
Despite these changes, it is easy to find a smuggler in any part of El Salvador today, 
and without traveling a great distance, would-be migrants can find competing guides 
offering door-to-door transnational service at various price and quality levels. At the time 
of research, regular door-to-door service from rural El Salvador to a destination in the 
United States for a healthy adult cost between $6,000 and $7,500, from anywhere in the 
country. Additional expenses apply to special packages designed for children or people 
with travel restrictions due to poor health.  
These prices are common knowledge, like the daily price of tortillas. Smugglers do 
not hide. In fact, there have been several successful human smugglers-turned-mayors in 
El Salvador (and presumably other parts of Central America and Mexico); alleged 
Salvadoran smugglers-turned-mayors include Narciso Ramirez of San Francisco 
Menendez, Cristobal Aleman Alas of Acajutla, and Mario Osorto of La Union, among 
others (Marinero 2010). While human smuggling may be illegal, it is widely acceptable, 
                                                        
16 I reviewed these want ads in the library archive of the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA). 
Today, the occasional advertisement for “fast and secure travel”, or as Coutin (2007, p.104, 
f.n.3) observes “arrival guaranteed”, is still listed in newspapers.  Some of the change in 
advertising may not be related to changes in the law, but instead to changes in technology.  A 
quick Google search online provided the phone number of a service provider who offers a 
“trip to the US fast and secure without visa.” An interview with police and a brief review of 
victim testimonies in the National Civil Police (PNC) case archives indicate that trafficking 
networks sometimes use the internet, as well as word of mouth, to lure victims with false 
advertising for international modeling agencies or other false work opportunities (police 
officer, San Salvador, 3/4/10).   
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even honorable.17 As one Salvadoran human rights activist explained to me during an 
interview, “coyotes are usually the good guys. Thank God they do what they 
do….Human smuggling is not a crime against humanity” (activist, San Salvador, 
11/24/09).18 With one of the highest homicide rates in the world (second only to 
Honduras), Salvadoran law enforcement has more pressing concerns than the victimless 
crime of human smuggling (ICE agent, 2/9/10). Prosecutions of coyotes are rare, and 
limited to cases in which claimants step forward to press charges (activist, Salvadoran 
police officer, 11/24/09; 2/25/10).19 More often than not, disputes with coyotes are settled 
out of court and outside the law (Salvadoran police officers, 2/15/10; 3/4/10).   
While prosecutions in El Salvador are rare, smugglers may have become more wary 
about crossing the border with their clients as a result of the potential threat of legal 
punishment (Salvadoran police officer, 3/4/10).  However, the intense violence between 
drug gangs and the changes in criminal territory that accompany the escalation of the 
drug war in Mexico more seriously increased the risks to Central American smugglers 
(Martinez 2010, p.138-150). During the 1980s, the person who made a contract with a                                                         
17 Indeed, when I visited the National Civil Police (PNC) and explained the purpose of my 
visit in passing conversation to various people who inquired about my presence in the station, 
it prompted personal accounts of officers’ own journeys to the United States and the officers’ 
families’ dealings with smugglers. Despite the illegality of human smuggling, police and their 
families must still arrange their passage on the black market: a testament to pervasiveness of 
migration practice. 
18 Of course, human rights activists want traffickers and abusive smugglers to be brought to 
justice.  Human trafficking involves the threat or use of force, unlike smuggling, which is a 
voluntary relationship between guide and migrant (Shelley 2010, p.10-11). In practice, the 
boundary between trafficking and smuggling gets blurred.   
19 The most recent high profile attempt to prosecute a smuggler came in the wake of the uproar 
of ‘the 72’, the high profile discovery of a mass grave of seventy-two Central and South 
American migrants (and among them fourteen Salvadorans) in Tamaulipas, Mexico in August 
2010. Two Salvadoran smugglers were captured and charged with transporting some of these 
migrants to their deaths, but later released (Chavez 2012). Prosecutors vowed to appeal the 
court’s ruling. 
   
153  
migrant often served as a guide throughout the journey, at least until the U.S.-Mexico 
border where they might shift responsibility to a Mexican specialist; this tradition of the 
‘heroic coyote’ seems to be slowly dying (Martínez 2010, p.138-150). Today, only a few 
for-profit local smugglers brave the journey to check on their local contacts in Mexico; to 
do so can lead to a long prison term if arrested by police or even death if apprehended by 
the wrong criminal territory boss (e.g. migrants, family member of smuggler, 12/22/09; 
2/8/10; 4/25/10). Experienced migrants, who take people on their journeys with them to 
offset their own travel costs, still move people along the route; but these migrant-guides 
and their travel companions suffer serious consequences if captured by police or drug 
gangs because they lack the resources to pay bribes or tributes, unless they agree to 
collaborate with the Mexican gangs (Martínez 2010, p.138-150). 
Today, if the contract is arranged in the home community, local recruiters begin the 
transaction.20 In these smuggling arrangements, recruiters generally receive half of the 
payment from the migrant in advance of the journey. The standard agreement requires the 
other half on delivery to the United States (a norm widely shared across Latin America). 
Traditionally, this first payment guarantees the migrant three attempts at delivery.  
Recently, economic recession and increased fear of criminal violence has negatively 
impacted demand for expensive contracts, such that some high-end door-to-door service 
providers offer ‘specials’. For example, some smugglers will now allow the migrant to 
transfer the second and third migration attempt to a friend or relative, if the migrant                                                         
20 Here, I describe only arrangements made in home communities.  However, family members 
at the destination often arrange the contract from within the United States; immigrant-
receiving communities also have local recruiters who operate within them.  Some people, in 
an attempt to save money, contract with smugglers at various points along the route through 
Mexico. Low budget smugglers and those contacted along the route through Mexico or at 
border towns have no need to offer ‘specials’.  They have seemingly unlimited clients. 
   
154  
decides that the journey was too painful or frightening to try again (male migrants, 
2/8/10; 5/19/10). Indeed, the smuggler from Town B claims that the recent economic 
recession increased vulnerability of Central American migrants in transit, because many 
people opt to travel without expensive, good quality coyotes (like him) (smuggler, 
7/5/10).  Some experienced migrants may receive special treatment or discounted travel 
by helping the guide keep order within the travel group along the way, and in so doing, 
technically become smugglers themselves and vulnerable to prosecution (e.g. male 
migrant/helper, female migrant, 2/24/10; 6/2/10).21 
If a migrant lacks the resources to travel, local recruiters may offer loans or connect 
desperate migrants with loan sharks (e.g. male migrant, 2/11/10). However, this credit 
system poses a risk of default and property loss to the migrant if the journey does not end 
successfully. Because coyotes have an incentive to engineer unsuccessful journeys if they 
stand to gain property, it is safer to take loans from family in the United States.22 Rumors 
about this practice circulate widely in both towns. Other local recruiters are actually 
human traffickers who only pose as smugglers; they promise poor women low-cost 
passage, but then sell them into sexual slavery en route (Salvadoran police officer, 
3/4/10; activist 12/3/09).23 While people were aware of the dangers of sex trafficking, I 
heard no reports of this happening to the inhabitants of either Town A or Town B.   
Local recruiters may not know much about what happens next to their clients, 
providing only a connection and receiving an occasional finders’ fee from the next                                                         
21 I say ‘technically’ because these migrants do not view themselves as coyotes.    
22 I received one first hand report in each town from former clients of coyotes who alleged that 
a smuggler had purposefully botched the delivery in an effort to take possession of property 
(female migrant, family member, 6/2/10; 3/1/0).   
23 Sexual payments for passage are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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smuggler in the chain. Several youths work as recruiters for the coyote in Town B, and it 
is doubtful that they know much more about the journey than the migrants (family 
member, 4/7/10). Indeed, the organization of smuggling groups varies considerably, some 
depending on subcontracting for segments of the route and others selling migrants like 
cargo to smugglers who consolidate human shipments from across the region.24These 
organizational structures and membership within a smuggling network are fluid, and 
migrants rarely know their details. Migrants in both towns believe that recruiters will 
understate the risks and suffering of the journey to entice customers (e.g. migrants, 
1/27/10; 3/1/10; 6/2/10; 7/1/10). 
While would-be migrants in Town A complained about a lack of information by 
which to judge the reliability of competing smugglers, the market for smuggling services 
inspired relative (though incomplete) confidence among consumers in Town B.  All of 
the clients of the sole coyote in Town B with whom I spoke reported confidence with 
their choice of smuggler before the journey.  Despite the danger, this smuggler 
occasionally travels with his clients to check on his Mexican connections (male migrant, 
2/19/10). All clients who subsequently returned to the community after time in the United 
States reported satisfaction with his travel services.    
                                                        
24 As discussed in Chapter 4, the structure of smuggling networks changed in response to 
violence in Mexico, with configurations ranging from subcontracting schemes (in which the 
Salvadoran smuggler pays a series of Mexican guides to transport clients) to a series of 
exchanges between unaffiliated ‘guides’ in which human cargo is purchased and sold along 
the route. This latter trading system emerged as smugglers needed to hedge the risks of 
crossing Mexico: migrants’ value to smugglers, and hence their price when traded as 
commodities, increases as they move closer to the final payment on their contract and the 
likelihood of capture decreases. This arrangement effectively changes the role of smugglers 
from service providers to human traders, altering their incentives for good behavior and 
blurring the boundaries between trafficking and smuggling. 
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In Town B, I received one firsthand report of severe violence during a journey 
contracted with this coyote (female migrant, 12/22/09). In 2006, a Mexican criminal 
syndicate intercepted a travel group and murdered the group’s driver for not paying the 
appropriate passage fee through their territory. From a cramped hidden compartment in 
the banana truck that transported them north, the migrant and her travel companions 
listened fearfully to the three gunshots that assassinated the driver. However, the migrant 
who suffered this abduction, which included ransom demands and brusque treatment by 
the kidnappers, claimed that the event could not have been prevented. During informal 
discussions, her family reported satisfaction with the coyote’s reaction to events, his 
ongoing correspondence and responsible attitude in its aftermath. Despite the harrowing 
experience, the migrant arrived and worked in the United States, voluntarily returning to 
El Salvador two years later to comfort her dying mother and start a small restaurant with 
her U.S. savings.  As a measure of her satisfaction with the service, she later contracted 
with the same coyote to transport herself, her husband and their seven-year old child to 
the United States on a second trip north.25 This coyote had transported many members of 
the family. 
                                                        
25 During this second trip, the family endured extreme hardship, despite its ultimate ‘success’: 
hunger, fear of the drug-addled guides subcontracted to lead them, unsanitary living 
conditions, temporary imprisonment in drop houses, and exposure to the elements.  The child, 
eight years old and fluent in English by the time my fieldwork ended, still cried at the thought 
of visiting El Salvador, because return would require them to make another terrifying 
unauthorized journey to the U.S. Migrants generally accept this level of suffering en route as a 
necessary evil, not grounds for complaint about a coyote. Border patrol apprehended their 
travel group entering Texas, and the family filed an asylum claim based on their persecution 
by extortion gangs in El Salvador. At the end of my fieldwork, the family lived in the U.S. 
while awaiting their hearing. They did not make their final payment to the local coyote, 
because they were apprehended rather than delivered.   
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I received no firsthand reports of dissatisfaction with the local coyote in Town B from 
migrants or their family members, and only one secondhand account of a client who had 
been unhappy with these services about two years ago. When I questioned two 
townspeople about this rumored dissatisfaction, they said that the dissatisfied client (who 
subsequently was delivered to the United States and therefore unavailable for an 
interview) misbehaved during the journey, forcing the guide to abandon him en route. 
The allegations of the dissatisfied client were shocking to the townspeople, because it 
seemed so unlike the coyote. Because of the client’s misbehavior, people reasoned that 
the client had no legitimate claim against the coyote (e.g. family member, female 
migrant, 4/24/10).    
In this instance, however, market reputation was not the primary mechanism for the 
enforcement of the smuggler’s good behavior.  When the dissatisfied client’s family grew 
angry in Town B, the client’s mother stood outside the coyote’s sister’s home, shouting 
insults and threats. Not unlike the kinsmen who “milled with wails and moans of grief 
before Odysseus’ palace”, this family employed a combined campaign of shaming and 
coercion (family member, 4/24/10). Another client explained her confidence in the 
coyote as an outcome, not only of long-term friendship and trust between their families, 
but also as a result of the fact that he took eighteen community members on the journey 
with her (female migrant, 1/18/10).  If something had gone wrong, eighteen families 
would have surrounded his house.   
Previously, a less reliable (and by at least one account, dishonest) coyote had worked 
in Town B, but had left town. Most people simply stopped patronizing him when he 
proved incapable of delivering (male migrant, 2/19/10).  However, the wife of a 
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dissatisfied client of this coyote explained how she retaliated against him when he and a 
loan shark allegedly conspired to cheat her family out of their home (family member, 
2/24/10). She claimed that the coyote deliberately stranded her husband during the 
journey to cause a loan default.  The coyote allegedly did this to at least five other people.  
Therefore, the wife of the dissatisfied client began to call the coyote’s house in Mexico 
and harass his family.  When the coyote’s wife answered the phone, the client’s wife told 
her to be ashamed, how the coyote had thrown five children onto the street and that he 
should give the money back. When the coyote’s wife hung up, the wife of the client kept 
calling, even when only the coyote’s children would answer the phone.  The coyote left 
town, but the client’s family did not get their money or house back.  Perhaps cognizant of 
these strategies, an interview with the ‘responsible’ smuggler of Town B indicates that 
fear for the safety and comfort of his family weighs on his mind during business 
transactions with migrants (smuggler, 7/5/10).  
Similarly, in Town A, a female client who had been cheated by a coyote from the 
nearby city of San Miguel reported that the coyote had been gunned down shortly 
afterwards. While this client did not claim responsibility for the murder, she shrugged 
and coolly reasoned that the coyote had finally cheated the wrong person: “If you treat 
people this way, sooner or later someone will come for you.  Not every person says that 
God will make him pay” (female migrant, 6/2/10).  Importantly, these are not instances of 
community vigilantism that require collective action (as is often reported in indigenous 
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Guatemalan communities), but familial retribution systems executed by individuals, 
much like the conflict between the Hatfields and McCoys.26    
When asked how to choose a trustworthy coyote, many people emphasized the 
importance of researching smuggler reputation. A time-tested relationship between the 
smuggler and the family of the would-be migrant is most important; most migrants 
reported that it is safest to travel with someone who is known to the family, and has 
previously transported immediate family members, particularly siblings (e.g. male 
migrant, 4/15/10).  Family recommendations have priority.  Coyotes recommended by 
friends are second best, and recommendations from strangers a distant third.  The 
hierarchy of recommendations stems from: 1) higher levels of confidence in 
recommendations from family, as opposed to friends and acquaintances; and 2) the social 
relationship and obligation between the families implied by an ongoing business 
relationship (e.g. male migrant, 2/26/10).27  However, knowing where the coyote’s family 
lives is as important as knowing the coyote’s track record as a service provider because it 
provides a means for retaliation in the event of a breech of contract (e.g. male migrant, 
2/26/10).                                                         
26 On community vigilantism in Guatemala see Handy (2004) and Godoy (2002; 2004). While 
villages participate in collective public lynchings and mobs in Guatemala, clandestine social 
cleansing and individualistic or familial retribution systems are more common in El Salvador. 
27 This analysis is also consistent with Granovetter’s (1985, p.490) discussion of the value of 
information embedded in a personal relationship.  He explains, “In practice, we settle for such 
generalized information when nothing better is available, but ordinarily we seek better 
information.  Better than the statement that someone is known to be reliable is information 
from a trusted informant that he has dealt with that individual and found him so. Even better is 
information from one’s own past dealings with that person.  This is better information for four 
reasons: 1) it is cheap; 2) one trusts one’s own information best- it is richer, more detailed, and 
known to be accurate; 3) individuals with whom one has a continuing relation have an 
economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to discourage future transactions; and 4) 
departing from pure economic motives, continuing economic relations often become overlaid 
with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism”.  
However, fear of retaliation also plays a most significant role. 
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In addition to family retribution systems, a second non-market mechanism regulates 
contracts for smuggling services in Town B: social reputation. The local smuggler of 
Town B would like to maintain an honorable image in the town. In fact, the desire for 
status may have partially motivated his entry into the smuggling business. A family 
member of the smuggler claims that: 
He makes sure his clients have food, shoes, clothing.  Sometimes he even takes them 
as many times as they need, not just the three tries.  He makes no money off those 
people, because it costs money every time they try.  He’ll guarantee them.  Why?....  
He doesn’t want to hide his face in town.  This is his town (Interview, family member, 
4/25/10). 
 
Thus, saving face weighs heavily on his mind.28 However, as explained by Avner 
Greif (2006, p.144), “such social and normative behavior is situationally contingent: 
whether a particular action insults others, how status is acquired, who is deserving of 
altruism, and what constitutes fair behavior depend on the time and place”. In other 
words, this non-market mechanism for good behavior only lasts as long as: a) the 
coyote’s ego remains tied to his status in the local community; b) status can be acquired 
by safe delivery of people to the United States; and c) clients agree on the boundaries of 
negligence or maltreatment.  As violence has intensified in Mexico, agreement on the 
boundaries of fair behavior has eroded in both towns because the journey is viewed as 
inherently dangerous and beyond the control of the coyote.  Subcontracting schemes, 
whereby a coyote connects a migrant with a chain of guides linked along the route rather 
than vertically integrated into the coyote’s family or organization, diffuse blame when 
                                                        
28 Indeed, he and his family may harbor local political ambitions. One family member mused 
aloud about the possibility that the coyote will one day become town mayor, and the family 
actively supports the current local mayor’s political party.    
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disasters occur. As conditions along the route worsen, the coyote in Town B may yet lose 
his social incentive for the careful transport of his clients.  
What about market incentive for the careful transport of clients? Market reputation 
does not always influence smuggler behavior.  Regardless of the dangers inherent in the 
journey, there seems to be no potential shortage of clients. Large numbers of Central 
American migrants desperately want to travel, and are willing to take risks on guides with 
an unknown record and reputation. For this reason, subcontracted Mexican guides and 
coyotes working in border towns do not seem particularly concerned about market 
reputation. Some coyotes may not anticipate negative short-term economic consequences 
for poor performance.  
For example, a Honduran woman (4/1/11), interviewed at a migrant shelter along the 
route, attempted to dissuade her guide from sexually assaulting her by pointing to the 
damage it would cause his market reputation, but in his response to her, the guide 
expressed a lack of concern about such matters.  He pointed to an apparently unlimited 
demand for his services. She described their interaction: 
When I would not give myself to him, he became very violent.  He said bad words, 
ugly words: “Don’t fuck around.  You are an old lady.  You are aguada”.29 He only 
treated me badly.  Abuse.  He threatened to leave me….  He kept touching me. It was 
9:45 at night.  My arm was sore from getting him off me…. He said rudely, in front of 
the other migrants, “Are you going to give me some ass or not?” When I said no, it 
made him very aggressive and he mistreated me. I told him that he had better watch 
out, because I will not recommend him to future clients.  I know lots of potential 
clients, but with him acting like this, I cannot recommend him, not unless he behaves. 
But he answered that he already had plenty of clients and did not care.  He had twenty-
five clients waiting right now. My recommendation, it’s not important.30                                                          
29 Aguada does not have a perfect translation from Spanish to English; it more or less means 
“flabby, soft”. It is a vulgar word used in this manner. 
30 The smuggler may or may not have been bluffing, but he convinced the migrant that he was 
unfazed by her threats to ruin his professional reputation.  She later reported him to a staff 
member of a migrant shelter in Oaxaca.  With the legal support provided by the shelter, she 
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The long-term impact of market reputation may not matter to every smuggler. I met 
many guides during my time along the route through Mexico, but I never met a 
‘professional’ who was dedicated permanently and full-time to the occupation.  This is 
not to say that life-long smuggling careers do not exist (particularly beyond the ground-
level of subcontracted guides and ‘connectors’ in which I was immersed), but many 
unauthorized guides do not think of their activity as a long-term career.31 In fact, some 
low-level unauthorized guides anticipate that each trip they arrange is the last trip, a 
means to achieve only an immediate goal, like their own arrival in the United States. 
Spener (2009, p.126), in his description of the continued diversity of Mexican ‘coyotaje’ 
practices, also observed these types of non-professional unauthorized guiding 
arrangements. Since smugglers do not necessarily intend to continue providing 
unauthorized travel services indefinitely, some may not be concerned about market 
reputation and may not develop a long-term strategy for the recruitment and retention of 
clients. As a result, they may be less careful about exposing clients to violence. 
Traveling without Door-to-Door Smuggling Service 
The major impediment to hiring a guide in Town B was not a lack of trustworthy 
information about whom to hire, but the cost. In Town B, I encountered a relatively high 
number of young men who intended or had already attempted (both successfully and 
                                                                                                                                                               
denounced the smuggler to Mexican authorities and received a Mexican visa for victims of 
human rights abuses. However, as is typical in such cases, no further prosecution of the 
smuggler followed. 
31 While he has been in the business for at least five years, the smuggler from Town B is not a 
full-time coyote.  For him, smuggling is a lucrative side occupation that grew accidentally 
from social contacts forged during the extensive travel required by his permanent formal job, 
as well as contacts from his family network (family member, 4/25/10).  He began to connect 
people, but never left his original vocation.    
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unsuccessfully) to make the journey without the assistance of a paid guide, at least as far 
as the Mexico-U.S. border where a contract for a short distance coyote can be negotiated 
for less money. In particular, young men from the outskirts of the towns, where 
cobblestone or paved roads turn to mud, lacked the money to hire a coyote.  I did not 
meet anyone who traveled with the expensive local coyote of Town B from these more 
impoverished areas. People from the surrounding colonias patronized other local 
operators or went to the city to find a less costly coyote. Many of the poorest migrants 
seek out a more experienced family member or friend to guide them, sometimes in 
exchange for paying passage for their partner.  Others go alone to avoid potential 
accusations of abandonment or maltreatment of a travel partner if the trip goes badly.   
Migrants from the periphery of Town A also had fewer financial resources than those 
in the center, and they were more likely to take chances on an inexpensive unknown 
guide or attempt to go it alone. However, few people in the center of Town A reported 
sufficient knowledge or willingness to try to make the trip alone. Although migrants in 
Town A seemed more risk averse than migrants in Town B, it was not because they had 
more information about danger.  Their risk aversion instead seems to stem from a belief 
that legal migration could be within their grasp, given the number of U.S. naturalized and 
legally resident family members distantly related to townspeople (e.g. male migrant, 
5/6/10).  
The mansions built by the first wave of migrants generate a stable material illusion of 
easy money in the United States. This idea, set literally in concrete, lingers after the 
recession has altered economic reality (mayor, 11/4/09). Similarly, the first wave of 
migrants generates an illusion of opportunity for legal migration, not confirmed by a 
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contemporary reality. This belief in legal opportunity does not seem to be based on a 
clearheaded evaluation of U.S. immigration law and visa availability; the United States 
has a system that suffers chronic visa shortages and application backlogs for even close 
family members of citizens entitled to entry.  According to the U.S. Department of State, 
El Salvador ranked eleventh in the list of countries with the highest number of waitlisted 
visa applicants, surpassing the allotted preference visas by 83,221 applicants in fiscal 
year 2012.  The ‘family first preference’ category alone, i.e. visas for unmarried sons or 
daughters of U.S. citizens and their minor children, has 8,749 waitlisted Salvadoran 
applicants. Other preference categories for the relatives of legal permanent residents or 
siblings of citizens are similarly oversubscribed.  Uncles, aunts, cousins and in-laws 
cannot sponsor relatives for visas at all. 
The people (overwhelmingly men) who migrate without long-distance coyotes often 
come from exceptionally poor households or face emergency situations that cut the time 
for saving money short, such as threats from criminal gangs, family illness and 
unexpected financial difficulties (e.g. migrants, 11/13/09; 5/19/10).  Some of the men 
have already traveled multiple times and therefore feel comfortable navigating the route 
independently, relying on their courage and wits.  Others have been deported from the 
United States and find it difficult to talk their families into paying another expensive 
passage, particularly if vices (such as alcohol or drug abuse) led to the deportation.  Each 
journey must be financed by debt for the family, and would-be migrants must seem likely 
to repay these debts to gain familial support.32 In several cases, when family and friends 
would not or could not provide financial support, the desire to reunite with underage                                                         
32 These findings are consistent with Spener’s (2009) description of migration practices in 
northern Mexico. 
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children or a spouse with U.S. citizenship produced a desperation that drove people to 
undertake otherwise intolerable travel risks (e.g. male migrant, 6/3/10). 
Central American migrants who travel without expensive door-to-door smuggling 
service frequently ride northbound cargo trains like modern-day hobos, a dangerous but 
relatively inexpensive means to travel through Mexico. They may try to contract with 
guides at difficult points en route, such as crossing the U.S. border.  These migrants may 
suffer more frequent violent incidents than clients of coyotes with social ties to the 
hometown, because they do not have an experienced guide to negotiate payments to 
corrupt authorities and drug gangs as they transit their territory.  Furthermore, guides 
contacted en route do not have the same incentives for good behavior as do hometown 
coyotes.33  For this reason, Spener (2009, p.200) labels contracts made with guides en 
route ‘partially embedded’.  Some of the migrants must beg, work or stop to wait for 
small contributions from friends and family in the United States to make each leg of the 
journey.  As a result, the duration of these trips is longer and more variable than trips 
made with door-to-door service, thus increasing the exposure to criminal victimization.  
Migrant Social Ties 
This chapter makes two important claims about social ties and their capacity to 
convey resources.  First, migrant responses to insecurity and distrust can be read through 
the lens of strong and weak ties, with medium-strength ties playing a minor role. 
                                                        
33In a similar situation, Granovetter (1985, p.490) notes that “this transaction has three 
characteristics that make it somewhat unusual: 1) the transactors are previously unacquainted, 
2) they are unlikely to transact again, and 3) information about the activities of either is 
unlikely to reach others with whom they might transact in the future. I argue that it is only in 
situations of this kind that the absence of force and fraud can mainly be explained by 
generalized morality. Even there, one might wonder how effective this morality would be if 
large costs were incurred.” 
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Granovetter (1973, p.1361) distinguishes between strong and weak ties, defining the 
strength of a tie according to “the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy 
(mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services” implied by it. Michael Woolcock and 
Anne T. Sweetser’s (2002, p.26) discussion of bonding, bridging and linking ties, 
provides further nuance to our understanding of social ties.34 In this case, bonding 
relationships arise among similar people with close proximity and a shared identity, such 
as immediate family members. Bridging relationships are those among dissimilar people; 
in the context of rural El Salvador, this would refer to relationships among neighbors, 
local acquaintances or compatriots who inhabit the same class status, but lack the strength 
of household commitments. Finally, linking relationships are social ties to elites, and in 
this case, foreigners.  
This tripartite categorization of social ties highlights the effect of distrust on 
information flows in migrant hometowns. In particular, a cultural belief in ‘envidia’ 
(envy) erodes bridging ties and devalues information attained from them. However, 
bonding and linking ties (the strongest and weakest) remain relevant categories for active 
social networks that provide potential resources for migration. 
Bonding ties, i.e. those within a household, convey the most important resources that 
migrants have before the journey begins.  Indeed, households often make decisions 
together.35 Migrants with multiple siblings, a husband or parents in the United States, on 
                                                        
34 In a footnote, Granovetter (1973, p.1361 fn. 4) also distinguishes between absent and 
negligible ties.  The bridging ties that I discuss in this paper are generally (but not always) 
stronger than negligible ties. 
35 The initial decision to leave is often made in consultation with parents or a spouse, 
depending on the age of the person involved. For this reason, Oded Stark and David E. Bloom 
(1985) treat the household as a decision-making unit.  For a summary of this ‘new economics 
of migration’ literature, see Massey et al. (1993).  I would not, however, go so far as 
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the whole, seem better prepared. While resources do not accumulate within a community, 
migrants from families with a long history of continuous departures have better financial 
resources and more confidence in their informational resources.  Meanwhile, information 
conveyed through linking ties, with foreigners or elites, sometimes engenders greater 
confidence.36 In other words, there is a tendency to trust outsiders more than potential 
rivals in the community; as Granovetter (1985, p.492) reminds us, and as Salvadoran 
migrants are acutely aware, “both enormous trust and enormous malfeasance may follow 
from personal relationships.” Paradoxically, the physical proximity of people in the town 
has generated distrust; in the absence of a norm of reciprocity or the closely tied fortunes 
and name that unite a household, suspicion dominates perceptions of social interaction. 
Fortunately for migrants, linking ties may emerge during the process of migration itself, 
when migrants interact with people from different class and national backgrounds along 
the routes and in the United States. 
Of course, the importance of continuous departures in a family migration history 
cannot be stressed enough, because otherwise, information available to a family becomes 
stale. Indeed, the finding that bonding ties provide useful information for migrants and an 
                                                                                                                                                               
Granovetter (1985, p.490) in saying that “In the family, there is no Prisoner’s Dilemma 
because each is confident that the others can be counted on”.  Indeed, the possibility that a 
migrant spouse will defect and form a new family elsewhere is a widespread (and apparently 
well-founded) fear. Sometimes men leave in the middle of the night, without telling their 
mothers or wives.  Along the route through Mexico, I also met women and youths fleeing 
domestic violence. As a long tradition of feminist literature suggests, households, while more 
unified than communities, have their own internal power dynamics (e.g. Hondagneu-Sotelo 
1994). 
36 Indeed, this belief in the relative trustworthiness of foreigners and elites helped to facilitate 
my fieldwork, even though I hail from the very country to which people want to travel without 
authorization. Despite the fact that many people viewed the government of the United States 
as an omniscient and powerful entity, capable of spying and craftiness (“listo”), my status as a 
foreigner in the community often proved to be an asset for fieldwork.   
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apparent advantage for avoiding violence during unauthorized migration requires an 
important disclaimer. The dynamism of the Mexican drug war (2006-present) undercuts 
familial advantages by changing the players and the rules of the game along the route. 
Following Granovetter’s (1973) analysis of the benefits of weak ties, the absence of 
bridging ties that could more quickly and widely circulate information within the 
community seems ominous for the safety prospects of migrants in this hyper-dynamic 
context. 
This leads us to the second insight about the nature of social ties: under combined 
conditions of increased risk and uncertainty, migrants must trust their family to help 
them, but paradoxically distrust the information itself as potentially out-of-date. 
Consistent with Frank H. Knight’s (1921) analysis of economic behavior under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty, resources conveyed through bonding ties becomes 
more important as the route becomes more dangerous.  Despite this dependence on 
resources from family members, an increased sense of uncertainty undermines 
confidence in all information. Under conditions of uncertainty, the advice that family 
members give one another at the outset of the journey becomes very vague, consisting of 
truisms such as “Be careful” and “remember God” and to “avoid sin”. These platitudes 
are undoubtedly good advice, but not actionable as migrants would like. Thus, family 
networks often provide financial resources rather than specific information. This situation 
puts migrants in a difficult bind, and their journeys become more like leaps of faith than 
carefully articulated travel itineraries. Family networks are important, but not foolproof, 
resources and their most important role is monetary, not informational. 
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Explanation of the Findings about Social Ties and Smuggling Markets 
To explain the lack of observed variation in migration resources between the two 
towns, I identify three processes that disconnect ‘community’ and the territory of the 
town.  First, widespread distrust impedes help outside family networks, calling into 
question the very notion of ‘community’ in rural El Salvador. Second, extensive internal 
migration within the country connects families across towns, spinning a national web of 
family-based migratory networks. Third, in the absence of resource sharing within the 
community, migrant social capital diminishes over time. Combined, these three processes 
produce a perpetual waxing and waning of informational resources available to migrants 
across different communities. 
Taken together, these processes make family migration history more salient, while 
undermining the utility of community migration histories. Migrants from families with 
long histories of more or less continuous departures to the United States are less 
vulnerable to violence than migrants from families with short or disrupted migration 
histories. While no unauthorized journey is safe and much violence arises from simple 
bad luck, a younger sibling is safer following in the footsteps of older siblings than 
someone who is the first to travel in the family (e.g. male migrant, 4/15/10). These 
migrants may be safer, because they will likely have more money to cope with 
emergency situations that emerge en route and the family will have established a 
continuous social (and potentially retaliatory) relationship with a coyote.  
Barriers to Inter-Family Resource Flows 
 Trust runs in families, not neighborhoods. In both Town A and Town B, kitchen 
gossip expresses and reinforces deep antagonisms, distrust and ill will that discourage 
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reciprocity between neighbors. As a result, resources accrue within families, not between 
them. The narrative of peasant solidarity in the face of political repression, told by 
scholars sympathetic to the guerilla movement in the Salvadoran civil war, does not hold 
up in these two towns, both of which fell under military control during the conflict. 
Perhaps fieldwork in places with high past insurgent activity would reveal present-day 
inter-family cooperation. However, there are good reasons to doubt that would be the 
case: widespread post-war disillusionment, continued poverty, persistent inequality 
exacerbated by migration and dollarization, and gang violence deepen distrust in 
Salvadoran communities across the country. Julia Dickson-Gomez (2002, p.417) 
describes similar patterns of community disunity and distrust in a former contested zone, 
where insurgent activity had been high.  Central American criminal violence is now 
widespread in both rural and urban settings.37 Furthermore, frequent internal migration 
has blurred the boundaries between communities, knitting together family networks 
across the country.   
In some cases, families do not share information with neighbors because disreputable 
coyotes threaten people to keep silence about the hardships suffered during the journey 
(Salvadoran police 3/4/10; activist 11/19/09).  Such instances, however, are rare and none 
were reported in the core of Town B.  Nevertheless, it is dangerous to denounce an 
irresponsible coyote in a way that draws police attention. One returned migrant in Town 
B, who openly discussed bad coyotes available in the nearby city, explained that people 
should also be afraid to harm a coyote’s business or run him out of town; after all, he 
reminded me, “this is a very violent place” (male migrant, 2/19/10).                                                         
37 For a discussion of the increasingly fratricidal nature of criminal violence in Central America 
and its relation to post-revolutionary disillusionment see Dennis Rodgers (2009).      
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Unfortunately, even in the absence of threats, information does not flow freely in 
either Town A or Town B, primarily because of a belief in ‘envidia’. One migrant 
defined envidia as not mere jealousy, but a sickness, an obsession, a corruption of biblical 
proportions (female migrant, 3/29/10). Inhabitants of both A and B used envidia to 
explain a wide variety of unsavory events and interpersonal conflicts.  In particular, 
neighbors are frequently suspected of envidia.38 However, foreigners and elites are 
relatively immune from indictment for envidia-motivated behavior toward low-class 
Salvadorans; it is a plague of peers. Whether explaining the opening of a competing food 
stand or a recent murder, envidia is a common frame for interpreting behavior, both in the 
telenovelas and daily life (e.g. community members and migrants, 12/2/09; 12/22/09; 
1/16/10; 1/25/10; 3/1/10; 5/6/10).39   
Envidia hinders information flows between neighbors in the community and within 
the extended family (distant cousins, uncles) by undermining information sharing and 
devaluing information when it is received. The flow of information is tainted by gossip 
because “people here talk” negatively about one another (e.g. male migrant, 2/26/10). 
Likewise, in a study of another rural Salvadoran community, Dickson-Gomez (2002, 
p.422-423) observes that: 
                                                        
38 Based on analysis of this AmericasBarometer data for El Salvador, Cordova et al. (2010, p.150) 
found that Salvadoran men trust their neighbors more than strangers, whereas Salvadoran women 
trust strangers more than their neighbors. Youth and education, but not wealth, increase trust 
(p.150).  These findings seem compatible with ethnographic observations: while both men and 
women believe in ‘envidia’ and feel constrained by potential accusations of it, older women seem 
to spend the most time engaged in ‘kitchen talk’. Immersion in this particular feminine gossip 
setting may further erode trust.     
39 I thank Froylan Enciso for pointing out that ‘envidia’ is a dominant trope of the soap operas 
that, perhaps next to soccer matches, constitute the most popular form of entertainment in Mexico 
and Central America. 
   
172  
Conflicts in the community in the postwar period are generally expressed through gossip 
and envy (envidia), not violence.  Gossip is the main form of sanction within the 
community, and accusations that envy is the motive for such gossip is the main 
defense….Gossip and envy are a reminder of neighbors’ hostilities and, therefore, of the 
potential for violence.40 
 
In interviews, several respondents cited their fear of being accused of envidia as a 
rationale for not sharing information about their journey. They also discounted 
information about dangers because they believed the talk of danger to be motivated by 
envy and therefore unreliable.  In their view, neighbors want to misinform in order to 
make migratory success of other individuals less likely.  Few reasonable expectations of 
reciprocity or resource sharing exist outside of the closest family networks.41   
These family networks seem to be shrinking. Perhaps based on a romanticized view 
of traditional marriage practices and family relations, a general anxiety over the 
disintegration of the Salvadoran family institutions pervades public discourse; this 
anxiety may be linked to the family separations and physical distances provoked by 
transnational migration.  Whatever the past may have been like, in this day and age, 
cousins and uncles cannot be consistently relied on for help during the migratory journey.                                                         
40 Julia Dickson-Gomez (2002, p.422-423) lists several narratives, ranging from alleged 
poisonings to alleged corruption, motivated by envidia. Interestingly, these same tropes of 
attempted poisoning by neighbors and hoarding money or work opportunities surfaced during my 
fieldwork on the other side of the country. 
41 Migrants rarely received financial support from sources outside their family.  One migrant in 
Town B received financial aid, in the form of a loan, from a multinational church group in the 
United States that she had linked with during a previous migration.  She used information gained 
through family networks to select the coyote. The financial aid received from outside her family 
network did not originate within the home community or associations based on shared hometown 
membership, but from multinational evangelical Christian contacts forged in the destination 
community. One migrant from Town A also reported receiving support from a multinational 
evangelical Christian church based in the United States (female migrant, 5/20/10). There are 
rumors that some clergy members of the Catholic Church in El Salvador have informally helped 
migrants with financial resources to escape political or criminal violence, but I did not receive 
any firsthand reports of such support beyond the activities of the Catholic shelters and churches 
along the route through Mexico and the United States.    
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Nevertheless, there is variation among families, as to how far trust and obligation extends 
and to whom.  In some families, first cousins count as virtual siblings, but in others, only 
the nuclear family constitutes the core.  Generally speaking, however, the more distant 
the blood relation, the less likely becomes pooled resources.    
Sometimes, cousins and uncles in the United States create a dangerous illusion of 
resources by making promises of support that fail to materialize when the migrant arrives 
at an agreed upon destination, such as the U.S.-Mexico border. Based on informal 
conversations with migrants stranded in shelters, cousins and uncles seem generally more 
likely to abandon their relatives en route than parents and siblings, but this is not 
universally true.  Because family networks are sometimes undependable, migrants must 
continually negotiate and re-negotiate the blurry boundaries of family trust. In these two 
towns, far-flung branches of family trees grow gnarled and complex; everyone is related 
to everyone else in some convoluted manner. Each town traces its modern founding to 
two competing landowning families, and most residents have some ancestral connection 
to these families. When people become desperate, these thin tendrils of distant familial 
ties give migrants occasionally misleading hope of assistance. This hope becomes a font 
of bitterness and accusations of envidia that erupts when that assistance is not realized. 
In a similar vein, Sarah Mahler (1995, p.89) found that Salvadoran migrants 
discounted negative information about hardship in the U.S., dismissing the person who 
related these difficulties as “egotistical”. To avoid such accusations, immigrants shy 
away from sharing negative information.  In her 1995 study of Salvadoran immigrant-
receiving communities in New York, Mahler traced this “egoism” to the immigrant 
experience itself, citing stories of solidarity that migrants told about their home 
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communities (p.95). During my fieldwork in rural El Salvador, I found a belief in 
“envidia” to be firmly entrenched. This belief underlies norms of distrust connected to 
patterns of information and resource hoarding, with similar effects on behavior to what 
Mahler calls “egoism”. The poor but stable rural lifestyle described by immigrants in 
Mahler’s 1995 study is but a distant memory in contemporary Central America, if it ever 
existed outside nostalgic reminiscing about the homeland.42   
This unraveling of the social mechanisms that underpin solidarity and reciprocity 
might ultimately be traced to any number of sources: a history of extreme violence (both 
political and criminal), capitalist economic restructuring, splintering of religious sects, 
and inequality, as well as the immigrant experience highlighted by Mahler. According to 
Cordova et al.’s (2010, p.151) analysis of AmericasBarometer survey data, the perception 
of vulnerability to crime negatively impacts interpersonal trust. Citizens who feel 
insecure tend to trust their neighbors less than secure citizens. According to the 
Latinobarometer survey (2010, p.91), El Salvador is the country with the highest 
percentage of citizens who fear crime victimization in Latin America. Perhaps for this 
reason, the 2010 Latinobarometer survey also found Salvadorans to be least likely among 
all Latin American nationalities to turn to a friend when they need information on an 
important topic; only 30% of Salvadorans indicated that they would seek important 
information from a friend (p.67). Medical anthropologist Julia Dickson-Gomez (2002) 
argues that this pervasive belief in ‘envidia’ and expectations of violence result from the 
transmission of civil war trauma to younger generations through narratives of illness. I 
                                                        
42 See, in particular, Mahler (1995, pg. 33) for a description of a dreamy bucolic lifestyle. 
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can only speculate that the origins of this distrust run deep in the perennially bloody 
Salvadoran history. 
Whatever its source, the belief in envidia disrupts inter-familiar relationships.  Since 
neighbors and close community members bear the brunt of these accusations, envidia 
does not impede relationships with people outside the community. Envidia does not 
impede close family relationships among those who share a household.  Outside of the 
household unit, however, elites may be perceived as more trustworthy sources of 
information than neighbors. As grudges accumulate, the emotional intensity of 
relationships, their longevity and a history of failed confidences may work to undermine 
trust, rather than augment it. The collective belief in envidia, which acts as a lens through 
which to interpret these social interactions, privileges linking relationships to outsiders 
with limited interaction, relative to bridging among community members with daily 
dealings. Community relationships lose some of their informational value.   
Despite this bleak analysis of community cohesion in rural El Salvador, among close 
family (i.e. among siblings and parents) information and money usually flow freely, 
when they are available. As a result, some families develop advantages over the course of 
their migration history.  Family networks continue to convey vital resources for survival 
in the context of escalating violence along the unauthorized migratory routes.    
A Hidden History of (Im)migration   
The geographical boundaries of towns do not delimit these family networks.  Thanks 
to extensive wartime internal migration, Salvadoran family networks often span the entire 
country. Migratory routes from rural towns merge in major cities. As a result, the 
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resources available in Town B are more dynamic and extensive than I expected, even in a 
context of extreme distrust at the level of the community. 
During the civil war period, people from Town B did not leave for the United States 
in droves, but the town received many immigrants from war-torn parts of El Salvador. 
The population of the departments of San Salvador, La Libertad, and Sonsonate increased 
prior to and during the conflict, while all other areas experienced net emigration 
(Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991, p.93). Building on previous labor migration patterns, 
Salvadoran households fleeing violence pursued diversification strategies for 
destinations, sending some family members to the city, others to quiet rural zones, and 
others to Honduras, Mexico and the United States. When asked to trace his family tree, 
indicating where he has family in El Salvador, one man exclaimed “better to say which 
towns I don’t have family members” (United States, 8/9/12). He has family in both Town 
A and Town B.  
Many people who moved to Town B during the war have siblings in towns across the 
country, in the capital city and in the United States. In town, it is not uncommon to find 
families with ties to the departments of San Miguel, Chalatenango or Sonsonate. 
Depending on the cohesion of the family, cousins dispersed across the country may (or 
may not) communicate relevant information about the migratory journey, share resources 
or form travel partnerships. Some families in Town B can leverage resources developed 
in communities with longer migration histories when preparing for their journey. 
Furthermore, local smugglers also leverage their dispersed family networks. 
The conjoining of migratory routes provides evidence of this leveraging. From Town 
B, the first leg of the journey north almost always entails a detour to the capital city or 
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San Miguel, where the travel group merges with migrants from around the country, who 
are recruited by local smugglers from other hometowns.43 In this way, the new migration 
flow merges into the old routes north. In Town B, the local smuggler works with his four 
cousins located in other parts of the country (male migrant/friend of smuggler, 2/26/10). 
Because of extensive cross-country family networks, migrants and their smugglers in 
towns with short migration histories can diversify their information sources and link with 
established migratory routes.  In so doing, they close the resource gap between early 
migrating and late migrating towns.   
The Erosion of Migratory Social Capital 
An erosion of migratory social capital over time also closes the possible resource gap 
that might have distinguished early migrating from late migrating towns. Family 
migration networks provide unexpected resources to migrants in Town B. A 
concentration of resource flows within (but not across) family migration networks 
undermines the potential for community-level advantages to migrants in Town A. There 
is no viable mechanism for the transmission of migratory social capital from one family 
to the next. As a result, as families leave the town and move their core members to the 
United States, they take their knowledge of the route and relationships with smugglers 
with them.   
The migration pattern in Town A follows a core-periphery movement. The pioneer 
migrants came primarily from families established in the town center. Just before and 
during the civil war, those families followed a chain migration model that sometimes 
relocated entire families. The early generation of movers benefited from an opening to                                                         
43 San Miguel has a long reputation for lawlessness and independence, rivaling the capital as 
the country’s second city (Salvadoran police officer, 2/25/10). 
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asylum claims in the United States, and the successive amnesties and suspensions of 
deportations offered under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and 
the 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA).44 Once 
legally established in the United States, these families often retained their property in the 
town center, either for sentimental reasons or with an eye to retirement. In the meantime, 
they rented the homes to families who moved from the surrounding colonias, who were 
sometimes their distant relatives.  Some properties changed hands, and some new 
families have purchased properties in the town center with the help of remittances from 
the United States.  In general, however, newcomers to the town center cannot access the 
informational or financial resources of the previous generation of emigrants.  Today’s 
Town A is not yesterday’s Town A; it is a new mix of families with shorter migration 
histories who remain relatively disempowered when compared to their landlords. 
With the passage of the 1996 Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act, 
many Salvadoran settlers in the United States were unexpectedly deported (Arana 2005, 
p.100; Zilberg 2004, p.761).  The legislation widened the list of deportable offenses for 
legal residents to include minor property crimes and drunk driving. Until a Supreme 
Court ruling in 2001 (INS v. St Cyr), the INS even applied the law retroactively in order 
to deport legal residents with previous convictions. More vigorous post-9/11 cooperation 
between local law enforcement and immigration authorities dramatically increased the 
deportations of both unauthorized migrants without criminal backgrounds and legal U.S. 
residents with criminal convictions to El Salvador, as shown in Figure 4.4: 
                                                        
44 146,000 Salvadorans gained legal status through the IRCA, and the Salvadoran embassy 
estimates that 129,131 Salvadorans benefited from NACARA (Gammage 2007).     
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Figure 4.4:  Removals from the United States to El Salvador, Fiscal Years 2001-2010
 
Source: ICE Yearbook for Immigration Statistics 2010, Table 38 
In 2011, the United States deported an estimated 15,400 Salvadorans (Ministerio de 
Justicia y Seguridad Publica de El Salvador 2012); approximately 47% of those deportees 
had criminal records in the United States, ranging from traffic violations to murder. As a 
result, a growing number of men from Town A’s early migrating families are 
involuntarily returning to El Salvador. These men occupy large, otherwise empty family 
homes in Town A.   
Despite their wealth and experience in the United States, deportees occupy a position 
of disempowered migration opportunity. During the waves of U.S. amnesties, 
opportunities for legal chain migration and the settlement of whole families abroad 
disrupted family histories of unauthorized migration.  These families’ relationships with 
potential smugglers are now ancient history; many of their former guides are no longer in 
the business. As noted by Spener (2009, p.170) in his study of long migrating 
communities in northern Mexico, intensified border policing drove some responsible 
coyotes out of the business. As territory changes hands and crossing fees must be 
renegotiated with dangerous Mexican route bosses, reputable coyotes may retire. As a 
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result, the knowledge of families with long migration histories needs to be updated 
periodically or it loses its value for would-be migrants. 
Furthermore, Salvadoran deportees suffer a stigma associated with ‘Americanized’ or 
‘Mexicanized’ youth culture, criminal deportation, vice and gang violence (Coutin 2007; 
Zilberg 2004). As a result of this stigma, families may view the deportee as unreliable 
and refuse to take loans to fund another journey. As I walked through Town A on my 
rounds, a handful of these lonely men offered to chat, happy to speak English (a language 
in which some of them feel more comfortable communicating than Spanish) with 
someone they assumed would understand them better than the Salvadoran campesinos 
who are now their neighbors. After being away so long, these men are not at home in 
Town A (e.g. male migrant, 5/18/10). They expressed intense feelings of social isolation 
and dislocation;45 their involuntary return does not bring migratory social capital back to 
rural El Salvador. 
Known Dangers, Uncertain Journeys, Undaunted Faith 
In the aftermath of the massacre of seventy-two Central and South American migrants 
by a criminal kidnapping gang in Tamaulipas, Mexico in August 2010, potential migrants 
in Salvadoran sending communities have been bombarded by media coverage of the 
violence along the route through Mexico. Migrants understand that the route is dangerous 
and that people have fallen victim to extreme forms of violence. Indeed, many fear for 
                                                        
45 In her ethnography of deported Salvadoran youth, Elana Zilberg (2004) examines these 
feelings of dislocation and the culture clash that occurs upon a migrant’s forced return in 
greater depth.   In her study, gang members raised in Los Angeles describe a harsh 
homecoming and the sensation of being permanent tourists or aliens in Salvadoran society.   
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their lives, and prepare for their journey by praying and putting themselves “into God’s 
hands.” 46  
Migrants overwhelmingly rely on faith in God to plan their journey (Hagan 2008).47 
While the national and international media coverage has succeeded in increasing fear and 
prayer, it has failed to provide more specific, actionable information that could be used to 
devise material, as opposed to purely spiritual, strategies to avoid this violence while 
migrating. A common refrain among interviewed migrants is that one journey cannot be 
used to predict the outcome of the next journey; the dynamism of policing and violence 
along the routes undermines the capacity to predict the outcome of migratory journeys. 
Only God knows and can protect the migrant. The only thing to do is to “ask God to care 
for you” (male migrant, 5/19/10): 
They know that one suffers, that is not a new thing.  One knows that on the route you are 
going to risk.  You pray to God and hope for luck that nothing happens (male migrant, 
6/3/10). 
 
In other words, migrants know about suffering and a general context of risk, but they 
have difficulty judging the probability of specific dangers occurring given the choice of a 
particular route in a particular moment. While they may attempt to mitigate their risks 
by hiring a coyote or finding a trusted travel companion, for the most part, migrants must 
assume a worldview of ‘uncertainty’ when making specific choices about migration 
                                                        
46 Likewise, in her study of Salvadoran immigrant networks, Cecilia Menjivar (2000, p.72) 
also observed that “almost all my informants- the fervently religious and the less so- included 
a prayer in their preparations for a successful trip”.   
47 Salvadorans interviewed for this study are Catholics and Evangelical Christians. The 
Salvadorans who did not regularly attend a church still self-identified as spiritual and 
discussed God’s role in their lives. In rural El Salvador, Christianity is pervasive. I found no 
differences in the information about dangers available to Catholics and Evangelical migrants. 
Catholics and Evangelicals also hire the same smugglers. 
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tactics. They must recognize the limits of their ability to know what happens along the 
route. As Anthony Giddens (1999) states, under conditions of uncertainty  
…dangers are experienced as a given.  Either they come from God, or they come 
simply from a world which one takes for granted.  The idea of risk is bound up with 
the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling the future. 
 
Indeed, the migrants’ reliance on faith as a resource is a rational response to 
incomplete information about the viability of particular tactics along the route. Since 
immigration police and criminals respond strategically to migration routes, a dynamic 
situation emerges; a method or route that was safe last week will not necessarily be safe 
again this week. A phrase repeated countless times in informal conversation as well as 
interviews is, “every trip is different”; individuals who made multiple journeys stressed 
the impossibility of generalizing about their experience, because each attempt proved to 
be absolutely unique (e.g. male migrants, 4/15/10, 3/1/10). En route, new and 
unpredictable relationships must be negotiated, new directions must be taken, and new 
tactics must be devised: 
Every time someone goes, the trip varies.  They might plan to go to the Yucatan and 
discover it is heavily patrolled.  So, they change the route to the Pacific coast and 
discover other dangers….The trip is unpredictable. Everyone knows that (community 
member, 1/5/10). 
 
When asked whether anyone can predict who succeeds and who fails in this ever-
shifting context, many people return to the theme of luck (e.g. migrants and family, 
1/27/10; 2/24/10; 4/15/10): 
Only luck is the difference among the dead and the survivors. Nothing matters: men, 
women, old, young. It doesn’t matter.  They are all dying.  People in this village are 
dying.  There are amputees, people injured, people going to jail, women raped…. (male 
migrant, 11/13/09) 
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From this man’s perspective, many people seem determined to learn the hard way. 
Without experiential knowledge, information is not always an actionable resource.  Some 
migrants make no pretense of expectations for the journey, explaining simply that no 
matter how much they hear about the journey, they “could not imagine it in advance” 
(e.g. female migrant, 1/13/10). Others express only a vague sense that “it will not happen 
to me” (e.g. male migrant, 1/16/10). As one female migrant explained about the 
experience of migration and its consequences for the cohesion of her family, “you don’t 
really think it can happen to you. It is something different when it happens to you. If feels 
different. You can’t imagine how it hurts, and it will always hurt” (female migrant, 
1/17/10). She had been warned, but people learn by living, not warnings. One man, 
frustrated that his advice about the journey had gone unheeded by others, explained that, 
“the majority here don’t believe it because they want to experiment with their own life” 
(male migrant, 5/18/10). Information is often useless, too vague and inapplicable to the 
particulars at hand, without the wisdom that comes from experience.  
Thus, migrants must assume an uncertain worldview and make a leap of faith to begin 
the journey without full knowledge of the journey ahead. You must “tighten your pants 
well” before leaving town and be prepared for anything (male migrant, 3/10/10). Even 
with supportive experienced family members, the journey is still a dramatic event.  Thus, 
at its outset, migrants reasonably and rationally accept that the future is in God’s hands, 
and they pray that their own resourcefulness will help them actualize His purpose. They 
go “without expectations…only asking God” (female migrant, 4/28/10).  
  
   
184  
Beyond El Salvador 
 What do we learn from the contrast between El Salvador and Mexico? Although both 
Mexican and Central American migrants pray and trust in God throughout their journey, 
research on northern Mexican sending communities emphasizes the stability of 
community-level migration patterns. With a brief comparison to Mexico, we can further 
speculate about the reasons for El Salvador’s divergence from this path dependent model.  
First, El Salvador has a very different human geography than a large, heterogeneous 
country like Mexico.  El Salvador is the most densely populated country in Central 
America (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991, p.85); small and packed with people, cross-
national familial networks within El Salvador may be more tightly maintained.  It is also 
the most racially homogenous country of Central America, without a large unassimilated 
indigenous population in rural areas. Salvadorans have been internally mobile since the 
capitalist restructuring of the coffee economy in late 1800s (Hamilton and Chinchilla 
1991, p.86). This internal mobility accelerated in the second half of the 20th century 
(Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991, p.87).  This long and intense history of internal migration 
contributed to the growth of family networks that span multiple towns across the country 
and connect the city with the countryside. Small, densely populated post-conflict 
countries with a long history of internal migration may exhibit more developed cross-
national familial networks. As a result, they may exhibit less community-level variation 
in migrant resources than larger, more sparsely populated countries without intense push-
factors for migration. 
Perhaps because of this extraordinarily high level of national and ethnic integration, 
the AmericasBarometer survey indicates no significant rural-urban difference in 
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interpersonal trust in El Salvador (Cordova et al. 2010, p.150). Salvadorans may simply 
follow a more urbanized pattern of migration. Research in Mexico suggests that 
international migration from urban areas generally does not exhibit the path dependence 
associated with community-level social capital accumulation found in rural zones 
(Fussell and Massey 2004).  In their study of Mexican migration, Fussell and Massey 
(2004, p.151) found weaker social networks and less migration-related restructuring of 
local labor markets in the urban environment. Mexican urban zones tend to be larger and 
more socio-economically heterogeneous, and offer more diverse employment 
opportunities, than Mexican rural zones (Fussell and Massey 2004, p.168-169). The 
population density and short distances connecting the urban and rural zones of El 
Salvador mimics these conditions, thereby further undermining the salience of rural 
community migration histories. 
Second, unrelenting violence and repression may have eroded bridging ties within 
Salvadoran hometowns to a greater degree than in Mexico. Like other Cold War conflicts 
in the region, the Salvadoran civil war (1979-1992) pitted neighbor against neighbor. It is 
difficult to overstate the level of post-conflict insecurity. The UNDP Human 
Development Report for Central America 2009-2010 estimates El Salvador’s per capita 
murder rate for 2008 as the second highest in the world, exceeded only by Honduras 
(p.12). Of course, homicides are not the only crimes with an impact on Central 
Americans. Theft, assault, fraud and extortion are commonplace.  According to the 2010 
AmericasBarometer survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 
24.2% of Salvadorans reported being victims of crime in the previous year (Cordova et al 
2010, p.86-89).  Extortion, drug trade and murders are common, increasingly so in rural 
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places like Town A and Town B.48 For this reason, many Salvadorans describe their 
experience of peace as “worse than war” (Moodie 2012).49 In this context of perpetual 
insecurity, the level of distrust and the belief in ‘envidia’ is unusually high.  
However, a belief in ‘envidia’ disrupts information flows within other countries. For 
example, it has been reported among Bolivian migrants as far afield as Spain (Tapias and 
Escandell 2011). Traces of this distrust may erupt across the globe, even in countries that 
have not suffered severe intercine violence. The presence of these tensions within rural 
communities may be the norm, not the exception. 
Third, the heavily studied migrating towns in northern Mexico represent a special 
case, rather than a typical case, of migrant sending communities around the globe.  Their 
close physical proximity to destinations within the United States generates a special 
informational context for these Mexican migrants.  Unlike migrants from most parts of 
the world to the United States, Mexicans only have one border to cross. This unique 
advantage has encouraged decades of commuter traffic, a ceaseless back and forth across 
the border with less uncertainty due to the short distance. In her study of religious 
practice and danger during migratory journeys, Jacqueline Maria Hagan (2008, p.70) 
found that Central American journeys require longer duration than journeys departing 
from Mexico, and Central American migrants are significantly more likely to suffer 
serious problems en route than Mexican migrants. Indeed, it seems that the longer any 
individual spends along the route, the more likely that they are victimized multiple times.                                                         
48 I listened to many reports of extortion, drug abuse and sordid stories about local murders 
during my fieldwork in both Town A and Town B. 
49 This attitude toward the post-conflict peace, explored by Ellen Moodie (2012) in her 
analysis of post-conflict Salvadoran crime narratives, surfaced verbatim numerous times in my 
own interviews and conversations during fieldwork. 
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For this reason, Salvadorans may be more ‘typical’ of migrants from other parts of 
the globe than Mexican migrants, because they have a farther distance to travel.  Some 
recent research suggests that safe migration from other parts of the world depends most 
heavily on family ties.  For example, Omar and Trebesch (2010) use Eastern European 
survey data to examine how the size of the migration flow impacts the likelihood that 
traffickers pose as smugglers and coerce labor from unwilling migrants. They show that 
this type of predator often targets migrants from high or rapidly accelerating emigration 
zones.  The size and acceleration of the flow provides opportunities for traffickers to pose 
as smugglers. Omar and Trebesch argue that only family networks, not community 
networks, provide useful resources to counteract this tendency (p.184).   
Finally, times have changed. For the most part, the scholarship that informed my 
initial expectations relied on fieldwork prior to the escalation of Mexican criminal terrain 
disputes (2006-present) or the onset of the U.S. economic recession (2007- present).  
Since that time, Mexican migration has fallen to net zero (Massey 2011). The ceaseless 
unauthorized migration that characterized the northern Mexican cross-border commute 
has slowed precipitously. And the upswing in criminal violence across the country is 
taking a toll on interpersonal trust within Mexican communities, particularly in the war 
torn north (Miroff 2012). Thus, the golden era of community migration may be drawing 
to a close, even in Mexico. The uncertainty that the Salvadoran case illustrates may 
represent a new status quo for migration practices, at least for the foreseeable future, as 
upheaval characterizes routes and the rules of the smuggling game are renegotiated in 
Mexico. 
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Conclusion 
The tale that emerges by tracing information in two Salvadoran towns highlights the 
dynamism of migrant networks as a financial resource, but their failure as an 
informational resource. Cecilia Menjivar (2000) emphasizes the contingent nature of 
Salvadoran migrant networks in U.S. destination communities. In her study of the Indian 
diaspora, Kara Somerville (2011) emphasizes the potential for the transmission of vague 
or incorrect information via long-distance transnational networks. Similarly, I find that 
conditions in Salvadoran migrant home communities produce contingencies in migrant 
networks, and conditions in Mexican transit communities shorten the lifespan of useful 
specific information. Interpersonal networks are fluid, potentially disrupted by distrust 
and envy within communities, but often widened or narrowed by human movement 
between them. In fact, with rampant accusations of envidia between neighbors and 
cousins, community seems like the wrong word to describe relationships among 
neighbors in post-conflict El Salvador.  
However, it did not take long for some families in the town with a short migration 
history to adapt to the situation, developing relatively confident tactics to evade the 
intensifying violence with remittances sent from the United States. This rapid adaptation 
occurred, in part, because social ties based on close family relations, not place, supplies 
important financial resources for migration tactics. Furthermore, family provides a 
potential for retaliation against smugglers in the event of a breach of contract. To the 
extent that reputation played a role in enforcing smuggling contracts, it was a concern for 
social reputation, not market reputation, which appeared to dominate smuggler motive.  
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Furthermore, in the context of rapidly changing criminal violence in Mexico, the 
information carried through family networks may suddenly, and without warning, outlive 
its utility. Such failures can have deadly consequences. As any migrant will warn, their 
social ties cannot guarantee a safe journey. Like Odysseus, they are acutely aware of the 
fallibility of their relationships and their beliefs about the route, maintaining their faith 
only in God.   
In this sense, the Homeric world is a fitting allegory for the social context that 
confronts migrants. Odysseus’ reputation is synonymous with his charismatic character, 
not his reliability within reciprocal trade relationships. And after his slaughter of the 
presumptuous suitors, the potential for familial retribution against his household is his 
primary concern. However, these social possibilities only loosely guide his behavior. 
Odysseus’ actions more closely align with his perception of divine will and the limits of 
his wiliness, not a strict adherence to norms and protocols. Indeed, in Odysseus’ two 
decade-long absence, Ithaca became a place where envy and rumor rule, and for men, 
“each one is the law for his own wives and children, and cares nothing about the others”. 
The important role of his immediate family notwithstanding, the changing and fickle 
nature of the deceitful social relations he must negotiate privileges the combination of 
faith and craftiness above all. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MAPPING ROUTES: THE ORIENTATION OF MIGRATION PRACTICE 
Introduction 
 
A long while she sat in silence… numbing wonder  
filled her heart as her eyes explored his face. 
One moment he seemed… Odysseus, to the life- 
The next, no, he was not the man she knew, 
A huddled mass of rags was all she saw. 
 
The woman was working the coffee fields when she saw the strange, gaunt man 
lurking behind the trees. He wandered around, staring at her and her children. He had a 
shaggy beard and mustache, unkempt hair in dirty curls. Mosquito bites made his 
shoeless feet look like meat, and they were bandaged with rags tied with a belt. Terrified, 
she picked up her children and ran home. But then he came and stared in her window. 
She was panic-stricken. He tried the door. She shouted at him to go away, and he shouted 
back that she was crazy. It was her husband. Like Penelope confronted with her long lost 
Odysseus, she could not believe him at first, but recognition slowly dawned on her. When 
he finally entered the house, he slept for two days and ate nothing. His listless body was 
both thin and swollen, telling her what she needed to know about his journey. It was the 
first of four attempts her husband made before successfully arriving in the United States. 
I interviewed members of this Salvadoran family eight times in their home 
community over the course of a year, listening as those who had traveled and those who 
had stayed behind collectively re-imagined the dangerous route. At first, the woman only 
talked about her husband’s experience, later opening up and telling me about the day her 
youngest son left town on my third visit to her family (3/1/10). He did not come home 
one night. In the morning, she went to look for him, asking in the streets, but no one 
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knew where he was. When she returned home, the smaller children were crying. They 
had found a note that he had written in a notebook. He had left home carrying only 
twenty dollars. She cried when he left, and she cried again remembering that morning.  
In the back room, I heard another cry above the woman’s sobs. Her three-month old 
niece awoke. The baby looked like a newborn, her oversized head on a tiny body and 
bulging eyes already deformed by chronic hunger. The woman explained apologetically 
that she knows her niece is hungry, but she can barely afford to feed her own children, let 
alone her sister’s neglected brood. She washed the baby. And she dressed her in a fresh 
outfit with little booties, donated by some benefactor, but she mumbles that nobody ever 
gave her anything for her own babies. Her sister gave the baby unboiled water, and it is 
amazing it survived. The baby is tough. She patted the baby and bounced her knee, but 
the baby continued to wail with hunger. My own chest grew heavy with the desire to feed 
the baby, but I dared not reach for the dying thing. Finally, she gave the screaming baby 
to her youngest daughter, who ran off with her little cousin like she was holding a 
ragdoll.  
After this interruption, our conversation veered abruptly to the news. She had heard 
about the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, and she believes something is coming for El 
Salvador. A man passed through town a few weeks ago warning of an impending 
disaster. He travels the countryside telling people about his visions. She believes him 
now, after seeing those distant events on the television. But here she stays, waiting for 
God’s will. 
In moments like these, interviews instruct not only through words, but experience; 
ethnographers decipher a tangle of eyewitness observations, emotions and non-verbal 
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communication that leads to new insights.50 These insights would be overlooked if 
researchers only focused on seemingly straightforward answers to survey questions. 
Before I left the Salvadoran town, on my way to Mexico to see the storied route first 
hand, the woman’s youngest son drew me a map of his own failed attempt to arrive in the 
United States. With these contributions, this family was one of many that transformed my 
interviews into an ethnographic journey. With the help of the stories and images I 
collected during that journey, I hope to render the lived experience of the transnational 
migratory route legible for a new audience. 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the case for an ethnographic method for understanding how 
Central Americans migrants navigate transnational routes. To do so, I first explain what 
an ethnographic journey is, and how ethnographers leverage experience, as well as 
interviews, to understand social reality.  Second, I describe my own fieldwork in greater 
detail. In particular, I explain the premise and protocol for a series of mapmaking 
workshops that I conducted. Third, I discuss how the maps reveal a transnational 
imaginary influenced by biblical and popular media depictions of the route. I also discuss 
what the maps surprisingly, and tellingly, do not reveal; the absence of a clear geographic 
orientation in several maps hints at the relative importance of social understanding, as 
opposed to purely topographical information, for navigating the journey. Fourth, I show 
how the maps recreate a framework for understanding the route that reinforces migrants’ 
commitment to the journey. Migrants have not passively received and internalized 
biblical and popular media images; they continually reinterpret the transnational                                                         
50 Clifford Geertz (1973, p.5-6). calls this ‘thick description’. 
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imaginary before, during and after their journey. Finally, I compare and contrast migrant 
maps to official maps of the route, pointing to how the artwork of migrants challenges the 
normative foundations of national borders. Likewise, I contend that an ethnographic 
reading of this artwork broadens our understanding of the construction of knowledge. 
An Ethnographic Journey 
This text follows an ethnographic journey. In other words, I retrace the micro-practice 
of migration in an attempt to understand the lived experience of the route. An 
ethnography ‘en route’, in which the researcher moves along terrain where activities are 
simultaneously hidden and known, reveals unauthorized migration practices, for which 
official sources continue to be notoriously inaccurate (Coutin 2005). I map the individual 
journeys of migrants, retelling their stories in both words and images. Indeed, alternative 
maps can render hidden practices legible to new audiences by rewriting what Michel de 
Certeau (1984, p.87) calls the “procedures for forgetting”:  
It is true that the operations of walking on can be traced on city maps in such a way as 
to transcribe their paths (here well-trodden, there very faint) and their trajectories 
(going this way and not that).  But these thick or thin curves only refer, like words, to 
the absence of what has passed by.  Surveys of routes miss what was: the act itself of 
passing by.  The operation of walking, wandering, or “window shopping,” that is, the 
activity of passers-by, is transformed into points that draw a totalizing and reversible 
line on the map.  They allow us to grasp only a relic set in the nowhere of a surface of 
projection.  Itself visible, it has the effect of making invisible the operation that made 
it possible.  These fixations constitute procedures for forgetting.  The trace left behind 
is substituted for the practice.  It exhibits the (voracious) property that the 
geographical system has of being able to transform action into legibility, but in doing 
so it causes a way of being in the world to be forgotten. 
 
By taking the reader on this ethnographic journey, I attempt to revive scholarly 
interest in a method overlooked by contemporary political science: “the act of itself of 
passing by”. To the extent possible given the dangerous and illegal practices under study, 
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I undertook a ‘mobile ethnography’, defined by Laura Watts (2008) as “travelling with, 
and constituting, a moving field site; participating in the relations between things, people 
and places on the move”.51  This method for studying migration echoes the experience of 
migrants. Parallel journeys made by ethnographers imperfectly retread the path of their 
participants. Despite its imperfections, mobile ethnography reflects the migrants’ own 
method for knowing the route; both researcher and subject undertake a similar process of 
information, imagination and improvisation. Participant observation, after all, is a 
reflexive imagining of what life is like for someone else based on observations made via 
immersive experience; it is a systematized way of knowing through doing.52  
To navigate uncertainty and violence, migrants must leverage social networks for 
introductions and financial resources. They must engage strangers in a series of 
performances through which they collectively imagine social relationships and 
possibilities for movement. And they must carefully observe the contours of their 
material environment. During their journey, they must constantly re-imagine and 
improvise upon symbolic and material assets to know the way forward.  
                                                        
51 Within the field of migration studies, David Fitzgerald (2006) identifies his own ethnography 
as ‘multi-sited’, because it incorporates both migrants’ home and destination communities.  
However, a different terminology better fits ethnographic work along transnational routes.  The 
route itself represents a single ethnographic field of inquiry, whose sustained practices constitute 
a ‘site’, albeit a long-distance one that continually shifts across the landscape.  As James Clifford 
(1997) advises, “In tracking anthropology’s changing relations with travel, we may find it useful 
to think of the ‘field’ as a habitus rather than as a place, a cluster of embodied dispositions and 
practices”. 
52 In a seminal volume on the contribution of ethnography to political science, Edward Schatz 
(2009, p.5-8) defines participant observation as “immersion in a community, a cohort, a locale, or 
a cluster of related subject positions”, and recognizes the centrality of this method of 
understanding through lived experience in a broader ethnographic methodological approach, 
recognized by its interpretive and empathetic sensibility (p.5-8). In the same volume, Jan Kubik 
(2009, p.30) reinforces this point, defining participant observation as “a disciplined immersion in 
the social life of a given group of people”.  
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Similarly, in the course of my research, I leveraged social networks for introductions 
and information. I engaged strangers, earnestly performing the professional role of 
researcher and Church volunteer, as well as the more personal roles of woman, foreigner, 
friend, mother, wife, customer and tenant, in the communities where I lived. I used tacit 
judgment, based in part on stereotypes and my own cultural frames, about the reliability 
of people, their position vis-à-vis the wider community, and how to interpret my 
interactions with them. I observed the knowledge-based artifacts produced by the flow of 
people over terrain and time, as well as how people employed them in their own 
activities. I developed, to the best of my ability, a sense of place. In the process, I learned 
a great deal about myself, as a researcher and an ethical human being. Needless to say, 
fieldwork is an improvisational practice (Yanow 2003, p.292).  
Ethnographers, like migrants, rely heavily on serendipity. Despite the role of 
subjectivity and chance in ethnography, neither ethnographic research nor migrants’ 
mobile knowledge are purely “impressionistic”; both require intensive preparation and 
thoughtful execution (Yanow 2003, p.292). Strict plans stifle creativity, while 
unstructured data collection provides no basis for convincing communication of the 
results. Worse, unconscientiously collected data can misrepresent reality and reinforce 
research bias. New ethnographic insights, like innovative unauthorized travel tactics, 
happen in that mental space between accident and expectation.53 For this reason, Charles 
Tilly (2006) convincingly argues that ethnography is neither art nor science. It requires a 
systematic method of observation and description that pure artists may forgo, and it can 
                                                        
53 On the role of accident in ethnography, see Frank N. Pieke (1995).  
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be judged from a clear set of intersubjective disciplinary standards.54  Thus, the work of 
ethnography is best described as craftsmanship. As such, it is a method uniquely suited 
for tracing the causal and conceptual mechanisms that underlie social and political 
phenomena (Tilly 2006). By leaving open opportunities for inductive improvisation when 
unexpected insights arise and thus refusing to lock researchers into a rigid deductive 
framework, ethnography is particularly well suited for tracing causal and conceptual 
mechanisms in a fluid, uncertain social realm. 
The concept of a discrete beginning and end of a journey interferes with an 
understanding of the continuous flow of information that shapes dynamic interaction 
between the material, socio-economic and socio-psychological landscapes traversed by 
migrants. To understand knowledge generated and transmitted through improvisation, 
researchers should, as George Marcus (1995) exhorts, “Follow the People”: not just to the 
places that they are going, but also to the places they happen to go to along the way.  The 
transnational route, from home to destination and back again, becomes the obvious 
research site.55   
                                                        
54Laurel Richardson (2000) argues that since ethnography is both art and science, we can evaluate 
it based on its: 1) substantive contribution; 2) aesthetic merit; 3) reflexivity; 4) impact; and 5) 
expression of a reality. In other words, ethnography should be a well-written, self-conscious and 
systematic work that resonates with the reader as a credible and valuable depiction of the ‘real’ 
social world under study. 
55 In this manner, the move to a conceptual framework of migration practice dovetails with a 
recent methodological challenge for traditional anthropological conceptions of the relationship 
between physical space and social boundaries. Ethnographers of yesteryear rooted their 
methodology in the notion of a physically bounded community; the ability to travel to a new 
location provided outsiders with analytical leverage to understand a habitus hidden from the 
locals.  However, the advent of ethnographies of globalization calls this notion into question by 
tracing the social construction of the relationship between place and society (Clifford 1997; 
Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Marcus 1995).  
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This research design provides the foundation for an “encompassing comparison”, 
defined by Tilly (1984) as the effort to “select locations within the structure or process 
and explain similarities or differences among those locations as consequences of their 
relationships to the whole” (p.125). Geography and practice link the communities of the 
migration route as part of a larger system of movement in people, goods and services 
through both the legal and illegal global political economy. These links come into view 
as the researcher moves across the social and material terrain of the migration route.  
Description of Fieldwork   
This ethnographic journey proceeded in three stages, divided between Salvadoran 
hometowns, the Mexican transit corridor, and the U.S. transit corridor and destinations. 
Given the sensitive nature of the topic of unauthorized migration and violence, purposive 
snowball sampling was the most appropriate method to find study participants. While 
snowball samples threaten to guide researchers toward clusters of people with shared 
experiences, word-of-mouth is the only viable strategy for interrogating the unauthorized 
migrant community. To offset this limitation, I contacted a wide variety of actors within 
the communities, including a cross-section of people with diverse life experiences, 
religious affiliations and political orientations. Forty-four percent of the study 
participants in El Salvador were women. Interviews with migrants crossing Mexico 
roughly mirrored the Central American migrant population, male respondents 
constituting a majority. Participants came from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua, in rough proportion to their nationality’s estimated representation in the 
migratory flow.   
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During my year in El Salvador (July 2008, and from September 2009 until August 
2010), I conducted one hundred forty-three in-depth semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews of Salvadoran migrants preparing for or returning from their journey, family 
members, community leaders, police and others.56  In El Salvador, ninety people 
participated in the study, often over a period of several weeks and sometimes over the 
course of months through multiple interviews. In two Salvadoran communities with 
divergent migration histories57, I focused on both the individual and the community 
levels of analysis to understand the development of transnational labor smuggling 
markets.     
Living in rural El Salvador with my family and performing volunteer work in a local 
Catholic convent provided an opportunity for participant observation and social 
relationships with townspeople in one community, thereby encouraging more receptive 
responses to interviews and mapmaking workshops. In the immersive ethnographic 
tradition, I engaged the communities both personally and professionally.58 This 
immersion allowed me to participate in countless informal conversations and daily 
practices, including listening to real time discussions among family members as they 
made migration decisions, in addition to formal interviews.  
                                                        
56 I wrote fieldnotes, during interviews and whenever possible in the course of each day, 
following the advice from Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz and Linda L. Shaw (1995). I 
then transcribed these handwritten notes on the computer each night. I did not record 
interviews. Instead, all quotes in the text of this dissertation have been reconstructed from 
shorthand. The vast majority of interviews and informal conversations were in Spanish, but I 
also conducted a handful of interviews in English, in some cases alternating between the two 
languages. In all cases, the preference of the participant determined which language was used.  
57 I discussed case selection of these communities and the rationale for beginning the research 
in El Salvador in their detailed comparison in Chapter 4. 
58 For a discussion of the benefits of immersion for the study of political science, see the 
edited volume (Schatz 2009). 
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Following my time in El Salvador, I conducted eleven months of ethnographic work 
(from August 2010 through July 2011) in transit communities, train yards and migrant 
shelters in Mexico with migrants from all Central American countries. In that time, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with Central American migrants en-route about 
their ongoing decision-making process. I contacted these people at shelters and in train 
yards at eleven locales along routes through Mexico, all the way from the southern border 
with Guatemala to the United States: Tapachula, Arriaga, Ixtepec, Tenosique, Oaxaca 
City, Lecheria, Coatzacoalcos, San Luis Potosi, Saltillo, Monterrey, and Reynosa. 
To facilitate access and gain inductive insights into migration practices, I engaged in 
approximately five hundred hours of participant observation as a volunteer at a migrant 
shelter about mid-point along the route through Mexico.59 I also accompanied 
unauthorized migrants on a sixteen-hour segment of their journey atop a freight train 
through southern Mexico. Finally, I interviewed activists, residents of the local Mexican 
community, government officials and others about their interactions with migrants.  In 
Mexico, I conducted one hundred twenty-two interviews with one hundred seven 
participants. The fieldwork along the route through Mexico enriched the initial 
community-based project by documenting ongoing processes of individual movement 
and social change along the route. 
                                                        
59 In my capacity as a shelter volunteer, I registered several hundred migrants, administering 
the shelter intake questionnaire about migrants’ hometown, nationality, marital status, 
educational background and experiences of human rights violations. I also taught English, 
administered a survey of sexual health for the shelter, cooked, cleaned, drove people to the 
hospital, assisted with security at the gate during the arrival of migrants, accompanied a 
migrant to file a legal complaint, distributed food and hygiene supplies, collaborated with 
activists, answered the telephone, arranged Skype calls, attended staff meetings and performed 
a variety of other small tasks. 
   
200  
In the final fieldwork stage, I interviewed sixteen migrants and family members along 
routes through the United States. Following the stories of migrants and specific 
individuals with whom I remained in contact from previous fieldwork, as well as forming 
a few new contacts with Central American immigrant communities, I made short, 
targeted trips to Texas, California and New York. Interviews in these locales included 
questions about the migrants’ and family members’ perception of the risks of their 
journey, as well as discussion of their home and receiving community migration history, 
the sources of information accessed about the route and the ways they fund or discuss the 
journey with would-be migrants who might be coming after them. I had the opportunity 
to make only one afternoon visit to a safe house through which a smuggling network 
moves people within the United States (9/23/11).60 
The flow of information and re-imagination of the route in the immigrant enclaves 
within the U.S. constrains migrant decisions in transit. Migrants must maintain contact 
with friends and relatives in the destination communities. During my fieldwork in 
Mexico, migrants complained that even after they become aware of dangers in the route, 
they could not change their travel plans because family members waiting in the 
destination limited funding. For example, if kidnappings or police raids are occurring on 
the train, the migrant can only switch to a more expensive form of travel or a new 
arrangement with a different smuggler if family and friends in the US wire money. If they 
cannot convince family members in the destination of the urgent need for more funding, 
the migrants cannot adjust their plans even though they now realize they are in danger; 
migration strategies thus become relatively inflexible. These final interviews provided                                                         
60 I mention this visit to emphasize how transnational unauthorized routes extend within the 
United States. 
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insights into how people in the destination and along the routes through the United States 
participate in the social processes of transit.  
Mapmaking: An Unexpected Artwork  
I supplement participant observation and semi-structured interviews with mapmaking 
workshops. Elisabeth J. Wood (2003) used mapmaking workshops in an ethnographic 
analysis of the collective memory of Salvadoran peasant resistance. Building on a 
tradition of cognitive mapping (Lynch 1960; Powell 2010; Seyer-Ochi 2006), I use 
similar mapmaking workshops to achieve a slightly different ethnographic goal than 
Wood (2003).  While I also examined the construction of social memory, I sought to 
understand the construction of the social imagination.  For that reason, in the two 
Salvadoran home communities where I worked, I asked would-be migrants to imagine 
and draw a map of the route they expected to travel. Returned migrants were asked to 
remember and draw a map of the route they had taken. Twenty-two people completed the 
exercise.61  
At its best, visual ethnography is a largely inductive process (Edgar 2001).  
Therefore, I conscientiously permitted participants to determine the content and form of 
the “maps”. I loosely followed Tovi Fenster’s (2009) three-step structure.  First, I 
conducted a semi-structured interview that took place over several hours or several days.  
At the end of this interview, I explained the mapping project and asked if they would 
participate.  People who chose to participate then mapped their memory or imagination of 
the route in a workshop, either with me present or alone, depending on their preference.                                                          61 Unfortunately, I could not display all of the maps or images collected during research in this dissertation. However, the entire set is available for viewing upon request, and a future publication will showcase them.  
   
202  
A final interview centered on the map, in which participants were asked to explain the 
story depicted in their map and their artistic choices. 
Beyond simple information, the illustrations drawn by migrants convey the images that 
underlie the migratory social imaginary. David MacDougall (1997) argues that visual 
communication may be a “language metaphorically and experientially close” to human 
experience (cited in Powell 2010).  In other words, migrants drew what Ingrid Seyer-Ochi 
(2006, p.170) calls a ‘lived landscape’, which is also a ‘layered landscape’ with levels of 
meaning shaped by both natural processes and human practices and connected by shared 
images.   
Migrants’ interpretations of the meaning of a ‘map’ were particularly intriguing. When I 
originally devised the mapmaking workshops, I had expected the maps to be visual 
representations of the physical terrain of the route. I initially thought that the maps would 
convey the topographical information available to migrants in their home communities, and I 
expected to observe differences in the accuracy of the maps that would indicate which groups 
of migrants are most vulnerable to exploitation en route. I naively expected that maps would 
reveal whether migrants from different communities, religions, political parties or genders had 
“better” information about the locations of dangers and opportunities along the route.  
No such systematic differences in informational resources can be gleaned from an analysis 
of the maps that I collected. The sample size is small, and it includes maps made by migrants 
with varying levels of migration experience, ranging from those who had never travelled to 
people who had made multiple journeys. Common themes in the maps emerge across all 
maps, but no clear patterns linked to the social attributes of their makers can be detected 
among them. Finally, the maps do much more than simply convey information. Instead, the 
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migrants’ maps give us both the reason and means to rethink the nature of information under 
conditions of uncertainty, delving deeper into the relationship between the social imaginary 
and lived experience. 
In retrospect, I had taken the meaning of a map for granted. Migrants transformed maps 
into artwork that conveys both their hopes and memories. These maps can be read as a 
political performance: a form of protest against immigration policies and violent crimes 
viewed as injustice. As such, many maps dramatically diverged from my initial expectation 
that migrants would draw strictly geographical representations of the route. Instead, they 
interwove the normative aspects of the social imaginary into the material practices of 
migration. This method thereby reveals the ‘mental maps’ (Migdal 2004) that organize the 
perceived relationship between space and social belonging; it shows where migrant maps self-
consciously converge and diverge from the official maps that cut space into discrete nation-
states.  In so doing, it reveals how ‘cognitive maps’ link to ‘tacit knowledge’ such that it 
“enables knowledge to move” for the purpose of navigation (Watson-Verran and Turnball 
1995, p.126). 
In the two Salvadoran communities, most would-be migrants and returned migrants with 
whom I spoke do not use written maps during their daily lives, nor did they plan to use a map 
to navigate their journey north. Migrants instead rely on human guides to negotiate the spatial 
and social geography of the journey. Migrants who cannot afford guides rely on word of 
mouth from other migrants and more experienced travel companions, and they learn how to 
travel north by travelling and encountering new objects and terrain.  Converging en masse on 
freight train yards in southern Mexico as a site for both information and transportation, 
Central American migrants literally take the journey one step at a time.  Following Mexican 
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migrants along routes into and through the United States, Ted Conover (1987, p.118) 
observed the same mode of travel:   
As the sun was setting I asked to see a map; soon it would be too dark to read.  But they didn’t 
have one.  “Excuse me?  No Map?” Emilio shrugged.  Maximo shook his head. Twenty-five 
hundred miles without a map?  “We know how to go”, said Maximo, in gentle reproach.  
“We’ve done it before.” 
 
Like these Mexican migrants, Central American migrants learn through the experience. 
The migrant maps took a wide variety of forms, expressing diverse interpretations of distance, 
each commensurate with the unique experience of the participant. Some mapmakers only felt 
comfortable narrating during the drawing.  In the absence of a verbal narrative, some 
mapmakers felt unable to remember what had happened; they could not figure out where to 
start drawing unless we could talk during the exercise. Once they began to draw, the migrants 
sometimes visualized the missing segments of the narrative and added stories that they had 
previously skipped. In this context, talking and mapping are co-constitutive means of 
remembering, not just expression. Maps do not just illustrate the memory; they are 
constructed by the narrative and remembering, and vice versa. This information, whether 
conveyed visually or verbally, does not exist outside the practice of telling. Information and 
practice must be interwoven during experience, imagination and memory.   
Other mapmakers only felt comfortable working alone, keeping the process of recollection 
or imagination a secret until they could emerge with the “correct” account of their story. Some 
participants said that they needed time to collect their thoughts and remember correctly what 
had happened before their interview or mapmaking session. In Erving Goffman’s (1959) 
terminology, mapmaking occurred “backstage”, illustrating how the presentation of the map 
during an interview represented a carefully crafted “performance”.   
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Finally, some mapmakers understood the exercise as an individual task, while others 
permitted family members and friends contribute. I left the decision whether to collaborate or 
work individually to the migrants.  The contribution of friends and family did not alter the 
mapmakers’ claims to authorship of the resulting artwork. The level of social engagement 
during the process varied substantially, depending upon the mapmakers’ confidence in his/her 
companions, and the mapmakers’ perceived need for technical assistance. In this manner, the 
migration mapping exercise, while foreign to participants, parallels other migratory social 
activities, as migrants balance the need for privacy and trust on the one hand and information 
availability and openness on the other.   
A few maps took the form of collages, with only a loose relationship between distance and 
events. A few maps seemed like prototypes for board games, with a path weaving its way 
back and forth across various obstacles or safe places on the page. Other maps took the form 
of a time-line or storyboard, with no reference to distance at all, simply the order of events.  
Some maps were a simple array of dots and lines on the page. One mapmaker drew a single 
manger scene and explained that her trip could be understood in the biblical story of Mary and 
Joseph searching for a home to have their baby: 
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Figure 5.1: Migrant Map: We are all Pilgrims  
 
This map illustrates the story of her family (5/7/10; 5/20/10). They left El Salvador in May 1985, 
when she was fourteen years old. The guerillas had tried to forcefully recruit her brother, and the 
entire family fled. She travelled on a Mexican visa by airplane to Tijuana. But there, the nightmare 
began. The smugglers hired to take them across the U.S. border separated young women from their 
parents in the safe house. Her father rescued her, insisting that the family must stay together, though 
he risked being killed to do it. She was willing to participate in the mapmaking workshop, because 
“it is important that people know what people are suffering and that they should be treated better”. 
She chose to draw her journey as a nativity scene, because she has been an Evangelical Christian 
since her childhood, and she always thought of the story of Jesus. “Mary had no good place to have 
her child” and in the journey through Mexico, “You cannot forget God”. She thought Mary and 
Joseph must have suffered as her family did. 
 
Finally, some maps resembled conventional ‘maps’ with a clear spatial orientation and 
geographical markers. Two of these mapmakers consulted existing maps in my presence.  The 
first, a long-time resident of the United States, checked an atlas to ensure that he remembered 
“correctly”.  The second, an employee in the local mayor’s office who was interviewed in his 
place of work, asked an assistant to print various maps from Google Maps to ensure that the 
locations and names of towns were accurate.  Interestingly, both these returned migrants are 
relatively active in local politics and engage the local extensions of the state bureaucracy 
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almost daily.  The atlas-user is an aspiring local politician and community activist, while the 
other is a local government appointee.   
Some mapmakers drew elaborate symbols that represent values; for example, in one 
potent image, a mapmaker illustrated an upturned hand holding bread, symbolizing how God 
provides daily bread and migrants follow His will by searching for it: 
Figure 5.2: Migrant Map: Our Daily Bread 
 
 
The artist began the explanation of his artwork by pointing at the picture of a hand holding bread 
(2/24/10). This represents the daily bread of Christ; “God gives you bread, but you must go out to look 
for it.” By migrating, he was obeying the will of God. Near the extended hand is a picture of crying 
faces with a dream of home and bread. They cry because he must leave his family to help them. There 
is a small wall separating Guatemala and Mexico to symbolize the level of difficulty in passing the 
border. At that point in the journey, he had a sense of adventure. In Mexico, he drew guns to 
symbolize drugs and delinquency. The U.S.-Mexico border looms larger on the page than the 
Guatemala-Mexico border, because it is more dangerous and difficult to cross. At that point in the 
journey, he felt the mixture of happiness and sadness, because he knew it was a point of no return. If 
he succeeded, he would never be able to come home again, and he wondered if he would ever see his 
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family again. He drew day on one side of the map and night on the other side of the map to illustrate 
how happiness and sadness, good and evil, get all mixed together during the journey. During the 
journey, there is no ethical or emotional clarity.   
 
This subset of more conventional maps illustrates national borders and landmarks, as well 
as locations of personal challenges and home.  Colors also play an important role in several of 
the maps.  In one map, a color code represents the different emotions experienced while 
traversing the terrain. The same person who drew the provocative daily bread image (see 
figure 5.2) also drew black dollar signs in Mexico, as opposed to the green dollars at home 
and the U.S., to illustrate the moral “dirtiness” of the activities to earn money there. In one 
example, the mapmaker, imagining the way forward, used only dark colors in order to 
represent how uncertain and ominous the journey seemed at its outset. For two mapmakers 
who imagined the journey, mountains concealed the future, emphasizing a sense of 
uncertainty by obscuring the view of what the journey might be like or where it might end: 
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Figure 5.3: Migrant Map: To Travel is Something Ugly 
 
The artist was a young woman who sells Avon. It is a dangerous job, because she rode the Salvadoran 
buses laden with expensive goods to sell. Given the risk of being robbed and losing the investment or 
pressed for exorbitant extortion fees to operate, small time entrepreneurship in El Salvador requires 
great courage. Nevertheless, the young woman said she lacked the courage to make the journey to the 
United States. In truth, she simply could not imagine herself traveling “in that way”; unauthorized 
migration requires too much walking, too much hardship. Her uncle left during the war. He was the 
first in the family to go. Her brother-in-law also went in the 1980s without a coyote. Then, four 
siblings followed. Each journey was more harrowing than the next. First, her sister went to the United 
States in 1998. It took eight days. Her journey was comfortable and secure. Second, in 1999 or 
thereabouts, her brother made the trip. But he had to cross the desert with a girl with a broken foot, and 
it was harder than her sister had remembered. Third, in 2002, another sister went to the United States. 
Her travel group was split in two, separated for the fifteen-day voyage. The adventure had become 
much more difficult by that time. Her sister had to ride in a tiny boat, saw many little animals, and she 
had to walk long distances. In March 2006, her fourth sibling made the journey. This brother had to 
cross the desert by foot, and it took him three attempts to arrive before he succeeded. Now with the 
deportations within the United States, no one feels secure after arrival anymore. Her brother might 
come home soon.  She does not lack the opportunity to go. Her brothers have promised her help and 
she knows whom to ask, but “to travel is something ugly”. In her map she chose dark colors to 
symbolize a sense of foreboding. She does not like to walk. There are animals. The ocean symbolizes 
danger. There is a train and quicksand, and even the sun is not brilliant. A tall mountain obscures the 
way forward. When she drew this image, she did not expect to leave home (3/28/10).  
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Figure 5.4: Migrant Map: Maybe A Path Forward? 
 
The artist was a young woman who worked in a tourist café near the beach (3/28/10, 4/19/10). When 
she agreed to make the map, she had already begun to plan her journey. A first brother had been in the 
United States for a long time, and a second brother had left recently, followed by a sister the month 
before our interview. They told her about the journey, that it was very hard. But the most recent 
brother had a better coyote than the first one, and they thought it was safe enough for their sisters to 
follow. Nevertheless, imagining the journey proved to be a daunting task for the young woman, and 
she delivered the map with an explanation that she had changed her mind. It was too dangerous to 
travel the route. In her map, dangerous animals line the trail, symbolizing the risks of the crossing. A 
mountain looms ominously in the distance, obscuring the path forward. The journey is uncertain. And 
she had heard about a new U.S. law that makes it impossible to work if you have no papers. Months 
later, however, I received word that the artist had undertaken the journey after all. She gave birth to a 
daughter in Texas.  
Migrant Maps: An Expression of a Transnational Imaginary 
Some scenes depicted in the maps express a transnational imaginary shaped by printed 
publications, radio and television broadcasts and artistic communications. Taken together, 
Arjun Appadurai (1990, p.9) calls these images “the mediascape”. From this perspective, the 
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Bible has informed a transnational mediascape in the Americas since the arrival of the 
Spaniards over five hundred years ago. The maps drawn by migrants show that both biblical 
and popular media representations of the migratory route shape expectations and 
interpretations of experience. Migrants encounter songs, movies, radio reports and television 
news programs about the route before, during and after their journey. Migrants post updates 
and images of the route on Facebook.62   
Popular Influences 
Song becomes a prism through which Central Americans interpret their migration 
experiences and identity. In a study of popular music in El Salvador, including both the 
corridos tradition that has migrated south from Mexico and recent developments in Central 
American hip-hop, Roxana Martel and Amparo Marroquín (2007) argue that songs narrate the 
reasons for migration, and they recount the dangers and social roles that would-be migrants 
expect to encounter along the route. Corridos are ballads, often with rebellious narratives 
about heroes, martyrs, smugglers, outlaws and migrants, that have engaged in a popular 
dialogue about Mexican migration, shaping the public imagination of the dangers and players 
in that drama (Sheridan 2009, p.138-141). In Central America, popular music is also a source 
of information about the route.  
This oral art form is also a dynamic means for migrants to re-imagine the journey en route, 
as well as at home. As people travel, they discover and adapt new ways to express themselves. 
Migrants play songs on borrowed guitars in migrant shelters. They write lyrics or perform rap                                                         
62 When I first arrived in El Salvador in 2008, cybercafés were opening in rural El Salvador and I 
introduced a few Salvadoran friends to facebook to keep in touch. When I returned in 2009, the 
number of cybercafés had increased, and many young Salvadorans had accounts on alternative 
networking sites. Along the route in 2010, I watched migrants learn about facebook and the internet in 
shelters and in cybercafés across Mexico. Today, facebook has become a virtual mural of the route 
with photos and songs posted by activists, migrants and even smugglers.   
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music that they upload to YouTube or Facebook, crowding around computers in shelters and 
cybercafés along the route to share their compositions. They raise their voices to praise God 
and ask for His protection along the route. Central American migrant youth write hip-hop 
lyrics with social critique of their plight and then publish them online. The style of these 
amateur videos and songs both mimics and innovates upon commercial hip hop artists from 
across Latin America, such as the Puerto Rican duo Calle 13, who sing about the injustices 
confronting this generation of nomadic young people. It describes the experience of those who 
must travel north “without a route” and “without a map” (lyrics to the 2007 song Pa’l Norte, 
“To the North”).  
In their lyrics, hip hop artists, like Calle 13, sometimes explicitly threaten the corrupt 
authorities that exploit migrants. For example, one young Nicaraguan man, travelling north 
with his wife and newborn baby, performed a rap about the murder of ‘the 72’ for me 
(fieldnotes 11/16/10); in an expression of transnational solidarity with other migrants from the 
region, the song warns Mexicans not to “fuck with Central Americans”. He had also posted it 
on youtube in Arriaga, Chiapas after performing it for a Salvadoran consular official there. 
Like the painters of the murals that decorate the route, these amateur musicians perform their 
art to fortify themselves in the face of uncertain danger and collectively re-imagine their 
purpose in opposition to the state and other violent actors.  
Despite the emergence of an innovative hip-hop music scene in Central America, migrants 
most commonly mentioned the influence of the more traditional Mexican corridos band 
Tigres del Norte when discussing how they understood their journey. The band’s lyrics 
highlight the everyday heroism of migrants and coyotes confronting the dangers and racism, 
and their social critique extends to the plight of non-Mexican migrants (Sheridan 2009, p.141-
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148). Consider the lyrics of their most famous song in Central America, Tres Veces Mojado 
(1988, Three Times a Wetback): “A Mexican takes two footsteps, and he is already here, 
today they deport him and the next day he is returned. This is a luxury that I do not have”. The 
Salvadoran migrant of the song must cross three borders to arrive in the United States, and the 
lyrics narrate his ordeal. 
Salvadoran migrants frequently relate this song as an accurate depiction of their 
experiences. It provides them with a framework for understanding the journey, and given its 
widespread renown in transnational popular culture, it also functions as a structure through 
which they can communicate their experiences, hopes and fears with a wide audience. In El 
Salvador, a man contemplating whether he should undertake the journey asked me to sit and 
watch the classic film based on that song with him, using it to express his own trepidation 
about migration. The Tigres del Norte produced and starred in this movie version of Tres 
Veces Mojado in 1989. It is an adventure story about a Salvadoran man crossing Mexico that 
ends with the death of a friend in the desert and his capture by the U.S. border patrol. 
Alongside the more recent Sin Nombre (Without a Name 2009), it is a cult classic.  
Several migrants discussed how Sin Nombre had impacted their expectations for the 
journey. The film is a tale of a young man who pays the ultimate price to save a migrant girl 
from his own gang as they ride the boxcars north. A Honduran man en route to the United 
States (Ixtepec 3/5/11) explains how the movie informed his fear of the train: 
I was thinking about this movie while crossing the river, and when I saw the tracks I 
thought, “this is where things started to go wrong.”   
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Similarly, at home in El Salvador, a different young man, still considering whether or not 
to embark on his journey, explained that Sin Nombre inspired some of the images that he drew 
in his map of the route he planned to take:  
Figure 5.5: Migrant Map: A Journey Without a Name63  
 
The artist’s father’s former smuggler had been harassing the family (2/7/10; 2/11/10; 2/17/10). His 
father had failed to pay the remainder of his debt and still owed $3,000 for his journey. His father was 
not going to pay. In the United States, his father had found another woman and no longer answered his 
family’s calls. The young man thought he might need to migrate to pay his father’s debts. The                                                         
63 This map and several other maps in the collection show signs of water damage and mud. I 
stored the maps in the house where I was living in El Salvador during fieldwork, but our 
humble home was struck by a flash flood. On this occasion, several homes in the community 
were destroyed, but no one was killed. Natural disasters, such as flash floods, earthquakes, 
sink holes and mud slides, occur frequently in rural Central America, and it does not take a 
hurricane to throw a rural community into disarray. The damage sustained by the maps marks 
them as historical documents, produced in a context of uncertainty and precariousness. The 
mud on the edges of this map tells a story about the conditions of life in rural El Salvador, 
which my family experienced first-hand when we lost most of our belongings in the flood. I 
had only the most severely damaged maps restored by a professional conservator. The rest of 
them visually testify to the documents’ harrowing escape from the river that engulfed the 
neighborhood. 
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smuggler was losing his patience. Six or eight months prior, the smuggler sent a letter with a threat. 
Then, one of the smuggler’s five men visited the house. They were given one more year to pay, but the 
smuggler’s man warned that something horrible would happen if they did not. He explained that it was 
not just the smuggler demanding payment. He had a business and must pay many other contacts. In the 
absence of the father, the family must pay. It could be worse; the young man knew someone who lost 
his car and his house after taking a loan from a smuggler. As he considered his own impending 
journey, the young man imagined the route through the movie Sin Nombre. He thought it is an accurate 
portrayal of the reality of migration, because it fit the stories he had heard from friends and on the 
news. He said that the idea of the truck came from a Tigres del Norte song. Despite having immediate 
plans to leave town within weeks, the young man did not travel to the United States during my time in 
contact with him. Instead, he continued to work in the tourist industry along the coast. Decisions to 
leave are fluid, and not everyone who thinks they will go ultimately leaves, even when their reasons to 
migrate seem compelling and urgent. This artist participated in the workshop, because he thought the 
activity of drawing the route might clarify his own choice for him. 
 
In a surreal turn of events, one returned Salvadoran migrant described a harrowing ordeal 
in which kidnappers forced him to watch Sin Nombre while in captivity in Mexico: 
Figure 5.6: Migrant Map: Kidnapping and a Movie  
 
In this map, we see the river that marks the border between Guatemala and Mexico. The young man 
then boarded the train. At the end of his journey, he wandered into the wilderness in an area where he 
expected to be caught by Mexican migration officials. At that point, he had given up hope of arriving 
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in the United States and wanted to be deported home. The final image in the right hand corner of the 
map is the facility where he was detained by migration officials before they returned him. 
 
The lean, dark skinned young man who drew the above map left town in 2009 with three 
brothers, an uncle and friends from the cities of San Miguel and La Libertad. They did not 
have a professional guide, but one person had experience traveling the route. He was 19 years 
old at the time. He felt both exhilaration and sadness at the outset of the journey. In the 
western bus terminal in Guatemala, he heard a song that says, “when I came from my land El 
Salvador” [Tres Veces Mojado]. The lyrics about suffering during the journey triggered a 
melancholy.  “The majority of people suffer”, he told me, “with a guide, it is more secure, but 
people still suffer.” 
On the train in southern Mexico, he encountered an armed group that he thinks were the 
Zetas, a cartel notorious for its brutality toward Central American migrants crossing their 
territory. They told him to give them $300 to board the freight train, but they lied; “They do 
not help you board the train.” He refused to pay, and they robbed him. They kidnapped him 
and his travel companions. They spent three days in captivity, while the kidnappers asked for 
the phone numbers of family members in the United States. But neither he nor his friends had 
anyone in the United States who could pay a ransom. They escaped in the night by removing 
some wood siding from the house and running away in the darkness. First, they fled to Grupo 
Beta, a detail of the Mexican National Institute of Migration (INM) with a humanitarian 
mission to aid migrants in distress, but they were turned away.64 Instead, Grupo Beta gave 
them the address of a Catholic Church with a shelter. So, they went next to the Catholic 
Church in Tenocique, Tobasco where the priest helped them escape.                                                           
64 The Mexican government launched Grupo Beta in 1996, first to help Mexican migrants in 
the northern border zone with the U.S. and then expanded to serve Central American migrants 
(García 2006, p.160). 
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In an ironic twist of fate, his kidnappers had forced him to watch the movie Sin Nombre 
during his captivity. They warned him that the route is dangerous, and they played the movie 
for him and his friends before they had escaped. The movie is the story of a young man who 
betrays his gang to save a Honduran immigrant girl on the way to the United States; he dies at 
the climax of the film, shot by his former friends while she crosses the Rio Bravo. Although 
the lean young man has no idea why his kidnappers wanted him to see it or what message they 
had hoped to send, the film still had an emotional impact. His map not only echoes his own 
experience, but the images from the movie. “The movie”, he told me, “captures the reality”. 
As bandits and migrants perform common knowledge scripts and roles along the route, 
experience itself also echoes the movie. 
Like stories of returned migrants, none of these movies or songs has an unambiguous 
happy ending. Even in stories of redemption, like Sin Nombre, media depictions of the route 
share the theme of hardship, loss and persecution. Whether fiction or non-fiction, migration 
stories of redemptive suffering and endurance abound. In her discourse analysis of all major 
Salvadoran newspapers from 1985 to 2004, Marroquín (2008, p.36-38) argues that a recurring 
theme of “exodus to the promised land” shapes the imaginary of the route, such that “the 
religious element present in the popular culture was reinforced by this journalistic treatment 
that views the migrant that passes this test [of the journey] as someone that has God as a 
helper in their crossing”. While many migrants dismiss the television or newspaper reports as 
false or exaggerated, these popular religious tropes shape expectations and interpretations of 
experiences (Marroquín 2008, p. 39).  
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Biblical Themes 
Given the small sample size, it is difficult to make generalizations based on categories of 
maps and mapmakers. Nonetheless, one theme is unmistakably evident across maps and their 
stories: the symbolism and religious imagery in the artwork reveal how migrants connect their 
experience to a larger normative critique of political and economic structures. The 
pervasiveness of Christianity is not surprising, of course. Jacqueline Maria Hagan (2008) 
documents the multiple ways that religion and faith influence Central American migratory 
journeys and how migrants interact with the “sacred geography of Mexico”. First, organized 
religion provides sanctuary along the route with a system of shelters and social networks 
(Hagan 2008, p.163-164). Second, everyday religious practices provide companionship in the 
face of hardship and a sense of consistency in periods of change (p.164-165). Third, religious 
faith provides a lens through which migrants can make sense of the experience, and it 
provides a sense of belonging under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, Hagan notes that the 
journey transforms and often reaffirms faith (p.167-168).  
The Bible provides a transnational normative orientation that structures interactions 
among strangers. It also facilitates the dialogue between activists and the public they hope to 
persuade. From the Bible, migrants and activists draw metaphors, archetypes and authority. 
Indeed, the prevalence of religious expression also signals the role of religion as a “common 
language” of the route (Vogt 2012, p.164). References to God and faith become interspersed 
in everyday speech, permeating expression and making encounters between strangers 
intelligible, if not always blindly trusted. The vast majority of Central American migrants 
identify as Evangelical Christian or Catholic (Hagan 2008). However, religiosity bubbles up 
in conversation, even when migrants do not worship in an organized Church. For example, a 
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Honduran man described his migration strategy as a constant awareness of the fact that “there 
is only one God”. He frequently described his path forward as constituted by God’s will, but 
he admitted that “It’s too hard to be a Christian…. I just like God a lot” (Ixtepec, 12/3/10). 
Whether they practiced a sort of everyday spirituality or institutionalized worship, migrants 
repeatedly urged me to turn to the bible to understand their plight: 
Look at the bible. It says that here we are homeless. We don’t have a place. Pilgrims. 
Of all that we are conscious, but one of the things we want is to be stable in a place. 
That has made us migrate (returned migrant, El Salvador, 5/7/10).65 
 
Indeed, the Bible provides a justification for migration and a framework through which to 
claim the illegitimacy of migration control. It provides the archetypes for the migration 
narrative, as well as moral authority for claims to a right to migrate, conditional on accordance 
with these biblical archetypes and allegories. One elderly Salvadoran man (El Salvador, 
2/1/10) had watched both his children and grandchildren suffer in the route. He had paid 
thousands of dollars in ransoms to kidnappers to release them, and then he had received one 
son deported home from the United States despite being married to a U.S. citizen. The old 
man explained the justification for his anger: 
The United States is an ingrate… Latin Americans have built the buildings and 
worked very hard. They contribute to the country and the United States treats them 
this way. The US has no right to treat honest people this way. I understand that the 
United States must deport and should deport people who cause problems, delinquents. 
But it should not treat workers this way. The United States has no right. God gave the 
planet to humanity, not to the US. Read the bible and you will understand.  
 
In this quote, the he recognizes the contributions of Central Americans to the U.S. 
economy. In an oft-repeated argument, he reasons that their identity as workers, as opposed to 
                                                        
65 These quotes convey a strikingly similar attitude to the Ecuadorian immigrants interviewed 
by David Kyle and Christina A. Siracusa (2005).  
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criminals, entitles them to respectful treatment.66 A Honduran man en route to the United 
States (Ixtepec 4/14/11) lucidly expressed a similar attitude, but roots his claim in the false 
social construction of race and nationality:  
We are all blood brothers. Are we not all human? Why do we use the word migrant 
when the earth is for everyone? Why? Racism. To this I say, God created the heaven 
and earth and human beings. Why separate this land? They are earthly laws, not the 
laws of God.    
In this view, borders are manmade and ephemeral, a product of racism. However, the roles 
that migrants fulfill as workers and breadwinners for their families are eternal and egalitarian. 
Many Central American migrants do not view unauthorized migration as “criminal”, at least 
not in the eyes of a much higher authority than the state: God.   
Figure 5.7: They Treated Us Like Criminals 
                                                         
66 Amelia Frank-Vitale (2011, p.106) also documents the strict distinction between criminality 
and migration with interviews among Central American migrants en route. 
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The artist crossed Mexico by bus with his brother (1/8/10; 1/22/10; 4/30/10). He had been too scared 
to try the train. Twice they had to pay bribes to Mexican migration officials while riding the bus. Near 
Mexico City, a migration official kidnapped them and held them in an abandoned house for several 
days, until his sister sent a ransom of $800 via MoneyGram. The safe house was dirty and filled with 
the clothing of the victims who had come before them. However, they were not really frightened until 
they arrived in Nuevo Laredo. The migrant house there was filled with gang members, drug addicts 
and other criminals. During the daylight hours, the migrants must leave the shelter and brave the 
streets, filled with police and drug dealers. They waited several days for their sister in the United 
States to arrange the money, and his brother chose a smuggler who seemed to have many clients, as 
indicated by a visible crowd of people waiting for service, and a known name. The smuggler was a 
Salvadoran man working for the Mexicans. In his shop, he sold all sort of things, both legal and illegal: 
food, pirated goods, and drugs. They agreed to pay him $1400 per person to cross the border: $400 up 
front and the rest would have been due upon delivery. The migrants helped on another across the Rio 
Bravo. They walked in the desert for five days in a group of twelve: 10 migrants, 1 smuggler and 1 
smuggler’s assistant. It was cold at night, and they could not carry sufficient food. In the wilderness, a 
smuggler’s truck was supposed to meet them to bring them to Houston, but migration authorities were 
waiting instead. All the migrants were captured, but the smuggler and his assistant slipped away. The 
U.S. migration authorities treated the migrants like criminals. As the young man remembered his 
treatment at the hands of these officials, he wept at the indignity of it. He only wanted to work, and he 
has never had any problems with the law in El Salvador, but they treated him like a criminal. They put 
him in a jail uniform and threw him into a small, cold cell with fifty others. It was so crowded that 
some people slept on the floor without sheets, and the air conditioning chilled him to the bone. They 
forced him to sign forms written in English. No one translated the form that described his rights for 
him. In detention, a pastor visited the migrants for Christmas and brought bags of fruit and chocolate, 
but later that day, they were transferred to another facility. In the process, the guards made them throw 
away the gift from the Church into the garbage. To a man of so little means, such waste is a terrible 
sacrilege. He spent 2.5 months in that facility, and at the time, he had no idea how long they might 
hold him. When they first captured him, he had pretended to be Mexican. He had buried his documents 
on the Mexican side of the river before crossing, but the U.S. officials knew from his accent that he 
was Salvadoran. After seeing the facility, he became frightened that they might keep him forever, and 
he admitted to where he was from to facilitate his departure. He had been separated from his brother, 
who had attempted illegal entry for the third time and had been sent for several months to a federal 
prison. During their captivity, their mother had thought they had died in the desert. During the first 
interviews, he had sworn never to return to the route, never to experience the injustices again, but 
months later he confided that maybe he would make another attempt. 
 
Like the mapmaker whose work is showcased above, many returned migrants expressed 
shock and dismay at being “treated like criminals” by U.S. law enforcement during 
apprehension, detention (including federal prison time for repeated illegal entry), and 
deportation. As depicted in the maps, these migrants echo Kyle and Siracusa’s (2005, p.167) 
findings; the justification for their actions lies in the economic and political victimization 
which they suffer in the global political economy and home community. Migrants illustrate 
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the difficult choices made for the benefit of their family and their perceived need to adhere to 
God’s law, a universal guide for humanity that supersedes the laws of the nation-state.  
Finally, in interviews migrants often use biblical allegory to explain their journeys. In 
particular, migrants explicitly compare this exodus to the Israelites’ crossing the Red Sea. For 
example, one Salvadoran man (El Salvador, 10/7/09) explained that: 
Salvadorans are like Israelites too. They must go but they must also live God’s Way. They 
must find a way to make a community and a home and live by law. 
 
In other words, the migrants searching for economic and physical security in the United 
States, away from the growing chaos of Central America, follow a mandate from God to 
found a new community with opportunities to lead a dignified and law abiding life, even if it 
requires unauthorized migration to do so. Indeed, the rule of law in the United States is 
precisely what makes it such an attractive place for Central American migrants (Frank-Vitale 
2011, p.110). In this sense, migration is god-given, not criminal. Ironically, a U.S. migration 
official (2/9/10) with many years of experience along the border echoed this allegory: 
You don’t stop undocumented migration. People have moved since the beginning of time, 
long before there were borders. Undocumented migration goes back to biblical times… 
splitting the Red Sea… that’s basically illegal migration. 
 
Religious leaders also draw clear parallels between contemporary migration and biblical 
suffering in their sermons. They appeal to the story of the Israelites in their sermons to 
migrants at shelters along the route, and they speak adamantly about how the migrants 
embody the values of Jesus, sacrificing for their families and struggling against poverty. 
Understood in this context, migrant maps may not provide a geographical orientation, but they 
most certainly depict a normative orientation that both motivates the journey and is necessary 
for survival. This normative orientation may or may not be sincere. Religion becomes one of 
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many scripts in a transnational imaginary of the route that migrants, Samaritans and predators 
may draw upon. Faith may fluctuate over time. However, this normative orientation provides 
migrants with an important resource to communicate their suffering and position. It makes the 
experience legible to an everyday audience versed in the Bible, providing a tool for generating 
common knowledge of shared practice among strangers. For activists working along the route, 
this common language also provides a persuasive manner of representing the plight of 
migrants to the larger public. When faith is resilient, expressed clearly in the images of the 
maps, it explains much of the single-minded determination that underpins their ‘practical 
intelligence’ for navigating routes (Barnouw 2004, p.21-26).  
Migrant Maps: A Normative Framework Under Construction 
This normative framework and shared language is not simply passively received, but 
continually re-constructed before, during and after the journey. The Bible, popular music, 
movies and news stories do not simply provide information about the route; they provide 
inspiration for migrants imagining the route. As Amelia Frank-Vitale (2011, p.120) points out 
in her analysis of unauthorized migration as civil disobedience, priests and migrants 
politically interpret biblical passages, rather than simply parrot them; for example, Padre José 
Alejandro Solalinde Guerra, a prominent human rights activist and founder of the migrant 
shelter in Ixtepec, Oaxaca, preaches the gospel from Matthew 25.35 as, “I was hungry and 
you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a migrant and you housed me”, 
when the usual translation is “I was a stranger and you welcomed me” (p.120). Migrants and 
other actors along the route actively re-interpret the Bible and other sources of information, 
rather than take them as is. Whether drawn by a would-be migrant expecting the journey or a 
returned migrant remembering the journey, the maps are evidence of this conscious 
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reimagining of the route. In fact, two people explicitly declared their reason for participating 
in the exercise was a desire to systematically think about how they might undertake the 
journey.  
As people imagined the route during the mapmaking exercise, they shifted their declared 
intentions, rethinking their decision to stay or go, and thus remaking their relationship to the 
route. Some mapmakers felt overwhelmed by the journey after drawing it and expressed a 
now wavering commitment to leaving home. Others, like the man that drew the map that 
follows, felt an even greater resolve to migrate: 
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Figure 5.8: Migrant Map: The Poorest People Give the Most 
 
The man drew as he spoke. The borders are clearly demarcated. Various events and resting points 
are marked by simple x’s and squares. He indicated where the United States is, but not label it.  
 
I approached a crumbling one-room mud home at the end of a muddy path (4/11/10). 
Three men sat in the shade. I addressed the homeowner, a small muscular man with the build 
of a jockey. He sat upright on a hammock. A younger man sat on a log. At first the man on the 
log seemed interested in what I had to say, but he quietly walked away at some point. Finally, 
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the boy prepared a backpack for an outing and also took leave without saying goodbye. But 
we were not entirely alone. An old, haggard looking woman worked in the hot sun in the 
garden behind the house. She occasionally scolded an equally haggard looking dog. When I 
explained my purpose and the rules of consent, the man agreed to participate and we talked 
about his journey. I returned a few days later, and we discussed my life at great length 
(4/18/10). He asked about my sisters, their lives and their husbands. He asked whether there 
are decent jobs where they live, and he opined that my childless sister works too much. 
Family must come first. While he confidently offered advice for my sister, he was not so 
certain about his own plans for the future. His elderly mother occasionally joined the 
conversation, but I could not understand her slurred speech, probably a consequence of her 
missing teeth.   
The man carefully tore a smaller piece of paper to use from the large sheet. He did not 
want to waste.  He began by sketching the borders in orange crayon: El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Mexico. It took him awhile to figure out the correct spelling of Mexico, writing and then re-
writing the word. He did not write Estados Unidos (United States), but he pointed to where it 
would be at the top of the page.  
When he traveled in 2005, there was not a lot of kidnapping. In those days, the worst that 
could happen was theft, by officials or by thieves impersonating smugglers. Twice thieves 
impersonated guides and tricked him out of money. Each time, they took his money promising 
smuggling services and then abandoned him. The first time the man said he would take them 
all the way to the United States, but after receiving payment he disappeared. The second time, 
another man approached them in Puebla. He was very well dressed: a nice long sleeved shirt, 
blue jeans with a belt, boots and a cowboy hat. He said he had been to the United States and 
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could take them. He took them to a house for several days. Then he took them to a park in 
Mexico City. But he left them there and never came back. Another migrant said he saw the 
well-dressed man drive north without them. All together the trickery cost him about $400.  
When he made his first trip, he traveled with two other people: a brother and an uncle. 
One of his relatives had more experience than he had and helped him ride the train. He tied 
himself to the train with a belt, so that he would not fall if he fell asleep. He always traveled 
with at least one other person to keep him alert and watch for dangers, and he never saw an 
accident on the train. He has heard the stories, but he never saw a woman raped or anyone 
assaulted or murdered. 
When I asked him how he knew how to go, he told me that I must understand that no one 
is traveling alone. He spread his arms wide to illustrate the mass of people that travel along 
the train route, and then he pulled his arms inward to show them moving forward in the same 
direction. “That is how you know where to go”. A Honduran man joined his little band of 
travelers. All nationalities travel together on the train, and the Mexican people were good to 
him too. “The poorest people give the most.” The people who live near the train tracks give 
shoes, food and water: 
You do not travel alone. Your little group is not alone. You are with thousands of others. You 
meet people and little groups form. You help one another. If you do not help people, you will 
not reach your goal.  If you go in bad faith, you cannot get there. If you are hurting people, 
God will not reward you. 
 
He repeated this philosophy many times during my conversations with him. Through the 
performance of reciprocity in a burgeoning community of practice, he navigated the route. 
Ultimately, he found the migrant house in San Luis Potosi by talking to others:  
There are lots of good people traveling for the same reason: to find work. You find other 
people traveling for the same reason, not to hurt anybody, and you travel with them. 
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He crossed the border in Texas. The uncle paid for a guide at the border, a guide that a 
relative of a female migrant in the shelter had used before. It cost $1800 to cross the border 
and arrive in Houston. They crossed the wilderness. He has another uncle in Los Angeles, an 
aunt and a cousin in Houston, and third uncle in Arkansas. But they are not close enough 
family to help much. They are distant. They were close enough to pay the coyote required for 
the border crossing, but not close enough to pay the $7000 it would have cost to travel more 
safely with a coyote from his hometown to the United States: 
If you show up at the border, you can usually get someone to pay, because you have traveled a 
long distance and shown your motivation.  
 
He traveled for one day less than a month. He made his new home in Arkansas, where he 
found work. As he reviewed his map, he confused the symbols and places he has drawn, 
switching them around in conversation. He would like to return to the United States, and he is 
waiting for the economy to improve. He has heard that there is not much work in the U.S. at 
the moment, but he expects that to change. And there is still necessity in El Salvador. The last 
government, when the rightwing ARENA party ruled the presidency, had claimed that with 
the transition to the dollar, people would not need to migrate anymore. But the government 
lied. The government claimed that replacing the colon, the former Salvadoran national 
currency abandoned in 2001, with dollars would eliminate the necessity to go to the United 
States. But what you earn in El Salvador is not the same, even if it is paid in dollars. He can 
earn five to eight dollars a day in El Salvador, and he makes that much in an hour of work in 
the United States. If anything, the dollarization of El Salvador has more starkly illustrated this 
wage disparity. By the end of the mapmaking interview, he is certain he will go back, and he 
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asks if I know anyone working in construction. Our discussion and the map renewed his 
determination to remake the journey, even though the route is more dangerous than before. 
This man’s resolve to make the journey is, in part, reinforced by a belief that his 
migration is preordained by God; his journey is a form of resistance to the poverty 
aggravated by a dishonest regime in El Salvador. He willingly accepts suffering to 
achieve God’s purpose. His sense of class solidarity in the face of violence is noble and 
dangerous, but not reckless when understood through the prism of his spiritual faith. This 
normative orientation also finds expression in the artwork of the route through Central 
America, Mexico and the United States. In the shelters and public spaces along the route, 
artistically-inclined migrants and humanitarian workers have painted murals depicting the 
journey.  
Imagining the Route through Public Art: Before, During and After the Journey 
The route and the artistic expressions of its imaginary extend from Central America 
through Mexico and the United States, and back again. For example, this mural decorates the 
home of a returned migrant in El Salvador.  
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Figure 5.9: San Francisco in Rural El Salvador 
 
 I chose to tell the story of this man, because I had been intrigued by this mural which superimposes destination on origin. Bridges connect the San Francisco in the United States, on the left, with the hills of El Salvador, on the right. The story behind the mural illustrates how home and destinations become entangled over time. In some sense, the artist’s life bridges these two worlds. (Photo credit: the author.)   
The artist fled town to avoid compulsory military service during the civil war in the 1980s 
(3/29/10). He was thirteen years old, and his cousin was fourteen. His cousin was already on 
the soldiers’ list, and the following year, he would be too; “Back then, you had to pick a 
side: the guerillas or the army.” Or you had to leave. He felt bad about leaving his 
grandmother alone, but his whole family had to leave. Three sisters made the journey too.  
His mother had made the decision. She was waiting for them in the United States.  
In that epoch, it was easier to get to the United States. An uncle found them all visas for 
Mexico, and they traveled by airplane to the U.S. border. They had a layover in Mexico City, 
where his uncle was briefly, but politely, questioned by Mexican officials; they asked for the 
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bribe in a private room, rather than in front of the children. The necessity of the bribe made 
the boy feel uneasy, but mostly the journey was fun. In Tijuana, he stayed for a month with a 
Mexican woman, a friend of the family. She had a commuter visa to cross into San Diego. She 
had many children, and she took his family across pretending they were her own. First, she 
took his cousin and sister. But she took a liking to him, and let him stay with her for a bit. She 
showed him around Tijuana and taught him some English. He was happy there. When they 
crossed, the woman told the border police that she was going to do her laundry in San Diego. 
She took him to his mother in Los Angeles.   
At first, he was not happy in Los Angeles. He urged me to imagine what the village was 
like when he left it: nothing more than dirt roads and a small collection of huts. When he came 
back recently, he could not find his own house amid the new construction. But eventually the 
United States became his home, and he received a green card. Unfortunately, the lawyer who 
helped with the petition had told them to lie and say he had arrived before 1980. He was just a 
kid and did as he was told. Sometime after 2001, they summoned him. By this time, his mom 
was dead. They asked him to supply school records proving he had arrived before 1980; 
“there was nothing to do but shut my mouth.” So, they deported him. He repeated to me that 
he never committed a crime. He denied any trouble with the law, only admitting to a DUI 
(Driving Under the Influence), which most Salvadorans consider a very minor offense. When 
I met him, he had a seven-year bar from the United States, where the vast majority of his 
relatives call home. By then, his family mostly spoke English, as he preferred to speak with 
me. They are a mix of Mexican and Salvadoran, all living in California.  
Living with his beloved grandmother, he was waiting for an appointment in the capital 
city to get his tattoos removed. With faded tattoos visible on his body and face, he could not 
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travel without harassment from police or a potentially deadly misunderstanding with a gang 
member who might think he is a member of a rival clique. He was a distant cousin of most 
everyone in town, but did not find the acceptance he had among more immediate family in 
Los Angeles. In town, he was often suspected of involvement in gangs, extortion schemes and 
threats. He complained bitterly that people in El Salvador did not understand that the tattoos 
are simply considered artwork in the United States, not gang messages. When he gets the 
tattoos removed, he should be able to get a decent job speaking English in a call center in the 
capital, San Salvador. In the meantime, he had started a new family with his girlfriend, who 
also lived for a time in the United States. Eventually, when his ban against re-entry expires, 
his sisters might petition for him to return legally. If that does not come to fruition, maybe he 
will find another way home. 
When the mayor’s office held an art contest to beautify the town with depictions of local 
life, the mural of California was his entry. He did not win, but his grandmother defended his 
choice of subject by arguing that California is very much a part of small town El Salvador, 
whether anyone likes it or not. The mural conveys a transnational imaginary that gives 
meaning to migration; California superimposed in El Salvador and vice-versa. The mural is an 
artifact of mobile knowledge. It is a material trace of a learning process of information, 
imagination and improvisation that Central American migrants undertake every day; it has 
been a continuous social process since the civil war period of the 1980s, despite the escalation 
of violence along unauthorized routes through Mexico. The mural, like the man, testifies to 
the integration of the village into a transnational circulation of people and practice.  
This integration does not only weave together homes and destinations, but the entirety of 
the long winding route in-between. Murals frequently decorate the walls of migrant shelters, 
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often with a recurring set of themes that narrate the journey, drawing on themes of religion, 
transnational solidarity, sacrifice and hope: 
Figure 5.10: A Mural in a Shelter: On the Way to the Promised Land 
 
This mural decorates the wall of a migrant shelter in Tecun Uman, Guatemala. It depicts the 
crossing of the Suchiate river into Mexico by raft, as well as the train and bus. In the shadow 
of Joseph and Mary, uprooted migrants walk north through Mexico to a promised city in the 
distance, either in the United States or Canada. (Photo Credit: Encarni Pindado.) 
 
The semiotics of these murals, like those of the maps, is unambiguous. The artwork 
created by migrants challenges the legitimacy of immigration enforcement. These scenes 
empathize with the plight of migrants, compelled to follow a difficult path in Jesus’ footsteps. 
They often depict the promised cities of the north, shining and waiting for the deserving 
migrant who endures and completes the journey. The messages are decidedly cosmopolitan in 
their appeal to a larger understanding of the Americas and the globe; often showing footsteps 
trespassing borders, the destruction of borders or simply removing borders all together. The 
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artwork often depicts the suffering of the migrants through religious imagery with coffins or a 
cross. Finally, they may contain scenes that vilify immigration policing, placing state 
personnel in opposition to Jesus. In fact, such artwork is not limited to the walls of migrant 
shelters. The murals even co-opt the very spaces intended for immigration enforcement. Like 
the West German side of the Berlin Wall, the Mexican side of the U.S. border wall has 
become the medium for expressing frustration with government policies that separate 
transnational communities and put migrants in danger (Sheridan 2009, p.111-137).  
Figure 5.11: Mural in a Shelter: Jesus Deported 
 
 
This mural decorates the wall of a migrant shelter in Saltillo, Coahuila. It depicts a U.S. border 
guard marching migrants with Jesus in their ranks. (Photo Credit: the author.) 
 
Immigration enforcement is a state making practice; it entails the deployment of 
violence to control territory.  Noting the perpetually shifting boundaries between 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ violence, Charles Tilly (1985) famously compared state 
making to organized crime.  If we “see the state like a migrant” as Kyle and Siracusa 
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(2005) exhort us to do, the boundary between the legitimate violence of the state and the 
illegitimate violence of non-state actors becomes illusory.  For the unauthorized migrant, 
both criminal violence and immigration enforcement represent obstacles to be overcome 
in a preordained journey.  The boundary between state violence and criminal violence 
matters little to the migrant, who distinguishes alternative forms of violence on the basis 
of life and death, arrival and failure. Because they move to fulfill the will of God to 
provide better lives for their families, all violence, whether the legal violence of 
deportation or the illegal violence perpetrated by criminal groups, is unjust. 
This normative orientation fortifies migrants so that they can cope with both the 
uncertainty and certainties of the route. On the one hand, in the face of great uncertainty and 
danger, when the future must be trusted and success cannot be predicted, a turn to faith and 
prayer seems rational. For this reason, nearly every migrants’ preparation for the journey 
includes a spiritual component. On the other hand, the only certainty of the journey is 
suffering. Migrants fully expect to experience fear, hunger, thirst, fatigue and homesickness, 
and they understand the ever-present possibility of more extreme forms of suffering that result 
from violence: rape, torture and even death. In some sense, this inevitability of suffering 
provides a reliable means for migrants to demonstrate their courage, motivation to succeed 
and their strong desire to help their families, giving the journey meaning as a ‘rite of passage’ 
(Massey 1998). When migrants understand suffering during the journey through the lens of 
righteous sacrifice, the language of ‘best case and ‘worst case’ scenario used to describe other 
forms of rational, strategic behavior loses its meaning (Hagan 2008). Any outcome is God’s 
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will.67 Thus, the migrants’ maps illustrate an important source of their steely resolve, the 
flipside of their capacity for ingenuity in the face of great uncertainty: a belief in the higher 
justice of their journey. 
Despite the unifying theme of unjust violence and just transnational movement, the 
diversity of the maps produced by migrants underscores what Kimberly Powell (2010, p.15-
16) calls the multisensory experience of the visual. Powell succinctly summarizes the 
methodological implications of this multisensory communication: 
More than providing a sense of the physical spaces that we traverse through, maps can shed 
light on the ways in which we traverse, encounter, and construct racial, ethnic, gendered, 
and political boundaries…. Understanding the aesthetics of mapping to illuminate and 
represent critical social, cultural, and political issues might lead to powerful and vivid 
representations of places that might otherwise prove elusive, hidden, or underrepresented. 
 
In other words, mapping provides a window into a “hidden and known” social terrain.  In 
both migrant hometowns in El Salvador, people who accepted my invitation wanted to make 
the human story of migration more visible.68  People expressed a desire that U.S. citizens 
                                                        
67 Similarly, in a study of migrant perceptions of risks during pirogue (unauthorized boat) migration 
from Senegal to Europe, Maria Hernandez Carretero  (2008, p.46) finds that “The presence of 
religiosity in assessments of the probability that negative eventualities would occur during a pirogue 
journey was clear through references to spiritual preparation before one’s departure. This usually 
involved doing special prayers, seeking amulets from religious guides, performing sacrifices, or, often, 
a combination of these. Through such actions, migrants sought help and protection from God against 
risks….Risk acceptability too appears to be mediated by religiosity to the extent that my informants 
consistently framed the consequences of pirogue migration, whether positive or negative, as the result 
of God’s will. Death was presented not only…as inescapable, but also as determined by destiny 
dictated by God. A common way of expressing this among my informants was to argue that God had 
established the time of one’s death from birth, so when that moment came, one would die, whether 
aboard a pirogue or sleeping at home. This deterministic understanding of death appeared to make 
(aspiring) migrants approach the prospects of pirogue migration with a relatively fearless attitude or, 
in any case, to provide a justification for the occurrence of death.” 
68 The majority of mapmakers expressed embarrassment and unfamiliarity with the activity of 
drawing, but little sensitivity over the sharing of the information. With the exception of a few young 
artists who seemed delighted to receive the art supplies, participants preferred verbal communication 
of their stories. Older participants, in particular, expressed shame when handling a writing utensil, and 
they frequently reminded me of their ‘self-taught’ status. Most people participated despite 
embarrassment, but people who declined the invitation to make a map usually cited lack of time or 
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understand their suffering and their dreams.  Despite my protestations that my study would 
not directly influence American policy, many participants mentioned that they hoped to 
positively shape the debate over U.S. immigration policy. Migrants created these maps 
because they understood the expression of their experiences as ‘the right thing to do’.  As 
such, mapping can be understood as a form of political resistance.  Their maps convey a 
message, direct from the hands of migrants to you.  
Migrant Maps vs. Official Maps  
For this reason, it should not be surprising that migrant maps differ substantially from 
official maps.  While the state has no dreams and memories to convey, no unifying purpose, it 
still sends messages.  In his influential article, David Harley (1989, p.12) explains how 
cartography, as a form of surveillance, augments the power of the state administrative 
apparatus69. As policing tools, state officials use maps in their daily planning and 
implementation of border control and immigration policies. As propaganda, maps nationalize 
territory, naturalize borders, and thereby reinforce the legitimacy of state control over human 
movement (Black 1997; Harley 1989). Finally, as bureaucratic artifacts, state maps justify 
expenditure and express efficiency. Thus, state maps may serve a dual purpose, both 
instrumental and expressive. Drawing on Erving Goffman (1959), Peter Andreas (2000, p.9) 
argues that, “state practices shape and interact with illegal border crossings and, at the same 
time, project images and messages to various audiences concerned about such crossings.” 
                                                                                                                                                               
drawing capacity, not fear or sensitivity about the release of personal information.  Because nobody 
declined to speak to me in great detail about these topics, I suspect the embarrassment of drawing 
dissuaded them.  More people declined the invitation in the second sending community where I spent 
less time and I did not volunteer as a teacher.  In that second community, people felt less comfortable 
and less socially invested in me, because I had not developed extensive friendship networks. 
69 See also James Scott (1998) for a similar discussion of maps as tools for state administration.   
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Maps represent one such knowledge-based artifact, produced by states to interact with illegal 
border crossers and project images of control to a public audience (van Schendel 1995, p.42). 
However, impeding unauthorized migration is not the only purpose of ‘official’ maps; 
some official maps, created by a public-private partnership, seek to protect unauthorized 
migrants.  Thanks to concerted effort by many concerned volunteers, researchers and public 
authorities, many maps are available to migrants along the route.  Catholic shelters, and other 
institutions that serve migrants in passage and advocate for their rights, have devised their 
own maps to locate human rights violations and warn migrants of the dangers.  These maps 
can be found in murals, presentations, posters and handouts along the shelter system that runs 
the course of the unauthorized route through Mexico.   
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Figure 5.12: Map of Risks 
 
A map of risks, on display at a migrant shelter, warns migrants about the dangers in the desert and the 
locations where many assaults have been reported along the route through Mexico. The map also 
shows the location of migrant shelters. 
 
Along the routes through Mexico, migrant shelters, academics, human rights organizations 
and the Mexican National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH), a government agency 
charged with monitoring and documenting human rights abuses, coordinate the production of 
educational maps for migrants. In the effort to make human rights violations visible to an 
international public, Amnesty International (2010) published a map of the route based on 
research by Rodolfo Casillas in its report. These institutional actors also use maps to raise 
public awareness of the plight of migrants and heighten a sense of humanitarian crisis.  The 
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former goal is instrumental, while the latter goal is expressive.  The two goals often co-exist 
in the same artifact. 
As for their value as a navigational instrument, some migrants request maps from shelters 
to orient themselves en route. Nevertheless, most information passes through word-of-mouth 
and experience. To the extent that the social terrain is dynamic, with shifting dangers, maps 
can have only limited value for avoiding violence. The maps may provide a general 
orientation, but a route planned by map alone cannot guarantee safe arrival in the United 
States. Many migrants arrive safely without ever referring to a conventional map. 
The more obvious the shelters and routes become on maps, the more visible and thus more 
vulnerable migrants become to police and criminal victimization. As they become visible to a 
larger public and their locations become common knowledge, shelters and routes acquire a 
dual purpose: serving both unauthorized migrants and those who would hunt for them.  The 
resulting struggle over information about and within these locations becomes an important 
factor in determining migrant survival.  While a map may guide people to essential resources, 
following a trail marked on the map increases vulnerability; well-trodden clandestine terrain 
thus draws more predators than novel routes.  From this perspective, resources provided in 
fixed locations do not necessarily generate certainty, but can exacerbate risk.   
In the global illegal economy, places become a politically contentious site for gathering 
information with important consequences for human security along the routes.  The 
consequences of this struggle often cut both ways, with publicity facilitating both protection 
and victimization. In this case, the visual language of migrant maps illustrates a profound 
schism between their perspective of dangers and the regulatory perspective of institutions that 
interact with them depicted on conventional maps. The migrant imagination and 
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institutionalized imagination of illegal migratory routes cannot be reconciled because they 
present such radically different contour lines of experience: individual vs. aggregate.  The 
migrant imagination and experience cannot be rendered ‘legible’ in the aggregate. James Scott 
(1998, p.11) argues that the state requires a schematic form of knowledge, facilitated by a 
process of simplification. This knowledge simultaneously provides an overall but narrow 
vision of the social world through the aggregation of standardized, and hence stylized, facts 
(p.11).  In the absence of this knowledge, the state cannot “see” society. In this way, legibility 
enables central state security functions.  
Like the pantheon of Greek Gods that disharmoniously alternated between obstructing and 
facilitating the journey of Odysseus, the various agencies of the state often work at cross-
purposes.  The image of the state as a unified actor is belied by the sometimes complementary 
and sometimes contradictory nature of state practice at the lowest bureaucratic levels (Gupta 
1995; Migdal 2001; Migdal 2004, p.20-22).  For example, the Mexican National Commission 
for Human Rights (CNDH) monitors and frequently denounces both the official policies and 
unofficial practices of the Mexican National Institute for Migration (INM).70  Even within the 
same state agency, we find paradoxical missions.  For example, immigration enforcement 
agencies in both the United States and Mexico explicitly seek to protect unauthorized 
migrants from harm (through the dissemination of educational materials, the deployment of 
special teams with medical and humanitarian training, etc) but also attempt to deter those 
same migrants by increasing the risks of unauthorized travel. Meanwhile, corrupt immigration 
authorities have created their own practices for the purpose of their own personal enrichment 
that conflict with both of these official missions, accepting bribes that impair the capacity of                                                         
70 See for example, the two recent CNDH reports (2010; 2011) on migrant kidnappings. 
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the state to control unauthorized movement through its territory while physically assaulting 
and threatening migrants with bodily harm.  
At the intersection of these practices, lower level officials in the state bureaucracy develop 
their own lived experience of the routes as they interact with migrants on a daily basis. As 
explained by a U.S. migration official, recalling his days on line duty with the border patrol 
(2/9/10): 
But people develop a sense. It’s like at the border. The agents can see a car coming from half 
a mile away. Maybe the mannerisms are just not right. It’s just that something doesn’t feel 
right. The agents have a difficult time articulating the probable cause. They just know who to 
stop. 
 
At this point in the interview, I stopped him to venture a guess about the feeling he was 
describing, “We might call it tacit knowledge?” But he laughed at my idea, “In law 
enforcement, we call it profiling.” Whatever we call it, Michael Kenney (2007) rightly 
identifies highly inductive and immersive police activities that require interpretation, such as 
undercover work, as “sensemaking”: a means of creating metis-like knowledge for the 
purpose of law enforcement (p. 83-88). However, in the practices that embody the knowledge 
these policing activities produce about the routes, the boundaries between state and societal 
actors become blurred. Individuals pass seamlessly between official and unofficial roles. 
This view challenges Scott’s (1998) oversimplified monolithic understanding of the state 
(Hibou 2004).  As Joel S. Migdal (2004) explains: 
These practices depict a state that is composed of diverse fragments, whose parts often operate 
in divergent ways.  Such practices conflicting with the image of the state, then, are not just 
quirky exceptions to the rule, corruption or criminality that can simply be eliminated by better 
policing techniques.  No, the diverse fragments represent spatial logics different from that 
implied in the state’s image.  The struggles representing the most important social dynamics 
in today’s world are found at the crux of these contending mental maps (p.22). 
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In these conflicting practices and spatial logics, the state attempts to impose multiple 
orders on society.  However, in an important way, all state and other institutions are blind to 
the world of migrant experience.  The institutional imagination of migratory routes hovers 
above the everyday practices of human mobility, including the everyday practices of policing 
human mobility experienced by state personnel. As illustrations of fixed resources and 
dangers along the route, maps provided by institutions cannot convey useful messages about 
rapidly changing conditions.  Therefore, they remain limited, insufficient guides. Their fixity 
fails to provide “the ability and experience necessary to influence the outcome- to improve the 
odds- in a particular instance” (Scott 1998, p.318).  As Willem van Schendel (1995, p.41-43) 
describes: 
The cartography of illegal flows depends heavily on the persuasive value of the arrow.  The 
arrow is a godsend for those wishing to represent illegal flows in a threatening manner 
beause it is a discursive tool that conveys the motion, stimulus, and target as perhaps no 
other graphic code could.  The arrow purports to make visible what is essentially invisible.  
It perfectly suggests the velocity of objects or persons flowing illegally, their aggressive 
penetration of sovereign territories….When it comes to understanding illegal flows, their 
bold arrows hide more than they reveal….A recourse to arrows feeds on a misconception: 
that illegal flows cross borders without affecting them or being affected by them.  As long 
as we see borders primarily from the perspective of the territorial state, as its outer skin that 
needs to be protected from penetration by unwanted aliens and outlawed substances, we will 
tend to fall prey to arrow disease and the underlying idea that borders and flows are 
antonyms. 
 
These official maps and their arrows, whether hostile or friendly to the purpose of the 
migrants, view the route as an aggregate.  By focusing at this level of abstraction, the maps 
and their arrows obscure the tactical improvisation, uncertain detours and social 
embeddedness of flows across nation-states.  To paraphrase Michel de Certeau (1984), this 
institutionalized viewpoint makes the plight of migrants legible, but only in a manner that 
obliterates their experience (p.87).   
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Conclusion   
For every Penelope, there is a Telemachus: a young man yearning to follow in his father’s 
footsteps despite his mother’s better judgment. Before I met the young man, his mother 
explained that she is particularly protective of him. Perhaps this was why she did not tell me 
about him at first, why I did not know of his journey until my third visit. Her older boy is 
“pure campesino”: tough and rugged, aggressive, capable of working the fields and defending 
himself in a fight. She did not fear for him when he took to the road like his father. The older 
boy is always in trouble, always challenging her authority. Maybe she did not beat him hard 
enough, but Lord knows she tried. She beat him until she ran out of strength, even leaving 
permanent marks on his flesh, but it did not teach him. But this younger boy is not like that. 
When I saw him, I understood. His eyebrows had been carefully groomed into thin arches, his 
build was slight and his hands were delicate. He spoke softly, and I too could hear the 
gentleness his mother seeks to protect.   
The young man prepared the map with a help of an artistic friend (4/18/10). They made 
the journey together, leaving in secret, and they made the map together with the same 
carefully guarded privacy. In the picture, there are stylistically drawn adobe houses, stop 
signs, a bus and some Guatemalan artifacts, connected by a meandering black line. His friend 
works in the school library and reads books in English and Spanish, an eccentric pastime in 
this small town. The map took a while to complete, because sometimes his friend is moody 
and unhelpful. I graciously accept the map, late or not, and the young man told me his story 
again. 
He did not tell anyone about his decision to go, not even his mother. If he had told his 
mother, she would have stopped him. He told her that he was going to his volunteer shift at 
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the Red Cross, and he spent the night at his friends’ house. He and his friend left in the 
morning. The year was 2009.His friend is older than he and had traveled once before. 
However, he did not make it all the way to the United States. His friend led the way. They 
took a bus to Guatemala City. For the first time in his life, he saw people dressed in 
indigenous costumes. It was a big, strange city, but he felt safe as long as he was with his 
friend. His friend always protects him. 
From there, they went to the border with Mexico. They had a difficult time at the river. A 
man nearby the river told them to pay him $10 to cross. But the ferryman exacted his own 
charge of $10, and then on the other side another man demanded $10. The young man and his 
friend explained that they had already paid, but to no avail. They continued north by combi (a 
system of paid transport in vans across southern Mexico). At Ciudad Hidalgo, not far from the 
border, they were assaulted and robbed. The bandits knew he was Salvadoran. I asked the 
young man how he was identified as a Salvadoran migrant to be robbed. He thought about it, 
and explains that Salvadorans are whiter than Mexicans. He thought the color of his skin was 
a give away. I pressed him a bit for more ways these robbers, and later the Mexican 
authorities, knew he was Salvadoran.  He paused again, before admitting that he forgot to take 
off a belt that said “El Salvador” in decoration across it. A smile spread across his face as he 
remembered it. 
Undaunted, he and his friend continued their quest. A man approached them, offering his 
services as a guide. They gave him what money they had left, and he took them to a house. 
There, they were interrogated and intimidated, but despite the pressured questioning, both the 
young man and his friend insisted that they had no relatives in the United States. In fact, his 
friends’ mother lives there, and the young man’s father is there as well, but they stuck to their 
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stories. A big, scary-looking man spent the night in the next room, and the wall was flimsy. 
So, they did not feel safe and they could not sleep at all that night. The young man might have 
slept a little, but only because his friend stayed awake. Early in the morning, they escaped. 
They had to break out, because they had been locked in. After the escape, his friend told him 
stories about kidnappers posing as smugglers. 
The boys explained their desperate situation to a Mexican woman making tortillas. She 
gave them a bit of money, warned them to be careful and advised them to take a combi to 
Tapachula, where they could look for work. In the Tapachula market, they asked everywhere 
for work. But one woman told them that she only hires Mexicans. He became angry, but his 
friend urged them onward, explaining that it would be best to leave and not come back. 
Finally, they found another woman in the market willing to give them advice and money. She 
said that they had better get a place to stay for the night soon, because it was getting late in the 
day. She told them about the migrant shelter. At first, he objected to the idea, thinking that 
Mexican authorities must run the shelter to deport people like him. But she explained that 
Church runs the shelter. He agreed to go, but only with lingering suspicion. The kindly 
woman put the boys in a cab, and she warned the driver that he must take them exactly to the 
doorstep of the migrant shelter, not drop them off anywhere else. She paid 50 pesos for the 
cab. Even when they arrived there, he remained nervous. 
They entered the shelter and gave their information to the man registering the arrivals. The 
next day, they helped with the gardening, making the beds and cleaning, and only then did he 
begin to relax. The priest was kind. They celebrated the priest’s birthday with the migrants 
and local parishioners. The parish donates clothing and prepaid phone cards for the migrants. 
Both boys called their mothers, and their mothers sent money. However, the priest warned 
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them about the gang members and kidnappers who hang out at the corner across from the 
shelter. The priest warned them not to tell anyone about family members in the United States, 
including other migrants, because kidnappers send people into the migrant shelters to get 
information. The man at the door of the shelter cannot tell who they are. So, the young man 
came to understand that he could not trust other migrants and that it was dangerous to share 
any information with anyone. 
Despite their mothers’ pleading to return home to El Salvador, he and his friend used the 
money their mothers sent to take another combi north. They had planned to go to another 
migrant shelter, but the police stopped them as soon as they arrived in the next town. The 
police asked why they were carrying backpacks. The boys claimed to be Mexican, but the 
police knew better. They took them to the police station in Tapachula for questioning, and the 
police told the boys that they did not speak like Mexicans. His friend, who is very light 
skinned, admitted to being Salvadoran. So, the young man also admitted to being Salvadoran. 
He could not imagine continuing alone.  
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Figure 5.13: Migrant Map: Two Boys go to Tapachula 
 
On the map he drew, there are no borders. The colors and patterns in the drawing reflect boys’ first 
experience of the indigenous culture of Guatemala, conveying their youthful sense of adventure. 
Perhaps the map re-imagines the experiences of the boys as they wish it would be. Despite the 
cheerfulness of the map, the young man swore that he would not return to the route. There are too 
many dangers. 
 
Thus, after a year of visiting this family, I was surprised by talk of another journey. The 
father had disappeared again into the United States, and with him, the meager remittances the 
family received had vanished. Hauled away by the police after a drunken incident and accused 
of extortion, the oldest son was incarcerated indefinitely with no clear date for a trial. The 
oldest daughter, a willowy beautiful girl with almond shaped eyes, had begun to date a 
recruiter for the local smuggler. The mother informed me that if her daughter manages to talk 
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her boyfriend into taking her for free or with a loan, she would go. She would leave despite all 
the suffering the route had already caused her family. God willing, he will take her. 
Chapter Summary 
By recounting these stories, this chapter has sketched a method for reading migrant maps. 
Official maps and migrant maps can both be conceptualized as knowledge-based artifacts of 
unauthorized movement.  While the state has no unified purpose, given the contradictory 
commitments to migration policing and the protection of migrant rights, a more general 
contrast between official maps and migrant maps illustrates the disjuncture between 
institutionalized ways of knowing the route and the lived experience of it.  Migrant maps are 
traces of lived experience that “reconstitute the procedures for forgetting”. They signal, but do 
not fully divulge, an experiential knowledge that cannot be expressed in a survey of the route. 
An ethnographic journey that embeds these maps in the lives of their artists offers insight 
into transnational migration. Through artwork and song, both at home and abroad, migrants 
re-imagine the route and their own purpose. The process of reflexive interpretation and 
strategic improvisation that propels migrants on their journey comes into view as we move 
along the route. This process can be illuminated through an inductive fieldwork project, but 
would be overlooked by a survey instrument that asked only ‘standardized’, pre-formed 
questions. Now that a methodological framework has been outlined in this chapter, next we 
will examine the dynamic normative and strategic reorientation that unfolds during the 
passage from Central America to the United States. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
IMAGINING ROUTES: ETHNOGRAPHY OF PRACTICED CROWDS 
 
Introduction 
 
“Ah Odysseus,” Alcinous replied, “one look at you 
and we know that you are no one who would cheat us- 
no fraud, such as the dark soil breeds and spreads  
across the face of the earth these days. Crowds of vagabonds  
Frame their lies so tightly none can test them. But you, 
What grace you give your words, and what good sense within! 
You have told your story with all a singer’s skill, 
The miseries you endured” 
 
The King Alcinous rewards Odysseus handsomely for his oration of the 
miseries he had endured on his journey, told “with all a singer’s skill”. Indeed, Homer 
describes Odysseus as “the great teller of tales” with a quick wit and an easy charm. In 
the course of his long travels, Odysseus constructs his own epic, regaling a series of 
hosts in strange lands with stories from the war and the sea. This self-narration shapes 
his encounters with strangers along the way, winning them over by sending artful 
signals about his character, selectively obeying social protocols for civil behavior, and 
generating empathy for his plight. Odysseus also dons a series of guises that help him 
reconnoiter places and people before revealing himself. Survival in a potentially 
treacherous and uncertain social field requires a fortuitous moment for the disclosure 
of identities.  
In all these interactions, the route home is imagined through both words and 
actions. Impromptu stories, whether told as entertainment or subterfuge, create 
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opportunities for Odysseus during his voyage.1 A collective imaginary provides the 
scripts he uses to dramatize his predicament or conceal his intentions. His 
improvisation upon these social constructions is central to his successful arrival in 
Ithaca, because the most dangerous terrain for a foreigner to navigate is not the natural 
landscape of oceans and tides; it is the social landscape of enemies and potential 
betrayal.  
As people move across an uncertain and violent social landscape, survival 
often requires a series of performances, both in good faith and bad. Erving Goffman 
(1959, p.15) defines a performance as an activity that alters the understanding of 
another individual within a face-to-face encounter; it is meaningful practice. Migrants 
and the people they meet en route reenact a series of social roles, improvising upon 
scripts to present self-idealizations and define situations accordingly. Strangers come 
to know each other and shape the context of their interaction through a series of 
performances, acquiring information about others and negotiating the terms of their 
relationship (p.4).  
In this chapter, I describe performances that constitute the transnational 
imaginary of Central American migration to the United States. I argue that people 
collectively make sense of their journey in these performances, and I show how 
improvisation on this imaginary shapes violence and the prospects for passage. For the 
                                                        
1 Of course, Odysseus is not alone.  A cursory glance at world literature yields many fables of 
storytellers who save their lives with compelling narratives, firebrand sermons, exuberant wit, 
fascinating riddles or the capacity to perform a wide variety of roles. For example, the 
storyteller of The Arabian Nights saves herself from the cruel king with “the only weapon she 
has at her disposal…her knowledge of thousands of stories” (Pannewick 2010, p.220). 
Likewise, many Central American migrants travel armed only with their wits, a well-timed 
smile and a talent for making friends.   
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purposes of this chapter, I focus on the performance of roles derived from two 
imagined communities: nationality and gender. These two imagined communities 
delineate victims and perpetrators of violence: foreigners and citizens, women and 
men. 
These imagined communities are partially reconstructed in the route as 
migrants move through novel settings and interact with strangers. Improvisation on 
these scripts generates opportunities for survival and movement, giving social and 
cognitive shape to the crowds and terrain that comprise major features of the route. 
They restructure the social imaginary of the route over time. These improvisational 
performances, a form of role shifting or “passing”, are a strategy for coping with risk 
and uncertainty; but they also increase social ambiguity and intensify uncertainty. The 
performances re-write the scripts. For this reason, passing both facilitates and 
complicates knowledge of violence en route.  
Methods: Performing Ethnography 
Of course, migrants, gangs and state authorities are not the only actors. 
Academics and journalists also play a part. In Central America, smugglers have passed 
as journalists (e.g. McClesky 2012). Journalists have become activists. The Mexican 
and U.S. governments have accused activists of smuggling (Coutin 2005; Frank-Vitale 
2011, p.90). While I did not engage in illegal activities, I too improvised upon social 
routines while in the field, performing the duties of a shelter volunteer as I studied 
those around me, passing easily between my role as a researcher and my role as shelter 
staff. Participant observation is a method for knowing through doing. It requires the 
researcher to thoughtfully assume various social roles and systematically record 
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subsequent observations in fieldnotes. In effect, participant observers are outsiders 
who reflexively mimic insiders in an effort to understand them. 
In situations where insiders have suspect loyalties, being an outsider is not 
necessarily an impediment to access. My access to interviews probably depended in 
part on my participant observation as a shelter volunteer, because it fit within an 
established, albeit deeply problematic, persona along the transnational routes through 
the Americas: the white female missionary.2 My willingness to foresake luxury and 
live among migrants, working with a Catholic priest in Mexico and a nun in El 
Salvador, likely connected me to this tradition, thereby rendering my good intentions 
believable to at least some of those I studied.  
Regardless of how my intentions might have been perceived initially, the 
interview itself is a performance through which two strangers craft a relationship 
(Denzin 2003). The researcher comes equipped with a script, including introductions, 
consent protocols and questions; and this script is adapted to the context and course of 
the conversation. The stories told by participants are usually a mishmash of truth, 
exaggeration, wishful thinking and lies, but the telling of each story nonetheless 
reconstitutes identity and emboldens beliefs.3 As they conduct interviews and make 
                                                        
2 Indeed, a Salvadoran immigrant living on Long Island often introduces me to her friends and 
family in the United States by explaining that we met, when I was “living like a missionary” 
in her hometown, and I suspect she does this for my benefit with the people I meet in her 
community. 
3 Norman K. Denzin (2003, p.66-79) analyzes the way interviews “arise out of performance 
events. They transform information into shared moral experience.”  
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observations, academics and journalists collaborate with migrants as they both re-
imagine the route, making sense of the violence and suffering during the journey.4  
Drawing on experiences and interviews along the route, I explore how actors 
improvise upon the social scripts associated with nationality and gender. Each 
performance confers information about the actor and defines, in concert with the 
actions of others, encounters along the route. It is through these performances that 
migrants navigate the social terrain of the route and come to know one another. Even 
when performances are dismissed as fantasy or lies, the narratives they produce 
engage the social imaginary. As they invent roles and identities across the material 
landscape, these performances reinvent what it means to be a migrant and a man. By 
                                                        
4 Fortunately, I did not need an elaborate ruse to survive. The legal status of my journey and 
the stereotypes associated with my gender, race and nationality set me apart from the Central 
American migrants with whom I spoke. I never ran the risks they encountered. Journalism in 
Mexico is a dangerous business with 48 disappearances or killings of reporters since 
December 2006 (Lauria 2012, p.35). However, a doctoral dissertation is a decidedly 
nonthreatening endeavor, and I did not run the risks of human rights activists or journalists 
while collecting data. Nevertheless, on three occasions during my fieldwork in El Salvador 
and Mexico, I felt sufficient concern for either personal safety or comfort that I willfully 
deceived people. First, male deportees sometimes explained to me how they miss white 
women, regaling me with stories of a white girlfriend or wife. When one particularly lonely 
and destitute young man became aggressive in his admiration, doggedly following me around 
a Salvadoran town with explicit compliments, I felt like the embodiment of everything he had 
lost in his deportation from the United States: a living symbol of his rejection from an adopted 
homeland. My discomfort prompted the head of a local family to claim (improbably) that I 
was their long lost niece from Canada. I only bothered to set the record straight with interview 
participants. Second, during a journey on the freight train through southern Mexico, a friend 
loudly introduced me to male train riders me as a nun, in hope of sparing me from lewd 
comments during the journey. Grateful for his thoughtfulness, I did not immediately disabuse 
anyone from his false claim. On a third occasion, I impersonated a volunteer at a shelter with 
which I had no formal affiliation. I did so in an attempt to cloak the interviews I had already 
conducted locally in the unproblematic registration routine of the shelter: an impromptu 
performance devised in a moment’s reaction to a veiled threat by a man with a gold plated 
pistol loitering in the shelter compound. I return to this encounter later in the chapter. These 
were the only performances in which I consciously pretended in a role; my other 
performances as a researcher and shelter staff were quite sincere. As bit players in the 
migration drama, even writers improvise performances from time to time. 
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examining how this social interaction is conducted and experienced, we can better 
understand the violence that endangers migrants during their journey.   
Nationality 
The eight-year old Salvadoran boy sauntered through the yard of the migrant 
shelter, showing off his capacity for Mexican language, using an exaggerated “guey” 
(a Mexican colloquialism) at the beginning of each sentence and mimicking in the 
cadence of his speech the melodic stereotype of Mexican Spanish. Looking for 
attention from adults, he exclaimed, “I can speak like a Mexican!” He had been in 
Mexico for several months now, idling at the shelter while his family applied for 
asylum because they had been persecuted by criminal gangs in El Salvador.  While 
they still hoped to ultimately arrive in the United States, Mexican asylum would allow 
them to move through Mexico more safely and work for better wages along the way, 
blending in with the citizen population without fear of deportation. The boy’s 
performances in the shelter yard garnered him chuckles and smiles from his intended 
audience. Nevertheless, he also demonstrated a potentially important survival skill that 
he was acquiring through play: the capacity to pass as Mexican.  
The wider the range of national identities through which someone can ‘pass’, 
the safer a transnational journey becomes. Indeed, if the boy could have ‘passed’ as 
American by speaking unaccented English, the border crossing into the United States 
would have been easier. His mother had considered borrowing the documents of 
another child and having her son pretend to be asleep as he crossed the U.S. 
checkpoint in a car with U.S. citizens posing as his parents; but she worried that the 
border patrol might wake him (12/13/10). Despite some tutoring he received at the 
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migrant shelter and his father’s fluency in the language, the boy’s English would not 
have withstood even cursory questioning. Instead, he would have to risk the dangerous 
desert crossing when they reached the border.  
Unauthorized movement across a terrain requires the negotiation of 
interpersonal encounters through which nationality is collectively re-imagined by 
migrants, migration enforcement agents, humanitarian aid workers, kidnappers, 
smugglers and everyday people living along the route. Information about national 
membership is coveted by all actors in the migration drama, as leverage for expedient 
deportation by authorities, identification for criminal predation or a potential signal 
about worthiness for humanitarian relief. Central American migrants learn to conceal 
this information, imitating Mexican or American national traits to avoid deportation 
and criminal victimization. For example, they frequently impersonate Mexicans in 
order to pass undetected through the migration checkpoints and public spaces of the 
interior of Mexico. Migrants also develop ways of camouflaging the cultural tells that 
mark one nationality from another, such as distinctive linguistic traditions, dress and 
customs. They manipulate accepted national identity markers as they attempt to pass 
undetected through the nation-state. In so doing, they may evade a variety of violent 
scenes that pose a danger to Central American migrants in passage:  
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Figure 6.1: Dangerous Scenes 
STEREOTYPED 
SCENES 
ACTORS FREQUENT 
SETTINGS 
CLIMACTIC 
ACTIONS 
Betrayal Trusted Travel 
Companions: e.g. 
relatives; friends; 
lovers; compatriots; 
members of the same 
gang 
Home, Train, Train 
Yard, Mountain or 
Desert Trail, Migrant 
Shelter, Street, Bar 
or Restaurant, Drop 
House or Hotel, 
Destination 
Theft, Assault, 
Murder, Rape, 
Abandonment, 
Information relayed 
leads to a 
kidnapping, 
extortion, ambush or 
police intervention 
Stranger Danger Unknown Migrants 
and Unknown 
Citizens: e.g. 
Samaritans; vendors: 
cooks, hotel clerks, 
prostitutes, bar 
tenders; gang 
members; guides; 
train conductors; 
drivers of taxi, bus, 
combi; Mexicans, 
Central Americans 
and Americans 
Train, Train Yard, 
Mountain or Desert 
Trail, Migrant 
Shelter, Street, Bar 
or Restaurant, Drop 
House or Hotel, 
Combi or Bus 
Theft, Assault, 
Murder, Rape, 
Extortion, 
Kidnapping, 
Trafficking, 
Information relayed 
leads to kidnapping 
or deportation 
Breach of Contract Guides and Clients Train Yard, 
Mountain or Desert 
Trail, Migrant 
Shelter, Bar or 
Restaurant, Drop 
House or Hotel  
Abuse, Trafficking, 
Extortion, 
Abandonment, 
Kidnapping, Rape, 
Guide’s 
Imprisonment 
Police Drama Migrants, Guides, 
Citizens, 
Authorities   
Checkpoints and 
Inspections: Border, 
Highway 
Checkpoint, Bus 
Stations and Train 
Yards, Raid: train, 
drop house, hotel 
Deportation, 
Detainment, 
Imprisonment, 
Assault, Extortion of 
Bribes, Kidnapping, 
Theft, Rape 
 
Migrants can avoid the violence inherent in ‘stranger danger’ and ‘police 
dramas’ by successfully performing ‘Mexican’, blending into the general citizenry and 
avoiding remote sections of the migrant route segregated from citizenry. During these 
performances, the national tells that ‘out’ migrants include language, ignorance of 
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common knowledge shared by co-nationals, and physical appearance. Both accents 
and colloquialisms give them away. Any conversation can expose a foreigner, leaving 
them vulnerable to deportation or extortion. One man complained that he need only 
open his mouth to order a bus ticket and, “they will say that I am ‘cachuco’ [an ethnic 
slur for a Central American in Mexico]….that I am a wetback, an imposter” 
(Honduran migrant, Ixtepec, 3/4/11).  
Figure 6. 2: Table of Examples of Cultural Tells5 
  
Clothing Word Choice, 
and Grammar 
 Behavior National 
Common 
Knowledge 
Other 
Belongings 
Decorated 
with Central 
American 
place names   
Words that 
can differ 
nationally: 
e.g. drinking 
straw, belt, 
soda, money, 
kid, 
‘cool’/good 
 
Staring out 
the window 
of the bus to 
see new 
scenery 
Calendar 
Facts 
Central 
American 
currency 
Dirty 
utilitarian 
style 
Mexican 
slang: e.g. 
“pinche”  
Nervousness 
and 
hesitation   
Symbols 
and food 
Passports 
and 
identification 
Exaggerated 
version of 
Mexican 
Central 
American 
Slang: e.g. 
“puchica” 
Sitting at the 
back of the 
bus 
Folklore Some 
Central 
American 
names: 
e.g. Elmer, 
Kevin 
Name brands 
not known in 
Mexico 
Grammatical 
constructions: 
e.g. “vos”  
Lack of eye 
contact 
Political and 
Social 
Geography 
Backpacks  
 
                                                        
5 This is not an exhaustive list of the examples encountered during fieldwork, let alone all the 
possible examples of cultural tells. Furthermore, the list changes over time. By the time I 
learned of these tells, they were already becoming less useful to migration police and 
criminals, because migrants were learning about them. 
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The content of conversation can also reveal national identity. National 
education systems inculcate a collective imaginary of the calendar (e.g. national 
holidays and work rhythms), symbols (e.g. recognizable flags, anthems, monuments, 
ethnic foods, and faces), and folklore (e.g. common historical narratives, events and 
figures). Tells include moments of hesitation that break the natural rhythm of a 
dialogue about places and people ‘known to be known’ by any Mexican.  
The most visible Central American migrants wear a unisex costume, shaped by 
the physical demands of the cheapest manner to negotiate routes to the United States: 
denim pants, dark and dirty clothing, sneakers, baseball caps, and backpacks. The style 
is comfortable for travel on the freight trains and treks through remote wilderness. As 
discussed by Jason De Leon (2012, p.490) in his analysis of the material culture of 
border crossing, U.S. border patrol personnel use style of dress, as well as racial 
stereotypes, to determine whether an individual is a smuggler, migrant or desert hiker. 
In fact, in the performance of their duties, state authorities acquire a deep knowledge 
that mirrors the learning process of the migrants they seek to apprehend (ICE agent, 
2/9/10). Their Mexican counterparts do the same. 
Racial stereotypes intersect with nationality, producing constraints and 
opportunities for migrants, depending on the color of their skin. In Mexico, a country 
where the ‘mestizo’ of mixed Spanish and indigenous heritage represents the dominant 
racial ideology, racial profiling renders blacks most vulnerable to identification.6 It is                                                         
6 Racial profiling also creates opportunities for smuggling. Smugglers sometimes blend high 
paying Peruvian clients into travel groups with indigenous Guatemalans, because of their 
similar phenotype (smuggler, El Salvador, 7/5/10). The Peruvians pass as Guatemalan, and if 
they are captured, they might only need to travel from Central America rather than returning 
to South America. This minimizes risks for the smugglers transporting them. 
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not unheard of for Mexican citizens of black Honduran heritage to be wrongfully 
beaten and deported by Mexican migration authorities. I met one such man who, after 
receiving a savage beating that shattered his jawbone and a wrongful deportation, had 
been forced to return to his Mexican homeland alongside Central American migrants 
and seek legal assistance at a migrant shelter to prove his nationality (Ixtepec, 
11/4/10). He had been travelling to visit family in San Luis Potosi when migration 
authorities intercepted him. Life along the migratory route as the Mexican child of a 
Central American is a tenuous existence. Abuse and harassment of citizens are the 
perils of racial profiling along a long-standing migration route, as Mexican Americans 
in the U.S. southwest can attest. 
Criminals also identify potential victims for kidnapping, rape, robbery and 
extortion by trying to detect the accent, migrant clothing and phenotype of Central 
Americans.7 In part because of racial profiling, Hondurans, and in particular black 
Hondurans, are most likely to rely on the dangerous train route where mass 
kidnappings and muggings occur with frequency, thereby avoiding buses that travel 
through migration checkpoints. The proportion of migrants reporting Honduran 
nationality on the registration rolls of the shelters has been the highest of any national 
group since Hurricane Mitch in 1998, often by a very large margin.8 One rumor 
                                                        
7 As De Leon (p.490) says, “from the perspective of those who encounter border crossers, we 
see that the clothes, water bottles and cheap sneakers further betray people by broadcasting 
their vulnerability to those seeking to either apprehend or assault them”, not only at the U.S.-
Mexico border but along the entirety of the route through Mexico.  
8 Olivia Ruiz (2001 p.38), in an analysis of hospital and migrant shelter records in the 
Soconusco region of Chiapas, found that migrants riding the train were most likely to be 
recorded as a victim, the numbers of Honduran migrants travelling through shelters surged 
following Hurrican Mitch, and these poor Honduran migrants fleeing the natural disaster were 
most likely to suffer an accident or violent incident en route. 
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circulating among migrants suggests that organized criminal groups particularly seek 
out Salvadorans, who are known to be better connected to established families in the 
United States and thus fetch higher ransoms, than the poverty stricken Hondurans, 
who throng the migrant shelters and crowd the most desperate routes to the U.S. 
Whatever the preference of kidnappers might be, any identifiable Central American 
nationality invites legal, illegal and extralegal violence en route. 
Figure 6.3 A Group of Migrants in Prayer and Mourning 
 
A group of migrants gathers to pray at a cross, marking the spot where a Guatemalan migrant had been 
recently murdered in Lecheria, Mexico. Notice the common style of dress shared by the crowd and the 
graffiti in the foreground (Photo Credit: Encarni Pindado).  
 
For this reason, many migrants purchase local name brands and fashions at 
their earliest opportunity if they leave the train route behind.9 The adoption of 
Mexican or U.S. dress and dialect facilitate survival when passing through densely 
populated portions of the route, such as the bus lines and urban areas. Migrants may                                                         
9 In her analysis of the violence against Central American migrants crossing Oaxaca, Wendy 
Vogt (2012, p.173-175) also documents the practice of “passing” and the various cultural tells, 
ranging from language to social and political geography and more Mexican sounding names. 
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also choose to travel without any identifying papers or possessions that might tie them 
to their homeland. The capacity to pass undetected through migration checkpoints 
along the highway saves migrants from the treacherous footpaths around them, where 
bandits frequently lie in wait. As explained by a transgendered Guatemalan migrant, a 
former circus performer, keenly aware of the power of self-presentation:  
My advice, from my point of view, I have seen some people...it seems to me that if 
you go well dressed, man or woman, whatever…if you are a woman if you go very 
well put together: skirt, heels, very pretty in bus…they [Mexican migration authorities 
or police] will not take you off the bus. Avoid the train. They realize that one is 
undocumented if you go dirty, if you smell bad, if you come dressed in dark clothes, if 
you carry your backpack and tennis shoes particularly…if you come comfortable, 
more like those here [in the shelter]…. (Ixtepec, 3/2/11).10 
 
Indeed, this advice seems prudent if a migrant has the gumption and familiarity 
with Mexican national customs. I met people who had traveled successfully in this 
way, passing as a Mexican belonging to the general citizen population. Sometimes 
Central Americans work and beg their way through Mexico on a meandering path over 
the course of weeks, months or even years. One Salvadoran man, interviewed at a 
midway point along the route, equated this strategy for knowing the route with the 
social relationships he formed during the journey: 
Here [in the migrant shelter] you cannot confide in anyone. You must be prudent. I 
will stay in the D.F. [Mexico City] for four months or so, and build relationships…I 
do not know the route. It is necessary to meet and communicate with people (Ixtepec, 
2/3/11). 
 
In the relative safety of a diverse and anonymous urban environment, where 
transience is not necessarily associated with unauthorized migration, this man will 
adopt a strategy of selective social engagement. He compared the challenge to the way                                                         
10 This Guatemalan migrant sold fake documents to other migrants attempting to pass, but fake 
documents do not seem necessary or advisable if someone performs persuasively. After all, 
many Mexicans do not carry documents in their own country. 
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he navigated violence while working as a truck driver in his home country, 
transporting shipments of seafood along a dangerous route from the coast in La Union 
to the capital of San Salvador.11 While moving across the country with valuable cargo, 
the driver must recognize that “there are places you go around because you don’t 
know the people. You cannot enter there.” In those instances, anonymity complicates 
mobility. On the other hand, he thought unauthorized crossing of international borders 
was, in an important sense, easier and safer than trespassing the interior boundaries set 
by competing street gangs in his neighborhood, because at home he could be easily 
identified with a community. Sometimes knowing people and being known 
complicates mobility. Thus, learning new strategies works through an alternation of 
partial concealment and partial social engagement, both of which require artful 
performances as the migrant negotiates encounters with potential allies and potential 
enemies in a transient social field.  
One Woman’s Odyssey 
A woman who had traveled to reunite with her mother in the United States 
before the birth of her first child narrated an example of successful concealment and 
engagement (El Salvador, 5/20/10).12 This second attempt at crossing Mexico 
                                                        
11 It is important to remember that these seafood shipments may or may not have been 
contraband. The zone that the man transported across is known for illegal seafood shipments 
entering from Nicaraguan waters without paying import fees (e.g. Mendoza 2009). The illegal 
economy is pervasive, and these gray markets proliferate across the globe. Mexico does not 
have the monopoly on unauthorized routes. 
12 In a break from ethnographic custom, I consciously chose not to give pseudonyms to the 
interview participants, leaving them nameless. Their anonymity in the text mirrors the 
experience of the route, as people meet, share stories and part ways without remembering 
names. They are, in this sense, undocumented; the images their narrative congers linger in the 
transnational imaginary, but the people they encounter would have a hard time remembering 
where they heard the story or from whom.   
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involved minimal suffering and delay.13 At the time, she and her underage cousin were 
four and six months pregnant respectively. A kindly uncle who could speak like a 
Mexican guided them during their journey.  
At six or seven at night, they arrived at the Mexico/Guatemala border. They 
spent that night and following day in a hotel. Her uncle went to get Mexican 
documents for the border crossing.14 They took photos of them, but they did not leave 
the hotel. They stayed there to memorize their Mexican name, address, who is 
president of Mexico, how they call the schools (e.g. what is ‘primaria’), and other 
various things. Aside from that, they did not talk much after leaving home. They 
brought with them only two changes of clothing in a small bag, vitamins, remedies, 
nothing related to El Salvador. They had to dress presentably with formal shoes, nicely 
made up. The following day they went across the border.  
In Mexico, her uncle bought the bus tickets and did the talking. They were on 
the bus all day and night. Migration agents would look at the bus, but they never asked 
for their documents. The girls did not speak in public, except to call quickly home on 
the phone to say “I’m fine” to their families, and then they would quickly leave the 
public phone. Their uncle occasionally left them to their own devices. The girls did 
not want to ask for the price of the food for fear of being recognized as Salvadoran. 
                                                        
13 I chose this relatively uneventful story to contrast against more sensational narratives.  
14Possession of fake documents is not without risks. In El Salvador, I met a man who had 
served time in Mexican prison after failing to pass a checkpoint with fake documents. He 
explained that it is difficult to act like a Mexican, even with a fake credential (returned 
migrant, El Salvador, 5/6/10). His experience in prison challenged the way he understood 
nationality, “In this route one makes friends with people from different countries that are not 
forgotten. You begin to feel like you know people. Mexicans discriminate against 
Salvadorans. But you become friends with everyone. They gave me clothing. In prison if there 
are only Mexicans, it is sad. You have to have patience to make friends with them”. 
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So, despite ravenous hunger, the two pregnant young women only bought cookies and 
juice without their uncle present.  
Later in the journey, migration agents stopped their taxi and asked where they 
were from. Her cousin, likely nervous, erred and said “I am from here” rather than the 
response they had prepared. As a result, they had to get out of the cab, and her uncle 
had to negotiate an impromptu bribe for their passage. He was angry at the girl for her 
carelessness. A mistake like that can cost migrants a small fortune in bribes or worse. 
However, such costly bloopers are common. In particular, the response “I am from 
here” is a common tell that alerts authorities at checkpoints. It would be a very 
awkward response from citizens traveling in their home country. The physical 
manifestations of nervousness, such as awkward phrases, rapid breathing and 
fidgeting, betray an unauthorized foreigner as quickly as an accent. By contrast, an 
appearance of calm implies an unquestioned faith in the legitimacy of one’s identity. 
Such faith in belonging is, in some sense, the essence of nationality. 
At the U.S./Mexico border, the uncle knew the young women could not move 
quickly through the desert in their late stages of pregnancy, but he also knew the 
procedures of the U.S. border patrol. Swimming alongside, he brought the two girls 
across the Rio Bravo in an inner tube. He told them not to fear as he pushed them to 
the other side of the river and left them alone. His departing words were “you are in 
the US now.” In an improvisation upon the border patrol’s own routines and protocols, 
the uncle had instructed his niece to search for help along the nearby highway and to 
‘pass’ as underage with her cousin when the officials took them so that they would be 
released into the country. He had told her the patrol would come quickly, and it did. 
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The subterfuge about her age failed when her mother, contacted by immigration agents 
in the United States, gave her true age, but she was released to her mother nonetheless.  
However, after confusion and ambivalence about her court dates caused her to 
miss a mandated appearance, she returned home to El Salvador feeling disillusioned. 
Without a clear understanding of the requirements of U.S. law, she did not register her 
departure with the authorities; she simply flew home without a plan. As a result, she 
would now likely suffer legal penalties if she attempted to return to the United States. 
Her baby was born twenty days after her return to El Salvador; those twenty days 
labeled him a Salvadoran citizen rather than a U.S. citizen for the rest of his life. When 
I met her, she was pregnant with her third (unwanted) child. Her uncle had offered to 
take her again the same way, but remembering the experience of the journey, the 
woman did not like Mexicans, “in Mexico, they lack the spirit of humanity”. That 
sentiment had kept her home so far, but she felt listless and unfulfilled in the small 
Salvadoran town where, among other things, her husband would not permit her to use 
birth control.   
For this woman and others, the experience of ‘passing’ paradoxically sharpens 
bitter ethnic divisions between Mexicans and Salvadorans while demonstrating the 
arbitrariness of such cultural markers. Migrants subvert language and dress, and learn 
to be Mexican or American. Migrants also forge transnational networks of friends and 
multinational families during their journey (in transit, as well as in destinations), 
feeding a sense of betrayal at their mistreatment en route; they may be the husbands, 
sons, fathers, brothers, sisters, mothers, daughters and wives of citizens in the 
countries through which they transit. This de facto cultural and social integration 
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brings the injustices of legal exclusion and special vulnerability to criminal 
victimization into sharp relief.  Perhaps for this reason, some Central Americans claim 
that the trauma and disrespect that they suffer during the journey through Mexico 
accounts for the historic hostility between these national groups in destination 
communities in the United States; “Because of they way Mexicans treat Salvadorans 
during the trip, Salvadorans and Mexicans don’t get along” (returned migrant, El 
Salvador, 3/1/10).15 Some Salvadorans lament the ‘Mexicanization’ that migration to 
the United States has brought to their culture as “worse” than its Americanization. 
Passage has the power to reshape migrants’ sense of nation, self and others.  
Of course, not everyone has access to a kindly uncle as a cultural guide. And a 
kindly uncle or trusted guardian can quickly change his demeanor along the route, 
becoming abusive or abandoning (or even selling) his charge. Nor does everyone have 
the dramatic talent, confidence and attention to detail to play the part; migrants miss 
the signals about how to travel or fail to improvise upon them, repeating stale 
performances rather than slightly revising them to avoid detection. They lack the 
                                                        
15 In what might seem ironic to an international soccer fan familiar with the records of national 
teams, some Salvadorans trace Mexican hostility to their “race” and the mistreatment of 
Salvadorans by Mexicans along the migratory route to envy about the 1981 World Cup 
qualifying game in which El Salvador defeated Mexico: “It’s like an envy of the Salvadorans. 
It is an envy they are burdened with. An envy. They lost a soccer match to the Salvadorans 
once, maybe that’s where it started. But really every foreigner has a risk in Mexico, but the 
only thing they have to respect is U.S. citizens, because the US has power. What is El 
Salvador going to do?” (returned migrant, El Salvador, 5/6/10). In another interview, when I 
looked slightly incredulous in response to this explanation, a migrant defended this 
interpretation of thirty years of national antagonisms by reminding me that Honduras and El 
Salvador fought a “Football War”; “They have hated Salvadorans since then [the World Cup 
qualifying match]. I worked with Mexicans [in the United States] and they told me about it. 
They have a spike in their heart!” (returned migrant, El Salvador, 4/28/10).  
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competence to generate the mobile knowledge necessary to negotiate these social 
encounters.  
As migrants’ stories such as this one suggest, national performances require 
preparation. Lacking the benefit of a Mexican childhood, Central American migrants 
may practice the correct accent, memorize local facts or prepare the appropriate 
disguise.16 Nonetheless, social encounters with strangers in transit cannot be fully 
planned or anticipated in advance; like social snowflakes, each constitutes a unique 
interaction with a particular audience.17 Since no one knows exactly whom they might 
encounter or under what circumstances along the way, these interactions must be 
staged and realized in the same moment along the route. Thus, the knowledge of how 
to perform arises only through an active engagement with the audience rather than a 
strict pre-scripted routine; it is the culmination of experience, skill, talent and a dash of 
inspiration. Inspiration reassembles known social stereotypes into a specific 
performance of nationality in particular situations. When achieved, this knowledge 
decreases vulnerability to both official and unofficial violence. Unsurprisingly, Central 
American migrants who successfully perform and thus assume Mexican or American 
roles are safer. 
  
                                                        
16 Cecilia Menjivar (2000, p.72) notes that migrants relay these national scripts home, warning 
their family members of the tests employed by migration authorities.  Unfortunately for 
migrants, ‘passing’ is not so simple as memorizing a script and reciting the lines. 
17 Noting the “incapacity of ordinary individual to formulate in advance the movements of his 
eyes and body”, Goffman (1959, p.73-74) explains that “The legitimate performances of 
everyday life are not “acted” or “put on” in the sense that the performer knows in advance just 
what he is going to do, and does this solely because of the effect it is likely to have.”   
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Spies, Smugglers and Wanderers: Playing the Migrant 
Perhaps surprisingly, a variety of people along the route also find it worthwhile 
to assume the cultural markers associated with Central American migrants. Why 
would it serve to camouflage oneself as a member of the most vulnerable national 
groups along the route? Spies for kidnappers, known as ‘rateros’, befriend other 
migrants to find out who among them might be the most profitable targets for 
extortion, watching who receives remittances during their journey and gathering 
contact information about migrants’ families in the United States. These spies 
sometimes steer their travel group into ambush, by guiding them to remote locations 
and then reporting their whereabouts to criminal accomplices. The shelters, train 
yards, hotels and bars frequented by Central American migrants are full of these 
‘orejas’ (ears), some of whom were themselves migrants coercively recruited through 
kidnapping and threats into the ranks of criminal groups.  
Gangs with cliques along the train route, whether they are small franchises of 
organized Mexican crime groups or Central American street gangs, are often 
multinational bands of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans and 
sometimes Nicaraguans. Predators blend into the flow of humanity moving north and 
gather information and material resources along the route, learning about migrants by 
acting as one.18 A Honduran man repeated a common warning about ‘rateros’, one that 
echoes the betrayals and mistrust that characterize the villages of Central America 
(Ixtepec, 3/4/11): 
                                                        
18 Rumors circulate that police are also traveling undercover as migrants to catch kidnappers 
(e.g. Honduran migrant, Ixtepec, 3/29/11).   
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They assault and kidnap. They come as a migrant and they spy on who carries money, 
who buys food. They hug like a friend, and they stick you with the knife. [He gestured 
the stabbing motion to illustrate.] You cannot confide in anyone, except the priest [in 
charge of the Catholic migrant shelter]. 
 
Improvisation on the role of the migrant, a leveraging of the material and 
symbolic resources available only to people in transit along the route, is sometimes an 
unpremeditated survival strategy that takes them into the business of spying for 
kidnappers, other trickery (including but not limited to theft) or profit making from 
their travel companions (ranging from selling drugs to provisioning coyote services).  
To decrease opportunities for such role-shifting and enhance security, the migrant 
shelters generally attempt to segregate Central American migrants, Mexican migrants 
and non-migrant homeless people. To this end, many shelters limit migrants’ 
movement in and out of their compounds, accepting and releasing sojourners only 
during regulated hours and even locking people in their rooms at night. The shelters 
generally limit migrants to stays of three-day duration, and may limit the number of 
permitted visits.19 
As migrants meander along the route for a long period of time or make 
repeated attempts to cross the border, anonymity erodes and social networks, based on 
trust and reciprocity, may begin to emerge from their repeated performances along the 
route. The longer a person spends on the road, the more likely they fall victim to 
multiple violent events (Hagan 2008). Thus, cultural and social capital does not 
                                                        
19 Exceptions to the rules may be made under extenuating circumstances, i.e. for migrants 
awaiting asylum claims, denouncing human rights abuses they suffered en route or 
volunteering a needed craft of skill at the shelter. Exceptions may also be made for women 
and children, which may put them in a privileged position to serve as ‘connectors’ along the 
route, producing advantages from the wide acknowledgement of their hyper-vulnerability to 
violence.  
  
271  
accumulate a clear advantage, because the lack of anonymity and transgression of 
social boundaries produces vulnerability to violence under the strategic interaction 
around these identities. 
These wanderers begin to bridge Mexican communities and the transit flow. 
Their role as potential ‘enganchadores’ (connectors) makes them both dangerous and 
helpful to other migrants. They might provide access to reputable smugglers or other 
useful information about opportunities and danger en route. However, using their 
contacts along the route, wanderers might also sell migrants to kidnappers or 
collaborate with thieves. This potential duality renders any advice they give to other 
migrants suspect. According to some migrants, the fact of simply knowing people 
along the route casts suspicion on a travel companion. When asked how to identify a 
‘ratero’, a Honduran migrant explained (Ixtepec, 3/4/11): 
They carry a cell phone. If they have a cell phone on this journey, they are bad people. 
Suspicious. What would a migrant need a phone for? Who in Mexico would they call? 
How would they pay for one? Migrants do not carry phones. Who would they call?   
 
Other migrants emphasized class-based tells to differentiate between humble 
campesinos and potential threats: 
It’s very easy [to know who to trust]. By their humility. If someone is very tattooed 
with eyes that [unfinished sentence coupled with a shifting of the eyes]….One does 
not believe them. Look for simple, respectful people in whom you can see the desire to 
arrive (Guatemalan migrant, Ixtepec, 3/4/11). 
 
Expressions of humility and other rural class-markers, such as simple dress 
appropriate for outdoor labor or including homemade items, simple speech and 
expressions of religion, serve as a proxy for a lack of worldliness and unfamiliarity 
with social networks that could include transnational gangs. These markers also signal 
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a shared goal and normative orientation to the journey, indicating a lack of exposure to 
worldly vices. In fact, there are innumerable performances of class-based solidarity, 
even across national boundaries. As a result, many stories of poor Mexicans sharing 
their modest wealth with Central Americans and unexpected (even life saving) 
moments of hospitality circulate along the route. Finally, a ‘humble’ appearance might 
also make migrants a less appealing catch for kidnappers, who gain the most from the 
extortion of those migrants with established family in the United States, capable of 
sending financial remittances.  
The tattoos and hip-hop styles popular with urban youth are read as stigmata 
associated with Central American street gangs, particularly when the individual fits 
the racial and class stereotype of gang membership. These cultural markers, 
criminalized in Central America under Mano Dura (Strong Hand) anti-gang 
legislation, indicate exposure to a wider world and sometimes signal access to 
financial resources that enable the purchase of luxury goods. Urbanized and 
transnational fashions further complicate traditional Latin American class conventions, 
an outward expression of the ways that migration has complicated class relations. 
These cultural transgressions provoke (often unwarranted) fear and unwanted attention 
from police authorities across the Americas (Zilberg 2010 p.196-199).  
Central Americans ‘dress-up’ in order to perform conventional Mexican class 
roles, passing through checkpoints along the route without the appearance of desperate 
poverty often associated with migrants.20 Conversely, unscrupulous people ‘dress-                                                        
20 De Leon (2012, p.487) says that, “Many undocumented migrants assume that the best way 
to avoid detection is to ‘not look poor’, a strategy that can backfire. I once observed a Mexican 
immigration official board a bus in Chiapas and single out and remove a group of Central 
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down’ to perform a rural class role to infiltrate the route. As soon as the association of 
class tells with trustworthiness becomes common knowledge, it becomes a resource to 
be improvised upon, instantly losing its power to predict loyalties or nationality. 
Furthermore, both naïve Mexican authorities (many of them drawn from the ranks of 
campesinos themselves) and Central American migrants frequently misread 
contemporary fashions, which can fluctuate wildly (Zilberg 2010, p.198).21 Therefore, 
inflexible rules about whom to trust or distrust and how to perform class can produce 
disastrous mistakes. 
As a consequence of their potential security threat to other migrants, as well as 
the damage to their reputation caused by charges of corruption, many shelters turn 
known people away if they cannot believably explain their frequent visitation. Many 
shelters also search for national tells, discriminating in reverse and turning away 
down-and-out Mexicans. They also watch for the cultural tells associated with gang                                                                                                                                                                
American migrants whose new wardrobes, fresh haircuts, and shiny sneakers caused them to 
stand out against the rest of the passengers who appeared to be working-class, underdressed 
Mexicans.” It is unclear how De Leon identified the basis upon which the migration authority 
identified the group of migrants, and I have personally never heard of Central American 
migrants looking “too good” or “too rich” to pass as Mexican. However, class intersects with 
nationality in complex ways along the route. In this case, I believe De Leon’s story provides 
an example of what might have already become a stale routine. As soon as the means for 
passing are exposed, in this case recently purchased clothing, they lose their utility to 
migrants; social camouflage only works if the predator is unaware of its possibility. 
21 Elana Zilberg (2010, p.198) explains the fallibility of “fashion police” with a compelling 
anecdote: “The police were often barely literate in the semiotics of youth culture. Take, for 
example, Weasel’s first attempt to cross back into the United States at the end of 2003 when 
he was turned back in Mexico because of his clothing…We laughed uproariously when he 
told me why he was one picked out of everyone on the bus as an undocumented Central 
American immigrant passing through Mexico. When he asked the federale (officer) who 
apprehended him, “Why me?” the man explained that it was because he was wearing old-
fashioned clothes that no Mexican wore anymore. Weasel was wearing, as he put it, “a very 
stylish [1970s style] retro shirt,” and as such he was dressed in the height of urban youth 
fashion.” Zilberg also explains that Central American police have become more refined in 
some of their identifications over time, as they learn to distinguish between jailhouse tattoos 
and more colorful decorative skin art. 
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membership. During a registration process, the shelter staff looks for familiar faces, 
and recognition might lead to exclusion as a suspected smuggler (e.g. fieldnotes 
11/6/10). Most shelters maintain a database with photographs that identify suspicious 
persons, as well as aid in the identification of missing persons and dead bodies 
recovered along the route. To gain access to migrant shelters, where many unassisted 
and increasingly desperate customers await opportunities to travel, ‘enganchadores’ 
(connectors) must pretend to be migrants, earnestly moving north. 
Thus, decreasing anonymity and the concurrent maturation of social 
relationships with locals is a mixed blessing for migrants who spend a great deal of 
time along the route. On the one hand, friendships and potential business partnerships 
generate resources for migrants. On the other hand, decreasing anonymity marks them 
as ineligible for many of the humanitarian resources dedicated to migrants in the route, 
because those that aimlessly wander the route are no longer perceived to belong to a 
deserving class of people who are attempting to better their lives. Furthermore, 
decreasing anonymity undermines their capacity to hide among the nameless and 
generates suspicion. As a consequence, their recognition enhances their vulnerability 
to violent retribution from rival gangs (including murder) and accusations of 
smuggling that can result in severe legal penalties in the United States and Mexico. 
The migrant-smuggler oral contract generally includes an agreement that the migrants 
pretend the smuggler is one of them if the group is apprehended by either kidnappers 
or authorities. 
For these reasons, the fact that smugglers, homeless persons and spies for 
kidnappers impersonate Central American migrants is an open secret. The possibility 
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that predators might ‘pass’ as vulnerable migrant underscores the ambiguity of identity 
and the fluidity of relationships en route. People may slip from role to role depending 
on the performance, and anonymity facilitates such transformations. Social roles are 
not mutually exclusive, and people improvise upon them under dangerous conditions: 
changing from smuggler to kidnapper, from migrant to smuggler or from kidnapper to 
migrant. Thus, people in transit may have multiple or fluid motives for ‘being’ a 
migrant. They may be moving north, but they may also be profiting from other 
activities along the way. The potential for hidden agendas sows distrust among 
migrants and heightens uncertainty along the route.22 This ambiguity also produces 
anxiety among migrants who must fear false accusations of smuggling or kidnapping, 
a position far more dangerous than simply being accused of unauthorized entry.23 
An Undocumented Mexican in Mexico and his Honduran Guide 
 
One of the shelters in Coatzacoalcos, Mexico was particularly dilapidated. 
Morale among the shelter volunteers was low, and one of the staff decried that the                                                         
22 Late at night in the women’s dorm, a Honduran mother, robbed while traveling north with 
her family by train, lamented, “They are us, same as us. Hondurans, Guatemalans, 
Salvadorans.” She looked down and repeated this several times; it’s your own paisanos 
[countrymen] that rob. “That’s why you cannot trust people in the shelter either”. She turned 
to advise the Guatemalan girl sitting next to her, “You don’t know who they are, your own 
paisanos.”  (11/4/10). The Honduran woman’s attackers were “just boys.” The next day, a 
teenage Salvadoran boy similarly lamented that his own paisanos had partnered with 
Mexicans to assault them with machetes en route; it happened to his family when they had to 
walk around a checkpoint in Chiapas (11/5/10). I heard many such laments. 
23 For this reason, some people leave their communities alone to avoid any appearance of 
impropriety in the event that bad luck befall them on the journey: “If you take someone, the 
family can accuse you of being responsible for them” (Guatemalan migrant, Ixtepec, 3/4/11). 
One young man told the story of his sister, who acting as a good Samaritan in the United 
States had helped a migrant. She lost her U.S. residency under charges of being a smuggler 
despite the fact that she did not get paid. U.S. law does not distinguish between humanitarians 
and smugglers, giving no consideration to the migrants’ view that “It’s that you always help 
your own.” She was deported under, what other migrants perceive as, a case of mistaken 
identity (Hondraun migrant, Ixtepec, 3/5/11). 
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very migrants they served were criminals (6/1/11). He accused them of selling drugs, 
assaulting their comrades and smuggling from within the walls of the shelter. Fearing 
that someone would be killed at night, they limited their service to a short respite 
during daylight hours, and they evicted the migrants after a single meal. Indeed, a man 
with a gold plated pistol, tucked into his pants but conspicuously displayed, lounged in 
the afternoon sun within the courtyard. There was no pretense by this man of playing 
the part of a migrant; the gold plated pistol is a potentially deadly prop for the 
performance of the narco (i.e. a member of a Mexican drug cartel). The staff had 
resigned themselves to the lawlessness that pervaded the ‘refuge’. 
In this unsettling context, I met a migrant who freely admitted that he was not 
really a Central American.24 He seemed older and more humble than his Central 
American travel companions. At first, he spoke timidly with a halting cadence that 
caused me to initially (and very incorrectly) doubt his intelligence, but over the course 
of the interview, he surprised me with his increasingly confident body language and 
well-spoken analysis of his situation.    
He was from Hermosillo in the state of Sonora, Mexico. I asked when he left 
home, and he shook his head: 
I don’t have a home, and I never did. There was never a house. I was an orphan. I live 
in the streets. Washed cars [as they pass, stopped at lights for pesos]. I did not even 
have grandparents. I always lived in the streets…. 
 
As he continued, it became clear that he had, in fact, once had a father and 
mother. But they began new families that did not seem to have a place for him. His                                                         
24 I chose to share this man’s story, because among the Mexicans I met passing for Central 
American along the route, he shared his experiences the most openly and seemingly without 
reservation. 
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stepfather became abusive, and beat him with cables. As a boy, he would hide from 
his stepfather. He could not love his mother because she had never protected him from 
this abuse, and he reasoned that the vast majority of street people share this 
background of domestic violence and neglect. He thought that his grandmother might 
still be in a retirement home in Tucson, but it was too late to find her now. He 
sometimes lamented the loss of his family, longing for the opportunities that he saw 
other people enjoy. He knew that somewhere out there he had cousins, aunts and 
uncles that he had never met. But for all purposes, he was alone. 
With a new appreciation of the depth of his homelessness, I rephrased my 
question; I asked when he left the city of Hermosillo. He replied, satisfied with my 
new question, “about a month ago”, and he explained his motive for riding the trains 
along the route. He kept moving, because: 
There is much discrimination here in Mexico, when one does not have a job. They 
don’t respect you. They take your money, even your own police. The authorities take 
your money when you sleep in the street. 
 
Later in the conversation, he returned to this issue:  
Sometimes the Mexican authorities revise your backpack and take your money, even if 
you don’t have drugs or alcohol. When people see beggars, they call the police. But 
begging is not illegal. 
 
The Central Americans and transient Mexicans share a vulnerability to 
harassment and abuse by Mexican authorities, and in response, his travel group pooled 
their resources. He trusted his mixed band of Central Americans and Mexicans, even 
though he had only known his present companions for three or four days and they 
would go their separate ways soon: 
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When one goes in the street, when there is a multitude in the street, they unite to 
protect each other…Mexicans help everyone. We beg together, eat together, share 
cigarettes, everything, like brothers. 
 
While he felt at ease with his temporary band of brothers, the Mexican man 
described the discrimination that he suffered in the shelter system, on the basis of his 
nationality: 
In many shelters, they discriminate against you, in some no. When I ask for money in 
the street, they [people in general] don’t value me. I see how they look at me. I have 
had good jobs….I arrived in a shelter in Tierra Blanca with much hunger, but it was 
purely for Hondurans and Guatemalans. They are not for Mexicans. They said I could 
not go there. I can travel without papers in all Mexico, but I also have necessity. I have 
never liked a shelter. 
 
He had not yet mastered passing as a Central American migrant, but neither 
could he access his Mexican birthright. The man complained that many potential 
employers asked him for papers. Unfortunately, he had lost his identification card and 
lacked the means to replace it: “Now I am undocumented.” I asked him what this 
meant for his relationship to the Mexican authorities.  
Sometimes the authorities accuse me of being a pollero. In Guanajuato, we were a 
group, smoking cigarettes and migra arrived. They have a psychological capacity to 
tell who is Central American and Mexican… They thought I was the pollero. One 
wants to help his friends, but it’s dangerous. If I help, they think I am a pollero. I’ve 
lived with people from Chile, the United States, everywhere. 
 
It was clear to me that the undocumented Mexican man was not the smuggler 
in the group. The Mexican man’s younger, tattooed Honduran companion made the 
decisions, signaling when it was time to go and indicating the direction. I interviewed 
this companion, and he seemed to be a more experienced traveler along the route than 
the native Mexican. The Honduran immediately impressed me with an intimate 
knowledge its places, grinning broadly as he shared what he supposed were the sorts 
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of criminal secrets that would help a fledgling writer: “That’s good for your book, 
no?” 
But I was more interested in his personal story. He had grown up alone along 
the tracks, leaving a broken home in Tegucigalpa, Honduras at the age of 11. On that 
first journey, his best friend had been thrown from the train. After many adventures 
and four years of living in Mexico, he arrived in the United States, where he managed 
to stay for three years before being deported.25 He did not fear a second deportation 
from the United States to Honduras, because it would be an excuse for an interesting 
plane ride and then simply a new beginning of his travels. And if they put him in 
prison for illegal reentry, so much the better; at least he would eat well. But it was 
unclear whether he would ever again arrive at Mexico’s northern border. He claimed 
to be on his way north, but he was clearly leading a roving life through Mexico, 
probably involved in occasional smuggling or some other criminal activity. The 
undocumented Mexican man confirmed that they would probably head south together 
for reasons that remained mysterious, perhaps even to them. 
As they lose their claims to the status of legitimate migrants and legitimate 
citizens, these wanderers enter a liminal position within route. They are neither 
migrants nor citizens. As their faces become recognizable, rival smugglers and gangs 
may target them as potential competitors or enemies. Authorities may target them as 
smugglers. They make enemies by lingering on the route. However, these wanderers                                                         
25 His narrative also included the fact that he fell in love with a passing Honduran girl, who 
inspired him to accept the money from his brother to pay a coyote to get to the United States. 
Otherwise, he had been quite content to stay in Mexico. Women, courtship and unexpected 
love along the way propel the plot of many male migrants’ stories. Listening to this young 
man’s story and seeing the teardrop tattooed on his cheek reminded me powerfully of the 
movie Sin Nombre (2009).   
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sometimes develop social resources that bridge new communities with the route. 
Mexican families sometimes de facto adopt these Central American men as sons, and 
Central American migrants may de facto adopt their Mexican comrades as brothers. 
They may fall in love. They may become fathers of Mexican citizens along the way. 
They may become gang members or connect to smuggling networks. In the process, 
they bring news of distant events along the route with them. Thus, they embody both 
information and danger for others.   
Figure 6.4: The Work of Las Patronas 
  
 
 
Train riders catch bags of rice and beans in Amatlan de los Reyes, Veracruz. 
A group of good Samaritans, now famous across Central America and Mexico 
as ‘Las Patronas’, provides food and water to migrants. The core of the group 
consists of three generations of local women from the same extended family 
who organized spontaneously. They have distributed food to migrants for 
seventeen years. At many points in the route, migrants experience warm 
welcomes and Mexican hospitality (Photo Credit: Encarni Pindado). 
 
Improvisation and the Transnational Imaginary 
As the undocumented Mexican’s story suggests, these improvisations on 
nationality diffuse along the route, merging national habits and obscuring cultural and 
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racial boundaries while illuminating the arbitrariness of territorial boundaries. As 
Linda Scholssberg (2001, p.1-2) explains: 
Because of this seemingly intimate relationship between the visual and the known, 
passing becomes a highly charged site for anxieties regarding visibility, invisibility, 
classification, and social demarcation ….If passing wreaks havoc with accepted 
systems of social recognition and cultural intelligibility, it also blurs the carefully 
marked lines of race, gender and class, calling attention to the ways in which identity 
categories intersect, overlap, construct, and deconstruct one another….The passing 
subject’s ability to transcend or abandon his or her “authenthic” identity calls into 
question the very notion of authenticity itself. Passing, it seems, threatens to call 
attention to the performative and contingent nature of all seemingly “natural” or 
“obvious” identities. 
 
Circulating in gossip, advice and entertainment, stories about national 
performances and the ambiguities that accompany them have profound implications 
for the human security of migrants and citizens alike. For example, these ambiguities 
complicate the work of state authorities that rely on national stereotypes to carry out 
their official duties. Undocumented citizens may be wrongly deported. Passing also 
renders the enforcement of national boundaries problematic, as citizens and migrants 
come to share a transnational imaginary.   
An Autopsy of Performance  
I stared, transfixed by the digital photograph of the dead man displayed on the 
computer in the office of the migrant shelter (fieldnotes, Ixtepec, 11/4/10-11/5/10). I 
saw a young man with a tattoo around his neck and the initials ES tattooed in Old 
English across his chest. His face was swollen purple with dried blood filling his 
mouth, and he had a large open wound over his eye. His blackened legs twisted oddly. 
He had been thrown from a train two days prior. On his body, they found the artifacts 
of a transnational life: an identification card, recording a birth in Usulutan, El Salvador 
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in 1988, alongside a Six Flags 2010 season “Play Pass” issued in California less than 
seven months before his demise.  
The tattoos branded him as a gang member, but something was wrong with the 
official documents. They did not belong to him. One of the migrants in the shelter, 
peering over the shoulder of the office manager at the photos, had seen the boy in the 
photo on the identification cards alive and well on the tracks.   
The body had now become a prop in other people’s performances. His death 
sent a message: to fear the gangs and to obey their rules. And now his corpse played a 
part in a farcical death of another mysterious young man known along the route only 
by a nickname, not the words inscribed on his identification cards. That young man 
only survived a few months longer before disappearing. But the dead man, who lay 
there on the side of the train tracks, played these parts unknowing.    
Later that day, two men arrived, one of them wearing a black vest with the 
yellow letters AEI scrolled across the back.26 Whispers erupted among the migrants as 
they watched the office door close behind the police, and the speculative drama 
unfolding around the body hit a crescendo. Rumors circulated. At one point, someone 
claimed to know that the dead man was, in fact, Panamanian. But this theory was 
quickly dismissed; Panamanians do not usually run with the street kids that live along 
the tracks in Southern Mexico.27 The Mexican police had to identify the body to 
repatriate it through the appropriate consulate, and they asked the shelter for help. The 
shelter manager questioned the migrants known to have friends in the gangs, which 
                                                        
26 AEI stands for Agencia Estatal de Investigaciones, the State Agency for Investigations. 
27 In all my interviews, I encountered only one person from Panama. 
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includes most anybody who spends significant time living in the shelter.28 Several of 
the dead man’s closest friends could identify the victim only by his nickname and 
reputation, not his nationality or family names.  
Ultimately, the tattoo of a Salvadoran flag on his arm led to his burial in El 
Salvador, rather than an anonymous grave in Mexico. Together, shelter staff, migrants, 
Mexican police and Salvadoran consular officials came to a consensus about the 
national identity of the body, each performing a crucial role in its identification. They 
redefined their relationships with one another, in this instance collaborating to know 
the transnational route and the dangers that lurk along it. In accepting a conclusion, 
they renegotiated and reconfirmed the symbols and material that delineate nationality.  
This process continues in Mexico on a larger scale as forensic teams 
investigate mass graves of people presumed to be migrants, attempting to identify the 
proper consulates to carry home the bodies. In August 2010, Mexican authorities 
discovered a mass grave of 72 migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Brazil and Ecuador, but the nationality of 13 of those migrants could not be identified. 
Rather than flying home in flag-draped coffins with the bodies of their former travel 
companions, the remaining 12 were buried in a common grave in Mexico (Soberanes 
2012).29 That highly publicized massacre marked only the first discovery of a mass 
                                                        
28 As noted previously, most migrants cannot stay longer than three days. However, migrants 
who provide testimony about a violation of their human rights are eligible for a visa, and some 
of these eligible migrants may wait at the Ixtepec shelter for months as the legal process takes 
its course. Particularly vulnerable people, such as women and children, may also receive 
special permission to stay for a longer period of time. Finally, some migrants stay longer 
because they volunteer or become paid staff at the shelter as cooks, construction workers, etc. 
Each shelter has its own policy about these exceptions. 
29 For international media coverage of the return of the remains of eleven victims to El 
Salvador, including images of the flag draped coffins and ceremony, see 
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grave of migrants; more mass exhumations and repatriations of foreign nationals have 
followed.30 The bodies are props in the opening scene of an unfolding drama between 
competing drug gangs and smugglers, and the discovery of mass graves becomes the 
set for the next act in which national governments claim those bodies as citizens.   
Indeed, the process of repatriating the dead mirrors the process of identifying 
and deporting living migrants.31 To do so, forensic anthropologists search for the 
informal cultural tells that can help identify nationality, ranging from tattoos to the 
prayer cards of local saints to national currency (Reineke on BBC 2013). They 
improvise upon the objects intended for other purposes, things that are carried as an 
expression of faith, serve as personal mementos, or facilitate economic exchange; they 
must transform these artifacts into evidence supporting a performance of national 
sovereignty: repatriation.                                                                                                                                                                
http://mexico.cnn.com/mundo/2010/09/05/presidente-de-el-salvador-dice-que-hay-un-tercer-
sobreviviente-de-masacre.  
30 For this reason, human rights advocates, including groups of mothers of disappeared 
migrants in Central America, have called for a database of missing persons and DNA. The 
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have endorsed this plan, but the only 
institutionalized mechanisms for this process are at the U.S.-Mexico border. Since 2006, 
anthropologists Bruce Anderson and Robin Reineke have worked to identify the remains 
found at the U.S.-Mexico border, using a database of 1,300 missing persons reports, personal 
testimonies and DNA from family members of missing persons, and the possessions of the 
dead (Reineke on BBC 2013). The Human Rights Coalition/Indigenous Alliance without 
Borders (2013) claims that between 2000 and May 31, 2013, 2,595 bodies of border crossers 
have been recovered in the Arizona-Sonora desert. The Pima County morgue in Tucson, 
Arizona, where Reineke works, stores nearly 800 unidentified corpses of border crossers 
found in the desert with insufficient information to determine their nationality for repatriation. 
Reineke is currently writing her dissertation in cultural anthropology on this work at the 
University of Arizona.   
31 The fact that this process postmortem repatriation reconstitutes identity and relationships 
between governments and society has not gone unnoticed by scholars. For example, Adrian 
Felix (2011) describes the cultural and institutional transnational practice of the repatriation of 
deceased Mexican migrants, which involves a collaborative effort between social networks 
and multiple levels of government. Thomas M. Hawley (2002) discusses the cultural politics 
of identifying dead bodies and repatriating soldiers who have gone missing in action (MIA) 
during the Vietnam War. 
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A desire to provide closure to the families of the dead motivates 
anthropologists and human rights advocates, but in the process, they must learn to read 
nationality when it has been unintentionally obscured by transnational lifestyles or 
intentionally disguised to mislead police. Human rights advocates must convince 
families to collaborate with government bureaucrats and scientists to assign nationality 
and receive an institutional response (Reineke on BBC 2013).32 As they establish the 
nationality of the deceased, the participants in this drama redefine the roles of actors 
along the route, overcoming the contentious scripts that usually attend these 
relationships. With each repatriation performance, government officials, human rights 
advocates and migrant families collectively come to an ephemeral understanding of 
each other. 
Gender 
The precocious Salvadoran boy, who had spent months at the migrant shelter 
in Oaxaca, was at it again (fieldnotes 1/31/10). He had found a new way to attract the 
attention of the adults around him.  This time, however, he was performing gender, 
rather than nationality. On the cement patio outside the shelter office, several people 
danced to Cumbia music, breaking the monotony of a long evening. The shelter’s 
female attorney picked up a toddler and danced in circles with babe in arms, and a 
buxom black Honduran woman took the eight year-old Salvadoran boy as a partner.                                                         
32 Reineke (on BBC 2013) explains the process, “Because of the highly decomposed nature of 
the bodies, the calls I make are never as simple as, “I am sorry to inform you…” Instead, it’s 
the beginning of a process that could take months. It unfolds as a kind of negotiation between 
the scientists and the families. Both sides have the same goal- to find the missing person. But 
for the scientists, the problem is an unidentified dead body, whereas for the families, the 
problem is a missing living person. These realities pull them in opposite directions.” Neither 
scientist nor family member intend to renegotiate nationality, but repatriation of the body 
inevitably requires the imposition of citizenship on the corpse.  
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But the men gathered around the office began to shout to the boy that he should “stick 
her against the wall” and the scene morphed from a maternal moment into an overtly 
sexual spectacle. For her part, the woman seemed game to play along and suggestively 
shook to the rhythm. The boy, lacking in rhythm but not dramatics, lunged 
aggressively forward at her with his pelvis, pushing her against the wall as instructed 
by the male crowd. The grownups laughed, including the woman who was willing to 
let him try again and again.33 He was, after all, just a boy parodying male sexuality, 
not a ‘real’ man. While this performance clearly lampoons gender for the laughter of 
an idle audience, gender scripts are part of the survival repertoire of all migrants 
confronted with violence along the route: male and female, adult and child.  
The practice of unauthorized migration requires an array of social encounters 
through which gender is collectively reimagined by migrants, migration agents, 
humanitarian aid workers, kidnappers, smugglers and everyday people living along the 
route. Gender provides signals about trustworthiness, merit and vulnerability that can 
either facilitate movement across the terrain or impede it, depending on the context of 
the social encounter. At some times, ‘acting the man’ defines a variety of social 
encounters, negotiating respect while moving across terrain of gendered violence, and 
at other times, ‘acting the woman’ enables identification with ‘safe’ social roles 
replete with both material and symbolic resources for migration. People may 
                                                        
33 Judith Butler (1990, p.138-139) understands the eruption of this laughter as the symptom of 
a destabilization of identity caused by gender parody: “The parodic repetition of gender 
exposes as well as the illusion of gender identity as an intractable depth and inner substance. 
As the effects of a subtle and politically enforced perfomativity, gender is an ‘act’, as it were, 
that is open to splittings, self-parody, self-criticism, and those hyperbolic exhibitions of “the 
natural” that, in their very exaggeration, reveal its fundamentally phanstasmatic status….In 
this sense, laughter emerges in the realization that all along the original was derived.” 
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consciously perform ‘gender acts’ to convey these signals or they may simply exude 
such information as a consequence of an uncritically accepted identity (Butler 1990, 
p.140).  
While social networks carry helpful information, they also convey gossip that 
limits the capacity of migrants to improvise new social roles for themselves.34 Given 
the stigma endured by rape victims and promiscuous women, both the survival of 
sexual violence and the exercise of sexual freedom may require women to disconnect 
from existing social networks (Arguelles and Rivero 1993, p.269). While the 
migration literature puts a great emphasis on the capacity of migrants to leverage 
transnational relationships of trust and reciprocity as a social resource (e.g. Tilly 
2007), anonymity can also be an asset.35 To understand how migrants navigate 
gendered threats to migrants’ human security, we must go beyond networks to 
examine the performances enacted during the journey itself.  
Gendered Violence 
Human rights workers, government officials and migrants almost universally 
cite women as the most vulnerable group of migrants in transit across Mexico. 
Smugglers have long been notorious for coercing their female clients into sexual 
relationships during the journey. For this reason, Wendy Vogt (2012, p.252-255)                                                         
34 On the role of gossip in the reinforcement of traditional gender roles of the male family 
provider and female caregiver in transnational Mexican migrant communities see Joanna 
Dreby (2009); she views “transnational gossip as a form of social control” (p.43). 
35 For example, in describing the experience of a Mexican migrant woman who was raped 
while in the United States, Gloria Gonzalez-Lopez (2007, p.240) notes that “Although she 
experienced emotional trauma after being raped, geographical distance from her family and a 
sense of anonymity in a foreign country protected her from potential family confrontations and 
conflict, and feelings of shame, guilt and moral persecution.” This anonymity cannot 
compensate for the additional violence and “dangerous spaces” that migrant women must 
navigate after they have left home, but it can be a resource for survival. 
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argues that smuggling is an exploitive form of ‘intimate labor’ in which gender 
structures the protective services provided by men and the sexual payment expected 
from women. Indeed, many migrants understand that women must pay for passage 
with their body at various points along the route, an informal sexual tax for crossing 
territory leveraged against female migrants by drug gangs, bandits and corrupt 
officials. Over time, women’s undergarments began to litter the secluded footpaths 
leading around a notorious migration checkpoint known as ‘La Arrocera’ in Huixtla, 
Chiapas, such that the name of the place became nearly synonymous with rape. 
Bandits lie in ambush at isolated points along these paths throughout Mexico, 
demanding to know how many women travel with each group and raping them within 
full view of their travel companions. A male Honduran migrant (Lecheria, 7/14/11) 
explained the incident that befell his travel group while hiking an isolated path in Los 
Pozos, Tobasco: 
Three attackers assaulted us and held us at gunpoint for two hours. They raped the two 
women who traveled with their partners. They did not want money. It was only to rape 
the women. Honduran women are known to be beautiful. 
 
In addition to crimes of power and passion, a market for female sexual services 
produces additional economic incentives for the kidnapping and exploitation of 
women. The brothels in southern Mexico house multinational staff, trapped by varying 
levels of economic and overtly physical coercion (Casillas 2005; Kelly 2008; Vogt 
2012, p.244). Given the potential profit from sex trafficking, gangs and corrupt 
authorities sometimes target freight trains carrying crowds of migrant women, clinging 
to boxcars with their male counterparts in an attempt to avoid the highway migration 
checkpoints, for kidnapping. Across the globe, migration has served as a gateway into 
  
289  
sex trafficking networks, when traffickers pose as smugglers or labor recruiters, luring 
women away and abusing them as soon as they have left the protective confines of 
their homes.36 Central American migration through Mexico is no different.  
For these reasons, female migrants are extremely vulnerable to a variety of 
special dangers during the journey to the United States (Castro Soto et al. 2010, p.40). 
Of course, a preponderance of sociological and anthropological evidence documents 
how transnational migration is a fundamentally gendered social process (Donato et al. 
2006). Migrating men and women are unevenly empowered with the potential to both 
overturn and reinforce accepted gender norms (e.g. Boehm 2008; Hondagneu-Sotelo 
1994; Mahler 1999; Mahler and Pessar 2001; Mcilwaine 2010). Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that violence along the Central American migratory route is gendered.  
Ultimately, however, a study of gender performance en route says as much 
about men, masculinity and hidden sources of male vulnerability to violence, as it says 
about the human security of women in transit. Many forms of violence against men go 
unnoticed as gendered, when in reality, they are shaped by ideas about masculinity. 
When confronted with violence en route, migrants’ improvisations on gender scripts 
reshape what it means to be a man, as well as rewriting the social script for women. 
Estimates of the Scope of Violence 
Sexual violence against Central American migrants is real and abhorrent. 
Nevertheless, the public perception of women’s vulnerability to violence is a product 
of political contestation along the route. Human rights advocacy efforts for immigrants 
trade heavily on evocative stereotypes, unintentionally reaffirming gender                                                         
36 For an overview of global patterns of human trafficking and its relationship to smuggling, 
see Louise Shelley (2010). 
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dichotomies.37 Estimates of the frequency of sexual violence circulate in media, 
academic work and the advocacy community, but ultimately these numbers more 
accurately convey a subjective sense of the danger to women than an objective 
indicator of the risks.38 These estimates survive because they are useful for sharing a 
profound feeling of moral urgency and crisis, not because they are statistically 
reliable. For example, Amnesty International (2010, p.4) reports that: 
All irregular migrants are at risk of abuse, but women and children- particularly 
unaccompanied children- are especially vulnerable. They face serious risks of 
trafficking and sexual assault by criminals, other migrants and corrupt public officials. 
Although few cases are officially registered and virtually none are ever prosecuted, 
some human rights organizations and academics estimate that as many as six in 10 
women and girl migrants experience sexual violence during their journey.  
 
Given the wide range of estimates for the size of the migration flow north, this 
six in 10 figure for the frequency of sexual violence against female migrants surfaces 
with astonishing regularity in the media and in interviews with human rights activists. 
Occasionally, human rights workers and migrants will provide higher numbers. 
However, the six in 10 figure has become an artifact of the common knowledge of the 
route (Amnesty International 2010, p.15).39 The Amnesty International report cites 
Padre Father Heyman Vasquez Medina of the migrant shelter in Arriaga, Chiapas, 
interviews of representatives of prominent UN institutions and the National 
Commission of Human Rights in Mexico (CNDH), and a 1999 report edited by Mario 
                                                        
37 Similarly, in wartime, transnational advocacy networks use images of female victims to 
arouse indignation and spur action for humanitarian intervention, even when male 
noncombatants are most vulnerable to execution (Carpenter 2003).  
38 For a discussion of the political utility of unreliable numbers related to clandestine 
activities, including human trafficking, see the edited volume by Peter Andreas and Kelly M. 
Greenhill (2010). 
39Sonia Nazario (2006, p78.) also mentions the six in 10 figure, but she cites a 1997 University 
of Houston study. 
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Bronfman, Rene Leyva and Mirka Negroni. In turn, Bronfman, Leyva, Negroni (1999, 
p.22) cite an interview with the Pastoral de Movilidad Humana-Guatemela, noting 
that: 
In the case of undocumented migrant women, it is estimated that 60% have some 
sexual experience in her journey to the United States, from rape and coerced sex to 
companerismo [a sexual partnership born of necessity or convenience]. For the woman 
migrants that pay a guide, to have sex with him can be a form of protection that 
significantly reduces the monetary payment for his company and sexual assault by 
male migrants. The companerismo between guide and migrant may also represent a 
type of coincidence of interests between the two, in that sex constitutes the resource 
that facilitates the woman to achieve her goal of migration (my translation). 
 
It is unclear whether the Pastoral de Movilidad Humana-Guatemala conducted 
a survey to arrive at this statistic. The most likely origin of the number is a survey, 
either formal or informal, with female migrants at Catholic shelters. Each shelter 
keeps a registry with facts pertaining to the migrants that pass there, including reports 
of violations of human rights suffered during the journey. Estimates based on this 
source are not accurate generalizations about the prevalence of rape for all migrants 
along the route. First of all, sexual partnership based on necessity, convenience or 
trickery constitutes an ambiguous zone between consent and coercion.40 However 
appalling and repugnant material constraints and pressures for sexual choices might 
be, some women in these relationships do not view themselves as victims of rape.41  
                                                        
40 Vogt (2012, p.248) draws on the work of Stephen Donaldson (2004) on prison relationships 
and calls these “protective pairings”. 
41Similarly, Kay B. Warren (2010, p.122) notes that efforts to determine the scale of 
Colombian sex trafficking have been complicated by the fact that the women themselves do 
not view themselves as “victims”. Of course, the failure of victims to recognize violence for 
what it is may simply signal the normalization of violence (Hume 2004), as opposed to its 
absence, but this internalization of violence complicates its measurement. My point is that it is 
difficult to standardize a measure of rape to calculate an objective numerical estimate of its 
prevalence. 
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Second, surveys conducted in shelters likely suffer from a sample bias. The 
people that stay at migrant shelters, rather than private hotels and houses, are the 
poorest migrants. They have not usually paid for the most expensive smuggling 
arrangements from their home country that allow them to pass in private cars through 
bribed checkpoints on the highway. Some migrants arrive at the shelters seeking 
security or medical support in the wake of a disaster.  
Amnesty International (2010, p.15) also cites a survey by Gabriela Diaz and 
Gretchen Kuhner. Diaz and Kuhner (2007) find that approximately 26 percent of the  
women they surveyed in the Mexico City Detention Center, where migrants await 
deportation, had reported suffering physical or sexual violence in Mexico. While 
private security guards for the railroad company, smugglers and civilians (including 
other migrants and known travel companions) also victimize women, Mexican 
government authorities allegedly committed over half of these crimes. Migrants 
surveyed in deportation centers may be, as the report notes, reticent to report abuse for 
fear of retribution while in custody. However, migrants held in deportation centers 
may be more likely to have suffered violence, since corrupt state authorities appear to 
be responsible for many rapes and other assaults along the route.42 As a Salvadoran 
man attests (returned migrant, El Salvador, 4/9/10): 
I saw officials rape women. I don’t know if they were private security from the 
railroad or police. They wore blue and black uniforms. They ordered all the women 
off the train. They raped them, and then they let the women on their way. If you try to 
stop the women from  being raped, they’ll kill you. That sort of thing happens every 
day.                                                         
42 While the practice did not surface in my interviews, both Vogt (2012, p.212-214) and 
Frank-Vitale (2011) note that male Mexican authorities sometimes force female migrants to 
strip completely naked and then penetrate them. These authorities pretend sexual assaults are 
an effort to check migrants’ genitalia for drugs.  
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Indeed, the safest migrants, whether male or female, are probably those that 
never become available to surveys during their unauthorized journey. These migrants 
avoid the usual places that unauthorized people assemble might be safest, passing 
unseen through the countryside and blending into the Mexican population with the 
protections (however imperfect) afforded to citizens. The Amnesty International 
report’s title, Invisible Victims, is thus somewhat ironic. After all, it is the most visible 
migrants, identifiable as outsiders in illegal transit, who may be the most vulnerable to 
violence.43 The relationship between visibility and vulnerability complicates estimates 
of the proportion of migrants that suffer sexual violence. Their very availability for 
answering questions about their plight, their identifiable status as undocumented 
migrants along the route, indicates that they inhabit a special class of unusually 
vulnerable people.  
The point is that we know the situation is grave, but we cannot say exactly how 
many women, as a percentage of the unauthorized migration population, suffer rape. 
However valuable numbers about rape might be for advocacy and public awareness of 
the problem, we cannot easily extrapolate from these surveys to understand the 
experiences of a larger, unknown migrant population. While sexual violence is a clear 
and present danger to Central American women in transit, no reliable objective 
estimate exists for the risk at this time.  
Despite widespread belief in endemic sexual violence, I did not receive any 
first-person accounts of rape from victims themselves. This is surprising, because I 
interviewed women who (according to other reliable sources) had, in fact, been raped                                                         
43 Brigden and Frank-Vitale (2011) reflect on the ethical implications of this visibility and 
invisibility for researchers who document undocumented survival strategies. 
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during their journey.44 I also established a rapport in which they entrusted me with 
other sensitive information. This dearth of first-person accounts is particularly 
surprising, because both male and female migrants, as well as human rights advocates, 
told horrific third-person stories that include mutilation of genitalia or penetration with 
foreign objects. Some of these stories were eyewitness accounts of atrocities and 
others were rumors that had attained the status of urban legend. I received many first-
person reports of assault, sexual harassment or attempted rape. Most migrants, 
whether male or female, suffered at least a robbery during their journey.45  
Some victims of rape may have chosen to transform their personal experience 
into third-person accounts of violence suffered by “a friend” or shape their own first-
person narratives into close calls to avoid directly talking about their own experiences. 
The plot turn of the close call recurs in the interviews; several women escaped rape at 
the last moment through an incredible turn of events. Given the stigma and emotions 
triggered by sexual victimization, optimistic adaptations of narratives would be 
understandable. Selective silences in narratives are a means for surviving sexual 
violence, protecting reputation and redefining identity in its wake. These escape 
stories and stories of the experiences of acquaintances may be true. Or they may be a 
way for victims to signal the existence of violence without painfully casting 
themselves in the role of the victim during their interview performance.  
The Normative Context of Sexual Violence Against Women                                                         
44 During interviews about violence, I make an ethical decision not to press for information. I 
prefer to allow participants to set the terms of our conversation, and I listen patiently.  
45 Wendy Vogt (2012, p.68) notes the same tendency to provide third person accounts of 
violence in her interviews with Central American migrants. I am the colleague she cites 
(p.201-202).  
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To understand these performances, it is first necessary to contextualize the 
sexualized risks of migration within the social setting of the home and destination 
community. The violence en route does not represent a rupture in the lives of 
migrants, but an intensification, exposure and improvisation of gender routines that 
unfold across the Americas. In many ways, this gendered violence is an extension of 
sexual and gender norms in Central American communities of origin. As Mo Hume 
(2008, p.65) argues in the context of urban El Salvador, the demonstration of violence 
has become integral to the performance of masculine identity, and domestic violence 
against women reproduces a mythology of feminine chastity and obedience. These 
norms cannot be understood outside a patriarchal political economy that frequently 
relegates women in sending, transit and receiving societies to marginalized positions 
in the labor force, including unpaid and informally paid reproductive and sexual work 
frequently attended by physical abuse (Castro Soto et al. 2010, p.40).46 The 
vulnerabilities produced by this marginalization across the Americas erupt most 
spectacularly during the journey with physical violence against migrant women.  
Gossip about incest, polygamy and prostitution coerced by poverty saturates 
small towns in Central America; its frequency and normalcy constitutes a common 
knowledge.47 In my conversations during fieldwork in rural El Salvador, men and 
women often made allegations against neighbors and others in the community for 
                                                        
46 Mercedes Olivera (2006) describes violence against women and femicide in the U.S.-
Mexico border region as a product of polarizing economic dislocation.  
47 I was reminded of these stories when I delivered my son to a local public kindergarten in 
rural El Salvador and read a handwritten sign outside the door reminding older boys to 
“respect childhood” and look for their girlfriends elsewhere.  
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sexual misconduct or predatory behavior toward young women.48 Many of these 
narratives may be fictionalized to damage reputations in the context of other disputes 
or expressions of envy; nevertheless, the apparent believability of the narratives to the 
storytellers (who find some social or emotional benefit from telling their stories), 
reinforced by the frequent sight of underage pregnant girls, suggests a routinization of 
sexual violence.  
Domestic violence, on the other hand, attains a normalcy that is hardly worth 
commenting on in Latin America, except by a handful of survivors (both wives and 
children) or when rumors implicate public figures.49 In El Salvador, like the rest of 
Central America, the lack of public outrage about the level and severity of domestic 
violence does not signal its absence (Hume 2008). Nor does it indicate an ignorance of 
the prevalence of domestic violence or a lack of public visibility, but instead points to 
a conscious ignoring (p.67). While domestic violence extends to the elite class, poor 
                                                        
48 Such stories included mothers selling the virginity of their daughters to wealthy men, 
accounts of child molestation, poor women prostituting themselves in front of their children, 
grown men attacking their teenage relatives within the home, female promiscuity and male 
polygamy. In only one account, authorities punished the perpetrator of child molestation, a 
local schoolteacher. For the most part, predatory behavior toward young women receives an 
official impunity. Instead, alleged victimizers may be punished informally by gossip, and 
potentially, when a male family member learns of misbehavior toward his kin, violent family 
retribution. In fact, a nun in one Salvadoran town, the town’s most vocal proponent of 
collaboration with the police during a local crime wave, expressed the belief that there should 
be limits to trust and community engagement with authorities, because the police themselves 
were so notorious for their sexual misconduct. She cited the rape of a mentally ill woman 
inside the local police station, and she worried about the safety of all young local girls. 
49 It is worth noting that I viewed some Central American childrearing practices as “domestic 
violence” when the participants in these practices understood them as a legitimate form of 
discipline of children. When my own son had a temper tantrum in the town square, the female 
vendors shook their heads at my mothering and inquired why I did not hit him. By their 
standards, I had been gentle to the point of negligent permissiveness and my ‘non-violent’ 
parenting constituted, at its worst, a form of abuse.  
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women have few opportunities to escape it.50 Partnerships of convenience are not only 
conceived along the route, but also under conditions of scarcity and violence at home.  
Of course, sexual violence and domestic violence continue after a ‘safe’ arrival 
in the United States (Arguelles and Rivero 1993, p.265; Gonzalez-Lopez 2007; Perilla 
1999).51 Despite relatively effective institutions for sanctioning sexual predators, in 
the United States, the Center for Disease Control (2010, p.20) estimates nearly one in 
five women living in the United States has been raped in her lifetime. And an 
estimated 44.6 percent of all women living in the United States have suffered sexual 
violence other than rape, including sexual coercion and other unwanted sexual 
experiences (p.19). Thus, sexual assaults are not aberrations in societies through which 
migrants cross, but a product of entrenched routines in home, transit and destination 
communities. Sexual violence is not exotic. 
For this reason, men and women cope with gendered violence from home 
through destination and back again. Many of the gender scripts performed in transit 
have parallel performances at home. In interviews, some women had hoped to escape 
these violent and oppressive gender scripts by fleeing to the United States, but found 
them reproduced throughout the journey. The experience of unauthorized migration 
both increases vulnerability to sexual violence along the route and decreases it by 
providing an escape route (Castro Soto et al. 2010). Gendered violence constitutes the 
route, from start to finish, such that navigating it is often less about avoiding                                                         
50 Indeed, the difficult escape from domestic violence in Central America recently (and 
belatedly) received recognition in U.S. asylum practices (Lieberman 2011).   
51 Lourdes Arguelles and Anne M. Rivero (1993, p.265) document a case of a racially charged 
rape of a female migrant committed by U.S. border patrol. Sylvanna Falcon (2007 [2001]) 
documents several such cases and argues that rape is used as a systematized weapon for 
territorial control along the U.S.-Mexico border.   
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victimization and more about surviving victimization. For many women, migration is a 
choice between victimization abroad and victimization at home. Thus, the boundaries 
of sexual coercion and consent are continually renegotiated in home, transit and 
destination communities, and we should be careful not to treat the route as the only 
space of violence against migrant women.   
Nevertheless, the renegotiation of sexual violence that occurs along the route 
occurs in a liminal space that alters the visibility of sexual violence. In the context of 
the route, women find themselves disconnected from protective social structures of 
home, and in particular, systems of family retribution that punish perpetrators of 
violence. Both the fear of corrupt officials (who often commit these crimes) and a fear 
of deportation undermine the threat of legal punishment of migrants’ rapists.  
Thus, migrant women find themselves in a state of heightened vulnerability to 
rape that is simultaneously anonymous and public. On the one hand, far from home, 
women can sometimes hide their victimization from their family, such that the rape 
does not become common knowledge in their home. Distance provides deniability, 
shielding women from sexual stigmata. Instead, they remain anonymous victims of a 
crime that everyone understands is endemic along the route. On the other hand, rape 
that occurs during the journey is witnessed by their travel party, rather than hidden 
behind closed doors. As a public event, this sexual violence often takes extraordinary 
forms and life-threatening levels of physical abuse.  
Race and nationality intersect with gender to produce this spectacle of sexual 
violence along the route, and it is therefore distinct, but not disconnected, from the 
private victimization suffered at home. In Mexico, sexual predators target Central 
  
299  
American women, not only because their victims are women, but because they are 
migrants. For example, Wendy Vogt (2012, p.172 & 245) and Patty Kelly (2008) 
document the racialization of sex work, in which Central American women are 
delegated to services deemed “dirty” and Salvadoran women are stereotyped as 
prostitutes. Thus, this practice of gendered violence also becomes a means through 
which nationality and gender become emotionally inscribed into the lived experience 
of migrants, as corrupt officials and criminals prey upon migrants.  
In this manner, rapists along the route improvise upon the routines of sexual 
violence in home and destination communities. The proliferation of transnational 
street gangs, vectors for these practices, plays a role in rising levels of public rape of 
young women in Central American home communities (Rubio 2011). Thus, just as the 
normative context of home and destination provide the routines upon which predators 
improvise, the renegotiation of gender that occurs along the route also diffuses into the 
societies through which it passes over time, slowly eroding the human security of the 
marginalized citizens living along it. 
Ex Post Facto Justifications for Sexual Violence Against Women 
Departure from the scripts associated with accepted gender roles provides an 
ex post facto justification for sexual violence.52 Gender stereotypes and morality 
                                                        
52In a study of rural Guatemalan women, Cecilia Menjivar (2008, p.127) writes that, “ Gender 
ideologies create spheres of social action that not only contribute to normalize these 
manifestations of violence but also justify punishments for deviations from gender role 
expectations. This is manifested in imposed demarcations between public and private spaces 
and in the resultant restriction of women’s movement, as well as in practices that are more 
directly physically violent, such as abductions of women before the marry (robadas).” 
Likewise, in the context of urban San Salvador, Hume (2008, p.67-68) finds that “Blaming 
women for men’s violence is not uncommon, and men often draw upon a repertoire of 
gendered codes to legitimize their violence and enforce social notions of “appropriate” 
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legitimate violence against women in Central America and Mexico (Castro Soto et al. 
2010, p.43; Hume 2008). In an extension of gendered travel norms accepted in many 
home communities53, many male migrants explained that women who travel without 
the protection of a brother, father or husband would be more likely to invite sexual 
abuse from coyotes or travel companions. Traveling to unknown territory alone 
represents a transgression of women’s traditional roles. Several men explained that 
without a close relationship to a female victim, a male hero would suffer extreme 
violence if he attempted to intercede on her behalf. Only fathers, brothers and 
husbands or lovers, not the women themselves and certainly not unrelated bystanders, 
have the right to protest.  
Several men, when confronted with a situation where a rape seemed immanent, 
ran away from the scene of the crime, complaining that they had no choice if they 
wanted to survive; “The guides treated the people well, except for the abuse of a few 
young women. Not all the guides abused the women, only some…[But he does not 
know for sure, because] if you see something like that, you must run” (Honduran 
migrant, Ixtepec, 3/29/11). Indeed, despite a widespread belief that male guardianship                                                                                                                                                                
behavior for women…The policing of women’s behavior is key to this dynamic, and it is 
popularly believed that men have the right to punish women who deviate from the acceptable 
notions of femininity.” 
53I came to a personal understanding of these gendered spatial limitations. As a female 
researcher frequently walking alone during fieldwork, men on remote rural roads would 
occasionally ask me if I was afraid I would be “stolen” or kidnapped. At first, I naively 
thought they were either threatening or warning me. Only later did I realize that it was meant 
to be a compliment. I felt a strong sense of revulsion at flattery conveyed in a language of 
gendered violence, but my female Salvadoran friends simply shrugged when I recounted these 
stories. When I experienced an unexceptional mugging in San Salvador and reported the crime 
to police, much to my chagrin, the police asked me why I was walking without my husband 
anyway. And on several other occasions in Mexico, men (many of them traveling long 
distances alone) marveled aloud that my husband permitted me to travel alone. Similarly, 
Wendy Vogt (2012, p.67), another young female researcher, also reported frequently being 
asked why her husband allowed her to walk alone during her fieldwork on the route. 
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is safer for a woman, even husbands or fathers who attempt to protect their wives or 
daughters from abuse have been assaulted, raped or killed by marauding gangs and 
kidnappers. 
Other men explained their hesitancy to protect female travel companions from 
sexually aggressive coyotes (human smugglers), because they believe that some 
women want to be coerced into having sex. One Salvadoran man echoed a common 
sentiment, though rarely explained to me so directly. When I asked him whether the 
coyotes mistreated women, he responded with laughter before answering (returned 
migrant, El Salvador, 1/27/10): 
Yes. Very humble women are easy to intimidate. But forceful women don’t have a 
problem with their coyotes...The coyote might tell them that he will leave them, and 
then they go with him. But they don’t really have to. They just want to do it. Maybe 
they like him or something. Some women just want an excuse.  
 
This man did not view all coerced sex as rape. In fact, the virtues of 
unaccompanied women may be suspect. For this reason, some men may not feel 
compelled to intervene to protect them from sexual predators. Of course, migrants’ 
trepidation to jeopardize their safety for a stranger can be understood when even male 
relatives of women have been savagely beaten or murdered attempting to shield their 
loved ones from sexual assault. In reality, even women traveling under the auspices of 
their male protectors suffer violence en route, particularly at the hands of organized 
bandits, gangs and kidnappers (as opposed to the unarmed opportunists within the 
woman’s own travel group that also prey on unaccompanied women). However, 
norms that circumscribe the boundaries of accepted female behavior provide a 
convenient excuse for non-intervention by male witnesses. Occasionally, these men 
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may play their gender role in bad faith, knowingly looking the other way when 
confronted with the rape of a female travel companion.  
Surviving Violence through Improvisation 
To survive this violence, women improvise upon traditional gender roles. The 
availability of multiple gender scripts provides a key resource for migrants as they 
trespass across national borders, negotiate encounters with strangers and navigate a 
terrain of gendered violence. The performance of gender can facilitate passage. First, 
female migrants sometimes self-consciously perform gender scripts of virtue; they 
might dress conservatively and pray auspiciously, such that they demand the respect of 
their travel companions through an enactment of feminine worthiness. They may seek 
the support of older, nonthreatening males in the group to play support in this role. In 
this way, they may perform chastity. One woman recounted how a man in her group, 
knowing that she was a religious woman, pretended to be her husband, and thereby 
saved her from a rape at the hands of her smugger. Several men told stories about 
protecting deserving women, who demonstrated their chastity in their pious and 
humble demeanor, from sexual abuse by smugglers. 
Second, women may perform ostensibly masculine scripts. This survival 
strategy may include the improvisation of dress, manner and habits commonly 
perceived as male attributes (Arguelles and Rivera 1993, p.268; Nazario 2006, p.78). 
In a more subtle gender performance, women may signal sexual unavailability through 
posturing and bluff. A woman explains the advice she gave to her daughter (returned 
migrant, El Salvador, 1/19/10): 
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When you are on the road, you must be strong. I had heard that coyotes sometimes 
sexually abuse their women clients. I think that happens to the humble, delicate ones. 
If you have strength of character, you will be OK. I never showed any weakness, 
never complained. That is the advice I gave my daughter: never show any weakness, 
be forceful and strong, have strength of character. My daughter is very delicate, very 
feminine…I told her not to be scared. No one is going to touch you. If you shake with 
fear, tell them you are shaking with anger. Shout. Be forceful. If it is time to run, be 
the first to respond to the command. Run faster than the others. Never show weakness. 
If they try to touch you, dare them and threaten them. Tell them you don’t need a man 
to protect you. And that’s what she did. The coyotes tell the women, if you sleep with 
me, I’ll protect you and make sure you get there. When the man said that to my 
daughter, she said, “My mom is paying my trip. So, you will protect me and get me 
there. I don’t need you.”   
 
This bravado does not protect against victimization by gang members, corrupt 
officials or kidnappers. The safety produced by such a performance is nothing more 
than smoke and mirrors. However, this posturing may scare away the most timid 
sexual aggressors among a woman’s travel companions, prevent milder forms of 
sexual coercion by guides, and provide women with a sense of empowerment, strength 
and calm to cope with emergencies. Unfortunately, such bravado also deteriorates 
quickly into blaming the victim, thereby reinforcing the misconception that women 
that have coerced sex with guides do so voluntarily. 
Third, some women do enter temporary sexual partnerships with guides or 
travel companions, not because they are coerced, but because they are truly convenient 
or desirable. In one instance, a teenage girl cried inconsolably after her advances on an 
older male coyote were rejected as improper (returned female migrant, El Salvador, 
2/6/11). Some guides do not sexually exploit their clients, and some women desire 
their travel companions. Furthermore, some of these partnerships may be more equal 
than others, and the woman’s primary function in the relationship may not necessarily 
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be sexual. A Honduran man explains why he partnered with a woman to travel north, 
rather than a man (Tenosique, 6/2/11): 
I don’t have money for the bus. But thanks to her, we can go in “puro ride” [only 
hitchhiking]. With her along, people don’t have as much fear and stop to give a ride. 
With her along, we can eat. If I beg for food, they don’t give me anything. If she asks, 
they give us food….You cannot trust in male friends….but a woman is different. Yes, 
there is more risk. But they give food to her. When we ask…when a “hembra” 
[woman/hen] asks. She supports me. I had a thorn in my foot and she took it out for 
me. On the road, women suffer more. 
 
It would be naïve to think that his female companion’s sexual services might 
not have played a role in the partnership or possibly provided occasional payments for 
the rides in private cars that he has enjoyed during the journey. However, there is a 
long list of qualities that make traveling with a woman desirable to men, many of them 
tied to female archetypes of the innocent young woman or the caretaking mother. 
Begging, in particular, is a form of street theater that may play on gender stereotypes 
for financial gain (Goffman 1959). Regardless of where we draw the boundaries of 
consent under such conditions of deprivation, it would be equally naïve to think that 
women do not leverage these stereotypes to achieve their goals and manipulate their 
travel companions en route.54 
Fourth, some women become predators, in part to avoid further victimization. 
In fact, some women come to play vital roles in smuggling and trafficking networks, 
leveraging the innocent and maternal identities associated with their sex to recruit 
women as clients or pass authorities inconspicuously as couriers.55 Women sometimes                                                         
54 Menjivar (2000, p.71) also discusses how women leverage pity during the journey. 
55 Robert Brenneman (2012, p.35) describes women playing these roles in transnational street 
gangs in Central America. However important their role and their capacity to leverage their 
femininity to subvert the law, women are usually excluded from the decision making 
hierarchy in such social formations. 
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play the role of bait, luring male victims to ambush with the promise of sex. Women 
generally tend the drop houses of both smugglers and kidnappers along the route 
through Mexico, performing the traditional feminine labors required to accomplish 
criminal activities: cooking, cleaning, and other caretaking.  
Some female smugglers use their gender as a selling point to attract potential 
clients, particularly young female migrants who fear sexual assault by their guides. 
Nonetheless, trusting a smuggler on the basis of her gender can lead to a disaster. As 
scholarship on transnational prostitution rings increasingly acknowledges, female 
victims of sex trafficking sometimes rise through the ranks to play a role of madam, 
blurring the boundary between victim and perpetrator in complex ways (Siegel and de 
Blank 2010, p.436-437). Female migrants may recruit other migrants for smugglers or 
sell them to kidnappers. In such instances, the boundaries between victim and 
perpetrator are fluid. Women may leverage traditional gender roles to become 
perpetrators of violence or simply to escape victimization. 
A Woman’s Odyssey 
Each woman may employ multiple strategies over the course of a journey, 
switching ably among different performances of femininity. For example, in the 
courtyard of the shelter at San Luis Potosi, I met a Honduran woman who had both 
played a maiden in distress and assertively challenged domestic violence. For most of 
her life, she had played the dutiful daughter and niece, but then ultimately displayed 
immense independence to continue her journey unaccompanied. 
She had traveled with an unreliable uncle told me how she had passed along 
the route. Articulate and confident, she had very expressive lips, occasionally jutting 
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sideways or forming a sardonic curl as she spoke. She is on her way to New York 
City, and I could easily envision her future success there. She had been studying 
nursing, but could not get a job in Honduras. She had been living with some other 
young single girls in Tegucigalpa, but her flatmates had too many boyfriends and bad 
habits. She did not approve of their lifestyle. So, the young woman left Honduras with 
her uncle and his wife, a trusted travel party. Her uncle had lived in San Luis Potosi 
for many years and knows Mexico very well. He promised her parents that she would 
be safe with him, and he promised that he would never abandon her on this route. But 
the trip had not gone as planned. People changed en route. 
Exhibiting obvious revulsion at the memory, the young woman told me that 
her uncle made her beg for money twice. The experience of that humiliation made her 
cry. She did not want to beg. They rode two trains through Tobasco to Coatzacoalcos, 
Veracruz, which at the time of the interview in the summer of 2011 would have been 
very dangerous route segments. The attention she received on the train was awful, 
“The way men look at a woman, any woman, when they board the train is 
overwhelming. And the women must pee at the side of the train. The men do not turn 
away. They watch.” She tried to urinate in a ravine, where she could not be seen by 
male onlookers from the roof of the train, but as a consequence, she almost missed the 
train and had to board it moving. She nearly fell. She could not get on. A Salvadoran 
smuggler on the train ran to her and pulled her aboard before she could fall underneath 
the accelerating locomotive. After her rescue, she was in shock and did not even feel 
where her leg had hit the train. She did not know she was bleeding. The pills she took 
  
307  
to stay awake on the train had made her dazed and numb. She kept popping pills out of 
fear of falling asleep on the train. 
From Coatzacoalcos, they went by bus to avoid kidnappers; but the migration 
authorities caught her uncle and his wife. The two of them had gotten their stories 
confused on the bus. He had said his wife was from Chiapas, and his wife had said she 
was from San Luis Potosi. So, they had to pay a bribe of seven hundred pesos each to 
continue. The young woman avoided capture by clinging to a young man in the seat 
next to her like a lover. He was surprised by the sudden amorous attention. In 
explanation, she whispered “help me, help me.” He replied, “So, you’re not from 
here” and took his cue to play along. As she reenacted the story for me, looking 
coquettish, I could imagine the flattery felt by the young man; it is not difficult to 
understand his impulse to cooperate in the ruse. 
Their little party of travelers passed along the route in this way and everything 
was fine, but in San Luis Potosi her uncle changed. He started drinking and smoking 
marijuana. He began to beat his wife, and there are two things that this young woman 
emphatically does not approve of: “The first is abortion. The second is hitting 
women.” So, she stood up to him. She told her uncle that he was not in the right and 
that he had to stop, but then he attacked her too; “He grabbed me by the throat, with 
his disgusting [long] nails breaking the skin under my chin. It was revolting. And he 
threatened me with his machete.” She did not tell her parents. She thinks her uncle’s 
wife did. Then her uncle’s wife ran away, stealing all the young woman’s belongings, 
including her Honduran identification, thereby leaving her fully and truly 
undocumented. After his wife’s departure, the uncle left her at the shelter, explaining 
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that she would be safe there, and he went north to the Mexican border town of Piedras 
Negras alone. Her parents will never forgive him, not for the abuse or making her beg, 
and the truth is that she has a hard time forgiving him too. He had promised never to 
leave her alone. 
Now she is afraid. Along the way, she heard the stories about sexual assaults 
from other migrants: “They say one woman was thrown from the train naked after a 
rape.” In another place along the route, they had raped two women just before she and 
her uncle had traveled past the spot. With increasing news about the kidnappings in 
the media, the family member who originally offered to pay for her trip has changed 
his mind, saying it is now too dangerous and she should just go home. But she refuses 
to go home. She made it all this way. She already suffered so much.  
A friend in the United States has promised to arrange for a safe coyote. The 
first contact she made did not work out.  He was a cheap coyote, but he was not a good 
person. He wanted her to stay at his ranch, alone with him, for fifteen days awaiting 
the departure to the border. So, he lost her confidence.  
While she waited for the arrangements to be made and the money saved, she 
decided to rent an apartment with an older Salvadoran migrant she met at the shelter. 
She advised me that is best to stick to mature people, rather than younger people, who 
she does not trust. She does not even trust other Hondurans. The attackers on the train 
“come from the same race”; they too are Central Americans, and “It is no wonder why 
so many towns don’t want the migrants. Bad people come too. Not most people, but 
some.” One town ran to the tracks, shouting at the migrants “We are calling the migra! 
We are sending the police!” She asked her uncle why they do that, and he explained 
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that many Central Americans have done bad things as they pass. Clearly, solidarity 
among Honduran travel companions does not guard women from abuse; Central 
Americans also commit a variety of offenses against both Mexican communities and 
other migrants, cooperating with human traffickers and bandits.  
Her story describes how gender shapes a migration journey, generating both 
resources and risk. As Oscar Castro Soto et al. (2010, p.37) argue, gender structures 
migration journeys, in ways that both limit and facilitate them. Meanwhile, migration 
journeys also transform gender, restructuring power relations between men and 
women as they re-negotiate their relationships en route and unlock new resources 
(p.37). This woman’s story illustrates the crosscutting role that gender plays in 
mobility. 
Given the common knowledge of women’s vulnerability to violence and their 
perceived physical weakness, female migrants may have an easier time appealing for 
help in times of danger or scarcity. In these situations, femininity, properly reenacted, 
may generate a positive reaction from potential benefactors. While the experience of 
begging was an unwilling humiliation for this young woman, female migrants may 
receive resources inaccessible to a destitute man. She could also improvise the role of 
a lover to pass, in this case without the need to provide sexual services. Indeed, several 
women extolled their relative ease of passing migration checkpoints without suspicion 
or with the willing collaboration of chivalrous (or in a more jaded reading, sexually 
interested) men around them. 
Of course, there is no denying the overwhelming gender-specific dangers she 
faces en route. Women must cope with an ever-present threat of sexualized violence 
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from both acquaintances and strangers, in private as well as public. Through her 
uncle’s actions, dangers followed this woman from home and erupted as soon as she 
was far from the protection of her father. Her attempts to avoid or refute gendered 
violence or harassment compromised her safety in other ways, isolating her from 
others and prolonging her journey north. Not only did she part ways with her uncle, 
she nearly fell under a train maintaining her dignity.  
Nevertheless, she is improvising resources for a dignified life. When I spoke 
with her, she was in the process of meeting new people, finding new partners and 
continuing onward despite explicit instructions to return home. To do so, she engages 
in a series of gendered performances that define her relationships with newly 
acquainted men and women, and thereby potentially generate new social networks. 
Disobeying her former male guardians and finding people willing to accommodate her 
migratory goals, thereby asserting even greater personal autonomy from her parents, 
she redefined what it means to be a woman.56 
Masculinity and Hidden Vulnerability 
Migrants redefine femininity during their journey, but they also redefine 
masculinity during their journey. Both femininity and masculinity provide resources 
for migrants. And even as human rights groups heighten visibility of female 
vulnerability, men continue to face hidden risks along the route. While sexual violence 
is a real and clear danger to migrant women, it is unclear that female migrants are                                                         
56 In her study of the role of gender in Mexican migration, Pierette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994, 
p.85) notes that women face more obstacles when family resists their migration decisions, 
because only men are expected to act autonomously. Through migration and settlement 
women reshape these expectations. Deborah A. Boehm (2008) warns us that the dialectic 
between migration and gender norms may not ultimately be emancipatory for women. Men 
reassert themselves and improvise upon their own traditional roles. 
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more vulnerable than men to many forms of violence, ranging from deportation to 
homicide. Indeed, some men also suffer rape, but with the additional stigma of 
homosexuality, they may be even less likely to admit to such victimization. If women 
have difficulty recounting stories of sexual assault when such violence is widely 
recognized as a sad reality, many episodes of male rape may simply be unspeakable. 
Furthermore, there are several dangers specific to male roles. These dangers 
arise from a normalization of an aggressive masculinity. As explained by Hume (2008, 
p.65-66): 
Failure to conform to this model means that manliness is questioned….Violence, 
drinking and womanizing have become so bound up with dominant constructs of 
maleness that they are seen as natural. This is to be expected. The model of hegemonic 
masculinity denies men agency, choice, and the possibility of being different. 
 
Regardless of whether men conform to this construction of masculinity in 
reality, its first consequence is the vulnerability of male migrants to the accusation of 
being a rapist and subsequent attack by local lynch mobs. All men are rendered 
suspect for their sexually aggressive tendencies, but foreign wanderers may be 
particularly suspect. In July 2008, a local mob overran the migrant shelter in Ixtepec 
with gasoline, a tire, rocks and sticks when a rumor circulated that one of the migrants 
had raped a local child.57 The crowd of townspeople, accompanied by local 
authorities, went as far as threatening to burn the priest who refused them entry, but 
eventually dispersed without bloodshed (Mexican activist, Ixtepec, 10/19/10). From 
the perspective of some Mexican locals, these actions express the popular will and 
moral outrage against injustices committed by migrants; from this perspective,                                                         
57 Brigden (2012), Ruiz Parra (2011) and Vogt (2012, p.300), among others, have all retold 
this now legendary story of the rape allegations and subsequent storming of the Ixtepec 
migrant shelter. 
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collective violence is democratic action and the survival of the Ixepec shelter 
represented a miscarriage of justice, likely the consequence of backroom deals by 
elites in the capital (Mexican community members, Ixtepec, 3/31/11; 4/1/11).58 
Rumors and local newspaper stories with accusations of migrant involvement in rape 
circulate with some frequency, and communities along the route fear the roving bands 
of men in transit, complaining that “they drink, drug and lack respect” bringing 
prostitution, criminal predators and contamination to the city. The attack in Ixtepec 
was not an isolated attack on a migrant shelter under the pretense of evicting potential 
threats. In July 2012, locals in Lecheria in central Mexico attacked migrants and 
successfully demanded the closure of the migrant shelter (Taniguchi 2012). Indeed, a 
broader vigilantism has surged in Mexico in the wake of the drug war (Casey 2013). 
As a Mexican community member sympathetic with the migrants explained, 
“…the most serious thing is the rape of a girl. It is the worst rumor that you can make. 
There have been many victims of this type of rumor.” I paused her and asked if 
someone intentionally generates the rumors to harm the migrants. She answered, “Yes. 
But the funny thing is that they invent it, and at the same time, they believe it” 
(Mexican community member, Ixtepec, 3/31/11). Migrant men, whether or not they 
behave according to the masculine stereotypes embodied in such gossip, are most 
vulnerable to these rumors and the possibility for vigilante justice that lurks within 
them.                                                         
58 In her analysis of the increased frequency of lynchings in rural Guatemala since the 1990s, 
Angelina Snodgrass Godoy  (2004 p.623) argues that these ritualistic public performances of 
justice can be understood as “the unsurprising result of the inevitably truncated, eviscerated 
forms of democracy more aptly termed polyarchy that contemporary geopolitics have installed 
in much of the developing world.” 
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Secondly, male migrants face the possibility of being trafficked as combatants 
in the drug war. Staff at one migrant shelter claimed that competing drug gangs recruit 
migrant men as assassins, sending them to clandestine camps for training (shelter staff, 
7/17/11). Some of this recruitment is done via a personal invitation, not coerced. 
Sometimes they select young men living on the fringes of society, Mexican or Central 
American, because they embody the qualities of toughness and cleverness. Men with 
military or police experience are particularly sought after. Some recruits may reject an 
overture to join the ranks of a gang and live to tell the tale, as long as they withstand 
intimidation and persuasively deny any loyalties to a competing criminal group. 
However, failed recruitment by a drug gang can end tragically for the migrant (e.g. 
Salvadoran migrant, Saltillo, 7/19/11).  
In the absence of reliable survey data, it is impossible to know how many 
forced combatants fill the ranks of warring drug gangs in Mexico. Furthermore, 
similar to the partnerships of convenience between migrants along the route, the 
relationship between a gang and its membership often exists in a gray zone between 
coercion and choice, victim and victimizer. The level of coercion in this relationship 
fluctuates overtime.59 Furthermore, this violence is not limited to migrants. 
As long as the division of labor is traditionally gendered, the drug war statistics 
will reflect a far greater proportion of male fatalities, because they have been 
customarily associated with the role of combatant in both criminal and state violence. 
Of course, these gender scripts are not static. The Mexican State Statistics Agency                                                         
59 For example, Brenneman (2012) studies the opportunities and motivations of young men 
who desert their Guatemalan street gangs. He argues that it their choices, beginning with 
recruitment, are a process that evolves overtime. 
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(INEGI) projected 120,000 total homicides between 2007 and 2012 (Molzahn, 
Rodriguez and Shirk 2013, p.13). Of these homicides, the Mexican government and 
prominent media estimate that organized criminal groups are responsible for 
approximately 50,000 deaths (p.14). The proportion of murdered women among these 
known drug war deaths, including known assassinations of female journalists and 
officials among others, nearly doubled between 2008 and 2011 (Molzahn, Rios and 
Shirk 2012, p.20). The Violence and Victims Monitor dataset found that 9% of 3,053 
murders committed by organized criminal groups between 2006 and 2012 were 
killings of women (Molzahn, Rodriguez and Shirk 2013, p.29). Neither male nor 
female victims of this violence were necessarily involved in any criminal activity.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that Mexican drug gangs no longer view women as 
noncombatants and have learned how to leverage murders of women for the spread of 
terror. Increasingly, they have also recruited women into their ranks of assassins, 
distributors and couriers (Correa-Cabrera quoted by Martinez 2013); Mexico 
incarcerated over 10,000 women for federal crimes in 2011, a tremendous increase 
since 2007 (Cave 2011; Turkewitz 2013). Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera (quoted by 
Martinez 2013) notes that modernization and economic desperation has brought 
women into nontraditional roles, including participation in criminal activity, just as it 
has brought women into the migratory route. However, the social camouflage of 
lingering gender traditions generates opportunities for women engaged in such 
activity, helping them move through the population without arousing suspicion. Some 
Central American migrant women and children, like their Mexican counterparts, are 
recruited into drug gangs for this reason. The fact that women remain a minority 
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among violent criminals facilitates the transgressions of the law by a few. Thus, gangs 
and perpetrators of violence also improvise upon traditional gender roles with 
deleterious consequences for both men and women. 
Thirdly, masculinity may generate pressures for risk taking and belligerent 
behaviors: drinking, fighting, womanizing, high stakes gambling, joining gangs and 
other acts of daring can earn men respect among peers.60 If anyone is at greatest risk 
of violence, it is the migrants (usually men) who drink to excess during their journey 
or seek drugs; migrant men who stumble from the notorious bars along the train tracks 
regularly receive machete wounds in robberies committed by either locals or 
transnational street gangs. In Ixtepec, Oaxaca, migrant shelter staff estimated that such 
attacks come to their attention about once a week (e.g. 10/19/10; 11/30/10; 2/1/11). 
Men that engage in these behaviors also jeopardize their travel companions. However, 
these male victims do not fit neatly in the moral discourse reproduced by human rights 
organizations. These hidden dangers challenge a gendered dichotomy between female 
victims and male perpetrators of violence.  
                                                        
60 On how Central American youths gain respect through gambling and risk taking behavior, 
including participation in violence and gangs, see Robert Brennemen (2012, p.38). 
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Figure 6.5: The Mango Run 
 
Young men grab mangos from crates alongside the tracks and then race to re-board the freight 
train, distributing the mangos to other train riders with cheers as their only reward. Mounting a 
moving train is dangerous and stories about accidents resulting in amputations legion; yet 
some people delight in the adventure of it and even jump from car to car for entertainment. 
Others board moving trains in desperation to stay united with their travel group or leave 
behind dangerous situations (Photo Credit: the author). 
 
Why do men continue to perform such a dangerous identity? For one, gender 
roles pervade the route from home communities through destinations in the United 
States, and tend to be deeply internalized as identities. The social penalty for male 
noncompliance with violent masculine stereotypes can be perhaps more dangerous 
than the risks faced by women. In El Salvador, Hume (2008, p.65) reminds us that 
men unwilling to participate in violence or express emotions, such as fear or sadness, 
may become victims themselves. Of course, a variety of gender and sexual scripts 
remain available to men and this ambiguity presents an opportunity for improvisation 
(Guttman 1996). Indeed, one version of the masculine archetype is the man with the 
strength, violence and chivalry to safeguard his women. However, as mentioned 
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before, men who attempt to re-enact this guardian role may suffer violence 
themselves.  
Men incapable of convincingly performing heterosexual scripts may face 
special challenges. Sexual identity and gender identity intersect, as do race and class, 
but should not be conflated (Sedgwick 1990, p.31). However, in practice, sexual desire 
for women is often conflated with masculinity and vice-versa.61 Along the route 
through Mexico, ‘feminine’ gay men and transgendered persons are subjected to 
unkind catcalls and name calling, even inside the safe space of the shelter.62 These 
men can be targets for more brutal victimization outside the shelters.63 The possibility 
of violence is part of both rural Central American and Mexican daily life for many 
homosexual men.64 Just as women flee gendered marginalization and violence in 
Central America, some LBGT persons or males who do not conform to masculine 
                                                        
61 Men identified as ‘straight’ also engage in same-sex sexual experiences. As noted in 
Cymene Howe, Susanna Zaraysky and Lois Lerentzen’s (2008, p.34) study of Mexican 
transgendered sex workers, literature on Latin American men suggests that the stigma of 
homosexuality normally applies only to the passive, “feminine” partner. In this social context, 
the label of ‘gay’ is not only about sexual orientation; it also, maybe even primarily, represents 
a gender transgression. Likewise, Gutmann (1994, p.238) emphasizes the fluidity and 
complexity of these sexual identities in Mexico. 
62 In at least one incident, a transgender person was permitted to reside in the woman’s dorm 
of the migrant shelter for her own safety, triggering controversy within the migrant shelter 
where I volunteered (see also Ruiz Parra’s 2011 mention of this same incident). 
63 The National Migration Institute of Mexico (INM) has on some occasions segregated 
homosexual migrants from other migrants, claiming to do so for their own protection. 
However, human rights activists and migrants charge that such segregation is actually 
motivated by discrimination against homosexuals and the belief that they might ‘contaminate’ 
the rest of the population (e.g. García Davish 2012). Vogt (2012, p.208) recounts the 
testimony of a transgender man who had been gang raped during a kidnapping, and his 
treatment by other migrants and shelter workers who believed, on account of his 
homosexuality, that he probably wanted it. 
64 For a description of violence against homosexual men in Honduras see Johnson (2012) and 
the OHCR (2012). 
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stereotypes also migrate to escape violence in home communities.65 Just as women 
encounter continued violence along the route, so too do the men who cannot perform 
masculine gender scripts or heterosexual scripts convincingly. While tolerance of 
sexual minorities exists in many communities along the route, the punishment for male 
transgressions of gender and sexual stereotypes can be terrible.66 Meanwhile, 
assertive, heterosexual men reap respect and camaraderie by demonstrating their 
masculinity through their escapades with women. 
Finally, some performances of manhood can be “all talk”. Boasts, bluster, 
sexualized joke telling and gendered yarn spinning around a campfire provide a 
relatively safe way to establish masculinity and its associated authority. A gendered 
authority, a man’s character, as constructed through storytelling can be a resource for 
migration. As Matthew C. Gutmann (1996, p.234) points out in his study of multiple 
Mexican masculinities, “for some men today, ‘the macho’ is also a playful role they 
can perform on demand.” 
An Unlikely Odyssey 
                                                        
65 Lourdes Arguelles and Anne M. Rivero (1993) explore how gender violence and sexual 
abuse force both homosexual and heterosexual Latin American women to migrate to the 
United States. They argue that migration scholars should not overlook the role of women’s 
gender and heterosexual domination in the production of new refugee flows, rather than 
simply labor migration, from Latin America. 
66 In Juchitan, Oaxaca in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, for example, indigenous Zapotec 
traditions have survived to create space for a third gender, known as Muxes (Lynn 2002). In 
urban zones, the LGBT community engages in political contestation for human rights and 
opens public spaces. Same-sex marriage, an indicator of public opinion, is legal in the 
Mexican states of Mexico and Quintana Roo. Thus, local attitudes, traditions and social 
resources vary along the route, but transient LGBT persons face the difficulty of navigating 
this patchwork of potential hostility and violence may erupt at any time along the migratory 
route. The route itself is an emergent transnational field with shifting sexual norms, and they 
must improvise gender performances to negotiate this uncertainty. Indeed, Matthew Guttman 
(1996) reminds us that no singular, unchanging machismo exists over space or time. 
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The power of storytelling and self-presentation is perhaps best illustrated with 
a story about a man in a wheelchair who I met in the migrant shelter in Ixtepec, 
Oaxaca (migrant in transit, Ixtepec, 2/3/11; 2/4/11). He and I established a rapport, 
joking together about our respective physical weaknesses: he has had titanium rods in 
his legs since polio crippled him as a child, and I have suffered problems with the 
metal rods along my spine since an accident as a young adult. He teased that if only 
the train had magnets, we could both ride easily north to the United States; “We could 
just stick ourselves on and go”. I laughed at the image of us pegged awkwardly to the 
side of the train. The man in the wheelchair had a habit of making people smile, and I 
was not immune to his charm. Alas, in real life, there are no magnets and the train is 
not so easy, but he was not worried for himself. He only expressed concern about his 
girlfriend’s safety, not his own.  
Whenever the man talked in the dusty yard of the shelter, an audience would 
gather, mostly people curious about how someone in a wheelchair navigates such 
dangers: “How do you go?” He has traveled before, and knows this journey well. He 
has made eight trips, and arrived successfully in the United States four times.  
Before he made the first journey, he had always warned his family in Honduras 
that he would leave, but only God knew when the time would be right. But then in 
2003, the news arrived that an uncle had abandoned his sister and an underage cousin 
in Guatemala. No one else was willing to go to help them. So, he volunteered. After 
all, he tells me, “Man proposes, God disposes.”67 He sought provisions at his 
grandmother’s house, and in particular, asked for a new wheelchair. While he was at                                                         
67 This statement is a Mexican American proverb about accepting God’s will (Glazer 1987, 
p.162). 
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his grandmother’s house preparing for the journey to find his sister and cousin, his 
home was robbed and the thieves took everything he owned. It was a powerful 
moment that made him want to cry, but God knows what he does. The man believed 
that the robbery was truly “the moment of decision, the moment in which God 
becomes involved”; he knew in that instant that he would go all the way to the United 
States, not just to Guatemala to rescue his sister and cousin.  He was in his thirties, “I 
knew of the dangers but it is more difficult when one actually sees it.” 
He found his sister in Esquipulas, Guatemala (near the border with Honduras), 
where the uncle had left her. But even with the help of the Guatemalan police, he 
could not find his cousin. The cousin was deaf and mute. Finally, a tip in a migrant 
house in Guatemala led him to his cousin. They even located the derelict uncle, who 
agreed to lead them north again.  I paused him for a moment bewildered, “But why 
travel with such an irresponsible guide?” He knew the way, and he had only 
abandoned them to avoid trouble with the authorities, because he was traveling with 
the underage cousin without papers.68  But he was irresponsible. He took them to a 
stadium to sleep for an entire week without food while he looked for drugs.  
In 2004, on another trip, he saw a man thrown from the train. The murdered 
man’s own travel companions turned on him and demanded money, but he would not 
pay. So, they killed him. A Salvadoran man interrupted him, perhaps thinking about 
falls from the train, “What happened to your legs?” The storyteller responded, “To 
me? Polio.” The Salvadoran in the audience took a short turn talking, “I never saw any 
of that until this last time when they stuck me on the train”, and he showed me the                                                         
68 Under CAFTA, Central Americans can travel freely within Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua. However, minors require a passport and a parent. 
  
321  
wound on his hand, possibly from a small knife. The man in the wheelchair had seen 
the police threaten and rob people too many times to remember.  
His girlfriend sauntered over to us and reminded him of that time a Salvadoran 
tried to sell her. The man in the wheelchair agreed. That Salvadoran worked in a car 
wash, near where their travel party slept for a night.  The man in the wheelchair 
overheard the Salvadoran from the car wash plotting with a man from a whorehouse, 
and the next day, the pimp showed up to take her away. She said no, but the pimp 
insisted. The man in the wheelchair had to intervene, “She goes with me and I am not 
leaving her”. I interrupted the story again, puzzled by the fact that the woman seems 
more physically capable of putting up a fight than a man confined to a chair,  “Wait. 
What gave a stranger at a car wash the right to sell her?” This time his girlfriend 
replied, “…only because I was a migrant.” The pimp tried to talk the man in the 
wheelchair into leaving her, and they told one his travels companion to reason with 
him. But the man in the wheelchair was adamant that he would not give her up. She 
would still be trapped in a brothel if not for his loyalty.  
After this tangent, the man in the wheelchair returned to the story of his first 
journey north, perhaps thinking of his sister. The uncle had been hanging around drug-
addled men. They pulled a pistol on his uncle and said they were going to rape his 
little male cousin, but his sister saved him. She told them to rape her instead, and they 
did.  
At this point in the story, his girlfriend gasped, “Where was it? La Arrocera?” 
The Salvadoran man guessed, “Before Lecheria?” “No, it was in Coatzocoalcos”, on 
the other side of the tracks from a migrant house in a remote place where the uncle had 
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gone to look for drugs. The man in the wheelchair was not there to protect her. He had 
gone by bus while the others continued on the train. But his sister told him about it 
when they reunited in San Luis Potosi. There his uncle hired a coyote to cross his 
sister into the United States. It cost her two thousand dollars. I asked, thinking that it 
must cost even more for a disabled man, “how much did it cost you?” 
“Me? Nothing. I did not use a guide. I had faith in God.”  Everyone in our little 
circle paused for a moment, stunned at this claim. I broke the silence to ask, somewhat 
incredulously, “But whom did you cross with?” “No one”, he replied. He explained 
that he wheeled himself through a kilometer of desert across the Nuevo Laredo-Texas 
border. From the migrant shelter in Laredo, one can see the first town in Texas. From 
the shelter, he could see the river that marks the border and where he had to go. While 
telling the story, he spread his hands in front of him so that I can imagine him looking 
at the view from the migrant house. He showed me how he rolled himself through the 
desert. 
To pass the river, migrants must pay a fee to the ferrymen, but he did not. He 
made his own boat. By now, the audience listened astonished. He took many empty 
plastic soda bottles and strung them together like a raft. From other interviews, I knew 
that poor swimmers sometimes wrap themselves in water bottles as an improvised life 
vest to cross the Rio Bravo, but the idea of a makeshift raft for a grown man in a 
wheelchair seemed farfetched. So, again I stopped him to ask for clarification, “How 
did you know to do that?” He knew one bottle would not sink, and he tested the bottles 
to see how many were necessary. It was a thoughtful strategy.  
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After the river crossing, he wheeled himself over a slippery mountain, and to 
the highway where he could catch the bus. In the wilderness, he happened upon a man 
who was so impressed by him that he agreed to be his lookout for migration officials, 
exclaiming only “You have got balls!” The bus stopped at the highway. The bus driver 
tried to turn him away, because the bus had no ramp for a wheelchair. But he would 
not accept no for an answer. He climbed aboard and hauled his wheelchair up behind 
him.  
He had been interviewed before, of course. He bragged that a Florida 
newspaper ran a profile of him once. Once finished with the story of his journey and 
bragging about his fame in Florida, the man in the wheelchair transitioned into the 
performance of a Christian-inspired rap about migration. Before we disbanded, his 
girlfriend prompted him to add one more story. There was a time when the 
Guatemalan police were after the two of them for a bribe, but he saw them coming and 
shouted “Get on! Get on!” She climbed on the back of his wheelchair and they sped 
down a hill to escape. Everyone still listening laughed, probably imagining the 
unlikely getaway and admiring her unlikely protector.  
Nothing in this story was achieved through the manipulation of pity for his 
physical condition. This man did not beg. He might have been unable to walk, but his 
strength of will, faith in God and tremendous “huevos” were enough to see him 
through the journey. Did anyone believe the man’s story about his lone crossing and 
self-reliance? Maybe. I did not, at least, not entirely. Such partly true stories play an 
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important function for the teller.69 For that moment in which they were captivated by 
his voice, the audience members re-imagined him as a capable and authoritative man, 
the lead character of his own drama. His performance, his quick wit and capacity to 
retrieve a laugh even under dire circumstances, established him as a man with uncanny 
charisma. He was someone worth getting to know. As he explained to me, “People 
orient you. You must chat with people. You must be sociable.” In this manner, he 
guided his group through Mexico, keeping them cohesive and optimistic and 
reminding them of his ability to lead. He did so despite his physical handicaps, or 
because of them, improvising upon these material challenges. He converted his 
crippled body and wheelchair into props for a superbly resourceful persona, 
temporarily suspending our disbelief. Indeed, the reshaping of his own story through 
its retelling may even suspend his own disbelief, bolstering him for the treacherous 
journey ahead. Such storytelling makes visible surprising possibilities for an 
individual, for the potential of a man, and for the route forward.70     
                                                        
69 Jason De Leon (2012, p.492) says that “one only needs to spend an hour talking with a 
group of recently deported migrants to hear a wide range of crossing techniques that range 
from “rational” (e.g., drinking a lot of water) to preposterous (e.g., a person once told me he 
almost evaded Border Patrol in the dark by walking on all fours and pretending to be a wild 
animal).” However, by taking such narratives at face value, De Leon misses the point of 
storytelling as a performance. Rather than dismiss seemingly improbable stories as 
“preposterous”, we must analyze what they say about the values, experience and self the 
storyteller wishes to express. 
70 In San Luis Potosi, I heard another incredible story, this time from a Dominican man who 
volunteered in the shelter (fieldnotes 7/16/11). The shelter had sadly closed, and we had 
ushered the last migrants into the street. I lingered, time to kill before my bus to Saltillo. So, 
sitting alone in an empty office, we made small talk about the beauty of his home country, his 
U.S. citizen children living in New York, the story of how he lost his U.S. residency, his 
successful brother the doctor and his own failed attempt to study chemical engineering, the 
injustice of the death penalty and, ultimately, how he believes slavery continues in a new form 
in Haiti and the African American community.  
Suddenly, what seemed to me like normal small talk ceased, and he solemnly said, “I 
want to talk about something spiritual.” He then proceeded to explain that before he left the 
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Backstage and Front-stage 
In many cases gender might be conveyed unintentionally, exuded as a 
consequence of identity, but some migrants are keenly aware of the power of these 
stories and self-presentation; they know the value of the information that these 
performances radiate. A segregation of backstage behavior and front-stage behavior 
reveals this awareness. For example, seeking to identify an anonymous body for 
repatriation, the shelter manager called a leader of the local clique of a Central 
American street gang to the office (fieldnotes 11/6/10). Inside the office, a young 
Salvadoran man with a lopsided baseball cap and fresh, clean clothes stared at the 
photo of the dead boy on the computer. I recognized him by the tattoo of two teardrops 
under his eye; I had seen him in the shelter office before, nervously tapping his foot                                                                                                                                                                
Dominican Republic, he had seen a ghost. It was a short, thin woman with short brown hair 
and glasses in a purple shirt and jeans. This image, of course, fit my description perfectly. He 
saw her in an abandoned building and she saw him. He paused dramatically, perhaps so that 
the effect of this news could reach me, and then added “but do not worry. The spirit never 
dies.”  
In the awkward silence that followed, I did not ask for further elaboration, but instead 
privately thought the man’s words were creepy. Maybe he had a sincere premonition and 
wanted to warn me. Maybe he believed that we had a deep spiritual connection and spoke 
figuratively to convey that sense. Maybe he literally believed that we had met on some 
metaphysical dream plane before and wanted to verify this past experience with me. Whatever 
the obscure motive for the ghost story, I can speculate that it did not have its intended impact; 
it did not establish a closer rapport. Instead, it transmitted a sense of foreboding and 
foreignness to the adventure that lay before me, making tangible a possibility of danger and 
misunderstanding. It also urged me to get to the bus station a few minutes early.  
Such miscommunication is the danger of improvised performance. The Dominican 
man did not harness a familiar imaginary for me, and the drama that he had intended could not 
be successful with such a naïve audience, unaware of the scripts he employed. It stalled mid-
performance, with the goal of his story, presumably a deeper intersubjective sense of social 
and spiritual connection, unachieved. We failed to come to a shared understanding of one 
another. Something important was lost in translation, not from one language to another, but 
from one social imaginary to another. However, it changed the way I imagined the route and 
people interacting along it as I moved across the terrain, albeit in a manner that the storyteller 
had not intended. Whether they are told in earnest or not, incredible stories have an important 
impact on the social imaginary and relationships along the route, and not necessarily the 
impact their authors intend. 
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and glancing at the door (fieldnotes 11/3/10). This time, he seemed to be in mourning. 
His girlfriend burst into tears and buried her face in his chest. He held her. I left the 
office, trying to give them some privacy for an emotional moment. Moments later, the 
youth with two tears and his girlfriend emerged from the office. He walked with his 
arm looped over the shoulders of his girlfriend with a confident, slow, swinging 
cadence, almost as though he was so cool that he could not be bothered to walk or 
even stand. He strutted across the yard of the migrant shelter, any trace of sincere 
affection for his girlfriend gone. For her part, his girlfriend, like any good moll, 
seemed unmoved with make-up and face intact, chewing her gum in obvious motions. 
I could not reconcile this sauntering image with the nervous, compassionate boy that I 
had met more than once inside the office. The man on the outside of the office showed 
no sign of the emotional vulnerability I had seen before.  
Along the route, migrants who either intuitively or consciously grasp the 
power of costume and performance seem likely to live longer. Selective adherence to 
gender protocols, a sort of improvised performance of being a man or being a woman, 
provides an important resource to people moving across a violent and uncertain social 
terrain. Overtime, improvisations on gender diffuse along the route. Gender 
performances circulate in gossip, advice and entertainment, increasing awareness of 
the possibilities for these performances. Thus, they change the meaning of man and 
the meaning of woman through the creation of new opportunities for the transgression 
of gender and territory. However, these improvisations also generate new punishments 
and stigmas that enforce these boundaries. Ultimately, violence against Central 
American migrants is sexualized through the collective re- imagining of gender en 
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route, through men and women’s words and deeds during the journey, but in 
unexpected ways that defy an oversimplified victimization narrative focused narrowly 
on women’s subjugation. The possibility for these transgressions and the ambiguities 
that accompany them has profound implications for the human security of men and 
women alike.  
Conclusion  
In the migrant shelter in Arriaga, Chiapas, a way station where many Central 
Americans start the train route north, I sat next to a middle-aged man with a faded 
tattoo above his eyebrow (12/2/10). He said that ‘el norte’ is blowing hard, and with 
that way of talking about the wind, I knew immediately that he is Salvadoran. He was 
in Los Angeles for a while. But, he explained, he is now a man without welcome into 
any society. It does not matter where he goes. He is always unwanted. He cannot go 
back to El Salvador, and he cannot go to Los Angeles. Why? I asked innocently. He 
thought for moment about how to respond. He took his baseball cap off and licked his 
chapped lips; “You see, I got involved in things that were not good. I knew they were 
sins, but I got involved anyway. Drugs, and…” his voice trailed off.  
This man and many others, waylaid like Odysseus’ crew in the land of lotus, is 
neither a ‘migrant’ nor a citizen. He no longer feels Salvadoran, Mexican or 
American. He is neither victim nor perpetrator. He is simply alone and moving 
through the world. His odyssey is not taking him home nor will it transport him to a 
better life, but his presence and the presence of scores of other wanderers is 
transforming the route. I met many like him, a growing class of transnational homeless 
men. 
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In turn, these wanderers and migrants must redouble their improvisations, like 
the mighty Odysseus, to survive an uncertain terrain partly of their own creation. In 
the course of their long journey from Central America through Mexico and the United 
States, they must construct their own epic. As people move across the landscape, they 
make a series of initial social contacts, meeting potential travel companions and 
engaging in business transactions, ranging from the purchase of food from vendors to 
the negotiation of smuggling services. This emergent socio-economic landscape is a 
potential source of camaraderie, goods and services for migrants, as well as providing 
ideas about migration strategies and threats. Through the performance of these social 
transactions, migrants skillfully manipulate norms of hospitality in strange lands, 
entertaining and begging where necessary to propel their journey forward.  
Anonymity aids migrants in their passage north, undetected by state 
authorities, just as being a ‘nobody’ facilitates Odysseus’ escape from the blinded 
Cyclops. Like Odysseus, held hostage but guided by the lustful nymph Circe, migrants 
are empowered and constrained by the social construction of sexuality. Similar to 
faithful Penelope, who outsmarts her suitors during decades of solitude, migrants use 
the obligations associated with their sex to weave artful schemes, subverting 
subservient roles to find a modicum of freedom from unwanted relationships. Finally, 
those shape-shifting Gods with fickle moods, state authorities and gang members, 
change form to complicate or facilitate unauthorized odysseys; and they sometimes 
focus their wrath on the good people, humanitarians and smugglers, who speed those 
journeys to a destination. 
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Whether purposeful or accidental, conscious or unconscious, migrants must re-
enact roles and re-imagine themselves as they undertake their journey. They do so in 
concert with the people they meet en route. Thus, these performances shape and 
reshape opportunities for survival, generating new social identities and reifying old 
stereotypes along the route. People know the route not by reading a map but by 
performing migration. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
IMPROVISING ROUTES: ETHNOGRAPHY OF PRACTICED TERRAIN 
 
Introduction 
 
let no lack of a pilot at the helm concern you, no, 
just step your mast and spread your white sail wide- 
sit back and the North Wind will speed you on your way. 
 
The goddess Circe guides Odysseus with this advice, urging him onto exploits 
with faith in both the Gods and his own cunning. She also inspires him to tie himself 
to the mast for safe passage through the song of the sirens, helping him to forge a new 
route home. In reality, ancient sailors like Odysseus discovered routes across the 
Mediterranean, transforming its geography in the process. Their journeys, motivated 
by war, trade and religion, shaped the possibilities for adventurers that followed. Over 
time, their voyages converted people to new practices and gave rise to reputations over 
great distances.71 These early migrations transformed the material landscape, carving 
an informational architecture for future transit. They pioneered trails and ports, 
reorienting communities to the trade they carried and facilitating subsequent 
movement across the region.72 These ancient migrants improvised a variety of                                                         
71 Writing at the crossroads of economics and sociology, Avner Greif (2006) explains the 
long-term capacity of Maghribi merchants to develop long distance reputational mechanisms 
routed in social networks and guild associations to facilitate economic exchange and their 
profound impact on the broader institutional setting in medieval Europe.  
72 Jeffrey Bentley (1993, p.22-23) describes the “social conversions” that occurred along pre-
modern trade routes around the globe: “This point holds true for all early civilizations: 
Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, and Meso-american. Rulers and traders from the 
central regions of these early civilizations naturally carried a great deal of cultural baggage on 
their adventures, and they deposited some of it in the hinterlands that they visited….A second 
result of ancient encounters between different peoples also survived over a long term and 
helped to structure the courses and consequences of future encounters.” Unlike contemporary 
businessmen who travel by air with the convenience of passport, Central American migrants 
and smugglers must move like ancient traders across great distances along land routes through 
uncertain terrain. As a result, Central American migrants, like the ancient travelers of early 
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technologies to ford dangerous waters and to scale mountains. Their success became a 
beacon to others. 
Today, Central American migrants also leave home with faith in God and their 
own cunning. With Odyssean ingenuity, some migrants tie themselves to boxcars with 
their belts to prevent potentially fatal falls when the siren of sleep overtakes them on 
their long journey by freight train. Using this and other daring improvisations to 
navigate the dangers, these contemporary heroes are remaking their region; they are 
transforming the North American geography.73 Their odysseys reshape the material 
and socio-economic landscape of Mexico and the United States. An informational 
infrastructure for sustained unauthorized migration emerges around popular routes, 
facilitating opportunities for human movement and cultural change. The artifacts, 
ranging from styles of clothing to messages scribbled on the walls of shelters, litter the 
transnational trail and become navigational clues for the next generation of migrants. 
Their passage becomes a beacon to others. Ultimately, each wave of migrants alters 
the possibilities for those that follow.  
This material process limits the performance metaphor explored in the 
previous chapter. Erving Goffman (1959), following Shakespeare, is correct that “one 
man may in his time play many parts.” Migrants’ performances of social scripts define 
                                                                                                                                                               
civilizations, deposit cultural baggage in the Mexican hinterlands of their adventures. These 
encounters among strangers en route structure the courses and consequences of future 
migration in the region.  
73 As explained by Peter J. Katzenstein (2005, p.2), “regions have both material and symbolic 
dimensions, and we can trace them in patterns of behavioral interdependence and political 
practice”. In this chapter, I trace micro-level interdependence and practice among Central 
American migrants and individuals in the societies through which they pass. Migration 
practice, shaped by American imperium in Latin America, has both material and symbolic 
dimensions that make borders porous.  
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new relationships in transit. Nevertheless, all the world is not a stage. Migrants 
perform their roles on a practiced terrain that cannot be pre-fabricated to order and 
may change unexpectedly mid-performance. A practiced terrain consists of the places 
and things shaped by sustained human movement. No stage manager can design the 
set and props for real world performances, and migrants’ interaction with the physical 
world takes on an improvised character. The props and places migrants discover en 
route both inspire new skits and bind actors to resonant scripts. The material remnants 
of migration intentionally and unintentionally transmit information that can be 
interpreted and improvised upon only through experience.  
This chapter explores the nexus between the material and symbolic dimensions 
of improvisation.74 First, I discuss the practiced terrain of the route: the places and 
knowledge-based artifacts that simultaneously emerge from and inform the practice of 
migration. A transit political economy constitutes this practiced terrain. In two 
examples, I explain the role of freight trains as a compass and migrant shelters as an 
informational oasis for the poorest, most vulnerable migrants. Second, I examine how 
migrants spontaneously interact with unlikely materials en route. In particular, I 
discuss the role of faith in this improvisation. Like Odysseus, migrants navigate by 
searching for signs of divine will during their journey. I argue that traveling with faith 
is a rational response to an erosion of useful information that accompanies the 
                                                        
74 Similarly, in his study of border crossing, David Spener (2010) documents imaginative ad 
hoc tactics employed by Mexican migrants in the desert; he identifies an ingenuity born of 
hope under conditions of economic injustice that extends to hybrid Chicano cultural 
formations, as well as the material tactics for clandestine journeys. I find that the makeshift 
tactics described by Spener are not limited to Mexican/Chicano cultural forms. In a study of 
Central American migration through Mexico, Wendy Vogt (2012) also mentions the 
“makeshift” quality of migration, because it is a nonlinear process. 
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sedimentation of material practice. The practice of migration inscribes itself into the 
landscape of the route and migrants learn to read it. Nevertheless, under conditions of 
uncertainty, the usefulness of this information is as fleeting and unpredictable as the 
North Wind. 
Material Culture of Migration Routes: Practiced Terrain 
To navigate their journeys, migrants take visual cues from their surroundings. 
Images of places, such as the trailhead, the river at the borders, the migrant shelter and 
the train yard, provide focal points that orient migrants to the physical terrain. These 
four examples were common motifs in the maps drawn by migrants. In his classic 
work on the geographical imagination, Kevin Lynch (1960, p.7) explains that people 
navigate everyday by these “public images” composed of key forms, in this case, 
paths, edges, nodes, landmarks (p.8). When rendered memorable by their 
differentiation from other terrain or symbolic importance, such landscape features 
guide people great distances. They also provide a basis for common knowledge of the 
location of migratory routes. The terrain of the route is thus hidden from official view, 
but easily found by searching for access points defined by public images.75  
                                                        
75 In this vein, Susan Bibler Coutin (2005, p.198) defines clandestine as “hidden but known.” 
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Figure 7.1 Migrant Map “What an Adventure”
 
In this map, we can identify landmarks, paths, edges and nodes. The highway is the path that leads 
from home, with parents waving goodbye from the curbside. It is also the path that leads through the 
United States in the north. Landmarks, such as the desert and mountains, orient migrant to the journey, 
helping judge distance, immediate risk and cultural differences as they move across terrain. The rivers 
at the southern border and the fence at the border in the north are clearly defined edges. Hotels through 
Mexico serve as nodes.76                                                          
76  The young woman who drew this map remembered her experience with fondness, as a 
great adventure (2/6/10; 2/11/10). Her father had paid for special service for his beloved, 
youngest daughter. Their family still inhabits a section of what was once the main hacienda in 
town, on the center square, and they still share the surname of one of the town’s eminent 
founders. Over the generations, however, the family fortune and property had been split 
among siblings and then cousins. Her father had hoped that she would use what was left of the 
family’s money to attend university in San Salvador, but she wanted to travel to the United 
States instead. She convinced him that the terrible stories about the route in the newspaper 
were lies. Before her eighteenth birthday, her father paid $7800, her college savings (sufficient 
to pay for an undergraduate degree in El Salvador), to a smuggler whose character he judged 
as sound and whose family lived within striking distance if something went wrong. The 
adventurous young woman travelled with a group of six girls, ranging in ages from 6 to 19, 
and their guide, through Guatemala and then Belize. In Belize, police held the girls at 
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Transit Political Economy 
 
These “public images” emerge from the interplay between a transit political 
economy, transnational imaginary and the material space traversed by generations of 
migrants.77 The broad publicity of these images points to widespread social 
participation in unauthorized migration, including the complacency or collaboration of                                                                                                                                                                
gunpoint as the smuggler negotiated the bribe in English, shouting. The guide paid other 
bribes in Guatemela and Mexico. They took an airplane to Tijuana, and their time in hotels 
was comfortable. The desert, however, was something entirely different. There, human bones 
served as landmarks that alerted her to the danger she was in. The six-year old avoided it by 
crossing the border at a migration checkpoint with a U.S. citizen couple that posed as her 
parents. The other five girls walked. The 11 year old cried constantly for her worn feet. All 
shared only one bottle of water for several days. At some point, their guide took them to a 
cave with a shrine of the Virgin of Guadalupe and a stash of several water bottles. He prayed, 
for his own safety as well as theirs; “he was a good man.” When the helicopter circled 
overhead, he would shout, “get down”, and the girls would dive to the ground like soldiers. 
Sticks and thorns became tangled in their hair. They crossed the Rio Bravo in an inner tube. 
On the other side, they had to run quickly to scale a wall with a rope and jump to the other 
side. Then they had to run across train tracks and into a waiting van. They had only five 
minutes between the border patrols to get all the girls across. The smugglers hid her inside the 
seats of the van and drove non-stop to Los Angeles from Arizona. It was hot and 
uncomfortable. And after bonding during the journey, the teenage girls all menstruated in 
unison. By the time they emerged from their hidden compartment in the seats of the van, they 
were covered in menses and their poor guide was too. At this point, the artist and her mother 
laughed so hard at the memory, gasping for air and shaking their hands in a distinctly 
Salvadoran gesture translated roughly as “too much”, that I could barely make out her words 
over the guffaws. But apparently, she delighted in retelling the story about the man’s filthy 
head and pitiable facial expression. When the emotion died down, the artist returned to her 
story. The journey from Los Angeles to New York was terrible, because again she was stuffed 
into an uncomfortable hidden compartment. Upon her arrival in New York, she found that her 
distant relatives in the United States were much less supportive than she initially imagined, 
and she did not have the opportunity to attend a U.S. high school as she had hoped. Instead, 
she struggled with her job as a waitress, working twelve-hour shifts. She was nearly fired for 
laziness her first week, before she got the hang of it. After all, she explained, she had never 
worked a day in her life. She had been her “daddy’s baby.” And dutifully, when her father 
became ill, she returned home to El Salvador immediately. She had to take a loan to buy the 
last minute return plane ticket, which cost around $1000. Her father had already lost 
consciousness by the time she walked through the door, and he died two days later in 
December 2009. The adventurous young woman expressed a desire to return to the United 
States, but could not leave her mother behind alone. Instead, she returned to her studies in San 
Salvador with the support of a brother who she had helped to arrive in the United States.  
77 Similarly, Lynch (1960, p.7) argues that public images “might be expected to appear in the 
interaction of a single physical reality, a common culture, and a basic physiological nature”.   
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Mexican citizens and corrupt officials along the routes (Casillas 2007, p.40). The 
images become visible to the general public, in part, because migrants interact with 
citizens during their journey, conducting a variety of social and economic transactions 
that diffuse information; once such images are public, they flag the location of the 
route and open informational entry points to the underground flow for newcomers, 
whether migrants or potential predators.  
This socio-economic interaction often transgresses the boundary between legal 
and illegal, because transnational routes develop a spectrum of supporting informal 
economic and social activity that defies classification (Andreas 1995; Galemba 2008; 
Nordstrom 2007). Unauthorized migration routes superimpose themselves on the 
infrastructure of the legal economy (Casillas 2007); information leaks across these 
artificial boundaries between legal and illegal domains, linked by socio-economic 
practice.78 In Mexico, for example, the migrant smuggling industry is a much broader 
socio-economic complex than illegal activity alone (Spener 2009). 
On each journey, Central American migrants generally spend anywhere 
between several hundred to several thousand dollars before they arrive at the U.S. 
Mexico border, not only on bribes and smuggling services, but on a variety of travel 
incidentals and low-budget entertainment.79 Smugglers and migrants purchase legal 
                                                        
78 Unauthorized routes also become superimposed on the infrastructure of other unauthorized 
routes, at least in so far that drug runners permit the migrants to trespass. For example, street 
gangs often guard drug shipments for the cartels, in which the unauthorized cargo is hidden in 
compartments under where migrants sit on the train (interview, Salvadoran official, 4/28/11). 
At other times, the cartels exterminate the gangs as a nuisance. Cartels also attempt to deter 
migrants from following drug routes, by kidnapping or killing them, because migration calls 
the attention of the authorities. 
79 The multiplier effect of migrant traffic has a profound impact on economic life along the 
route. During fieldwork, I unsuccessfully attempted to run a survey at a shelter to document 
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goods and services en route: e.g. pre-paid phone cards, computer time at cyber cafes, 
room and board, fuel for vehicles, cigarettes, alcohol, Mexican and U.S. currency 
(often exchanged informally at disadvantageous rates for the migrants), international 
money transfer (e.g. Western Union, which charges large fees) and clothing. Some 
male migrants, not immune to earthly temptations, may gamble or pay prostitutes 
picked up in bars. Purveyors of legal goods and services may employ unauthorized 
migrants as laborers. Vendors may knowingly provision smugglers for the journey or 
make extortion payments to criminal territory bosses.  
One Salvadoran smuggler, wryly explaining the exorbitant price of a cup of 
coffee that Mexicans charge his Central American clients, argued that even the 
laundresses in some Mexican towns were dependent on his human traffic (El Salvador, 
7/5/10). He lamented that many people in these towns have no interest in going to 
school, because they grow up in these businesses. He picked up a small saltshaker on 
the table between us to show me the size of a coffee that costs a dollar: “and the food 
they sell the migrants is bad. Expensive and ugly food. Five dollars a plate for next to 
                                                                                                                                                               
migrant expenditures in a transit community and then estimate a multiplier effect for the 
town’s economic activity. Within a few days of data collection, I abandoned the effort for two 
reasons. First, questions about income and expenditure are extraordinarily sensitive and 
truthful answers require an intimate rapport. People do not want to share this information, 
because they do not want to admit to having access to funds (which makes them vulnerable to 
robbery or kidnapping) nor do they want to admit to buying alcohol, drugs or other contraband 
(which makes them vulnerable to expulsion from the shelter). Therefore, I could only gather 
such information via observation and ethnographic interviews with key informants, methods 
that violate conventional survey methodology. Second, even honest migrants with scarce 
resources seemed incapable of accurate accounting of their purchases; the exercise required a 
level of organizational skill and effort that exceeded the capacity of very tired, hungry and 
anxious individuals. Frankly, they had more important things to worry about than my survey. 
Therefore, while I can describe the economic, social and cultural impact of migrants on the 
transit towns, I cannot provide numerical estimates of that impact beyond the most general 
impressions of my ethnographic experience. 
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nothing….it’s almost a fraud.”80 The Salvadoran smuggler estimated that perhaps as 
much as 40 percent of the migrant remittances sent from the United States to El 
Salvador ultimately pave the route through Mexico and Guatemala for family 
members of migrants in transit, rather than fuel investment in his own country. Of 
course, despite the fact that he is profiting from the brokerage of these services for 
migrants, the smuggler’s capacity to estimate the overall percentage of Salvadoran 
remittances spent in Mexico is limited; he simply cannot know the number, and his 
estimate expresses a subjective sense of injustice at the usurious prices that Mexicans 
charge him.81 Nevertheless, he correctly recognized that over time, small communities 
through which migrants pass orient their economic expectations and prices to the flow 
of people. In this vein, he explained that Central American “migration has changed the 
culture, in particular, in Chiapas. Without migration, Mexico would die. It is the 
commerce of the illegals that keeps it alive.” 
                                                        
80In a lament echoed by human rights activists and migrants along the route, a friar at a 
migrant shelter in Tenosique, Tobasco explained that, “it is a mined countryside. And when 
there aren’t assaults, there are other abuses. The locals charge prices of fifty pesos for a Coca 
Cola. They threaten to call the migra if anyone complains about the prices” (6/2/11). Such 
petty extortion drives up prices for migrants along the route. On a panel at an event in 
Juchitan, Oaxaca (4/12/11), a Mexican human rights official explained: “They leave due to 
necessity. They deserve dignified treatment. The CNDH is an ally of the good father, good 
son, good husband…. And the abuses that I am talking about include the people who charge 
20 pesos, rather than 8, for a glass of water or 16 rather than 8 for a soda, knowing the person 
is a migrant. The taxi driver who charges too much and says if you don’t pay me, I’ll tell 
migration”. 
81 People, in the United States as well as Latin America, often use percentages to express 
emotion, rather than objective estimates of fact. For example, one Salvadoran man (10/7/09), 
who had returned from the United States, estimated that today, unlike when he travelled, “the 
route is 60 percent death and forty percent survive”.  At one point, he argued that only 10 
percent survive (11/13/09), and then he estimated the odds of survival at zero. Thus, I 
interviewed him many times and this percentage changed each time I asked him about it, 
perhaps depending on his mood.  
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The relationship between border towns and the paths that crisscross the U.S.-
Mexico frontier provides a stark example of the co-evolution of transit political 
economies, the transnational imaginary and material space. Anthropologist Jason de 
Leon (2012, p.478) explains that the so-called “trash” that litters the desert landscape 
is, in fact, the “distinct archaeological fingerprint” of migration practice. He examines 
the artifacts discarded along the way. In particular, he argues that a collective folklore 
of migration is defined, in part, by images of these artifacts: dark clothes, cheap worn 
sneakers, and empty black water bottles, often decorated with religious symbols. 
These artifacts reveal a routinization of collective suffering and sacrifice by migrants 
(p.484). As U.S. border enforcement produced geographic bottlenecks in the routes 
north, key Mexican desert communities (such as Altar, Sonora, a community 
described by de Leon) became staging grounds for clandestine crossings. The 
convergence of the stream of people through these communities gave rise to a 
particular class of vendors that provision impoverished masses in transit (p.484).82 
These daily economic routines make migration practice visible at the borders.  
                                                        
82 Four key differences should be noted between my analysis and De Leon’s archaeological 
approach. First, De Leon (p.484) emphasizes the oppressive nature of this material culture on 
migrant choices, creating subopotimal outcomes for survival in the desert, where I highlight 
opportunities for improvisation of such objects. Second, given his primary focus on migrants’ 
vulnerability to unchanging but brutal natural elements in the desert, de Leon also emphasizes 
his capacity to judge the objective impact on physical survival. However, with my focus on 
the dynamic and uncertain social dangers of migration along the route, I make no such claims. 
Indeed, I do not draw lines between “rational” and “preposterous” migrant narratives, as he 
does (p.492); I instead seek to understand what such stories tell us about the people and 
practice of migration. Third, while he mentions that migrants learn from the visual clues they 
receive from the material terrain, he does not fully develop that point, instead focusing on the 
messages that artifacts provide to social scientists, not just other migrants. I focus on how 
migrants themselves interpret the material culture. Finally, I conduct ethnographic, not 
archaeological, research; while I keep comprehensive fieldnotes and detailed descriptions of 
every place I visited, I did not attempt to catalog objects systematically. In future work, teams 
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In fact, communities much farther south than the Sonoran desert bear the 
imprint of unauthorized migration. Far from the border zone, in notorious towns such 
as Arriaga in Chiapas and Ixtepec in Oaxaca, or the neighborhoods in the immediate 
vicinity of the tracks in larger cities such as Coatzocoalcos in Veracruz and Lecheria 
in Mexico, transience has become a permanent and visible condition. For example, a 
young Salvadoran man, struck by the extent of these operations, remembered his 
journey through Chiapas: 
The guide took us to a town in Mexico made by the illegal route. The town’s whole 
existence is to provide for migrants. They cook for migrants, they house them for a fee 
and sell them what they need for the journey (El Salvador, 2/19/10).83 
 
Along the route, a multitude of small shops (selling inexpensive footwear, 
clothing and other supplies for the journey), cheap hotels, smugglers’ safe houses, 
brothels, bars and restaurants have opened in private homes near the train tracks, 
testifying to a reorientation of economic activity by locals. Whenever the train stops in 
a populated area, women swarm in to sell home cooked food and drinks to the 
migrants. In these places, the desire to attract new customers motivates many 
purveyors of quasi-legal or unauthorized services to visibly and forthrightly market 
their availability, approaching complete strangers, rather than solely relying on word-
of-mouth recruitment of clients. Debris of migrants’ belongings litters the ground 
along the train tracks across the length of Mexico, artifacts of a thriving transnational 
trade route. 
                                                                                                                                                               
of archaeologists should undertake that work at migrant stations along the length of the 
transnational route, as de Leon has done at the border itself.  
83 This young man’s map is included in the appendix to this dissertation. 
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Figure 7.2: Migrant Stations 
 
In this photo, migrants’ personal effects litter the area along the train tracks: tennis shoes, 
backpacks, clothing, a large water bottle and a bottle of beer. At the U.S.-Mexico border, 
Jason de Leon (2012, p.479) calls these impromptu rest areas “migrant stations”. Migrants 
often leave behind such items when they must escape quickly or are stripped of their 
possessions by authorities, kidnappers or bandits. Behind this pile of migrants’ effects, there is 
graffiti on wall. Graffiti is obviously not limited to the migratory route, but it is a transnational 
cultural form, exhibiting hip-hop styles developed in Los Angeles and New York and carried 
to Latin America by migrants. The tags, i.e. the signatures developed by individuals to express 
their personalities and status, mark the territory of local cliques of street gangs that roam the 
train route from Central America through the United States. Graffiti relay messages over long 
distances. (Photo Credit: Encarni Pindado.) 
 
From the Guatemala-Mexico border to the United States-Mexico border, an 
unsightly and pervasive moral economy of begging has also come to underwrite 
migrants’ consumption of local goods and services.84 While more fortunate migrants 
rely on remittances wired from the United States to pay for their travel expenses, 
anonymous begging also provides desperate Central American migrants the means to 
                                                        
84 The institutionalization of this transit political economy, including the kidnapping industry 
that victimizes migrants for ransoms, has also been facilitated by transnational financial flows, 
money sent via Western Union and Elektra to migrants from U.S.-based relatives as 
unexpected situations arise along the route through Mexico (Casillas 2007, p.42). For a 
description of the relationship between the informal transit political economy and Western 
Union, see Vogt (2012, p.198-200). 
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move to work in Mexico and the United States. Along the route, shelter staff often ask 
them to refrain from begging, encouraging migrants to ask for day labor instead; the 
constant haranguing for handouts antagonizes locals and strains relations between the 
shelters and their surrounding neighborhoods. It is important for human rights activists 
and migrants to present themselves as workers, not vagrants, in order to claim moral 
authority and pressure authorities for recognition as people worthy of protection. 
Nevertheless, an uncommonly high number of people are obliged to beg while they 
travel the transnational route, and their visibility marks the pathways north.85 Migrants 
can navigate by following the ebb and flow of hopeful, but otherwise destitute, 
permanent wanderers. 
As I interviewed local vendors, I stopped to chat with a grey haired man with a 
weathered face and broken front teeth, who had a particularly clear explanation of his 
weariness of migrants.86 When I explained the purpose of my interviews, he 
interrupted to tell me that he had something to say to the Central American migrants, 
some of them his customers: “Do not leave your country” (Ixtepec, 11/2/10). Like 
several of his neighbors in the homes that line streets along the tracks, he sold 
miscellany through a barred window into his living room. He complained that the 
migrants say there are not enough jobs in their home countries, but he did not believe 
it. He asked what I thought, “are there really no jobs in El Salvador?” I demurred, 
explaining that I did not know exactly what the employment figures were. Perhaps                                                         
85 The route also draws Mexican drifters who impersonate Central American migrants while 
begging, leveraging the migrant narrative for sympathy. 
86 I chose to highlight my conversation with this man, because of the clarity of his expression. 
However, many other interviews with Mexican community members echo the same 
frustration. Vogt (2012) attributes these negative local attitudes toward migrants to 
scapegoating and the social fragmentation that accompanies structural violence. 
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annoyed by my evasive answer, the man looked at me sideways and continued 
bitterly: 
Some people say that they are only in transit, but one comes after another and there’s 
always one more. It feels permanent even though they are passing through. It’s the 
same. One takes their place. 
 
Under these conditions of permanent transience, Mexican locals adjust their 
economic strategies to the movement of people along the route, stocking the goods 
and providing the services demanded by a transient Central American population and 
the migrants’ handlers. The route becomes a rich site of socio-economic 
interdependence, as well cultural interdependence, though not necessarily good will or 
trust. Complaints about unauthorized migration as a vector for transnational crime are 
commonplace in communities along the route.  For this reason, some locals do not 
view migrants primarily as potential customers, but worry instead about the potential 
for spillover violence into their community.87 Shopkeepers, taxi drivers and food 
vendors in transit towns often claim that they would gladly lose the income gained by 
catering to unauthorized traffic to calm the social disruptions associated with the 
largely male and destitute transient population in their midst.  
A first-hand experience of ubiquitous and enduring transience has eroded 
citizens’ empathy for vagrants. Drawn by the economic opportunity of transit 
corridors, squatters from poorer parts of Mexico sometimes build illegal homes 
dangerously close to the train tracks; they can be evicted on the whims of local 
politicians or train company officials (fieldnotes, Coatzacoalcos, 6/1/11). Thus, the                                                         
87 Locals also complain that migrants are vectors for disease in their community, and they 
complain about the unsanitary conditions of some shelters (hygiene varies depending on 
which shelter) and the train tracks, where migrants frequently throw their trash.  
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routes pass through unauthorized Mexican communities, home to an already 
marginalized population with a tenuous capacity to claim their birthright as citizens. 
The presence of migrants in their midst exacerbates their own insecurity, leaving them 
vulnerable to the same predation that migrants suffer. For these reasons, some 
Mexicans living in the transit corridors struggle to rescue their own families from the 
northbound human flood. While the economic opportunity of transit flows provides a 
livelihood for many citizens along the route, the sustained vagrancy of migrants also 
tends to wash citizens’ shallow sense of physical security away, leaving resentment 
among in its wake. After all, the transit political economy is structured by violence. 
Economic interdependence produces opportunities for migrants to camouflage 
their movement in the flow of legal goods and people, obscuring the official gaze 
(Andreas 1996, p.58; 2003, p.96). However, at the level of social practice, clandestine 
interdependence also generates common knowledge about unauthorized activities 
between locals and migrants. Over time, sustained socio-economic transactions give 
substance to the  ‘public images’ that guide migrants and their predators. 
Interviewing Migrants in Arriaga: Before the First Train Ride  
In early December 2010, I conducted interviews in the shelter in Arriaga, 
Chiapas, an early resting place along the western route through southern Mexico, just 
before the first 100-mile freight train ride to Ixtepec, Oaxaca. The Central Americans I 
met in Arriaga had already crossed the Suchiate River at the Mexico-Guatemala 
border. To do so, they had paid the ferrymen to board the makeshift rafts that carry 
untaxed contraband commerce (ranging from toilet paper to cigarettes) and daily 
commuters in both directions. Like so many unauthorized activities along the routes 
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through Mexico, this extensive “free trade” system is visible in daylight (Galemba 
2012)88; one only needs to look down from the official international bridge or across 
the banks of either side of the river to get a clear view of this ceaseless economic 
activity. It is not a secretive practice.  
The migrants I interviewed in Arriaga had also already made a long trek along 
well-trod paths through the wilderness around highway migration checkpoints. That 
the sole use of these trails is the evasion of migration enforcement is common 
knowledge, and they therefore attract many bandits and sexual predators. Some of the 
migrants resting in Arriaga had ridden the combi (passenger shuttle) networks. Drivers 
of these vans alternate between helping and harming the migrants, providing free 
information but often extorting exorbitant fees for transport. The majority of migrants 
in Arriaga had already made multiple attempts at crossing Mexico. Despite having 
already braved so many dangers, these migrants were still at the beginning of the long 
journey north, only about 150 miles north of the Guatemala-Mexico border. 
The first man who agreed to an interview on an early December morning was 
short and thin, and his age was not obvious by looking at him (12/2/10). I choose to 
relate his story here, because unlike many others that I met in Arriaga, it was his first 
journey north. Thus, he could not draw on any previous personal experience to 
envision the road ahead. His skin had a smooth innocent quality, but he had a large 
bushy black mustache that seemed out of place on a youth. His brown eyes were large 
and round, ringed with equally round, tired circles in the skin below them. He was                                                         
88 Rebecca B. Galemba (2012) calls the unauthorized commerce in corn across the Mexico-
Guatemala border “globalization through the back door.” She examines the moral economy of 
this “free trade” and the mobilization of peasants to legitimate the practice. 
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from Nueva Santa Rosa, Guatemala. Three cousins had migrated to Los Angeles, but 
he had no communication with them. He was the oldest sibling in his house; the four 
others were still studying. Hurricane Agatha destroyed the properties his family rents, 
devastating his poor family.89 That was what ultimately pushed him to leave. He was 
traveling with four friends from the same community who had also suffered damage 
from the hurricane. Relying on word of mouth, the kindness of strangers and God’s 
protection, he and his companions had travelled quickly across Mexico’s southernmost 
state of Chiapas. They had arrived safely at the migrant shelter where I found him. 
The Freight Train: A Compass90 
Like many of the migrants who cannot afford door-to-door human smuggling 
services from Central America to the United States, he left home with only a vague 
notion of geography.91 Rather than rely on the North Wind, however, he found the 
train yards in southern Mexico. He knew that the freight trains would carry him in the 
right direction. In that sense, the train yard serves as an entry port to a clandestine 
terrain, where word-of-mouth and the physical space itself can lead a migrant to the 
U.S. border. The freight train is not only an inexpensive transport vehicle; its tracks                                                         
89 A volcanic eruption followed by Tropical Storm Agatha in May 2010 hit the municipality of 
Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa very hard. According to Major Alvaro Jimenez of the Salvation 
Army (quoted in Uribe 2010), this dual disaster displaced thousands of people and resulted in 
the loss of many homes.  
90 Whenever I discuss the train, I am referring to a freight train, not a passenger train. In the 
1990s, the Mexican government suspended passenger service, leaving only freight trains, 
except for a handful of short novelty lines for tourists and the Mexico City commuter system. 
At that time, the government granted concessions to a handful of private companies for the 
continuation of freight service. Migrants ride the freight trains like hobos. Until 2005, this 
route began in Tapachula, Chiapas, but that segment of the route suffered damages in 
Hurricane Stan and has been indefinitely suspended. Migrants lament the closure of this 
southernmost segment, because crossing Chiapas now requires some combination of extensive 
hiking on dangerous trails and expensive passenger transport.   
91 For example, he mistakenly identified his hometown as located in the northern part of 
Guatemala. Nueva Santa Rosa is located approximately 70 miles south of Guatemala City. 
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and equipment are a conduit for information.92 For example, the colors and markings 
of the engines signal the destinations of the trains. If the train breaks down or migrants 
must flee into the wilderness to escape a migration raid, scattering and hiding among 
the bushes, they regroup around the tracks as a focal point, using the steel rails to 
guide their long walk to the next shelter.  
It is not surprising that the train has come to serve as a focal point for migrants, 
particularly near the beginning of the route through Mexico. In Lynch’s (1960, p.9) 
words, the train has a high level of imageability: 
That quality in a physical object which gives it a high probability of evoking a strong 
image in any given observer. It is that shape, color, or arrangement which facilitates 
the making of vividly identified, powerfully structured, highly useful images of the 
environment. 
 
The source of the train’s eminent imageability is two fold: material and 
symbolic. Firstly, beginning in the 1990s and intensifying with Plan Sur in 2001, the 
proliferation of highway migration checkpoints pushed an increasing number of 
migrants to the trains, generating a bottleneck for unauthorized traffic along the tracks 
(Casillas 2007). The poorest and most vulnerable migrants could not afford to pay 
smugglers or the bribes to corrupt officials who stop the bus.  
The location and sporadic tempo of train service, combined with the increasing 
numbers of migrants converging on the train, create large crowds of migrants across 
southern Mexico. From Chiapas through Veracruz, trains run relatively infrequently                                                         
92 According migrants and human rights activists, the price of riding the freight train has been 
increasing since 2011, as the street gangs are again attempting to extend and deepen their 
control of the train route. Their capacity to extort boarding fees, in particular along the eastern 
route through Tenosique, has increased. Migrants and smugglers who cannot pay may be 
thrown from the train. Nevertheless, migrants continue to try to ride without paying. It is 
unclear for how long this trend toward increasing cost of riding the train and the homicides 
that accompany it will continue. 
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and unpredictably, as a result of a schedule dictated by the weather, wear on the aging 
rail network and the logistical needs of the patchwork of subsidiaries of the major 
railway companies. This unpredictability often produces a backlog of migrant hopefuls 
loitering around train yards.93 The presence of these crowds illuminates the way 
forward, and sudden movements in the crowd signal either danger or the impending 
departure of a locomotive. In this southern zone, the tracks begin in Tenosique in 
Tobasco in the east and Arriaga in Chiapas in the west, merging in Veracruz and 
moving migrants to the outskirts of Mexico City before dividing into many alternative 
routes north.  
In contrast to those in the south, trains in the northern half of the country run 
faster, more frequently and in more directions, thereby dispersing the crowds of 
migrants.94 Because of this dispersion, the train begins to lose its imageability in the 
north. As the journey progresses, this class of migrants relies increasingly on 
information transmitted by word-of -mouth or paid guides. 
 Secondly, the symbolism of “the beast”, as the train has become known 
colloquially, provokes strong emotions. In the past, the desert at the U.S.-Mexico 
border represented the most potent popular image of suffering during the journey; but 
today, the train dominates popular media and folklore in Central America. Legends 
about the terrible accidents and assaults that stalk its rails circulate widely. Ironically, 
these harrowing stories orient Central Americans to the train, making the image of the                                                         
93 The most dramatic of these backlogs in recent history occurred in Veracruz in June and July 
2012 when hundreds (or thousands, depending on whose estimate) of migrants became 
stranded without resources after a derailment suspended freight train service (Barranco 2012).  
94 Private security on most trains can be bribed for passage, but some migrants know better 
than to try to board the most freshly painted engines that connect Saltillo with auto dealers in 
the United States; the security on that line is too effective for migrants to ride in the open. 
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locomotive and its relationship to migration recognizable, rather than scaring people 
away. Thus, the train has taken a central place in the social imagination of the route, 
thereby becoming a useful, albeit dangerous, arrow that points people north. 
 Shelters: Informational Oases  
Nowhere along the route is the double-edged nature of information more 
apparent than at migrant shelters. The shelters are the route’s most important 
informational resource for the poorest migrants. In these places, migrants can learn 
about the latest security threats, receive updates about police movements, discover 
alternative routes north, find out about job opportunities, watch and mimic tactics 
employed by other migrants, ascertain their legal rights and form new relationships 
with potential travel companions and smugglers. In contemplative moments, migrants 
receive spiritual support, and they listen to arguments by clergy and activists about 
their ethical obligations and rights.  
However, the shelters are also an informational resource for a variety of other 
actors along the route, some of them with nefarious intent. Spies, known as rateros, 
enter the shelters to retrieve information about migrants for kidnappers; they seek to 
identify who received money through Western Union, the phone numbers of relatives 
in the United States, the travel plans of migrants, and the presence of members of 
competing gangs. Recruiters for smugglers enter the shelter, hoping to advertise their 
services to potential clients.  
Shelter personnel are well aware of these problems. In January 2011, during a 
period of political activism in response to a mass kidnapping near Chahuites, Oaxaca 
on December 16, 2010, criminals entered the shelter grounds in Ixtepec, Oaxaca. They 
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did not disguise their intent to intimidate the staff, boasting of the intelligence they had 
gathered about the volunteers working there.95 These men allegedly found the shelter 
priest resting in his hammock and warned him: “Do you know why we do not kill 
you? Because if we kill you, they are going to close the shelter and it is going to be 
more difficult to find the undocumented. However, with the shelter, you get them 
together for us” (quoted in Ruiz Parra 2011, translation of quote is mine).96 Thus, 
these places become the site of a struggle over information, as migrants and criminals 
attempt to conceal their personal data and identities from one another. Indeed, the 
shelters provide a variety of services to migrants, but information is the single-most 
important resource and danger that migrants confront there.   
The mass kidnapping on December 16, 2010 near Chahuites, Oaxaca illustrates 
how information surfaces in the shelter and transforms the route, as migrants and 
criminals adapt to it. It had been the first mass kidnapping in Chahuites in recent 
memory.97 Until then, Medias Aguas, Veracruz, farther north along the route, had 
                                                        
95An increasing sense of danger and intensifying rumors accompanied the security crisis and 
political controversy that surrounded the mass kidnapping of December 16th, which led to the 
deployment of an armed, plain clothes police team to protect the priest. I left the Ixtepec 
shelter for interviews at other fieldsites on December 15th. An impending event felt imminent 
to everyone present in the shelter at that time. I returned to Ixtepec on January 11th and 
resumed interviews. 
96 Vogt (2012, p.270) repeats a very similar quote from a shelter priest whose life was spared 
because a street gang did not want the shelter to close. Vogt also describes the ironic 
symbiosis between migrant shelters and the gangs who prey upon migrants. Her purpose in 
describing this contradiction is to examine how structural violence undermines solidarity and 
leads to the corruption of safe spaces by violent actors.     
97 Of course, the events of December 2010 were not the first kidnapping in the local area; in 
January 2007, local kidnappers collaborated with corrupt Ixtepec authorities to kidnap 12 
migrants and jail the shelter priest, Padre José Alejandro Solalinde Guerra, who attempted to 
locate and defend the victims (Moreno 2007; Ruiz Parra 2011).  Under the watchful eye of 
Padre Solalinde, international human rights activists and the local military base, the area had 
not been the site of large-scale kidnapping. Until December 2010, most crime in the Arriaga to 
Ixtepec corridor against migrants had been assaults on migrants by locals, machete wounds 
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been widely perceived to be the first danger zone for this organized criminal activity. 
The migrant shelter in Ixtepec is the resting place for migrants along this passage from 
Arriaga, Chiapas through Chahuites (where no regular stop exists) and on to Medias 
Aguas. For migrants, Ixtepec represents a major transition point in the dangers of the 
route.  It is the first train stop in Oaxaca. In Chiapas, to the south of Oaxaca, migrants 
cope with bands of local Mexicans and Central American street gangs that attack 
people, raping and stealing, as the migrants trek around migration checkpoints or ride 
the train. In Veracruz and Tamaulipas, to the north of Ixtepec, migrants face mass 
kidnappings that can include torture and extortion. Ixtepec is also a bottleneck in the 
Mexican land routes north, located in the narrow Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The local 
area has long been the crossroads for both legal and illegal traffic since pre-historic 
times, supporting a vibrant transit political economy (Bernal Gomez 1996, p.26-28).98 
 When kidnappings in Medias Aguas accelerated sharply after a long rainy 
season in 2010, the shelter in Ixtepec became an important informational oasis, a point 
where migrants improvised new routes north. The rains had caused trains to run off 
schedule, frequently delaying movement of migrants in and out of Medias Aguas.  
Given the spike in kidnappings at this time, it seems likely that this irregular flow of 
potential victims produced incentives for kidnappers to ‘binge’ when trains did arrive 
(Salvadoran migrant, Honduran migrant, Ixtepec, 11/4/10). By the time the trains 
                                                                                                                                                               
from fights outside bars and muggings along the tracks, extortion demands from corrupt 
authorities, rapes (which appear to be endemic along the route), excessive use of force during 
migration raids on the train, and robberies by Central American street gangs. Migrants passing 
Chahuites frequently complained of abusive raids by migration authorities on the train, but not 
mass kidnappings. 
98 For more detailed data about the contemporary local economy of Ixtepec, climate and 
society, see the SAGARPA (2008).    
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resumed a more regular schedule in November 2010, the backlog of migrants had 
grown desperate to travel farther north, and the kidnappers had grown desperate to 
turn a profit. 
As kidnappings in Medias Aguas accelerated over the course of many weeks, 
the Ixtepec migrant shelter staff’s warnings to migrants became increasingly urgent.  
They began to warn migrants of the “certainty” that the next train would be targeted 
by kidnappers. The priest would run to the trains, shouting the warning of the 
kidnapping ahead, and he held meetings in the shelter chapel urging migrants to find 
alternative routes of travel (fieldnotes 11/6/10): “If you’re in a hurry to be kidnapped, 
go to Medias Aguas. If not, come to the shelter!”  Among the migrants themselves, 
talk of the dangers in Medias Aguas began to circulate. Kidnapping victims, once 
released, would sometimes find their way back to the shelter to spread the word. In the 
office, a thin Salvadoran man could be overheard pleading with his family in the U.S. 
for the funds to avoid the next segment of the train route; he cried beseechingly into 
the telephone, “but they say they’re kidnapping!”, desperate to convince his loved 
ones that the money he had requested was not for gambling or other vice (fieldnotes, 
Ixtepec, 11/19/10).    
While many migrants understood the vague contours of the dangers before 
their journey, they frequently learned the specific locations of danger along the way. 
The shelter in Ixtepec became a place where this information surfaced and could be 
exchanged among migrants and with human rights activists; it is also the place where 
unauthorized migrants may file legal claims against human rights abuses. The shelter 
is a site where academics, newspaper reporters, government agencies and spies from 
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organized criminal groups attempt to access information of unauthorized migration 
flows and individual migrants. In Ixtepec, by mid-December, some migrants had 
begun finding alternative routes to avoid Medias Aguas (fieldnotes, Ixtepec, 
12/13/10).99 As a result of its physical geography and the informational site of the 
shelter, Ixtepec became the fork in the route north.    
For this reason, the kidnapping on December 16th targeted Chahuites, a point 
farther south than usual. Shortly before the kidnapping, talk began to circulate about 
the appearance of dark Suburbans on the streets of Ixtepec (fieldnotes, 
Ixtepec,12/13/10). Some said the Zetas were trying to identify guides at major migrant 
transit motels in the that town, probably to extort passage fees before they scattered in 
new directions. Others whispered that the street gang had been attempting to exert 
more control over its territory in the Arriaga-Ixtepec corridor, and the guides were 
fighting back (fieldnotes, Ixtepec, 12/14/10). For this purpose, one faction of the local 
clique of the MS gang might have entered a pact with the Zetas in Veracruz. As 
explained by a local human rights activist months after the event, Ixtepec is home to 
“three branches of crime” which had begun to work together:  1) local street gangs, 
Central American delinquent youth who call the train tracks their home; 2) the Zetas, 
organized criminals moving down from Veracruz; and 3) corrupt authorities, officials 
acting outside their legally sanctioned capacity for personal gain ranging from police 
to local government (Ixtepec 3/6/11). If the rumors are to be believed, the newest pact 
between these three branches of crime occurred at the nexus of pressure from above                                                         
99 Migrants began to take busses through the Sierra Madre de Oaxaca or the west coast 
(12/2/10). An INM agent in a coastal town north of Ixtepec commented that between January 
and March 2011, they had captured at least twenty-seven unauthorized migrants where it 
previously had not been a known transit point (3/9/11).  
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and below. From below, street gangs found it difficult to impose taxation of the train 
route and sought assistance with their local conflict. From above, Zetas responded to 
the changing geography of the route and sought to enter new territory.   
The result was a tragedy in Chahuites. On December 16th, approximately three 
hundred men, women and children left Arriaga, Chiapas on the northbound freight 
train en route to Ixtepec. The Mexican National Institute for Migration (INM) raided 
the train near Chahuites, Oaxaca, detaining and deporting about ninety-nine migrants. 
According to the testimony of a Honduran man who arrived at the migrant shelter in 
Ixtepec, Oaxaca the following day, INM officials threatened that “within a half an 
hour, there would be another stop.”100 This man estimates that two hundred people 
escaped the raid and returned to the northbound train. However, their ordeal was not 
yet over. As allegedly predicted by the INM official, a second raid targeted the train. 
This time, however, civilians attacked the train with machetes and small arms, 
kidnapping approximately forty people. 
In the initial aftermath, the INM and the Mexican government denied that any 
kidnapping had occurred, relenting only after intense pressure from Central American 
governments and a transnational coalition of human rights defenders. This coalition 
transformed the shelter into a public platform for the projection of information about                                                         
100 Laura Sponti, a visiting journalist at Albergue Hermanos en el Camino en Ixtepec, took the 
initial testimonies on December 17, 2010, which I accessed in the shelter e-archive, along with 
bulletins released by the shelter as events unfolded.  Fernando Batista of the CNDH later 
confirmed the existence of 18 testimonies (Ballinas 2010).  An account given in a statement 
by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights varies slightly from this version of events, 
in which the train conductor makes the threat of “trouble farther along” in an extortion 
attempt. (OHCHR 2011)  Several alternate versions of these events circulated in newspapers, 
and an analysis of these alternative stories will be part of my larger dissertation.  My brief 
retelling in this paper relies primarily on the shelter archives and discussions with shelter staff.  
For international media coverage of these events, see CNN (2010). 
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the dangers confronted by migrants. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Navi Pillay criticized the Mexican government and called for a more aggressive 
investigation of this crime (OHCR 2011). Based on the testimony of an informer, 
Mexican police arrested a faction of the local MS 13 street gang involved in the 
kidnapping on other charges (Salvadoran official, 4/28/11). These arrests lead to a 
temporary improvement in migrant security. According to interviews and shelter 
communiqué, the kidnappings were displaced to the route through Tenosique, Tobasco 
for a time. On February 19, 2011, three migrants at the Tenosique migrant shelter 
claimed that criminals assaulted the train following an INM raid, marking the 
beginning of a deterioration of migrant security along route on the eastern side of the 
country.  
The shelter system played a pivotal role in informing migrants of the 
kidnappings in Medias Aguas, thereby shifting the route. After criminals responded to 
this shift, the shelter system played a pivotal role in informing the public of the 
kidnapping in Chahuites, becoming a place where information could surface for 
journalists, activists and sympathetic policy makers. How and why can this 
information surface in the shelter? How does it become a fork in the road?  
The locations of shelters are relatively fixed and visible. In the 1980s, shelters 
mostly clustered in the northern border zone, which was the most acutely dangerous 
place for migrants at that time (Hagan 2008, p.99). At first, these shelters provided a 
respite for weary Mexican travelers (p.99). As the refugee flow from Central America 
accelerated, the shelters became the front line for human rights activism on behalf of 
Central Americans fleeing political violence. These activists and humanitarian 
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workers, like its sister sanctuary movement in the United States, drew inspiration from 
liberation theology and their broader Christian faith (Garcia 2006; Hagan 2008). 
During the 1990s when U.S. border patrol effectively closed the migration corridor 
through Tijuana-San Diego and deportations intensified, some shelters in the northern 
border zone began to cater to Mexicans deported back across the border. These 
Mexican migrants sometimes returned penniless and became stranded in frontier 
towns far from their homes.  
In the 2000s, awareness of the horrors of the journey from Central America 
spread, and the number of migrant shelters along the route multiplied despite the fact 
that they were not exactly legal. In 2008, the Mexican Supreme Court decriminalized 
humanitarian aid to migrants, which had not previously been clearly distinguished 
from smuggling under Article 77 of the Population Law. While humanitarian workers 
and activists still report some harassment from police, this ruling facilitated the 
expansion and further institutionalization of the shelter system. 
By 2012, there were approximately 54 shelters from Guatemala to the U.S. 
border. Any estimate of their presence is complicated by the fact that new shelters 
periodically open and others close. Many of them, however, congregate in the most 
visible corridors of the route, serving the poorest and most vulnerable migrants who 
travel along the train tracks or linger at the borders. Catholic faith has inspired both 
clergy and lay people to organize most of these shelters, but they serve migrants from 
any religion. They are loosely networked through the Church, but not funded by it. 
The shelters vary in their level of institutionalization, rules, resources, and social 
organization. Some maintain a permanent professional staff, while others rely 
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predominately on volunteers with high turnover. Once established, shelters provide 
diverse services to migrants, ranging from a simple meal to overnight hospice for up to 
three days (or more in extenuating circumstances), medical care, and legal support. 
While the relationship with the surrounding community may be friendly or hostile, the 
shelters become a hub of local economic activity. For this reason, Vogt (2012, p.39) 
conceptualizes them as depots along the unauthorized route, i.e. places of constant 
coming and going through which migrants are “transformed into commodities where 
they were traded, bought, sold and distributed.” As such, the shelter is a hub of in the 
transit political economy. 
Neighbors often distrust what happens within the walls of the migrant shelter, 
complaining about the criminality and predation that it draws to the community. 
Likewise, migrants complain that the shelters are beacons for criminals who seek to 
abuse and exploit them. While distrust is rampant within their walls and migrants’ 
personal information may be used to commit crimes against them later in the route, the 
shelters usually offer sufficient physical security to facilitate conversations among 
strangers without an immediate fear of assault or apprehension by authorities. With 
some notable exceptions, people remain safe until they leave the sanctity of the shelter 
grounds. This modicum of security contributes to a relatively relaxed atmosphere, 
when compared to the train yards at night, and permits more information to surface. 
Institutionalized religion facilitates the shelter’s visibility under these quasi-
legal conditions, deterring intervention by federal Mexican authorities and deterring 
the most flagrant assaults by organized criminal gangs. Outside of shelters, there are 
also informal encampments built by migrants. During exceptional moments, the 
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federal government has provided temporary migrant camps, most recently during a 
major backlog of migrants in Veracruz in the summer of 2012 caused by the cessation 
of train service following a derailment (Barranco 2012). However, the moral authority 
of the Catholic Church in Mexico creates a political space for particularly open 
informational oases. In an oft-cited poll conducted by Consulta Mitofsky (e.g. 
Archibald 2012), Mexicans have consistently ranked universities and the Catholic 
Church as the least corrupt institutions in Mexican society. Most Mexicans are 
Catholic, and even criminals fear for their immortal soul. The institutional and 
normative power of the Catholic Church enhances the power of individual priests to 
maintain these facilities despite threat.  
Shelters that project information of the route to transnational human rights 
networks provoke additional security guarantees from politicians, and they may 
receive material resources for surveillance, guards and cement walls. Thus, shelters 
play a vital role in political contestation for migrants’ rights. They provide an access 
point to the underground for the general public. A multinational cadre of journalists, 
human rights investigators and activists arrive at the shelters daily to take testimonies 
from the migrants that congregate there. For this reason, the shelters are not only a 
platform for migration. Shelters also become a platform for the projection of 
information necessary for national and international political activism. Unfortunately, 
this publicity becomes a beacon for covert predators as well as migrants. 
Shelter staff will sometimes organize information sessions for migrants to 
warn them of the dangers ahead. These briefings are sometimes part of the registration 
process. Staff may also give some carefully guarded advice to the migrants they 
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perceive as the most vulnerable to abuse; for example, in Oaxaca, there is a bus route 
that migration does not police, but to give the information more widely would attract 
both authorities and (more quickly) criminals to the route. Therefore, shelter staff 
selects the migrants and circumstances under which they share that information 
carefully. When migrants successfully pass along the route, they relay the information 
back to the shelter by telephone. 
Of course, most of the information passes without intent. People simply tell 
yarns to kill time. They eavesdrop on gossip. At home, people sit on a porch and 
watch the world go by for entertainment, learning about their neighborhood in the 
process. Similarly, the main source of entertainment for the poorest migrants is the 
conversation and reality drama that unfold in shelters. In so doing, they come to 
understand the route and its inhabitants. 
Migrants also use the shelters to communicate with family and friends in the 
United States and Central America via telephone or, where available, the internet. 
Some shelters offer free phone calls, while others provide public phones to be used 
with pre-paid cards. In this manner, the shelters become a node for transnational 
information exchanges. Family members of migrants from Central America often 
contact shelters in search of missing persons. 
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Figure 7.3: Missing Persons Flyers 
 
Desperate family members search for missing persons at the migrant shelters along the route. 
Groups of mothers of the disappeared, such as COFAMIDE in El Salvador and COFAMIPRO 
in Honduras, have called for the establishment of a DNA database to help locate bodies of 
victims of the journey. Members of these groups periodically join protest caravans along the 
route, carrying placards with the photos of their missing loved ones. 
 
Importantly, these attempts to access information at the shelter leave a material 
trace. The sad yellowing posters of missing persons flapped in the breeze of a doorway 
in the shelter in Saltillo. The dirt yard in Ixtepec was littered with phone cards. On the 
walls of the now defunct shelter in San Luis Potosi, migrants had lovingly inscribed 
the addresses of shelters in Mexico and the United States, as well as the contact 
information for the Denver day labor center Centro Humanitario. They also left behind 
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artwork, messages of encouragement and their own names, on the walls of the now 
defunct shelter in San Luis Potosi. 
The layout of the shelters differs dramatically from one to the next, depending 
on the unique history of the place. Often the struggle over information and security 
drives physical changes to the shelters. Thus, migration shapes the material contours 
of shelters, and conversely, their material contours shapes the information available to 
migrants.  
Their layout inevitably adapts to new resources and needs over time. Some 
shelters look like large homes, converted for the task. Others look like secure 
compounds. Some sprout from congregational initiatives, growing as addendums to 
existing buildings owned by the Church. NGOs may make large donations to shelters 
to enable specific projects, like dealing with a pressing sanitation or security issue, 
depending on their own reading of priorities. Skilled Central American masons or 
electricians occasionally take time from their journeys north to contribute, either 
earning wages or volunteering. Thus, migrants themselves have built many of these 
structures piecemeal over time, and the compounds often expand in a makeshift 
manner as financial resources, human capital and construction materials become 
available. The rules and regulations of shelters are also often products of experience, 
changing and adapting as shelter staff confront new dilemmas and improvise upon old 
ways of doing business. In this sense, the social and material structure of the shelters 
emerges from practice. 
In turn, the social and material structure of the shelter shapes migration 
practice. The regulation and physical layout of the place shapes the information 
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available to migrants during their journey. There is a trade-off between physical 
security and the flow of information through the shelter. The more isolated and 
selective the shelter becomes, the less opportunity for infiltration by criminal gangs. 
However, the regulation of movement in and out of the shelter comes with a steep 
price for migrants; they become less capable of learning about and adapting to changes 
in the route.  
For example, shelters often segregate Mexicans and Central Americans to 
minimize opportunities for recruitment by smugglers and infiltration by kidnappers. 
However, this segregation by nationality also decreases the information available to 
migrants. It isolates them from the larger community. Shelters also often segregate by 
gender, because sexual assault is so common. However, the segregation of men and 
women decreases the information available to the female minority by cutting them off 
from gossip at night. Indeed, in an extreme case, men and women are locked behind 
bars in separate wings of the facility at a regulated hour. Shelters often deny entry to 
repeat customers, who come under suspicion as smugglers or spies. However, in so 
doing, the shelter excludes the most experienced migrants from sharing their stories 
with others. In the most regulated shelters, migrants cannot leave to go to the train 
when they receive information about its immediate departure. They cannot leave to 
make travel arrangements and re-enter to wait. Finally, and most importantly, migrants 
may choose not to enter the shelter for fear of missing vital information about the 
movement of the trains:  
Because of the irregular schedule of the trains, there is a need to sleep in the vias and 
that is where the danger of the attacks comes from (Guatemalan migrant, Ixtepec, 
5/14/11).  
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The train yards at night are extraordinarily dangerous places, and it is a 
measure of the high value of this information to migrants that they would risk sleeping 
there to receive it. Thus, the regulation of movement in and out of the shelter is an 
important security consideration. Movement must be monitored to prevent 
kidnappings out of the shelter and to prevent the smuggling of guns and drugs into the 
shelters. The safe space of the shelter requires it, and that safety is key for the survival 
of an informational oases. However, too much regulation also undermines 
informational utility of the place. These security regulations undermine the flow of 
information through the shelter, and ultimately erode the human security of migrants. 
In this sense, the shelters are a microcosm of the larger problem that confronts 
Mexico.    
Reading the Material through the Divine: Signs on Heracalitus’ River 
Before the earnest Guatemalan man left home, he consulted only two people. 
Neither one was a parent. His father had died eight years ago, and his mother lived far 
from him in Esquintla, a city on the western side of Guatemala. He did not ask her. 
Nor did he talk to his cousins who had traveled the route before him. Instead, a female 
cousin who stayed behind in Guatemala warned him of the risks: assaults, 
kidnappings, murders, and the possibility of falling from the train. Her advice was 
simply to “be careful.” A friend in the United States agreed to help, but his friend’s 
advice was almost as vague: “Take care of yourself. Do not talk to unknown people. 
Do not sleep just anywhere. Do not walk in the mountains because of snakes and 
thieves.” Of course, the man had to do these things anyway, even though he had not 
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planned to. He began the journey by asking God for protection, “because it is very 
complicated to get started with advice like that.” Then he and his companions went in 
search of the train. 
Before they reached the legendary train or even the Guatemala-Mexico border, 
he and his little travel group ran into a Nicaraguan who joined them for a time. They 
met the Nicaraguan in Mazatenango, on the western side of Guatemala on the way to 
Mexico along the InterAmerican highway.101 He knew the way to the train and they 
did not. The Nicaraguan had no money and they did. They “are all God’s children”, 
and so they agreed to travel together in a combi [passenger van]. But after a while, the 
Nicaraguan had a change of heart and decided to go back. He told them, “I have my 
children and something could happen.” It was hard for the five Guatemalan men when 
their new friend turned for home. The Nicaraguan was left without money and they 
were left without a guide. The Nicaraguan cried when he turned to leave them, 
because they had all become very good friends. They gave him a backpack. It was all 
he would return home with. They had been united by the purpose of arriving in the 
United States, but the Nicaraguan had been assaulted while begging in the bus station 
and had begun to think of seeing his family again. The experience changed his 
priorities. 
I asked how they could trust the unknown Nicaraguan, and the man explained 
that it was the sadness in his face that had made him trustworthy. His apparent                                                         
101 The InterAmerican highway connects Panama City, Panama with Nuevo Laredo, Mexico 
on the United States border, crossing nine countries on the North American continent. In the 
Panamanian Isthmus, it connects with the PanAmerican Highway system that links an 
additional nine South American countries. This highway system, constructed with the help of 
U.S. Army Corp engineers for U.S. security purposes beginning in World War II (Wood 
2011), is a major artery for both authorized and unauthorized traffic in the Americas.   
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desolation drew them to him. Indeed, visible poverty is a common tell that someone 
along the route is a migrant. They invited him to join them because he had no money. 
In return, he had given them the good advice of not talking to others, advice they had 
received before but obviously disobeyed by talking to their new friend.102 The 
Nicaraguan taught them where to find the migrant shelter in Arriaga, a safe place to 
sleep while they waited for the train, but he was not the only kind-hearted person they 
had met on their journey across Chiapas. Strangers gave them food and money from 
the doorsteps of their homes, five or ten pesos for the combi when most sorely needed.  
Searching for Signs: Experience, Inspiration and Improvisation 
At the point where I met this man in Arriaga, he and his companions expected 
to board the train. From rumors in the migrant shelter, he knew about the dangers in 
Medias Aguas, Veracruz, a town on the train route where there had been a recent spate 
of kidnappings. He and his travel companions feared the kidnappings, but money was 
short and they did not want problems with the migration officials that patrol the bus 
lines. Thus, for them, the bus “does not exist.” He seemed so determined in the face of 
this danger that I asked what could possibly make him reconsider, “What would make 
                                                        
102 Throughout my fieldwork in El Salvador, Salvadorans often emphatically (and ironically) 
warned me not to trust Salvadorans. Virtually every goodbye also included a variety of 
security warnings. At first, I naively understood these parting comments as sincere 
expressions of concern for my wellbeing. Indeed, some unsolicited security advice might 
indicate a special safety concern for an uninitiated foreigner, particularly a white woman 
taking long solo trips across their country. However, as I watched people greet one another, I 
eventually came to understand the omnipresent security warnings as a ritual for establishing 
rapport, a way of generating common knowledge between two people about the 
untrustworthiness of outsiders; security warnings are a performance of interpersonal 
confidence, as are, under some circumstances, expressions of religious faith. I began to give 
them too. 
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you turn back?” After all, one member of his party had already gone home to Central 
America.103 
The man answered that, as he travels, he asks God if He wants him to return to 
Guatemala. If not, the man continues along the route with His benediction, and he 
believed that God had blessed his journey. There were several times when he and his 
travel companions had to walk right by migration officials, and they did so with no 
problem: “It is a sign.” The earnest man would go in search of more signs, listening 
and adapting his course as God makes His will known. For him, the journey was not 
only an escape from poverty and violence; it was a process of finding one’s place in 
the world through risk and sacrifice. No human being could provide the information 
sought by this man in his wanderings, because God alone spoke to him through the 
experience of the route. The man did not plan his journey, but instead sought to 
uncover God’s plan for him. Indeed, devout migrants read the landscape of the route 
through the lens of their faith, and they attribute their capacity to overcome material 
obstacles, including all manner of suffering and danger, to divine will.104  
Moments of inspiration or dawning understanding may appear as divine 
messages (Hagan 2008). However, pious migrants are not the sole beneficiaries of 
mobile knowledge. All people in this uncertain environment engage in a process of 
knowing through doing. Divine or not, the oldest handmaiden of inspiration is 
                                                        
103 Of course, the Nicaraguan might return to the route. Many people traveling through the 
shelter system try many times to arrive in the United States. It is not uncommon for people to 
return home, resolving never to travel again, and then find themselves on the road again after 
rediscovering their motivation to leave. Neither the dangers of the route nor life in Central 
America is tenable, and as a result, many people wander from Central America and back 
again. 
104 See also the in-depth discussion of this point in Hagan (2008). 
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necessity, and migrants become aware of opportunity through the experiences created 
as they seek it out. Without experience, the public images that guide migrants across 
terrain may remain latent in the imaginary, deflating the wind by which people 
navigate.    
Despite the Guatemalan man’s self-professed inflexibility about his mode of 
travel, swearing to me that the bus is absolutely off-limits, migrants frequently break 
their own rules and devise new tactics along the route. In fact, he himself had already 
broken many of the safety rules he had set at the beginning of the journey. Migrants 
must remain open to the signs they encounter, learning to manipulate familiar 
resources in new ways and responding to unexpected situations as they go. In fact, 
they often surprise themselves with their ingenuity at they cope with surprises and 
interact with the social or material landscape of the route. As migrants make clear in 
their interviews, physical experience of the material reality of the route is essential to 
understand it.  It is not just accumulated experience that is important, but also 
experience of the moment in which the knowledge is applied first hand. As a 
Honduran migrant (Saltillo, 7/18/10) explains: 
I have a feeling that says, “oh man, I don’t go there” and I was right. I said that about 
Huehuetoca. Let’s not go. I heard a lot of stuff about that place. Then we met these 
guys who said they were chased by the Zetas there and they caught one…I don’t 
know. I can smell danger. That is the reason why I never get caught….I am involved 
in this kind of thing a lot. And God, maybe it’s God. I always ask him to help. 
 
This man boasts of his experience along the route, but he also humbly 
recognizes that something else, maybe divine intervention, happens in the moment 
making new tactics or a new way forward possible. Improvisation is intimately 
connected to experience. Migrants use unforeseen resources and manipulate materials 
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for purposes outside their original intent.  As we have already discussed, migrants 
demonstrate an opportunistic grasp of the most fixed and established features of the 
material landscape of the route: train tracks and migrant shelters. However, migrants 
also transform a multitude of tangible signs they encounter along the route through 
more subtle improvisations.  In particular, migrants improvise as events unfold, 
searching for signs through which to navigate and converting them into strategies to 
achieve their goals. To do so, they rely on physical objects in their path. For example, 
the architecture of safe houses can facilitate escape, and unlikely vehicles may be used 
for transport. 
Safe Houses  
Safe houses are buildings that house kidnapped, smuggled or trafficked people; 
they are ‘safe’ for the kidnappers, smugglers and traffickers, not necessarily the 
migrants. In these houses, sanitation suffers with too many people crammed too 
closely together, sometimes with unworkable plumbing and insufficient food. Over 
one hundred people at a time may wait for days, weeks or months in buildings 
designed for single-family living. Women, some of them romantically involved with 
male kidnappers or smugglers, often serve as caretakers of these facilities, and 
sometimes run the operation from a family home. 
During smuggling operations, safe houses serve as clandestine way stations, as 
coyotes make arrangements for the next leg of the journey. Even in these voluntary 
smuggling arrangements, however, the doors and windows are often locked to limit 
the comings and goings of clients, preventing them from alerting authorities (whether 
inadvertently or purposely) to their whereabouts. The dire conditions within 
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smugglers’ safe houses, which may include poor hygiene and sexual abuse, drive 
some migrants to attempt to escape their own coyotes. During kidnappings, safe 
houses serve as holding facilities for victims during the negotiation of ransoms, and 
they may be staging grounds for other criminal activities, such as sex trafficking. In 
the most tragic cases, such as the much publicized massacre of ‘the 72’ in Tamaulipas 
in August 2010, they have become aboveground tombs for murdered migrants.  
These safe houses may be located in either isolated rural or busy urban locales 
along the route to (and across) the United States. Despite limitations on clients’ 
movements in and out, the location of smuggler safe houses is usually common 
knowledge in local communities and migrant shelters. After all, safe houses are a 
consumption node in the local political economy, requiring food and other services for 
the upkeep of a large, confined population. Kidnappings may happen anywhere in 
Mexico. However, because safe houses are difficult to keep secret and their visibility 
can lead to raids by competing gangs or authorities, the kidnappers in Veracruz or 
Tobasco sometimes transport their victims to Tamaulipas, a stronghold of the Zetas in 
northern Mexico, for more secure captivity. Thus, whether they were trafficked by 
kidnappers or smuggled by coyotes, many migrants report visiting safe houses across 
the country, like a series of stepping stones north.  
Despite the lengths to which kidnappers go to maintain control in these houses, 
some migrant kidnapping stories end in great escapes, rather than the payment of 
ransoms. Given the recent professionalization of the kidnapping industry in Mexico, 
the continued possibility for any such breakouts or resistance to traffickers is 
astonishing. Given the publicity surrounding multiple massacres of migrants, the 
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courage demonstrated by migrants who attempt any such breakouts or resistance to 
traffickers is equally astonishing. 
Fortunately for migrants, two “fixed and established” factors conspire to 
facilitate escapes. First, the routines and traditions of kidnappers produce opportunities 
for the liberation of migrants. As the behavior of captors becomes patterned around a 
daily routine, victims begin to intuit opportunities. In particular, shift changes among 
the kidnappers and celebrations, which usually involve inebriated guards, provide the 
key moments for movement. Substance abuse, including both drugs and alcohol, is the 
norm in kidnapping gangs. For example, a Guatemalan man (Ixtepec, 4/15/11) 
described his escape during the festivities around the World Cup: 
They kidnapped me, but I escaped during the World Cup. They took me to Medias 
Aguas [a town in Veracruz notorious for kidnappings] in a house. They tied my 
feet….I was going about begging [before the kidnapping]. I asked for a glass of water 
and a taco, and they said wait here. They came back and put a gun on me….They hit 
me and asked about my family. They put a gun to my head….They had me in a locked 
room, but I climbed out from the roof and I jumped. That’s how I hurt my leg. I asked 
God to give me the strength to go on.  
 
During his escape, the kidnappers were drunk and watching the game. 
Migrants capitalize on these routines and traditions, particularly the almost obligatory 
drunkenness that accompanies holidays and soccer tournaments. In the story of the 
desperate man from Honduras described in Chapter 3, Christmas celebrations, during 
which inebriated guards littered the safe house with empty bottles of alcohol, clued 
migrants into the behavior of kidnappers during holidays. Migrants then knew to 
expect similar informality and lack of surveillance on New Year’s Eve. Some migrants 
capitalize upon these predictable celebrations to make their escape. If the moment 
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feels right when the party begins and migrants do not lose their nerve, some of them 
improvise their way out of captivity. 
Second, the physical architecture of the safe houses also determines the 
possibilities for escape. The building is not something that migrants can discern in 
advance of their capture, which is itself an unexpected event. In fact, the buildings 
themselves are improvisations by kidnappers. While doors can be locked, the drop 
sites are not dungeons designed with the expressed purpose of imprisoning people. 
They are houses built for voluntary occupation with windows and doors, and they are 
sometimes made of wood or flimsy materials, rather than stone or cement. In a key 
moment, when the guards’ gaze has been diverted and manacles are lifted, migrants 
may peel away a wall or roofing material. They might sneak out a window. They 
might disappear into a bathroom and never come out. If they are lucky enough to be 
on the first floor of a two-story building, they might run away during a military raid on 
the drop house.   
Thus, not surprisingly, escapes from drop houses are always conditioned by the 
built environment and physical constraints imposed on migrants.  The fact that even 
the most organized and professional kidnappers use makeshift facilities for the 
containment of sometimes hundreds of victims produces some limited opportunities 
for resistance. Nevertheless, it is rarely “planned” resistance. Migrants devise only 
skeletal, short-term escape plans, sometimes only agreeing on a time to rebel or slip 
away. Crowded living conditions with strangers make coordination difficult and 
escape plans more likely to be discovered.  
  
372  
Of course, to make use of the key moments produced at the confluence of a 
fortunate turn of events and a gap in physical constraints, migrants must be escape 
artists. With great finesse, victims must watch and wait for an auspicious moment to 
rebel or sneak away from makeshift prisons. The intuitive sense of such opportunities 
is not a science. It takes gumption and cunning, as explained by a Honduran man 
(Coatzacoalcos, 6/1/11), remembering his success: “I am clever. I climbed out a 
window in the bathroom. The others were to scared to move. They didn’t want to 
come with me.  Only I escaped.” Not everyone can imagine such a difficult maneuver. 
Key moments for these actions are produced by routines and traditions, but they may 
only be intuited in their time and place. Importantly, improvisation and inspiration 
does not end in captivity. Trafficking victims leverage tangible signs to resist. 
Unlikely Vehicles 
Tangible signs also identify or mark alternative forms of transportation. 
Ultimately, migrants move across terrain by whatever means necessary, often 
following the path of least resistance, which for the poorest migrants, means the least 
expensive transport: the train. Not coincidentally, the train has the highest imageability 
as a means of unauthorized migration.  However, there are many other modes of travel 
available to those who have the means.  
Journeys often involve a surprisingly diverse array of travel modes. Reports of 
travel by train, private car, bus, van, secret compartments in vehicles ranging from 
trucks hauling produce shipments to military transport moving soldiers, walking, 
ambulance rides, and bicycle are not uncommon. In one story, a woman began to 
praise God in song in earnest, quietly at first, afraid of annoying her smuggler. Slowly, 
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the entire travel group joined in, singing for spiritual strength as they travelled across 
terrain in a van. The smuggler turned around from the front seat and shouted, “What 
are you doing?” Startled, she explained her faith and need for solace. He thought for a 
moment, before responding, “That’s good. Keep singing. If we get pulled over, we 
will tell them we are a church group”. A new disguise was born. Indeed, neither 
migrants nor smugglers necessarily know how they will arrive in advance of the 
journey, and opportunities for travel emerge as people make accidental discoveries en 
route and then leverage them to their advantage. 
In fact, methods of travel that would be utterly unimaginable to both migrants 
and smugglers before the journey reveal themselves along the way. For example, 
Mexican human rights activists have organized a series of protest caravans along the 
route. A caravan is an established part of the social movement repertoire in Mexico, 
drawing on the long tradition of Catholic processions, reenactments of Jesus’ burden 
of the cross during his crucifixion. These caravans for migrants’ rights follow the 
route north. During these events, groups of victims of criminal violence, students, 
family members of disappeared migrants, journalists, activists, priests and nuns, and 
shelter staff wave banners demanding justice for migrants and an end to the violence. 
Over bullhorns, they give testimony about the suffering they have endured. Cameras 
roll for documentaries. Priests perform Catholic mass. Journalists conduct interviews. 
Such events generally materialize in the aftermath of mass kidnappings and around 
Easter, when Catholic processions are common. The immediate purpose of these 
marches is to enhance communication among the migrant shelters, strengthen the 
growing transnational web of activists, and raise awareness of the plight of the train 
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riders. Ultimately, organizers intend to guarantee human rights protections and safe 
migration by calling on the both Mexican legislators and civil society to act.    
However, these actions have, on a few occasions, also facilitated safe 
migration in a more concrete way. They have provided the social camouflage and 
political cover for unauthorized migrants to move north with the caravan. Migrants, 
learning of an impending action at a migrant shelter, may delay their departure to 
coincide with the protest. The protest provides social camouflage by mixing activists, 
journalists and students with migrants, and providing a context of contested nationality 
that complicates the usual cultural tells. Perhaps more importantly, the protest 
provides political cover for migrants moving north. In recent years, government 
authorities have not dared to intervene with unauthorized marchers, because it would 
likely provoke media outrage and condemnation by transnational rights networks. 
Thus, a small handful of migrants have sometimes found themselves travelling north 
in a very unexpected fashion: as political protestors. 
For example, for the protest in January 2011, the Governor of Chiapas 
personally provided a fleet of vans to transport hundreds of protestors on their march 
north from Arriaga to Ixtepec, including around 75 unauthorized migrants, to 
demonstrate his unwavering commitment to human rights (Frank-Vitale 2011, p.83). 
Thus, 75 unauthorized migrants not only found themselves moving north openly, but 
also officially escorted by the governor himself. Years of organized political 
contestation by activists made this unlikely vehicle for unauthorized migration 
possible (p.83). However, migrants must seize upon such rare opportunities, and not 
just protests, without hesitation or miss them entirely. And participation in these 
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events is not without risk, because it destroys anonymity. Indeed, one migrant who 
had participated in the protest was killed shortly thereafter. 
From Public Images to Tangible Signs 
These improvisations, supple manipulations of material and symbolic 
resources along the route, require inspiration. Put another way, improvisation requires 
the capacity to read and respond intuitively to the subtle signals of experience. To 
recognize the right moment for an escape, migrants must be acutely aware of their 
surroundings. They must also locate a window, whether a metaphorical window of 
opportunity or a literal opening in the wall. To seize upon a surprising means of 
transportation, they must be open to opportunities as they experience them. 
Improvisation relies on tangible signs. The experience of these signs can transform 
both geographical orientation and social identity en route, and they often represent the 
culmination of lived events and faith-based interpretation.105  
In other words, pubic images must be experienced, removed from the abstract 
hypothetical and confronted in the flesh with perception, sensation and emotion. 
Otherwise, there is no conversion of imagery into the signs that change migrant 
behavior. Signs can bring moral clarity, as well as tactical improvisation. The most 
important “signs” indicate the right path to follow, which is also a righteous one, but 
they cannot be understood (or even seen) in advance of the journey. Migrants stumble 
upon signs along the way. Many migrants feel they arrive at a better understanding of                                                         
105 As explained by Lynch (1960, p.131): “The creation of the environmental image is a two-
way process between observer and observed. What he sees is based on exterior form, but hwo 
he interprets and organizes this, and how he directs his attention, in turn affects what he sees. 
The human organism is highly adaptable and flexible, and different groups may have widely 
different images of the same outer reality.” 
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God’s will through the experience of material reality and their immediate needs. Even 
the minority of Central American migrants who does not explicitly embrace 
Christianity along the route felt an analogous sense of fate when confronted with the 
uncertainty and danger of their journey. Whether devising unlikely transport or 
escaping the calamity of captivity, the need to recognize signs, rather than follow a 
premeditated course, makes sense for migrants navigating the unknown and coping 
with the unexpected. 
Saber and Conocer 
The Spanish language provides a useful tool for understanding the type of 
knowledge necessary for understanding these signs. As a derivative from Latin, it 
offers a distinction that has been curiously lost in English: saber vs. conocer.106 On the 
one hand, “Conocer” is to know through familiarity; the experience of a person, place, 
thing or practice is necessary for this knowledge. It is an experiential knowledge. On 
the other hand, “saber” should be translated as to know of or about a person, place, 
thing or practice in the abstract; no experience is implied. Migrants almost universally 
stress this distinction in their interviews, using the contrast between knowing as 
‘saber’ and knowing as ‘conocer’ to describe their difficulty in forming clear 
expectations and planning a journey. You simply must experience the route, to 
understand it. 
In interviews, the dialogue shifted between the two types of knowledge. 
Though it bears some similarities, the distinction that migrants make with the shift                                                         
106 Bertrand Russell (1911) famously points to this linguistic structure, inherent in Latin, 
Greek, German (wissen and kennen) and French (savoir and connaitre), to differentiate 
between ‘knoweldge by acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge by description’. 
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between saber and conocer is more refined than crude concepts of ‘book smarts’ and 
‘street smarts’, which imply that an individual might accumulate know-how. Under 
conditions of uncertainty, the human capital of ‘street smarts’, however useful, has its 
limits; it may expire without warning. Instead, migrants echo what Elaine Scarry 
(1985) calls “the fact of pain’s inexpressibility.” Until violence and suffering en route 
happened to them, they could not fathom the true meaning of the consequences of 
migration. Even if they were well informed about the risks in advance, they did not 
know the danger. Outside of the moment of suffering, that level of understanding is 
inaccessible. It has to happen to you first. 
Of course, suffering is not the only inexpressible moment. People know other 
people through face-to-face acquaintance. They also know joy, and they come to 
recognize opportunities through their experience of them. Street smarts, a well-honed 
talent for making these recognitions in a particular cultural setting, does not hurt 
survival chances. But it is insufficient under conditions of uncertainty. Migrants do not 
know the way forward until they engage with the circumstances that produce 
opportunity. They must experience all the emotions and sense-making that those 
circumstances inspire before changing course. 
Heraclitus’s River 
The devout man with the bushy mustache had made a kindly impression on 
me. After meeting him, I hoped against the odds that I might hear from him again. It 
was an unlikely prospect, but I did encountered six migrants at multiple locations 
during my research. Before I left Mexico, I also received rumors about the 
whereabouts and activities of various migrants indefinitely moving along the route. 
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After my return to the U.S., I maintained contact with some Salvadoran families that 
span the United States and El Salvador. A handful of tech-savvy migrants also found 
me after their arrival in the United States. So, it was possible that I would see or hear 
from the Guatemalan again. Alas, years passed and I never received any 
communication from him or the vast majority of the people I met en route.  
 Dynamic conditions and the obscurities of anonymity along the route 
complicate the view of an ethnographer as much as that of migrants. Put simply, the 
route, as I knew it during fieldwork, had changed even before my own act had come to 
a close. Thus, I could not predict the likelihood of success or failure of the earnest 
Guatemalan man, and I still wonder about his fate. Whatever ultimately happened to 
him, the possibility of violence haunted his journey. The testimonials of kidnapping 
victims remind us that the information provided by the material infrastructure of the 
route cuts two ways. Ironically, migrants read the artifacts of sustained migration to 
orient their journey, but these same artifacts can betray their location. The utility of 
information about the route is fleeting and unpredictable.  
The material infrastructure of the route generates a human security paradox.  If 
migrants can learn by moving along this terrain, so can the authorities and criminals 
that hunt them. Oases draw predators. The combination of the routes’ “hidden but 
known” qualities produces a geographic vulnerability to criminal violence (Coutin 
2005, p.197; Coutin 2007, p.105): a predictable place to prey upon people in the 
shallows of the law. When migrants can travel among citizens, they share in the 
(highly imperfect, but relatively strong) security guaranteed to citizens. However, 
migrants and some smugglers continue to follow the clandestine terrain of the route, 
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moving amid a critical mass of unauthorized travelers, because they lack the 
information or financial resources to navigate in the open.  
Thus, the practiced terrain of the route provides both a resource and a danger 
for migrants. As information condenses in material form around the transit political 
economy and landscape of the route, it becomes visible to a variety of strategic actors. 
For this reason, the unauthorized flow of people can be aptly described by Heraclitus’s 
famous metaphor of a river that can never be stepped in twice. The sedimentation of 
material practice paradoxically erodes the utility of the information it deposits along 
the route; as a result of strategic interaction between migrants and criminals, the most 
tried and tested places of passage potentially become the most insecure. As a 
consequence, uncertainty flourishes along the banks of a sustained flood of migrants. 
The train tracks, the isolated mountain and desert trails, the chain of migrant shelters, 
and the transit towns through Mexico become violent places. Every journey, like each 
footfall in Herclitus’s ever-changing current, is unique. 
Conclusion 
The landscape of the route changes with the passage of people. At the same 
time, it signals a way forward. The rules for reading those signals are never fixed. 
Migrants do not know if violent actors lay in ambush along the trail. Mexican locals 
also learn to read the socio-economic landscape of unceasing transit, orienting their 
economic activities to the wanderers in their midst, but in so doing, risking the wrath 
of state authorities.  
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Indeed, Homer warns of the potential dangers of hospitality when Odysseus 
inadvertently draws the wrath of the Gods upon his Phaeacian hosts.107 The assistance 
they provide the stranded stranger provokes the Gods to “pile a huge mountain around 
their port”, thereby preventing the Phaeacians from assisting future wanderers who 
stumble upon their civilization. The Phaeacians had read the rules incorrectly, and the 
fabled Odysseus accidentally closes the route for the sailors that follow his course, 
leaving behind a material landscape suddenly and irrevocably altered in his wake. 
Early adventurers inscribed their odysseys into the physical terrain, not through 
the provocation of Gods, but by the simple fact of their travel. Sailors skirted unknown 
coasts, trading or stealing foreign goods when they made landfall, unintentionally 
leaving archaeologists with a rich record of their voyages. By the dawn of the 
medieval period, roving vagabonds, prophets and shepherds circulated great distances 
by land, carving dirt paths into the hillsides with their frequent footsteps (Braudel 
1995[1966], p.47). A material infrastructure for maritime and land commerce formed 
around these popular routes, facilitating opportunities for trade and cultural change 
(Braduel 1995 [1966]). The valuable artifacts they transported along these routes 
                                                        
107 Bernard Knox (1996, p.44) explains the significance of this Phaeacian anecdote in Homer’s 
epic: “This is the end of the great Phaecian tradition of hospitality and help for the stranger 
and wayfarer. This action of Zeus casts a disturbing light on the relation between human ideals 
and divine conduct. If there is one stable moral criterion in the world of the Odyssey, it is the 
care taken by the powerful and well-to-do of strangers, wanderers and beggars. This code of 
hospitality is the one universally recognized morality….Of all the many hosts measured by 
this moral standard, the Phaeacians stand out as the most generous, not only in their regal 
entertainment of Odysseus, but also in their speedy conveyance of the hero to his own home, a 
service they provide for all wayfarers who reach their shore. And now they are punished by 
the gods for precisely this reason….” 
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became clues about how and where to travel for the next generation of migrants.108 
The Mediterranean landscape itself tells their stories. 
Today, the North American landscape tells the stories of the Central American 
migrants who move across it. They navigate this landscape with the material clues that 
they encounter. These clues orient them geographically and provide the props for 
social performances en route. By analyzing migration practice in detail, emphasizing 
the interplay between migrants’ faith and the physicality of the journey, this chapter 
probes the interaction of the material and symbolic dimensions of the route. I have 
given an ethnographic account of practiced terrain, examining how migrants read and 
respond to their surroundings. The social and material landscape of the route is a 
product of the strategic practice that it conditions, and the reliability of the messages it 
provides travelers is always problematic. Migrants must navigate this uncertainty with 
                                                        
108 These artifacts are more durable than the breadcrumbs of children’s fables. Jeffrey Bentley 
(1993, p.41) notes an example of the transmission of information by traded objects along 
global routes around the ancient world; around 128 B.C. Han ambassador Zhang Qian 
deduced the existence of a safer route through India after observing Chinese products for sale 
in Bactria. In Bentley’s analysis, the desire for trade largely drives social conversion along 
routes established for economic exchange. In contrast, Mary W. Helms (1988) emphasizes 
how intellectual, social and religious motives have driven trade in foreign objects and travel 
throughout human history, giving rise to trade routes over time. She argues that travel has long 
been a rite of passage for religious elites: “Travel is fun; travel is exciting, often dangerous; 
travel provides tactical or esoteric knowledge, valuable experience, and a variety of material 
goods. Travel also can give a measure of individual freedom and of personal renown. In 
addition, the experiences of travel can place the traveler in a peculiar position or endow him 
with a different aura or status not only while he is adventuring but when he returns home” 
(p.78-79). Like the tourist trinkets in circulation today, the tangible objects transported along 
ancient routes were valuable as curiosities and visible representations of the prestige of well-
travelled people. A key difference between the ancient examples illustrated in Homer, Bentley 
and Helm’s work and the contemporary context, perhaps, is the democratization of this rite to 
the masses that engage in unauthorized migration, rather than restricted to an economic, 
political or religious elite. Today, unauthorized migration routes are trade routes for labor and 
other goods, driven by both profit and social motives. They are travelled, not by kings and 
princes as in Homer’s epic, but by the most marginalized workers in the global economy. 
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faith and experience, rather than relying solely on preexisting scripts and rehearsed 
scenes. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
LIBERALIZING ROUTES: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
Introduction 
 
And to no one- no man, no woman, not a soul- 
Reveal that you are the wanderer home at last. 
No, in silence you must bear a world of pain, 
Subject yourself to the cruel abuse of men. 
 
Homer’s Iliad is the story of a reluctant adventurer, forced to leave his beautiful 
young wife and newborn son behind. The sequel, the Odyssey, narrates his difficult 
return home. In the Iliad, Odysseus attempts to avoid going to war. He feigns insanity at 
the approach of his sworn ally’s messenger, but the ruse fails when Odysseus breaks 
character to save his infant son’s life. In the Odyssey, we learn that our exiled champion 
struggles for twenty years to find his way back to the place from which war had torn him 
unwillingly. In that time, he silently bears a world of pain, but perseveres in his quest 
homeward. Even after he arrives in Ithaca, he is fated to roam again in penitence to 
Poseidon.  
The story of contemporary Central American migration is more Odyssey than Iliad. 
More than three decades of personal, social and economic transformations along the 
transnational route animate contemporary Central American migration. Migrants, 
traveling a well-trod but increasingly unpredictable passage, tell stories of perpetual 
wandering and longing for a home, not a direct and glorious commute to the gates of 
Troy. Like Odysseus, these wanderers must suffer the cruel abuse of men in silence, 
outside the protection of the law. And like Odysseus, arrival does not necessarily imply 
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the end of their travails or travels. Buffeted by unexpected calamities on an indefinite 
journey, these migrants sometimes become permanent wanderers.   
In this concluding chapter, I briefly point to the implications of this Homeric telling 
of Central American migration for contemporary liberalism. First, I provide a story to 
illustrate the argument of this conclusion. Second, I restate the argument of the 
dissertation, walking the reader through a review of the chapters. In so doing, I outline 
the process of information, imagination and improvisation that constitutes mobile 
knowledge, a concept that draws on the ancient Greek idea of metis. Third, I revisit the 
role of risk and uncertainty in the odyssey. Mobile knowledge is the means by which 
migrants navigate a world of risk and uncertainty, but this learning process also produces 
social ambiguities that exacerbate uncertainty. It thereby complicates governance.  
Finally, I argue that policymakers must acknowledge the baffling complexity and 
uncertainty of this transnational social reality. I argue that the simultaneous legal 
exclusion and de facto socio-economic inclusion of migrants along the routes through 
Mexico and the United States highlights the contradictions of liberalism, even when 
migrants are transient rather than settled. Whatever the merits of borders might be for 
national security, liberal domestic orders cannot be sustained with punitive and pervasive 
internal policing of transnational flows. The focus on the process of mobile knowledge 
and policing that unfolds along the unauthorized routes cutting through nation-states, as 
opposed to a myopic focus on the borders that divide them, challenges us to confront the 
very real human security crisis these contradictions helped to produce.   
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A Story of Impossible Return 
Whenever a migrant along the route greeted me in perfect English, learned over the 
course of many years living in the United States, I was reminded of the long road home 
that Odysseus had to travel. These frequent encounters with English speakers underscore 
the illusory nature of boundaries between home, transit and destination in lived 
experience. Lived experience engenders cultural hybridity. Indefinite journeys, which 
migrants sometimes undertake without real hope of settling in the United States, 
complicate the very idea of destination (Coutin 2005). Somewhere along the way, home, 
abroad and in-between become confused. On my last night in the shelter in Ixtepec, 
Oaxaca, as I was preparing to travel homeward to Ithaca through the migrant shelters, I 
met a black Honduran woman who reinforced impression for me (6/30/10).109 As I 
listened to her impeccable English, I was struck by the irony that we were both trying to 
go home. Her adventure was an Odyssey of impossible return, not an Iliad of departure.  
Her gently graying hair had been styled into a crew cut and a baggy shirt concealed 
her breasts. If not for her voice, I would have assumed she was a thickly built man. She 
had the kind of smile that always seemed to be winking at you, and I liked her 
immediately. She had lived in the United States most of her life. As a young girl, she had 
tired of her dependence on her younger sister’s translation from Spanish to express 
herself in public. For this reason, she had forced herself to learn English well enough to 
rival any native speaker. When we met that night in the migrant shelter, her mother, 
sister, and whole family were still in the United States. She alone had lost her legal                                                         
109 I chose her story of many similar stories of people returning home to the United States, 
because it was a moment of inspiration for me personally, bringing the similar stories into 
focus.   
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residency and had been deported to Honduras after “a few” drunk-driving incidents. She 
told me all this with a smile. 
Of course, the smiling woman’s family did not understand the violence unfolding 
along the route, and she was not going to tell them; “They would worry so much. They 
know nothing about this.” Her mother did not know that she had been robbed and 
abandoned. The smiling woman had paid a hundred quetzals, about thirteen dollars, to 
cross the Guatemala-Mexico border with a woman in a taxi without inspection. This low-
budget female coyote took her to Puerto Madero, Chiapas and introduced her to people 
with a boat. The smiling woman paid them to take her to Puerto Escondido, Oaxaca. 
About ten other people rode on a small boat with her. They were from all over Latin 
America, even a few people from Brazil. The boat encountered a storm and big surf, 
before the captain dropped them on a beach that he proclaimed to be Puerto Escondido. 
The migrants disembarked the little boat in the rain, but found themselves stranded on a 
desert island. The smiling woman laughed incredulously while telling the story, “Can you 
believe that? I was left on a desert island in Mexico! I would have never guessed. I was 
on an island in the ocean! There weren’t even trees. It was just sand.” For the smiling 
woman, this utterly implausible adventure belonged to the plot of a far-fetched television 
sitcom, not real life, and certainly not her life. 
The island where the smugglers abandoned the migrants was small, and the migrants 
easily walked its circumference. Luckily, it was raining and they were able to collect 
rainwater to drink. But she had no food for several days. Finally, some fishermen rescued 
them; “You should have seen the looks on their faces.” The fishermen informed the 
migrants that they were still only a few miles north of the border: “We didn’t even make 
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it out of Chiapas! And they had collected 3000 pesos [approximately $240 dollars] from 
each of us. That’s a lot of money. I think they drop people on that island.”   
The loss of her spending cash had been difficult. The smiling woman had her U.S. 
credit card with her, but it did not help. She had been shocked to discover that, “These 
tiny little towns don’t have ATMs! There aren’t banks!” As she shouted this, I hushed her 
and hastily explained the danger of boasting about owning a credit card or bank 
account.110 Ever more alarmed by her apparent unfamiliarity with the ways of the road 
and her obvious foreignness in rural Latin America, I asked her how she managed to find 
the shelter. The smiling woman explained that some other migrants told her about the 
shelter in Arriaga, Chiapas, and she followed them there, where she learned about the 
train.  
The experience of the train had been no less surreal than the desert island. She saw 
people clambering to the top of the boxcars, and she saw one of them fall. There was a 
big group of Guatemalans with a smuggler, “…and they scurried up there like monkeys. 
There weren’t even ladders all the way to the top.” She could not fathom how they did it. 
The tops of the cars were slippery, and she was too scared to climb up. Instead, she found 
a place wedged below, between two boxcars. She had just a tiny ledge, and she had to 
hold on for dear life. She tried to tie herself to the train with a belt. She was shaken the 
                                                        
110 During my fieldwork, I generally assumed that migrants knew the dangers and the route 
better than I did, and as a result, I did not directly answer many questions about the safety of 
the route. As a shelter volunteer, I would sometimes provide information that I could obtain 
online about migrants’ legal rights. More than once, I printed out information about asylum, 
and on another occasion, provided a map of the train route. I often provided contact 
information for the Catholic priest, and encouraged vulnerable people to speak to him directly. 
However, in this case and a few others, I felt there was an ethical imperative to intervene with 
some limited safety advice in the context of the interview. I recognized that any advice could 
be expired by the time I gave it, and I provided this disclaimer. 
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whole time by the vibrations of the train. At this point in the conversation, she 
demonstrated how she sat, with her hands up, holding onto some bars overhead. She even 
fell asleep that way, because she was so tired: “It was 12 hours in that position!” Another 
migrant would shout at her, “Don’t fall asleep! You’ll fall!” And she would wake up.  
From Ixtepec, where I met her, she wanted to go to Tijuana, Baja California on the 
U.S. border. From there, she expected that she would try to enter with her (now obsolete) 
green card. She had heard a rumor that it would take six months for her loss of the green 
card to get into the U.S. Border Patrol’s computer. I doubted whether her passport and 
green card were likely to survive the journey, and I warned her that it sounded like a 
fool’s errand. Because she seemed so unschooled in Central American and Mexican 
street life, I encouraged her to consult the shelter priest about safety precautions. 
However, it was clear that she did not necessarily think her plan would work, and I had 
the impression that she was still searching for a better idea. What else was she going to 
do? Nobody in her family knew about contemporary dangers or maintained contacts with 
smugglers. They had all lived in the United States legally so long that their information 
about the journey had expired. She had devised this idea on her own. She would try to 
pass as a legal resident. In an important sense, she was impersonating her past self. 
Remembering the smiling woman as I write this dissertation, I can easily imagine that her 
odyssey took her to many other unexpected places on a winding and uncertain path, 
though I am unsure whether she ever returned “home.” 
The most desperate migrants are become transnational vagabonds across Central 
America, Mexico and the United States. In “transit”, they sometimes become uncertain 
about the distinction between home and passage; their destination may not be clear to 
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themselves. And because of harsh socio-economic realities in their birthplace, they 
become vagabonds long before they ever embark on the migrant road. Because of harsh 
legal realties and mass deportations in their adopted countries, they may be forced to lead 
vagabond lives long after they have arrived. 
Across Central America, nation-states have not provided the basic physical stability 
that, in an important sense, defines home. Whether they make the journey or not, many 
Central Americans are, in an important sense, strangers to community life. Under long-
term conditions of scarcity and insecurity, envy and rumor have taken root, expelling 
people onto the routes without communal resources. A cycle of poverty, insecurity and 
lack of upward mobility make Central Americans outcasts in their own societies. 111 For 
this reason, the Catholic Church has openly expounded a conditional right to migrate, a 
right based in the fact of Central American governments’ failure to provide a homeland 
(Hagan 2008).  
The pioneers of Central American migration, like the smiling woman I met in Ixtepec 
who had first gone to the United States decades ago, were unwillingly torn from their 
birthplace by violence and economic turmoil. Deportees travel the unauthorized routes in 
desperation. Citizenship may officially mark them as Salvadoran, Honduran or 
Guatemalan, but their families, jobs and lifestyle reveals a de-facto membership in a 
transnational society of the Americas. Their odysseys have produced a mismatch between 
their place of legal domicile (Central America), their physical location (in transit through 
                                                        
111 Juan Gonzalez (2011) persuasively argues that these political, social and economic 
conditions that push migrants from Latin America are themselves a product of U.S. foreign 
policy in the region, a “harvest of empire.” 
  
390  
Mexico) and the place where they feel they belong, or at least, where they feel they might 
have the opportunity to build a home (the United States).  
As they struggle to find a home, some migrants accumulate days, months and even 
years stranded in perpetual transit through Mexico. These people become embedded in 
relationships and practices along the route from Central America through Mexico and the 
United States. Transnational sojourners transcend easy dichotomies between citizens and 
foreigners, settlers and migrants. Their fluid stories complicate the demarcation of 
distinct spaces of ‘home’, ‘transit’ and ‘destination’. They improvise new directions, 
shaping these spaces in their odyssey. This personal transformation is mirrored by a 
broader social transformation, as the improvisations of migrants reinvent cultural scripts 
and reorient the economy in societies of transit. Sustained human movement sweeps 
citizens and foreigners, settlers and migrants, into its domain. It spawns new practices 
and relationships, diversifying the social space of the route, generating new associations, 
and thereby creating new challenges for the states that would seek to impede these flows. 
In uncertain times, the continuity of these flows depends on the ceaseless cultural change 
described by this dissertation. 
Summary of Argument 
 
This dissertation examined how migrants cope with escalating policing and criminal 
violence in transit from Central America. The sustained practice of migration informs 
migrants’ behavior along a dangerous route, not only through social networks, but by 
carving a transit political economy and transnational imaginary. I argued that migrant 
decisions are rational, but must be viewed as part of an experiential process of 
information-gathering, imagination and improvisation en route. Under conditions of 
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uncertainty, migration and vulnerability to violence in transit cannot be fully understood 
by focusing at the moment that migrants first decide to leave; we must travel the route 
with them to understand this ongoing learning. Once we travel the route, tracing the 
footsteps of migrants, we reveal a transnational social process that transforms foreigners 
and citizens alike. 
Chapter 1 Introducing the Migrant Odyssey described the risky and uncertain nature 
of the violence that migrants must navigate as they cross Mexico. It explained that the 
migrant route was analogous to the ‘dark wine sea’ travelled by the Homeric hero. 
Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant (1975, p.222) describe the deep sea of the 
Ancient Greeks as uncertain:  
In this chaotic expanse where every crossing resembles breaking through a region 
unknown and ever unrecognizable, pure movement reigns forever.  Disturbed by the 
winds which blow across it and by the flux and reflux of the waves, the sea is the most 
mobile, changeable and polymorphic space.    
 
Likewise, the Central American migration route through Mexico has become a 
mobile, changeable and polymorphic space. It is a transient region characterized by 
violence and strategic interaction between migrants, criminals and the state. Like the 
fickle flux and reflux of the waves, dangers en route change rapidly. Migrants shift their 
goals and loyalties without warning. Both the ancient sea and the contemporary 
unauthorized route are the natural home of a metis-like knowledge. 
Chapter 2 Theorizing Migration embedded migration decisions in practice. Wise 
Odysseus and his equally crafty bride Penelope do not fall into a habit of hubris in the 
face of grave danger. Similarly, migrants freely admit that they cannot accurately predict 
the risks of the journey. For this reason, they are rational, but do not make rigid plans for 
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the journey. Under conditions of uncertainty, information cannot be stored and 
accumulated as ‘social capital’. This chapter pointed instead to an experiential learning 
process, called mobile knowledge, through which migrants convert information with 
imagination and improvisation en route. In so doing, it explained the creativity of 
migrants. 
Chapter 3 A Veil of Brown and Gray described, in greater depth, the polymorphic 
context in which this creativity emerges. It outlined the ambiguous and uncertain social 
structure of the journey, introducing the shape-shifting cast of criminals that confronts 
migrants along the route. By explicating the relationships between these actors, this 
chapter more clearly illustrated the bewildering complexity and fluidity that confronts 
migrants on their journey. For Central American migrants, like Odysseus, the dark path 
homeward is a potentially deadly contest with a variety of capricious characters.  
Part two of the dissertation begins where I began the study: with expectations derived 
from conventional approaches to migration. To study how migrants respond to this 
uncertain social terrain, Chapter 4 Informing Routes asked: What do migrants know about 
the routes before the journey begins? And where does this knowledge come from? To 
answer these questions, I compared and contrasted two Salvadoran towns with different 
migration histories. Surprisingly, I found that my original expectations did not hold; 
useful informational resources did not accumulate in a town with a long migration 
history, relative to the town with a short migration history.  
In fact, the high level of insecurity and distrust that characterizes these towns 
reinforces the Homeric allegory. In this fragmented social reality, social mechanisms 
imperfectly enforce smuggler-migrant contracts, and market reputation plays a less 
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significant role than the threat of retribution. Furthermore, while migrants in both towns 
were keenly aware of dangers, they lacked specific information that would guarantee a 
safe arrival, because “every trip is different”. Thus, the chapter provided a picture of the 
moral economy of local smuggling markets and the social networks that support it. In so 
doing, it presented null findings based on expectations derived from conventional 
approaches to migration. 
Chapter 5 Mapping Migration explained the surprising findings of a mapmaking 
exercise conducted with Salvadoran migrants in these communities of origin. We might 
have expected maps written by migrants before and after their journey to exhibit the most 
vital geographical information for surviving the adventure. Furthermore, we might expect 
to see differences in maps from communities with these divergent migration histories. 
However, it is a shared and pervasive normative orientation of migration, not a 
geographic orientation, which looms most prominently in the illustrations.  
Thus, this chapter began to sketch an alternative approach to understanding 
migration. It outlined a research method that parallels the migratory experience. It 
described over two years of fieldwork from rural villages in El Salvador through transit 
communities in Mexico and into the United States. It explained how I traced migration 
practice with a pragmatic mix of participant observation, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews, and mapping workshops with migrants. A juxtaposition of 
migrants’ maps against official maps of the routes illustrated the ‘mobile knowledge’ best 
accessed through ethnographic insight. Using images drawn by migrants in their maps of 
the route, as well as narratives from interviews and popular media, this chapter also 
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examined the relationship between the migrants’ normative and geographical orientations 
to the journey. 
Part three of the dissertation turns to how migrants navigate the route in practice. 
Given the dearth of specific, trustworthy information that might guarantee safe arrival, 
migrants must continually re-imagine the route and themselves during the journey, 
performing their own epic as they move across terrain. Chapter 6 Imagining Routes 
discussed how imagined categories become ‘scripts’, influencing social dynamics in the 
anonymous crowds that form along the route. At the same time, however, migrants 
subordinate social rules to new purposes. In other words, they improvise upon these 
scripts, and thereby re-imagine roles in the performance of migration. As they do so, they 
develop new goals, reinterpret their opportunities and encounter previously unknown 
constraints through the prism of their identity. Thus, this chapter explored how migrants 
navigate the social terrain of the route, reimaging nationality and gender in passage. 
Of course, these violent odysseys are not an abstract exercise. They are flesh and 
blood trials through which migrants must pass. Migrants encounter objects, obstacles and 
visual clues, and they experience violence first hand. For this reason, in Chapter 7 
Improvising Routes, I analyzed the material terrain of the route, examining how migrants 
leverage material resources in surprising ways, subordinating physical objects to new 
purposes. I asked: how do migrants take cues from their material environment as they 
travel the route?   
Using participant observation and interview materials, I discussed the imageability of 
the route. In particular, the train route serves as a compass and the migrant shelter fulfills 
the role of an informational oasis for the poorest, most vulnerable migrants. However, 
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visible places also serve as focal points for criminal predators and police. Stalked by 
criminals and cops, migrants move across terrain with faith, searching for signs of divine 
will. In the process, they construct both the material and social reality of the route. 
Risk and Uncertainty 
Both extreme risk and uncertainty characterizes this material and social reality. The 
risks of the journey include frequent rapes, robberies, deportations, and even deaths. The 
dangers of the journey are legendary, but this violence may happen unexpectedly, in 
novel forms, and at the hands of trusted companions during the journey. Thus, migrants 
do not practice migration in a world of risk alone. In a social context of fluid 
relationships and continual improvisation on settled roles, the past cannot predict dangers 
for migrants.  
What may not be a problem for a social science vantage point, produces an intractable 
issue for decisions made in practice. Unlike the intellectual world of the social scientist, 
the migrants’ world is uncertain, as well as risky. As Frank H. Knight (1921, p.154) 
acknowledged, social scientists can reduce uncertainty by grouping instances into a 
category of events. While a researcher may move to a higher level of abstraction to make 
broader classifications and predictions about events, a migrant cannot do so without 
losing the utility of the question: which path should I take to get there?  Moving away 
from the particular and toward the general undermines the utility of knowledge in 
practice. Migrants must assume that unknown unknowns lurk around each bend in the 
road; they must expect the unexpected.  
Furthermore, the journey is unpredictable, because it is potentially transformative. As 
they move across the landscape and confront violence, migrants learn about themselves, 
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their desires, their fears and their goals. In this sense, the process of mobile knowledge 
transforms the journey into a pilgrimage; it becomes an odyssey that reformulates identity 
en route. People change in surprising ways when confronted with novel, violent 
situations. Their destinations may change. Migrants cannot know about the experience 
until they have lived it, and they leverage mobile knowledge to navigate this risk and 
uncertainty. They use imagination and improvisation to conceal their identities, transform 
the social roles available to them, and discover new paths forward. They subvert 
expectations for their performances to their advantage. In so doing, they shape a new 
society in their wake.  
Migrants are not the only people who participate in this transformative process. As 
they interact with citizens along the route, mobile knowledge cannot be contained. A 
larger social conversion unfolds, as transnational routes become transmission belts for 
newly improvised practices and roles (Bentley 1993, p.22-23). As a result of the 
possibility for surprising personal and social transformations, the route becomes an 
increasingly ambiguous place. Possibilities for concealment and betrayal complicate trust 
and render the behavior of travel companions unpredictable. Local communities both 
trade with and prey upon the transients in their midst, producing uncertain loyalties 
among migrants and citizens alike. Under the constant barrage of new faces and 
intensifying violence along the route, the social roles and relationships that underpin both 
settlement and migration become unmoored. 
The combination of risk and uncertainty forcefully calls mobile knowledge into 
being. Risk alone does not require mobile knowledge to navigate. Under purely risky 
conditions, people may judge future events with some sense of reliability and make more 
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definite plans. Nor does pure uncertainty require mobile knowledge to navigate, because 
the stakes may be low and luck may be played without peril. However, a world of risk 
and uncertainty is a world of imagination and improvisation, not only information.  
Implications for Liberalism 
Any inalterable plan for traveling across an uncertain terrain would be foolhardy. 
Furthermore, rigid top-down policies aimed at controlling territory have proven to be 
equally foolhardy (Scott 1998). Everyday people have responded to these policies by 
improvising upon social scripts and re-imagining roles. The mobile knowledge inherent 
in this imagination and improvisation blurs the real-world distinctions between 
citizen/foreigner and settler/transient upon which liberal justifications for sovereign 
borders rest.112 In other words, mobile knowledge produces hybridity, giving rise to new 
and unpredictable cultural re-combinations that subvert imagined communities. This 
ambiguity destabilizes the dichotomies that organize the liberal conceptual map and 
complicate liberal governance. These complications recall our attention to the unresolved 
“liberal paradox” that James F. Hollifield (2004, p.885) identifies as the clash between 
sovereign borders and liberal ideals of global socio-economic integration and universal 
rights.  
As this dissertation makes clear, this paradox between national sovereignty and 
liberalism is not restricted to the border. Research on smuggling and unauthorized 
migration usually focuses on borders as the primary site of policing and danger for 
migrants (e.g. Andreas 2000; Cornelius 2001; Cornelius 2007; Dunn 1996; Eschbach et                                                         
112 This dissertation also hints at the impact of mobile knowledge on related dualities, such as 
state/society, domestic/international, public/private, markets/violence, legal/illegal, 
victim/perpetrator and local/global.  
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al. 1999; Heyman 1999).  However, as uncertainty and risk increase, the route meanders. 
Growing numbers of people have become transnational wanderers with only transitory 
destinations within the global south, vulnerable to a variety of abuses (Cave 2012).   
This process is not limited to the Americas. It is a challenge to a global society of 
liberal states that have implemented heavy-handed restrictions on transnational flows. For 
example, Michael Collyer (2007; 2010) similarly describes how policing has generated 
increasingly “fragmented journeys” for migrants in transit to Europe. In that context, 
academics have begun to document the relationship between intensified policing and 
physical dangers (not limited to violence) to migrants at the borders of the European 
continent (Carling 2007; Spijkerboer 2007; Grant 2011).113 Medecins sans Frontieres 
(MSF) has documented a rise in Sub-Saharan migrant injury from criminal violence 
along routes through Morocco to Europe (2005; 2010a), including a special report on 
sexual violence suffered by these migrants (2010b). Collyer (2007) links this criminal 
violence to a de-facto bilateralism in the European-Moroccan relationship, which led to a 
“spatial reconfiguration of migration control”: augmented patrols within Moroccan 
territory as well as at the borders (p.671-673).114 As a result, transit spaces became 
increasingly violent places (Collyer 2007; Hess 2010). 
In this global context of intensified migration enforcement and violence within transit 
states, the impact of borders is not restricted to the territorial margins of nation-states.  
The new migration enforcement strategy targets the arteries of the migration system as it                                                         
113 For a review of the burgeoning literature on transit migration and the ‘new’ geography of 
migration in the European context, see Collyer, Duvell and de Haas (2010). 
114  At this time, there is a richer interdisciplinary literature on transit migration into Europe 
than is available in the United States. Interestingly, Sabine Hess (2010) traces this interest in 
‘transit migration’ and migratory routes into Europe to studies commissioned by the IOM on 
Turkey in the context of EU-expansion debates. 
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crisscrosses the heartlands of nation-states, not just their frontiers: federal governments 
confer border enforcement authority upon local and state police, encourage information 
sharing and cooperation between law enforcement agencies for these tasks, require 
identity verifications for employment and services, conduct immigration and drug raids 
within their territory, establish internal inspection checkpoints (many miles away from 
the border along major highways and at major domestic transit hubs: bus stops, train 
stations, etc), extend roving areas where border control agents may function, and increase 
criminal penalties for both smugglers and migrants.115 Legal residents face deportation 
for non-violent crimes. Etienne Balibar (2004, p.109) eloquently summarizes these 
changes: 
Sometimes noisily and sometimes sneakily, borders have changed place.  Whereas 
traditionally, and in conformity with both their juridical definition and ‘cartographical’ 
representation as incorporated in national memory, they should be at the edge of the 
territory, marking the point where it ends, it seems that borders and the institutional 
practices corresponding to them have been transported into the middle of political space.  
They can no longer function as simple edges, external limits of democracy that the mass 
of citizens can see as a barrier protecting their rights and lives without ever really 
interfering with them. 
 
Of course, the edges of citizenship have never really been defined in practice 
(Bosniak 2006, p.4). Despite the essentialist rhetoric of fixity necessary to construct the 
‘imagined community’, nation-states have always been porous entities born from 
common ‘pilgrimages’ (Anderson 2006, pgs. 53-58; Greenblatt 2010, pgs. 1-23). 
                                                        
115 Here, I am describing the situation in the Americas. Balibar (2004, p.111) explains a 
similar transition in Europe: “…there is another aspect that has been forced on our attention by 
the problems relative to the treatment of asylum seekers and the modalities of control of so-
called clandestine immigrants in Western Europe, which pose serious problems for the 
protection and institution of human rights: the system of identify verifications (generally 
occurring with the territory) allowing a triage of travelers admitted to and rejected from a 
given national territory.  For the mass of humans today, these are the most decisive borders, 
but they are no longer lines.” 
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‘Societal security’, defined by Ole Waever (1993, p.23) as “the sustainability within 
acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, 
association and religious national identity and custom”, has always been an appendage to 
that process of national mythmaking, never a reality. Long before ‘globalization’ became 
a buzzword, state survival depended on the capacity to harness transnational trade, capital 
and migratory (and as Stephen Greenblatt (2010) shows us, cultural) flows to their 
advantage.116  Even smuggling of ostensibly illegal goods has been manipulated by states 
for power and resources across history (Hibou 2004, p.352).  Cultural and social changes 
have always accompanied both licit and illicit flows. As explained by Greenblatt’s (2010, 
p.6) manifesto for the study of cultural mobility, “the reality, for most of the past and 
come again for the present, is more about nomads than natives.” 
Nevertheless, when the policing of transnational flows could be relegated to a 
peripheral border zone, away from the core constituency of the state, the dual fiction of 
liberal democratic governance that respects human security with controlled national 
boundaries could be better sustained. Moderating his earlier (1987) stance, which 
espoused the abolition of borders, Joseph Carens (2010), draws on the settler/transient 
distinction to negotiate this paradox. He argues that unauthorized migrants should be 
granted full rights if they lay down roots in an adopted country and have lived within that 
society for a period of time. Indeed, the extension of citizenship to migrants who have 
social ties in the United States would significantly diminish the necessity of clandestine 
travel for many of the most desperate and vulnerable people. However, along                                                         
116 In this vein, Rey Koslowslki (2002) argues that human migration has long played a vital 
role in world politics, shaping the fate of states and the reach of empire since pre-modern 
civilization. 
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contemporary routes, the very notion of settlement has been so undermined that 
disentangling rooted migrants from transients becomes a difficult task. In this context, 
any threshold for settlement is arbitrary. As Linda Bosniak (2010, p.85) correctly points 
out, such a system potentially legitimates the same sort of permanent transience that the 
revolving deportation door currently perpetuates.  
And what about the obligations of transit states to migrants? As citizens and migrants 
mingle, they become loosely linked by the shared practice that emanates from the routes. 
They need not be entrenched in reciprocal relationships or years within the United States 
to be integrated into this regional system. In an important sense, Central Americans have 
been integrated into the transit political economy and transnational imaginary long before 
they ever leave their birthplace. Where they might make a home is unclear from the 
beginning, and the boundaries of membership are too fluid for the state to mandate.  
In this context, restrictions on the rights of aliens necessarily limit the freedoms of 
citizens (Caren 1987, p.253). After all, citizens and migrants engage in economic 
contracts and interact in a broader social context, and internal immigration policing limits 
their capacity to do so (p.253).  Furthermore, when people are linked by practice, a 
deterioration of the human security of citizens who live along the routes coincides with 
the deterioration of the human security of migrants.  For example, a Mexican community 
leader living along the unauthorized migratory route explains his opposition to a migrant 
refugee camp: 
We are not xenophobes.  We are tired of the authorities assuring that they are going to 
construct a definitive shelter and they do nothing.  We are not against the migrants, but 
it’s just that with them come organized criminals like Los Zetas or illegal traffickers 
(quoted in Chavez 2012). 
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Along a transnational route embedded in the transit society, migrants and citizens, 
settlers and transients, suffer together. As cultural tells and national distinctions become 
illusive, the restriction of territorial access to foreigners without the infringement upon 
citizen rights becomes impossible. Mobile knowledge moves, and communities are 
continuously re-imagined in the process. The markers and materials associated with 
nationality become diffused, corrupted and co-opted. Internal policing of sustained 
human migration applies arbitrary cultural markers to a brown and gray social reality. 
Consequently, race and gender, stereotypes of cultural difference used to profile 
suspected migrants and smugglers, re-emerge within the liberal polity. These illiberal 
categories thereby come to constitute citizenship in practice. Whatever the merits of 
external border enforcement might be, the boundaries between foreigners and citizens, 
settlers and migrants, cannot be impartially upheld along transnational routes through the 
interior of the nation-state.  Because of its implications for citizens, let alone its 
implications for a universal valuation of all human beings, this heavy handed policing of 
transnational flows within transit and destination states cannot be justified in liberal 
democratic states.   
Now that the state security apparatus recognizes the transnational clandestine routes 
that run through it and vigorously attempts to control them, the contradictions inherent in 
the dual fiction of liberal societies with closed borders have surfaced in the extreme form 
and frequency of violence, both legal and criminal, along the routes. The eruption of 
these contradictions, in the deaths and violence suffered by migrants, as well as the 
harassment of citizens by both citizens and officials along routes through Mexico and 
Morocco, represents a challenge for the delicate bargain between nation-states and 
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individuals. When migrant destination states, such as the United States and European 
countries, promote internal policing to their neighbors, such as Mexico and Morocco, 
they are exporting an illiberal politics. 
Ultimately, this illiberal politics of migration control undermines both national and 
human security. Liberal scholars who defend migration policing sometimes justify their 
position by pointing to the Hobbesian reality of the international system (Cole 2000; e.g. 
Whelan 1988). Clearly, democratic states have a duty to protect their citizenry from 
dangerous global politics and guard against the dislocating effects of transnational flows. 
However, the illiberal politics that destination states export to transit states actually 
exacerbates the Hobbesian reality of the international system by undermining the 
possibility for democratic governance. The policing of transnational routes, as opposed to 
the policing of borders between countries, creates a Hobbesian-like reality within the 
domestic realm of the state. Perversely, and thanks to this internal policing, the 
borderlands now extend indefinitely across destination, transit and sending countries.    
Of course, this violent restriction of transnational movement is not the only option for 
the governance of population flows in a global society. Phillip Cole (2000) examines the 
internal contradictions of closed-border liberal egalitarianism and its de facto acceptance 
of a Hobbesian view of sovereignty in the international system. Against the Hobbesian 
justification for migration policing, he argues that sovereign borders are not the only 
institution available to protect liberal orders. Instead, he points to the international human 
rights regime as a nascent alternative solution to democratic governments’ legitimate 
need to cope with negative consequences of transnational flows (p188). Indeed, an 
invigorated international and transnational collaboration to safeguard the migrants’ rights 
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and provide greater official access to global mobility would be a boon to the human 
security of migrants and citizens alike, as well as a liberal intervention on behalf of 
national security properly understood.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, both migrants and citizens suffer from a mismatch between the lived 
reality of migration and the nation-state. As people make these uncertain journeys, the 
mobile knowledge they construct destabilizes social boundaries. On the one hand, 
Bosniak (2006, p.140) trenchantly argues that egalitarian inclusion is a worthy abstract 
ideal for which liberal societies must strive. Nevertheless, she recognizes that in practice, 
its fulfillment is complicated by inevitable contestation over internal boundaries of 
obligation and belonging, a chronic political destabilization (p.140).  
On the other hand, national borders might be a worthy abstract ideal for those 
committed to their protection. Indeed, migrants themselves hope to escape from Central 
America across the U.S. border and into a realm of law and order, a realm with the 
promise of economic, emotional and physical security. In so far that the border shields 
the United States from harm, migrants want it to remain intact. They go to the United 
States, because it is different than, but connected to, their birthplace. 
However, when that quest for sovereign and separate national worlds involves 
internal migration policing, it is inevitably complicated by ongoing the improvisation and 
imagination of everyday people. Migrants’ perpetual movement along the route and their 
increasing vulnerability to intense forms of violence reveal the harm caused by state 
attempts to fix these boundaries within. In the United States and Mexico, the 
simultaneous social inclusion and legal exclusion of thousands of immigrants contributes 
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to the human security crisis along the unauthorized routes. A cycle of deportations, 
perpetual movement and desperation conspire to produce a permanent underclass of 
transnational homeless people, outcasts by law and made vulnerable by exclusion from it, 
but regionally integrated along a transnational route. In this way, the U.S. and Mexican 
governments fail to meet their obligations to both the citizen and the non-citizen 
members of their societies. These societies have become intertwined in practice, despite 
intensified immigration policing. 
In contrast to this regional integration into a transit political economy and 
transnational imaginary, the continued failure to provide a semblance of national socio-
economic integration and physical security for Salvadoran, Honduran and Guatemalan 
citizens in their birthplace undermines the value of citizenship in Central American 
countries. National regimes of inequality, corruption and disorder undermine the social 
contract. There is no home there. In this situation of permanent transience, the attempt to 
forcefully impose borders within states leads to an illiberal and violent socio-economic 
interdependence and the denial of basic rights to North Americans of every nationality.  
From the Mediterranean to the Americas, Homer’s ancient wisdom remains relevant 
for these violent and uncertain times. When Odysseus arrives in Ithaca, disguised as a 
beggar, the loyal swineherd Eumaeus takes him in, explaining that hospitality is a matter 
of divine obligation: “It’s wrong, my friend, to send any stranger packing- even one who 
arrives in worse shape than you.” As a boy, Eumaeus’s own slave had conspired with 
foreign sailors to kidnap and traffic him into slavery; he thus intimately understands the 
ease with which anyone can become an outcast. Of course, there are risks to welcoming 
foreigners into your home, as the Phaeacians could testify. The good swineherd 
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undoubtedly recognizes the possibility that both friends and foe may travel in disguise. 
But Eumeaus also knows too well that the distance between citizen and slave is not far to 
travel. Because the Gods play unpredictable tricks with fate, he chooses to live by an 
egalitarian ethos. He grants Odysseus hospitality, and thereby unwittingly plays his role 
in the salvation of Ithaca. 
Not unlike Odysseus and Eumaeus, migrants and citizens share precariousness along 
migratory routes. Mobile knowledge transcends boundaries, generates social ambiguity, 
and complicates policing. Governments along these routes cannot guarantee the most 
basic rights of citizens without including migrants, let alone live up to a utopian 
egalitarian standard of respect for universal rights for all mankind. For this reason, it is 
time for policy makers and civil society groups across the globe to take Eurmaeus’ 
admonishment seriously. Acknowledge the lived reality of migration and guarantee 
hospitality to transnational wanderers. Allow them to find a home without bearing a 
world of pain in secrecy.        
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APPENDIX 
  
The full set of twenty-two untitled, uncaptioned migrant maps follows this page, each given its 
own page for display. Unfortunately, some of the finer details have been lost in the digitization 
of these maps, an issue to be resolved for future publications.  
  
Water damage and mud on some of the maps is the result of a flash flood that struck my home 
during fieldwork, where the maps had been stored temporarily. No one was killed in the flood, 
but several neighbors lost homes and automobiles. The damages to these historical 
documents remind the reader of the precariousness of life in rural El Salvador. While the original 
copies of a few of the maps have been restored by a professional paper conservator, I have left 
the mud in the images for this reason.  
  
All maps are available for viewing upon request. These maps and their accompanying narratives 
will be made available on a website at a later date. 
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